P L A : Snapshot: China’s Southern Theater Command PLA

SOURCE;
https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-southern-theater-command/

                                               

                 P L A Snapshot

  : China’s Southern Theater Command

                           By

                  : Peter Wood

Publication: China Brief Volume: 16 Issue: 12

July 22, 2016 07:56 PM Age: 8 months

On December 31, 2015 China began a major overhaul of its structure military organizational structure. This included the abolition of the seven previous Military Regions (军区) and the creation of five Theater Commands (战区) (See China Brief, February 4 and February 23). Many units previously under one Military Region have found themselves under a new command. The Southern Theater Command (STC) is one such structure, composed of parts of the former Chengdu and Guangzhou Military Regions. Covering an area almost double the size of Texas and a population (320 million) larger than that of the entire United States (318 million), the Southern Theater Command is responsible for China’s important borders with Myanmar and Vietnam and the vast area claimed by China in the South China Sea. [1]

The South is one of China’s most important strategic directions (战略方向), as it is a major source of trade, fish resources, and potentially oil, gas and hydrate deposits. Two of China’s strongest economies, Guangdong Province and Hong Kong, sit at the center of the Theater Command. Xi Jinping visited the area shortly after becoming Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Beijing News, December 13, 2012; Gov.cn, December 12, 2012). In an interview, the STC’s commander, General Wang Jiaocheng (王教成), described the STC as “guarding the motherland’s Southern gate” and as having “shouldered the important mission of protecting [China’s] interests in the South China Sea” (Xinhua, February 29). Particularly in the aftermath of the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, the STC, the organization directly responsible for enforcing China’s claims of sovereignty, demands closer scrutiny. This brief overview and the accompanying map are an attempt to highlight the key features of this important organization within the PLA.

The Army, Navy and Air Force Theater Command Headquarters report to the Southern Theater Command. General Wang has also noted that

one of the purposes of the Theater Commands is to improve the coordination between military services (Army, Navy, Air, and Rocket Forces) 

(Xinhua, February 29). The Southern Theater command, as home to an extensive land border, lengthy coastline (and larger maritime claims) and complex airspace, embodies the importance and difficulty of coordinating these disparate arms of China’s military. A brief description of each of the major services follows, highlighting the Southern Theater Commands’ essential units and equipment.

Ground Forces

STC PLA Ground Forces are commanded by Liu Xiaowu (刘小午). Bai Lü (白吕) serves as commissar (The Paper, February 5). The Ground Forces include three Group Armies: 14th, 41st and 42nd. Reporting on military exercises in the region involving the 14th Group Army based in Kunming, Yunnan, indicates that its constituent brigades include a wide range of equipment and units, ranging from towed artillery to Type 96 tanks. Yunnan and Guangxi both share a border with Vietnam. Yunnan’s geography is particularly mountainous, posing significant problems for deployment. With the apparent calm in Myanmar’s internal conflict in the Kokang region that borders Southwestern Yunnan, stemming the cross-border flow of drugs and counter-terrorism will be the main priority for the areas’ security units. Despite past enmity and occasional tensions over maritime borders, the two sides have a number of established joint patrols and exercises. In late July, for example, Chinese police and border units practiced counter-terror operations with their Vietnamese counterparts (ChinaNews, July 29). Given China’s plans to further link its provinces to markets in Southeast Asia and along the Indian Ocean via Yunnan, this formerly sleepy corner of China may eventually become a more important transport corridor, raising the importance of PLA units stationed there.

Guangxi province is more densely populated than Yunnan and has an important rail-link between China and Vietnam. During 1979 this border saw the brunt of fighting during China’s brief war with Vietnam and subsequent skirmishes for several years afterward. The 41st and 42nd Group Armies, based in Guangxi and Guangdong respectively, are home to a number of large formations, including the 123rd Mechanized Infantry Division in Guigang, Guangxi, the 124th Amphibious Mechanized Division in Boluo, Guangdong and 163rd Infantry Division in Chaozhou, Guangdong.

Guangdong is by far the most densely populated of the provinces included in the STC, with a population of over a 107 million, not including Hong Kong and Macau. An Army Aviation brigade in Guangdong province has received China’s indigenous Z-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters (Youtube, August 30, 2013; China Military Online, January 11). Hainan province hosts the fewest ground troops, though the 132nd Infantry Brigade is based in Wuzhishan.

Navy

The Chinese Navy has emphasized the South as an important strategic direction since at least the early 1980s. In 1983 the Navy began training missions to the Spratly Islands. [2] PLA Navy Commander Liu Huaqing (刘华清), a long-time advocate of improving maritime power projection throughout the South China Sea, visited Woody Island (永兴岛) in 1987 to oversee the construction of a naval monitoring station (Party History Review, April 8). As home to one of China’s three fleets (North, East and South), and the primary base for its NUCLEAR missile-equipped submarine force (Type 094 SSBNs) outside Sanya, Hainan, the South Sea Fleet (南海舰队) forms an important leg of China’s nuclear and conventional maritime deterrent.

The South Sea Fleet is currently commanded by Shen Jinlong (沈金龙) with Liu Mingli (刘明利) serving as commissar. Noteworthy units include the 2nd and 9th Destroyer Zhidui, located in Zhanjiang, Guangdong and Sanya, Hainan respectively. Hainan is also home to a coastal defense battery which appears in satellite imagery to be stationed outside Sanya, protecting the naval facilities there. The importance of the South Sea Fleet is further emphasized by the number of commissionings of advanced destroyers (and long range supply vessels). Military vessels are further backed up by a large number of Coast Guard and other maritime enforcement ships, many of which are recently decommissioned and repainted PLAN ships (China Brief, May 15, 2015).

The PLA Navy’s South Fleet continues to receive a higher proportion of advanced warships such as the Type 052D guided missile destroyer Yinchuan (银川) (China Military Online, July 12). Along with the deployment of land-based Surface Air Missile batteries such as the HQ-9 battery recently rotated out from Woody Island, these destroyers—including other members of the 9th Destroyer Zhidui outside Sanya—are improving China’s coastal air defense (China Brief, March 28). A large number of new long-distance supply ships (including most recently the Honghu and Luomahu) have also been commissioned into the South Sea Fleet, building up the logistic backbone needed to sustain operations far from shore (China Navy Online, July 15). The South Sea Fleet is also home to China’s two Marine Brigades (the 1st and 164th) (see also China Brief, December 3, 2010). The Marine Force was initially set up to provide the PLA with a dedicated amphibious force to take Bach Long Vi Island and other islands disputed between it and Vietnam. [3] These forces would be carried into combat by elements of the 6th Landing Zhidui, which includes the large amphibious landing ships such as the Jinggangshan (井冈山).

PLA Naval Aviation

The South Sea Fleet’s PLA Naval Aviation (PLANAF) 8th and 9th Divisions include a mix of legacy fighter aircraft as well as upgraded and indigenously produced variants such the J-11B and H-6K bombers. Their primary role is to defend China’s maritime airspace and, in the case of conflict, use a number of long-range anti-ship weapons such as the YJ-10 and YJ-100 that can be launched by JH-7B fighter-bombers from Hainan or H-6Ks strategic bombers flying out of Guiping-Mengshu Air Base in Guangxi (ChinaMil, February 4).

PLANAF elements of the South Sea Fleet have had a prominent role in challenging U.S. military electronic and maritime surveillance flights in international airspace near China’s coast and reclaimed islands. In 2001, a PLANAF J-8 fighter from the flying out of Lingshui Air Base on Hainan collided with an EP-3, forcing it to land at Lingsui AB. In August 2014, a J-11 fighter flying from Jialaishi AB, also on Hainan, performed a barrel roll over a P-8 aircraft.

Air Force

PLA Air Force Theater (PLAAF) Commander Xu Anxiang (徐安祥) was promoted to the Southern Theater Command Deputy on July 25 (The Paper, July 26). An Zhaoqing (安兆庆) serves as political commissar. The Southern Air Force Theater commands a number of large units equipped with Su-27, J-11 and J-10 fighter jets, as well as older models such as the Mig-21 derived J-7. In 2015 The PLAAF deployed J-7s closer to the border with Myanmar after violence between government and (China Brief, July 17, 2015). These will likely be phased out as additional J-10s become available.

Chinese TV and print media released photos on July 18th showing an H-6K bomber flying over Scarborough Shoal (黄岩岛) (Sina, July 18). An accompanying statement trumpeted the PLAAF’s ability to conduct long range strikes and patrols. Though not confirmed by the reports, the bombers’ identification numbers appear to indicate that it belongs to the 8th Bomber Division, 24th Air Regiment of Leiyang, Hunan (See map). Other bombers of the same variant belonging to the PLANAF have conducted similar long distance patrols, through international air space in the East China Sea to the east of Okinawa. In the 1980s, during a period of similar unrest over territorial claims, earlier variants of the H-6 bomber belonging to Chinese Naval Aviation flew to Swallow Reef and Northeast Cay, making a similar statement. [3]

The 8th Bomber Division also operates some of China’s small fleet of aerial refueling tanker aircraft. This latter capability currently forms an important bottleneck to improving the capability of the Chinese Air Force and may be resolved as China brings its Y-20 strategic transport aircraft, or other airframes that could be converted to tankers, online.

Rocket Force

The Rocket Force (formerly 2nd Artillery) also has bases and a number of launch brigades located within the borders of the Southern Theater Command. Though the Rocket Force, which is not examined here, reports to the Central Military Commission, they would no doubt play a role in Theater-level campaigns. [4]

Although the Southern Theater Command has yet to complete its reorganization of constituent units and needs to further improve communications between the services it commands, the fact of its creation is a clear sign of China’s commitment to streamline and upgrade its military forces. As units refine training and receive upgraded equipment, China’s ability to project power and deter along its strategic Southern axis will surely see a marked improvement.

Notes

1. Data is from China Bureau of Statistics 2014 and includes Hong Kong and Macau.
2. [Declassified] CIA-RDP84S00928R0003000050006-0, National Archive CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), China: Military Options Against Vietnam p. 10. The first training mission to the Spratly Islands occurred in May 1983.
3.  CREST, pg. 11
4. These include launch brigades equipped with DF-21 C/D Anti-ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) and CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) that have ranges of 1,500km. Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, DOD, April 26, 2016. Pg. 25

 Southern_Theater_Command_Overview-1.jpg

 CB_16_12.pdf

SOURCE:
https://in.finance.yahoo.com/news/why-manohar-parrikar-failed-defence-073833503.html


PARRIKAR'S ONLY MISTAKE WAS THAT HE DID NOT TAKE STEPS TO DISMANTLE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE NOR  TOOK STEPS TO WORK ON THE REALISTIC REORGANIZATION OF MINISTRY 

                                                    TO 
                    THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE MODEL

                                                                           - Vasundhra

          #############################                                                          

Why Manohar Parrikar Failed In Defence

Bloomberg Quint

23 March 2017

Few Defence Ministers began their tenure with such high expectations and ended it on such low key with almost nothing to show for the two-odd years spent as the military’s boss, as Manohar Parrikar. Returning to Goa without making the slightest ripple in a ministry crying out for hard political decisions and implementation of even harder solutions, may be something of a record. Even so, were we all wrong in hoping Parrikar would do big things differently, logically, with oodles of practical good sense? For one as a graduate of IIT, Mumbai, it was expected that he would bring an engineer’s approach and problem-solving methodology to issues of national security, especially those relating to the conventional forces that in many respects are mathematical in nature.

He started out promisingly. The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) race was decided by the time the Manmohan Singh demitted office. It only remained for the incoming BJP government to sign on the dotted line of a contract for the Rafale aircraft that would enrich France, the French economy, the French aerospace sector, and specifically, Dassault Avions, without doing much for Indian Air Force's (IAF) fighting ability.

He did the unexpected, showing the greatest reluctance to sign a contract, Parrikar pondered more economical options in lieu of the Rafale.

He came to the obvious conclusion that the entire ‘medium’ category in combat aircraft is a bit of a hoax perpetrated by IAF.

This may be seen in his exploring a Hi-lo solution revolving around the Su-30 MKI license-produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Nasik as the high-end fighting platform, and the indigenous Tejas as the low-end bulk combat compenent. His publicly observing that the price of a single Rafale can fetch the IAF three Su-30s, arguably the best multi-role fighter plane currently flying barring the F-22 Raptor, and his refuting the IAF’s charge propagated through the media that the Sukhois suffered from heavy downtime, by talking of its serviceability rate as comparable to any other aircraft in the fleet, suggested that here was a defence minister who was prepared to take Air HQes head-on.

View photos

A Rafale fighter jet, manufactured by Dassault Aviation SA, prepares to land following an aerial display on the 

A Rafale fighter jet, manufactured by Dassault Aviation SA, prepares to land following an aerial display on the second day of the 14th Dubai Air Show on November 9, 2015. 

(Photographer: Jasper Juinen/Bloomberg)

Then prime minister Narendra Modi’s Paris trip happened in April 2015 and, voila! just like that, there was the announcement of a buy of 36 Rafales — a ridiculous figure because it meant the IAF could do very little with it in terms of strengthening its force posture or warfighting capability. They were too few in number to operationally matter, and too costly to risk in hostilities, but may prove useful to Vayu Bhavan as a wedge to wangle the resources to get an additional 100-200 Rafales in the future.

This decision marked Parrikar’s slide. He could not in good conscience act gung-ho about Rafale, equally he couldn’t be seen, or even politically afford, to oppose the PM.

This is a sidebar– but why Modi made this decision remains a mystery, considering the Rafale makes little military, political, or economic sense. If, as is being alleged, President Francois Hollande lubricated the Rafale deal by promising Indian nuclear weapons designers access to the French inertial confinement fusion (ICF) chamber in Bordeaux so that India’s unproven and untested thermonuclear designs can be validated short of explosive underground testing, and also finessed, by triggering miniature fusion reactions in the ICF facility, then Modi has taken a big gamble.

Paris has not always delivered on its contractual or even secret executive-level agreements.

Assuming they do this time, where’s the guarantee that the French won’t pass on the Indian ICF data to its friends and allies, thereby compromising the Indian deterrent? Moreover, is a paper promise of access to ICF, Bordeaux, worth the escalating costs of the Rafale, considering Indian scientists continued to gain from access to the Russian ICF in Troitsk, outside Moscow?

In any case, Parrikar was never the same again. He chose thereafter to do what any lay politician has done as defence minister — surrender to the autonomy exercised by the civilian bureaucrats running his ministry.

Leaving it to the babus to do all but formally make decisions meant he sidelined himself, and wound up enmeshed in the Gordian knots of red tape he had set out originally to untangle.

View photos

Manohar Parrikar, then India’s defence minister, attends 

Manohar Parrikar, then India’s defence minister, attends the opening ceremony of the Aero India air show at Air 

Manohar Parrikar, then India’s defence minister, attends the opening ceremony of the Aero India air show at Air Force Station Yelahanka in Bengaluru, India, on February 14, 2017. (Photographer: Dhiraj Singh/Bloomberg)

Force Station Yelahanka in Bengaluru, India, on February 14, 2017. (Photographer: Dhiraj Singh/Bloomberg)

One is tempted to compare Parrikar’s fairly undistinguished time in office with that of the longest serving defence minister, AK Antony, in the preceding Congress Party coalition government.

Unlike Parrikar, Antony, a lawyer, understood the pitfalls of decision-making and was wary of babus weaving a web to victimize politicians.

Zealous in protecting his reputation for absolute propriety, he shunned all decisions concerning procurement of major military hardware — Project 75i, MMRCA, howitzers, etc. Consequently, in his eight years as defence minister nothing was decided on the big ticket items, nothing was bought.

In both cases, the usual rampaging waste of national economic resources was avoided but at the cost of weakening force readiness and modernization, by Parrikar because he permitted the civil servants to create an impasse at every turn, and by Antony because he deliberately avoided taking any decision at all.

Not sure whether Parrikar’s mode or the Antony operandi is better.

Bharat Karnad is professor for national security studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. This article was originally published on his website bharatkarnad.com.

The views expressed here are those of the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of BloombergQuint or its editorial team.

Geo-Strategic Imperatives For India (R)

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/14102016-geo-strategic-imperatives-for-india-oped/#at_pco=smlwn-1.0&at_si=58ac78d8e6f1fb30&at_ab=per-2&at_pos=0&at_tot=1

Geo-Strategic Imperatives For India – OpEd

                                  BY 

             AMITABH HOSKOTE 

                                AND 

        VISHAKHA AMITABH HOSKOTE

 OCTOBER 14, 2016




The term ‘Known Unknowns’, hitherto fore unheard of in India, and definitely not in the Indian strategic context, is a clarion call for Indian strategists to wake up to the reality of a post modern scenario where the severity of multifarious situations poses new and inexplicable dangers to the very sovereignty of the nation; if unheeded, it threatens to annihilate the very concept of united India as we know it. An initial look did surprise us of the extent to which the Indian establishment chose to ignore or conveniently overlook such very real possibilities. We try and put down some thoughts garnered from perspective; the factual information has been gleaned from very public sources of information and nothing written in succeeding paragraphs purports to be classified at all. In fact such is the free flow of information in contemporary times that it is shocking at times how “frog-in-the-well” our entire attitude has been; though equally encouraging is the role being played by an ever increasingly aware media and the growth of strong, democratic and independent thought which has an increasing influence on public thought and policy & decision making.

Another imperative for prompting such thought is that the world today is no longer a place where entire countries can choose to exist in seeming isolation. Severally connected and hinged economies often give rise to the term ‘shrinking world’, and not without reason. Such has the interdependence of trade and commerce become that it is no longer possible to survive singly. The other facet to this rule is the fact that policies, not only foreign but domestic as well, need to be shaped and re-shaped with each shift in the global tide. Often clarity of thought and purpose is lost in the intertwining of so many factors contributing towards fashioning the strategic and national aims of a country; this especially true when the focus is on new concepts and fresh ideas. As in the post-crisis business world, innovation seems to be the key word

.

Concept of Known Unknowns and relevance in the Indian context

The concept of Known Unknowns has been studied and written about by Nathan Freier for the US Army War College. It is essentially unconventional strategic shocks in defence. Such shocks that by their sheer strategic impact, surprise and the potential for disruption and violence, they would demand the focused attention of defence leadership, as well as the decisive employment of defence capabilities in response. The US found 9/11 and the events after that catastrophe challenging for its defence establishment, but according to Lt Col Freier, a strategically dislocating surprise would be next, and just around the corner. And sure enough, we have a global war against the Islamic State, which is now threatening to turn into a new cold war between the US and Russia owing its dimensional shift in Syria. What with so many imponderables as Iran, North Korea, and even its failure in Afghanistan and its inability to deal with the Taliban in frontier districts of Pakistan, could the ‘strategically dislocating surprise’ come from this part of Asia? Could the stand off between India and Pakistan, both nuclear states be the catalyst to reorient strategy, investment and missions in so far as the US is concerned? Given that unconventional challenges lie definitely outside the realm of traditional war fighting, does not necessarily mean that it is non-violent, non-state, or unorganized.

Risks to national security which may not be fully anticipated or predicted would thus constitute Known Unknowns; that they exist can be conceived but yet they are not being imagined or expected. 

Defence strategy usually faces the critical flaws of being reactive in nature and lacking imagination. This is attributed to the otherwise strict hierarchical controls owing to the nature of the job; it however leaves strategy planning and decisions susceptible and vulnerable to surprise. Aversion to institutional change is another key factor. Yet the Known Unknowns stretch conventional wisdom to such an extent that it becomes difficult to ferret out a likely and suitable response, whereas their broad and fundamental implications rise and mature fast leaving little room for the system to adjust itself to the strategic and inherent changes. Concepts face the challenge of change and existing paradigms are questioned; prevailing strategy and assumptions are undermined leaving strategists little choice but to venture into uncharted territory.

What does this concept mean for India? The relevance of such disruptive and strategic shocks would find its roots in the very nature of India’s sub continental environment and the rapidly changing global economic scenario, which forces India to look into newer and unexpected areas of likely conflict. Given the history of animosity that engulfs the country historically, it becomes that much more a lucrative target for various sections of neighbouring establishments. Also with the rapid economic growth of modern India and its increasing clout in global affairs, it needs to forge new and meaningful relationships to further strengthen and consolidate its own position on the world stage. In drawing a parallel to the US, India has had its share of challenges like 26/11 and every new day announces new stories of insurgent and naxalite violence. China and Pakistan continue to be painful thorns in the side, and with both neighbours taking a hostile stand, the security establishment has its work cut out for it. Central Asia has always been strategically important and in the last three decades has faced intense turmoil with it being the new arena for wars, conflicts, socio-political changes and mushrooming religious fundamentalists. Its proximity to India and the vulnerability associated with it, should give a new focus to our policies, both domestic and foreign. New avenues for meaningful dialogue need to be explored and all available means of ensuring territorial integrity and the security of Indian citizens will have to be undertaken. Above all, conceptual framework should be reinforced with a strong military establishment, and a proactive doctrine. Indian strategists will do well to always be on their toes, since most state and non state antagonists are unlikely to change or just disappear; instead they may find new and innovative means to bleed the Indian behemoth.

Points to ponder for the Indian political and defence establishments

What is India’s geo-strategy? What are its regional and global objectives? Is there focus on forming a coherent long term strategy or are we just blundering our way about international diplomacy? All these questions and more need to be answered by the Indian polity and thereafter the defence hierarchy. Endemic to the Indian system where the military functions as an arm of and under a civilian government, is the greater role played by the polity and the bureaucracy, in formulating policies. The defence establishment which implements these policies also needs to be given greater autonomy as also an implicit faith imposed in their ability to function apolitically, yet at the same instance provide valuable inputs to further governmental policies. Such a move has historically has been viewed with apprehension by the civilian establishment (and indeed, the sub-continent is rife with enough examples, both Pakistan and Bangladesh being cases in point). However this would also pave the way for flexibility and innovation in the functioning of the defence forces and thereby reduce the chances of getting shocked strategically!

In the regional context of the sub-continent, we continue to face relentless attack by subversive forces under various garbs.

Does the fact that a country which is not only one eighth of the Indian landmass, but has been carved out of it, continues to implement strategy with impunity with the sole aim of bleeding India, tell us something? 

Are we indeed unable to deal with this imbalance for almost 70 years? Where dialogue and diplomacy may not work due to the inherent nature of the Pakistani mindset (it has always found itself threatened by India), can we switch tracks and look at such an infusion of economics, that it will becomes impossible for Pakistan to ignore the impact and therefore be forced to change its policies, or at least reign in those non state players who work towards subversion in Indian territory?

Where China has had the liberty of implementing various policies to bring it to the point of being an economic giant, India has been progressing too, albeit ponderously. On the one hand is the vibrancy of the Indian democracy and on the other is the lack of political will to implement measures for growth. These have in fact worked to further China’s subversive strategies, giving it a perfect platform to fuel naxalism inside Indian territory. Indeed, the growth story in India sometimes seems to be despite the government, not because of it! With its economic status well cemented, China also harbours ambitions of being a global power militarily. To that end, it has made rapid strides in bringing in technology and upgrading the fighting capabilities of its forces. It postures more frequently in a threatening manner, based on its historic border disputes with India. The recent spate of military/ naval posturing in the Indian Ocean region, the South China Sea, and the upcoming China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or the new Silk Route, are all signs of muscles being flexed by the Chinese dragon. However there seems to be little or no response and definitely a complete lack of coherent and well thought out strategy on our part. This is further taken as a sign of weakness and exploited increasingly. Alarming reports suggest that China has managed to slowly extend its hold over disputed border territory. Its increasing military clout is evident from its growing presence in the Indian Ocean which is essential to China’s projection of its power, but also a potential threat to Indian interests. What are we doing about these issues? At the end of the day, we do not have any cogent long term strategy in place and only now and very slowly waking up and gearing ourselves for a potential conflict with China. In its quest for energy and petroleum globally, China seems to succeed much more than does India. The infusion of Chinese funds into African economies and the number of successful bids in Central Asia and Africa for oilfields, is surely putting China in a more secure position by the day. Even the conduct of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 was meant to announce its arrival on the global stage. Surely these issues need to be examined.

Traditionally India held its non aligned status (but with a dash of convenience thrown in) through the Cold War years. With the break up of the USSR and the US emerging as the single and uncontested global hegemon, India found itself drawn into a closer relationship with the US. On its part the US also cannot ignore the rapid growth of Indian economy and has shown all signs of positive engagement with us. Yet, as they say in diplomat-speak, ‘There are no permanent friends, only permanent interests’. Contradictory to its engagement with India, the US continues to indirectly fuel conflict in the sub-continent through its policies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To be fair to the US, it is unable to deal with its own creation (yet again!) and therefore cannot afford the collapse of the Pakistani establishment (and the nuclear dimension to boot!) and the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It then becomes incumbent on India to initiate positive relations by whatever means possible. Ultimately, Indian interests must be supreme for India and going by the analogy of permanent interests, it too should re-examine all avenues for its growth, security and consolidation of status. Post the economic meltdown in 2008 the US found itself more and more dependent on economies with strong growth. And what better candidate than a democracy (surrounded by all other forms of governance) with tremendous prospects in the foreseeable future. The question therefore is where are we headed in our relations with the US?Can all these positives not be leveraged to bring abo ut a change in our regional equations? Policies may not change overnight, but concerted efforts would at least pave the way for a brighter future.

Indian capabilities both overt and covert face the prospect of erosion due to the lack of coherent long term strategies and egoist polity and bureaucracy, which resists the very idea of fresh infusion in thought processes. A paradigm shift in our outlook based on where our national interests lie is essential to the continued economic success and to obviate any possibility of attacks on our security and territorial integrity. It is therefore of paramount importance that a proactive and consistently innovative approach be adopted to geo-strategic concerns. Such a move would invariably herald the renaissance of India.

*Amitabh Hoskote, PHD (Development & Conflict Studies) & Vishakha Amitabh Hoskote, MA, MPHIL (International Relations, Political Science & Development Communication)

TOPICS:Foreign PolicyIndiaPoliticsSouth Asia

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Amitabh Hoskote

Amitabh Hoskote is a Strategic and Defense Professional and Scholar with varied experience in Combat, Defense Management, research in Security & Defense oriented issues, crises management, strategy planning & execution. With a Masters and PHD in Development and Conflict Studies, Finance and Economics, he has been an Honorary Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a leading Strategy Think Tank in India and writes regularly for the Eurasia Review on issues of geopolitical importance.