WELCOME TO 2017: : Shadows Of The Past 'WARS' Loom On 2017

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/27122016-shadows-of-the-past-loom-on-2017-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

     WELCOME TO 2017

: Shadows Of  The  Past   'WARS' Loom On 2017

                   BY

OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION 

            Earth. Photo Credit: NASA

DECEMBER 27, 2016 

In a sense, many of the phenomena go back to the financial crisis of 2008, the biggest shock to the global economic system since the 1929. Nine years after 1929, a nervous, pessimistic and Hobbesian world was plunged into war. Well, 2017 is nine years after 2008.

There is no doubt 2016 has been a momentous, tempestuous, eventful year. In the past few weeks, this writer has read pieces comparing its import to 1498 (the year Vasco da Gama found the sea route to India and opened up the riches of the East to western Europe), to 1848 (Europe’s “Year of Revolutions”), to the period immediately before World War I, to the period immediately before World War II.

At a conference in September, it was mildly amusing but also telling to have two speakers — unconnected and uncoordinated — make World War I analogies.

 The first was a European, who described the situation in his continent as fraught and resembling the international order and great power equation just prior to World War I. The second was an Asian, who described the situation in his continent as fraught and resembling the international order and great power equation just prior to World War I.

Obviously the fact that we are living through the centenary of the Great War (1914-18) has evoked multiple reference points. In 2017, the world will commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, a spectacular success and then a spectacular failure, all in the course of less than a century: the revolution itself had been devoured and the Soviet Union had gone by 1990.

Nevertheless, the new salience of Russia and President Vladimir Putin’s penchant for Big Politics will draw even more 1917 analogies in the coming year.

At the turn of the previous century, the cracking of the Concert of Europe caused two world wars after an era of post-Napoleonic calm. The turbulence leading up to the second of those wars was intensified by an economic crisis. What do these precedents mean to us, if they mean anything at all? No exact comparisons are possible but a study of the past would offer clues as to the timelines of history and the pace at which events move and seemingly axiomatic truths can be disrupted.

The Concert of Europe eventually ended because a new and non-status quoist power — Germany — wanted its place at the high table. Traditional powers were unwilling to cede space and a conflict resulted. Additionally, the rising tides of nationalism and populism and turbulence at Europe’s Islamic doorstep led to the fraying of the concert. It is possible to find aspects of all these challenges today in the troubled European Union project.

Europe is divided on several counts. There is nationalism and nostalgia, couched in the economic certainties of an earlier age. Brexit was one manifestation of this and British politicians, even those who know better and realise trade currents cannot be wished away, find themselves paralysed into not telling the public what it doesn’t want to hear. Similar urges are being seen in France — which sees a presidential election in 2017 in which the pendulum is certain to swing right — and Italy, perhaps even Germany, where fears are perceived not from a liberal economy but liberal migration.

Yet, more than Europe itself, the evocation of the dying years of the Concert of Europe is perhaps apposite in Asia. Here too, in the waters of the Indo-Pacific, there is non-status quoist power — China — headed by a “core leader”: Asia’s would-be Kaiser, Xi Jinping. The traditional multilateral architecture of the region, underpinned by American capacity, is under strain. The United States has a taste for taking on China but it remains unclear, despite Donald Trump’s election and rhetoric, if it has the stomach.

Mr. Trump has promised a muscular, militarist foreign policy and approach to China. He has offered to befriend Russia, number three as it were, in an alliance to take on number two. He has spoken loosely — though one suspects not without design — of an arms race in Asia and of a wave of weaponisation, even hinting at the N word. The re-militarisation of Japan and enhancing capacities of South Korea and India are probably on his horizon, as is the scramble for ASEAN — a bloc now split between the two superpowers.

Yet, while all this may make for excitement and action in the short run, a fundamental contradiction remains. American investment in the security of the Indo-Pacific region was linked to its trade and economic interests.

If Mr. Trump, as President, walks away from trade with Asia, what is the US motivation for a longer-term military role in maritime Asia?

In 2016, it was questions such as these that threw the international order into a tizzy. They will haunt it as January 2017 begins its journey, with the inauguration of the new American President. So many other imponderables will play themselves out in the coming year — the beginning of the formal British departure from the EU; the unwillingness of China to give India space and its attempt to hem in Narendra Modi; the crumbling of old certitudes in southeast Asia; the prospect of the US reversing a policy that, since the Iraq war of 2003, had served to strengthen Shia regimes in West Asia and once more banking on Saudi Arabia to take on Iran; the ability of a new general in Pakistan to yet again leverage his nation’s geography; the ability of Russia to punch politically — but in the ultimate reckoning, punch above its economic weight.

In a sense, many of these phenomena go back to the financial crisis of 2008, the biggest shock to the global economic system since the 1929. Nine years after 1929, a nervous, pessimistic and Hobbesian world was plunged into war. Well, 2017 is nine years after 2008.

This article originally appeared in The Asian Age.

TOPICS:

ChinaDonald TrumpEuropean UnionForeign PolicyImmigrationIndiaMilitaryRussiaSaudi ArabiaUnited States

SOURCE: http://www.eurasiareview.com/26122016-india-brewing-storm-in-a-teacup-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29


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   PART -I  :-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/the-army-chiefs-challenge.html
         
 PART - II:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/arm-in-arm-institutions-like-army-are.html

 PART - III:- 
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/selection-of-army-chief-sensitive-issue.html

PART - IV:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/men-in-shadows-derailed-bakshis-chances.html

PART - V:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/india-coas-brewing-storm-in-teacup.html

      India' COAS: Brewing                    Storm In A Teacup

                        BY

          OBSERVER RESEARCH                                          FOUNDATION 

DECEMBER 26, 2016 

                                                                      By 

                           Deepak Sinha

On the hotly-debated issue of selection of the Chief of Army Staff, let there be no doubt that hypocrisy and selective use of facts seem to be the norm on both sides of the fence. At the outset, in the 21st century, Service chiefs have been reduced to pygmies by successive Governments over the years. They are no longer the divine entities to the rank and file that they were in the past. Social media and the Internet has put paid to that. Their inability over the years, to either influence policy or ensure that the military is appropriately treated along with blatant acts of partiality and unethical behaviour on the part of some incumbents, has also seen to that.

There are three major issues that have come to the fore in this debate over suitability of a particular individual to hold that appointment. To suggest that this is an issue of merit versus seniority, as some have attempted to do, is a non sequitur, given that all those who reach the rank of Army commander or equivalent after 36 years or so of service, are obviously at par, though each has his own strengths and weaknesses. The difference in seniority and experience is only either in months or just ranking within the batch on commissioning and means little at this rank, except purely in bureaucratic terms.

The most important argument made against supersession of the senior-most candidates is that it may lead to politicising of the military because future Army Commanders, vying to become the chief, may end up cozying the politicians and doing them favours. This argument is self-defeating because if the moral and ethical foundation of our Army Commanders is so shaky, then they have no business to hold such important posts, and the Ministry and service headquarters need to carry out deep soul searching of the existing selection process. That apart, it isn’t as if some officers do not cozy up to politicians or that political influence does not count.

Moreover, politics is not a game that is restricted to politicians only and is undeniably at play within the organisation at higher levels. We should not be surprised to know that in ensuring a ‘line of succession’, based on seniority, subterfuge and subversion are routinely resorted to by the serving incumbent and other senior commanders and bureaucrats in the Ministry. Sudden changes in promotion criteria, delay in conduct or promulgation of selection boards and dishing out of awards, details of which are not easily available in public domain, but clearly known to all within the organisation, clearly points to this unhealthy practice. Supersession upsets the elaborate planning process by introducing a degree of uncertainty, disliked by all participants of this game.

There is an element of farce in the argument being made to rubbish the Government’s apparent partiality to the fact that the officer selected has comparatively more experience in counter-insurgency at the ground level than those senior to him and the fact that this aspect has been given over-riding importance. It is being suggested that we are playing into Pakistan’s hands because we are giving undue importance to the proxy war that it is waging in Jammu & Kashmir and ruling out offensive operations in the plains and deserts in any future conflict.

The truth, whether we wish to accept it or not, is that given the nuclear capabilities of our adversary, conventional war is an undesirable venture and we have very limited options in the heartland of Punjab, despite our very potent capability to implement the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine that has been enunciated. Unless circumstances otherwise dictate, no mature political leader will ever approve plans that push the dagger into the heart of Pakistan and could, therefore, lead to an escalation of conflict into the nuclear realm, however unlikely that may be.

In our context, the Line of Control is where any future conflict is likely to be restricted to, and we have little choice but to robustly counter Pakistan’s proxy war in that theatre through force and other means. Also, given China’s ever increasing attempts at dominating the region, the mountains and those with the experience, ground knowledge and skill-sets to fight in that terrain have become increasingly important and occupy crucial positions within the hierarchy. Similarly, there was a time, a few decades ago, when the plains and desert sectors were of immense importance and our forces were biased towards conduct of mechanised warfare.

Consequently, those with the requisite expertise, had the edge when it came to selection for higher ranks. The fact is more than any element of bias or partiality, time and circumstances appear to have played a crucial role in selection of the chief and politicisation of the issue is best avoided. We must not forget that the previous regime too had superseded a flag officer while appointing Admiral Robin K Dhowan as the last Naval chief for reasons that it felt were indisputable.

Having said this, it appears that the present Modi Government has missed an ideal opportunity to have set in motion the restructuring of our defence establishment by appointing a Chief of Defence Staff or Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has become a dire necessity and cannot be delayed or wished away without deleterious consequences to our national security establishment and environment. By appointing the senior most to that post, much of this present controversy could have been avoided or side-stepped, which would have been to everybody’s benefit. One can only hope that better sense prevails and it does so even at this belated stage.

This article originally appeared in The Pioneer.

TOPICS:

Foreign PolicyIndiaKashmirMilitaryPakistanPoliticsSouth Asia

SOURCE:
http://www.sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/7780-men-shadows-derailed-bakshi-s-chances-becoming-army-chief

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   PART -I  :-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/the-army-chiefs-challenge.html
         
 PART - II:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/arm-in-arm-institutions-like-army-are.html

 PART - III:- 
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/selection-of-army-chief-sensitive-issue.html

PART - IV:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/men-in-shadows-derailed-bakshis-chances.html

PART - V:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/india-coas-brewing-storm-in-teacup.html

        Men in shadows derailed Bakshi’s             chances of becoming Army Chief

                               By

                   Shiv Kunal Verma 

NEW DELHI 

25 December, 2016

Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command arrives for a three-day visit to review the operational preparedness and the security situation in Gangtok, on 2 November 2015. IANS

There is evidence to indicate that the move to supersede Lt General Praveen Bakshi, the senior most Army commander who was seen as the natural contender for the post of Army Chief after the retirement of General Dalbir Singh Suhag, started some months ago, with negative stories about the officer being planted through anonymous letters. Four anonymous letters were floated with vague allegations against Bakshi by “men in shadows”, who succeeded in getting a probe ordered into the charges. Nothing emerged from the investigation. But the fact that an investigation was ordered, was used against him for sidelining Lt Gen Bakshi. Eventually, Lt Gen Bipin Rawat was made the Indian Army Chief.

Even Kautilya, the acknowledged master who laid down the guiding principles of statecraft during the era of Chandragupta Maurya, would have been befuddled with what has been happening since the days of the UPA to the Indian state and its relationship with its own armed forces today. The naming of Lt General Bipin Rawat as the next Chief of Army Staff defies convention. The decision, which meant superseding two serving Army Commanders, now is certain to change the very outlook of senior commanders in the armed forces in the future.

From ancient times—going back to the Ramayana and the Mahabharata—the epics assert that “a king’s roots are his treasury and his army”. A careful examination of the Mahabharata in particular, when shorn of its myth and poetic fancy, allows us to glean the foundation on which later Indian military theory and practice evolved. In the beginning, the Army was one of the two prakritis (essential elements), but as time went on, more and more elements were added on and the Army sank lower and lower down in the order of importance.

Nevertheless, despite having senapranetras (later known as senapatis), kings retained their supremacy in matters of defence, being the final and ultimate authority when it came to taking decisions. In his superb book, A Military History of Ancient India, Major General G.S. Sandhu writes: “The king, and the other princes, received their early training in niti (politics) and dhanurveda (military science); they were imparted training in both the theoretical and practical aspects of warfare. They were also given intensive training until they gained proficiency in the use of weapons.”

Today, monarchies are long gone, and the people are governed by the state where power is centred in the hands of elected representatives. However, the fact of the matter is that with the reins of power in their hands, the elected head of a democratic government is in a way a modern-day monarch. The main difference from the days of yore, however, is that our decision making officialdom of today know little about armies and what makes soldiers tick, to say nothing of the use of weapons, their deployment, and their use. Since the early 1950s, ever since the political-bureaucratic began to exercise power in Independent India, most of them and those in their immediate vicinity have had little exposure to the armed forces.

The writing was on the wall for Lieutenant General Praveen Bakshi three to four months ago when an unseen “dirty tricks department” suddenly became hyperactive. Until then, Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi, the Eastern Army Commander, being the senior most among those who had the residual service to make the grade, was seen as the natural contender for the top job when the present COAS would hang up his boots. An Armoured Corps officer, Bakshi had an outstanding record of service, and among the rank and file, the reputation of being a no-nonsense dyed-in-the-wool soldier, who would, it was hoped, ensure self-respect in the armed forces.

               Lt Gen Bipin Rawat        &      Lt Gen P.M. Hariz

Four anonymous letters were floated with vague allegations against Bakshi. The “men in the shadows” succeeded in getting a probe ordered into the charges. Interestingly, through his four-year tenure first as Eastern Army Commander and then the COAS, the present incumbent, General Dalbir Singh Suhag had ensured that only his handpicked officers had replaced him as the Corps Commander in Dimapur, Nagaland. It may be remembered that General Suhag had been the 3 Corps Commander for some time and is conversant with that area and its special characteristics. It may also be recalled that it was during this period that he had a DV-ban slapped on him by General V.K. Singh in connection with the Jorhat raid that was reversed by his successor, General Bikram Singh, the moment he took over. Meanwhile, Bakshi’s squeaky-clean image could not be dented and the agencies apparently reported back saying they had nothing to build a case on.

To make matters tricky for the “shadow men”, the Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar, initially decided to stick to the existing norms of seniority and suggested Bakshi’s name to the Prime Minister’s Office. Suddenly, out of the blue, anonymous missives appeared, ghost written by the “men in shadows”. The government thereupon went in for a relook.

Coming to General Suhag, throughout his tenure as the Army Chief, he has surrounded himself with Gorkha Regimental officers. Various key appointments have been lying vacant for months altogether, as was the case with the Indian Military Academy in Dehradun. The outgoing Army Chief is very close to the National Security Adviser. In the aftermath of the Monand Chandel incidents in May and June 2016, where eight Assam Rifles men and then 22 men from the Dogra Regiment were killed, the NSA had himself supervised the nationally acclaimed retaliatory raid that the then DGMI said took place within Myanmar.

With some sections of the government reportedly keen on picking Lt Gen Bipin Rawat for the job, there was a meeting of common interest between them and the COAS, who too had a high opinion of Rawat, who had been one of his chosen few to command 3 Corps. However, to appoint Rawat, the Ministry of Defence had to go over the head of not just Praveen Bakshi, but also Lt Gen P.M. Hariz, who was the Southern Army Commander in Pune. This, it was then claimed, was done “in national interest”.

The writing was on the wall for Lieutenant General Praveen Bakshi three to four months ago when an unseen “dirty tricks department” suddenly became hyperactive. Until then, Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi, the Eastern Army Commander, being the senior most among those who had the residual service to make the grade, was seen as the natural contender for the top job.

In the immediate aftermath of the announcement, the government informally justified Lt General Rawat’s promotion on the grounds that as an infantry officer he had greater experience in handling counter insurgency scenarios. However, this failed to impress critics who pointed out that Bakshi had earlier commanded 9 Corps and served as Chief of Staff, Northern Command, apart from which he also handled Eastern Command, which was as deeply involved with CI Ops as Northern Command. The same could also be said for Lt Gen Hariz, who, like Bakshi, has had a blemish-less record of service and enjoys a first class reputation amongst his peers and his men. On social media and across forums, there was a divide as the Army split into two—those for and those against, mainly on grounds of their service arm.

According to the same ancient texts that hold forth on the role of senapatis and kings, the role of the soldier is clearly defined, stating “The gods send calamities unto those who forsake their comrades in battle and return home with unwounded limbs”. Led by an able administrator, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the government needs to ensure that the “shadow men” are not allowed to prevail with their choices of who will eventually hold the reins of the Army. By manipulating the system for reasons best known to themselves, the “shadow men” may well have prevailed with their choice of who will eventually hold the reins of the Army, but they have also driven a wedge into a system where men at the very top may forsake their comrades in peacetime. For soldiers do not only fight with courage and valour for country and flag, they fight mainly for the man on their left and the man on their right and at the end of the day, they expect fair play from those at the top. It is imperative that the need of the hour is to dispel the influence of these “men in shadows” and their modus operandi of anonymous complaints, which should be treated with the contempt they deserve. It is now up to Prime Minister Modi, whose destiny it is to preside over the various prakritis that hold this country together to ensure that the Army is kept away from these underhand tactics and each soldier is given the respect and honour due to him or her.

Shiv Kunal Verma is the author of the books 

The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why (Rupa & Co.) and 

1962: The War That Wasn’t (Aleph). 

The latter, hailed by critics to be the most definitive account of the Sino-Indo conflict, examines in detail the role of the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in tampering with the Army’s hierarchy, which directly led to the debacle against China.

Selection of Army Chief a Sensitive Issue

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/selection-of-army-chief-a-sensitive-issue/341704.html

RELATED 

MUST READ

   PART -I  :-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/the-army-chiefs-challenge.html
         
 PART - II:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/arm-in-arm-institutions-like-army-are.html

 PART - III:- 
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/selection-of-army-chief-sensitive-issue.html

PART - IV:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/men-in-shadows-derailed-bakshis-chances.html

PART - V:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/india-coas-brewing-storm-in-teacup.html

             Selection of Army Chief

                                    a

                        Sensitive Issue

                                     By

                     Dinesh Kumar


A civilian government’s prerogative to make appointments must be respected without a doubt. However, it is mandatory that it exercises judgement based solely on merit — without prejudice, lobbying or parochial considerations.

                           Lt Gen Bipin Rawat                                                     IT is a convention rather than a statutory requirement for the senior-most lieutenant general to be appointed as a Service Chief. Thus, the government has not committed any illegal act by appointing Lt General Bipin Rawat as the country's 27th Army Chief after superseding two lieutenant generals. On the contrary, it has exercised its prerogative in a democracy where civilian supremacy over the armed forces is paramount. 

Yet, the decision has evoked much criticism among sections of retired Army officers who have attributed it to “political interference”, described it as a “bad precedent” and even predicted “the beginning of the end of an apolitical Army”. The government has defended the decision to appoint Lt General Rawat as the Army Chief by explaining the rationale in a generalised and generic expressions of he being “best suited” to deal with “emerging challenges, including a reorganised and restructured military force in the north (China), continuing terrorism and proxy war from the west (Pakistan) and the situation in the North- East.” The government has also highlighted Lt General Rawat's operational experience as an Infantry officer in counter-insurgency (CI) operations in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states and also along both the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and Line of Actual Control (LAC) with Chinese-occupied Aksai Chin.

This explanation sounds reasonable when viewed in isolation but not necessarily when seen in a larger framework. The senior-most superseded officer, Lt General Praveen Bakshi, is currently heading the critical Eastern Command which is entrusted with defending India's borders with three countries - China, Myanmar and Bangladesh and also the territorial integrity of Bhutan. It is also entrusted with counter-insurgency operations in the north-eastern states. If he is considered “less experienced”, then how did Lt General Bakshi, an armoured corps officer, be assigned to head the Eastern Command which in 1971 spearheaded the liberation of East Pakistan in a landmark war with Pakistan? 

In any case, considering the security environment in the country, most officers from the Army's three principal combat Arms — Infantry, Artillery and Armoured Corps — have had exposure to either or both the CI and LoC / LAC environment in some form or the other. For example, officers from the armoured corps and the artillery are known to serve in Rashtriya Rifles units that are tasked specifically with CI operations.Will all future Army Chiefs from now on be required to be from the infantry with operational experience in Jammu and Kashmir, is one of the many questions that the announcement raises. 

This is not about discussing the merits or demerits of Lt Generals Rawat and Bakshi. Their names are incidental. Rather, the limited point here is that both these officers rose to become Army Commanders after obtaining equivalent experience during their career. There is little to suggest that one is more outstanding than the other. With both officers at par, should not the seniority convention have prevailed so as to keep the armed forces away from needless controversy? 

As it is civil-military relations have of late come under considerable stress with the government mishandling the One Rank One Pension issue; doing little to address the anomalies of the Seventh Pay Commission,; downgrading mid-ranking military officers vis-a-vis their civilians counterparts in the Ministry of Defence;milking the retaliatory strikes across the Line of Controlfor political capital and, more recently, announcing the next Army and Air Force chief barely a fortnight prior. 

There is nothing wrong in making a “deep selection” to appoint a highly capable officer as the Service Chief or a regional commander. Currently, all professional parameters being satisfactory, an officer's seniority (date of birth and date of commission) determines his appointment to top positions. Aware of their standing in the service list many, if not most, Service officers are known to take the careerist route and play safe. This does not always result in the best officer getting promotions and being assigned pivotal posts. As such there is need for the armed forces, particularly the Army, to seriously review its deteriorated internal health which includes the quality of leadership, politics and vendetta among the higher ranks, the subjective system of annual confidential reports that has led to considerable litigation and financial, moral and professional corruption. 

A larger challenge is from the political executive of the day. Considering the nature of petty, partisan and corrupt politics prevalent in the country and how politicians are used to blatantly interfering with appointments of civilian bureaucrats and policemen, the credibility of the Indian politician is at a constant low. While many politicians in India may otherwise treat the armed forces with awe, barring some individuals they take little interest in understanding the armed forces in particular and national security in general. National security is not the exclusive preserve of the armed forces; it is multi-faceted and complex requiring serious study and understanding by the political executive which takes all final decision. 

Hence, if 'deep selection' is to henceforth become a norm in selecting Service chiefs, the government will have to devise a criteria. While a civilian government's prerogative to make appointments must be respected, it is mandatory that it exercises judgement based solely on merit without prejudice, lobbying or parochial considerations. Political meddling with a potent and monolithic organisation like the army has the potential for inducing political ambition in its leadership. 

The country can do without politicians trying to use an Army headed by “deep selected” pliable generals to exert influence. Surely that will mark the end to India's professional and apolitical instrument of last resort in a country where governance continues to be marked by political and administrative mismanagement even as security threats abound.

dkumar@tribunemail.com