An Army for the people? M. G. Devasahayam

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/an-army-for-the-people/397454.html



  
                             PART ONE OF TWO PARTS




  

PART ONE :  

 [A]      

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/an-army-for-people-m-g-devasahayam.html

PART TWO:

[ B ]

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/04/no-doubt-army-for-people.html

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DONT TAKE INDIAN ARMED FORCES  FOR GRANTED. ARMED FORCES ARE THE CUSTODIAN OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION  
                                                 &
 LOYALTY OF ARMY IS GUARANTEED AS LONG AS THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION IS RESPECTED  AND INTEGRITY  OF THE NATION IS  ENSURED                                                                                         - VASUNDHRA

Powerless?Farooq Dar tied to the Army vehicle as a human shield. Former Chief Omar Abdullah took to Twitter to display his anguish and attached the video screenshot of Dar.

             An Army for the People?

                                     BY

                      M. G. Devasahayam

Army’s healing touch:The Army was the saviour for people devastated by the floods. Army doctors provide medicines to the flood-hit people at a medical camp in Srinagar. PTI

Next Image

L’affaire  Human Shield’ of the Indian Army tying a stone-thrower on their jeep in Kashmir has evoked mixed reactions. Many, including Army veterans, are defending it as a tactical means to avoid stone-throwing and thus permit operations with minimal bloodshed of protestors and Army personnel alike. Many others condemn it vehemently.

Among the latter are those who call it part of "D doctrine" that draws its inspiration and ideology from the state of Israel. While this can be the Standard Operating Procedure for the Israeli Occupation Force in illegal occupation of Palestine, it cannot be an SOP in the Indian Army or any other self-respecting military. 

For the moderate objectors, the Army personnel who used the tactic are clearly at the end of their tether in being deployed in internal security operations with no end in sight. They feel soldiers on-the-ground would not have used the tactic had they not been frustrated with having to take the blame for failures and the bullets and grenades from militants over the decades, for pulling politicians' chestnuts out of the fire, a job that the police are not quite up to.

Those who defend the "human shield" quote paragraph 305 of the "Regulations for the Army" for deployment of troops on duties in aid of civil authorities: "The strength and composition of the force, the amount of ammunition to be taken and the manner of carrying out the task are matters for the decision of the military authorities alone." 

Paragraph 306 (d) provides immunity to officers if they act in good faith which is held to mean "with due care and attention". For them, the young commander in Budgam faced with a hostile crowd of over 900 and the option of opening fire undoubtedly acted in good faith, exercising due care and attention, thereby averting a potential catastrophe.

Both sides have merits in their argument. But the problem is with the common denominator-the prolonged and endless deployment of the Army in internal security duty which is the job of the police and at best of the para-military forces for a short period. As per the Army Doctrine-2004, the Indian Army's primary role is to preserve national interests and safeguard the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of India against any external threats by deterrence or by waging war. To perform this role, the Army keeps aloof from the civilian crowd, concentrating on their training and battle readiness.


 Relegating the Army to its secondary/tertiary role by prolonged troop deployment on internal security duties, dilutes the Army's authority, corrupts ranks and compromises efficiency through lack of training. 

Besides, over time the Army is looked upon merely as another state force with its soldiers losing the respect and mystique they traditionally enjoyed. Familiarity breeds contempt and military men find themselves at the receiving end. This is precisely what is happening in Kashmir. Since the civilian population is directly involved, politics and politicians come in. Power games begin and wittingly or unwittingly the Army becomes a pawn. 

In the case of Kashmir, the endeavour of power-mongers has been to create a situation of intense hostility, inextricably miring the military into it forcing it to resort to excessive force. To perform this "task," the Army is vested with draconian powers under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). In a July 2016 verdict, the Supreme Court ripped open the cloak of immunity and secrecy provided by AFSPA to security forces for deaths caused during encounters in disturbed areas. 

Earlier, Commissions headed by former apex court judges have found serious human rights violations by the security forces and have recommended the scrapping of AFSPA or making drastic changes in it. 

Successive governments and the Army top brass have been defending AFPSA with all their might. Over the years, the effort of ruling politicians has been to make the Army an instrument of an increasingly autocratic state. The question arises: What is the mandate of the Indian Army — to defend democracy or oppress the people at the whim of an autocratic state? This poser came up when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed the Emergency in June, 1975 turning a vibrant democracy into enslaved autocracy. Putting the entire blame on Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) and the movement led by him she made specific reference to JP calling upon the Army not to obey any order, which they considered wrong: "You have not sold your conscience and honour for the sake of your bread", JP had said and challenged the Home Minister to try him for treason. Response to the poser came from the international media in a lengthy article titled “Ruler of 600 million arid alone”-Indira Gandhi is unmaking a democracy to save it," in the New York Times of August 10, 1975 — written by Claire Sterling, [http://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/10/archives/ruler-of-600-million-and-alone-indira-gandhi-is-unmaking-a.html?_r=0 ]                                                       a columnist for Atlantic Monthly, Washington Post and International Herald Tribune after extensively visiting India.  After analysing the situation on the ground and presenting the alternatives before Mrs Gandhi — becoming a real dictator or sending the country into the Soviet orbit — Claire opines that neither development is likely to leave the Indian Army unmoved:

[  ]

“India's standing Army of nearly a million men has been resolutely non-political since Independence. But it is also sensitive to the smallest slight to its honour, dignity and military independence, not to mention the nation's sovereignty; and it is steeped in loyalty to constitutional principles. It was altogether her Army when she enjoyed unquestioned legitimacy of constitutional rule. It may not be should its ranking officers conclude that she has become something else. More than ever now her fate hangs on the Army's loyalty.” 

Claire concludes the article with touching poignancy: "One thing worse than governing India by democratic persuasion would be trying to govern it by force. Yet that is how Indira is trying to do it now. Depending on how fast and how far she goes in changing from a traditional Prime Minister to the one-woman ruler of a police state, the Indian Army, the one group with the power to stop the process, could intervene. If it were to do so, it would almost certainly be not to replace her with a military dictator, but to restore the institutions of democracy it has been drilled into defending since birth." The Army lived up to this faith and Emergency ended with Indira Gandhi's defeat in the 1977 elections. The Army did not intervene but remained a bulwark of India's democracy and its institutions. I was a witness. Should our Army be any different now? 

The writer is a former IAS officer

L O C JAMMU & KASHMIR : BATTALION ACTION TEAM [BAT]

SOURCE:

http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in/2013/10/loc-downside-of-bat-actions.html?m=1

      

     BATTALION ACTION TEAM [BAT]
                                    OF
       PAK INFANTRY BATTALIONS 

LOC: The Downside of BAT Actions        

Editor

Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Ata Hasnain

October 5, 2013 

Updated 05 May,2017.

The recent ongoing Pakistani intrusions on the Line of Control must be understood in the larger perspective of the Pakistan’s philosophy of keeping the LC alive by Border Action Teams(BAT). Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain explains the nuances to clear misconceptions about the LC dynamics.

During the 06 Aug 2013 flare up on the LC (LoC) in the Poonch Sector and the beheading incident in Jan 2013 the common string of information was that the targeted killing of Indian Jawans on the LC was executed by BATs. Even in the Army, not many would boast of knowing what BATs are, how do they function (modus operandi), what effects they have and how the Indian Army handles the threat. In the typical lackadaisical way that the public treats matters military not many sought more information on BATs, preferring to leave them to our professional Army to handle.

In a way that is a positive because the world of the LC is the domain of just a few who have had the honour and the ‘sugar high’ of serving in the razor sharp environment that presents itself daily in the ‘border areas’ of Jammu & Kashmir. It may be appropriate to clarify some of the basic ingredients of this high drama environment.

What is the LC?

The LC is different to the LAC (Line of Actual Control), different to the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) and much different to the Working Boundary (a term used only by Pakistan). The LAC alludes to the land boundary between the areas currently held by China and India along the Northern borders and the AGPL refers to the un-demarcated area north east of NJ 9842. To detail these aspects would be to digress from the main issue the LC, which is quite often called LoC by the media but the Army prefers to shorten it to the more colloquial LC.

The LC is an imaginary line running along the current frontier between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Although the Instrument of Accession of 26 Aug 1947 and Joint Resolution of the two Houses of Parliament of Jul 1994 place the whole of Jammu and Kashmir with India, the actual ground position has emerged over the last 65 years commencing with Pakistan’s invasion in 1947 the conflicts of 1965, 1971 and 1999 (Kargil), as also the proxy war launched by Pakistan since 1989. The LC runs well east of the actual International Boundary (IB) and is the alignment along which the operations of 1947-48 came to a halt thus creating Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK-often referred as Azad Kashmir, or AK, by Pakistan). Unlike the IB there are no boundary pillars (BPs) delineating the LC, however, there are a series of mostly unrecognizable landmarks such as boulders, trees and nullahs which have undergone change over years. The Indian and Pakistan Armies are in eyeball contact in their various pillboxes and picquets all along the alignment but at places terrain constraints may separate the two by two or more km.

It is an environment little known to the outside world, where the notion of ‘Grabbers, Keepers’ exists. Translating this into reality it means that any side grabbing a piece of ground for a tactical advantage gets to keep it unless forcibly evicted (recall Kargil 1999).

Events Leading to Current Status

All was well on the LC till 1989 or so except the sporadic shootouts of lower intensity which took place for the sake of ‘moral ascendancy’. A much misunderstood term, ‘moral ascendancy’ remains even today a task for the wily infantrymen and encompasses a range of sub tasks primary being the sanctity of the LC, (no loss of ground) and prevention of rogue actions by Pakistan.

In 1989 things started to change drastically with the belief among the Kashmiri populace that ‘Azadi’ or merger with Pakistan was becoming a reality. The proxy war within the Valley had to be sustained by Pakistan through induction of terrorists, explosives, military hardware and finances. The LC became the obvious conduit through which all this happened. Much against the common belief that the LC is manned metre to metre the ground reality is that there are large gaps dictated by terrain factors, logistics and climatic constraints. It is these gaps which were exploited and converted to ‘highways’ (a terrorist term) for movement of terrorists, potential terrorists(recruits), hardware, explosives and finances.

The Army was forced to redeploy and selectively reinforce at the cost of its counter terrorist operational grid in the Valley floor. This left many of its LC picquets weaker as a new dimension was added to the task of ‘sanctity of the LC’ this was Counter Infiltration. Sensing a great opportunity the Pakistan Army commenced selectively targeting Indian picquets with a mix of regular troops and well trained terrorists (those who had undergone Daura-e-Khas training). The purpose force back Indian Army counter infiltration ambushes, located between picquets and thus create the gaps needed for infiltration. Unprovoked firing by Pakistani posts further forced the creation of gaps. All this occurred in the Nineties and progressive lessons learnt by the Pakistan Army refined the BAT concept.

Characteristics of BATs

Border Action Teams comprise a mix of Pakistan Army regulars, Pakistan Special Forces elements and high profile terrorists (Jihadis) who are trained to cross the LC to execute raids on Indian picquets, ambushes and patrol parties or logistics elements. Strength has mostly been experienced to be 15 to 20. Beheading has been one of the modus operandi adopted by these teams to cause scare and impose immense caution on their targets. The immediate effect of information about concentration of a BAT opposite a particular segment of the LC is an inevitable strengthening of the defensive stance; stronger patrols, more protection for logistics elements such as mule trains which carry advance winter stocking stores; all this at the cost of the counter infiltration grid. The situation can then be exploited for strong infiltration bids through gaps. Quite obviously BAT actions are in the mold of terrorist acts launched with the intent of imposing caution and creating the tactical conditions for terrorist infiltration.

The Coming of the LC Fence

The inevitable question does the Indian Army sit on its haunches waiting to be attacked; far from it. Indian infantry units are known to have wreaked revenge and delivered telling blows on the Pakistan Army and terrorists. In years before the Cease Fire came into place on 26 Nov 2003 exchange of Arty Fire and direct firing heavy weapons was common place. Many an ingenius Indian gunner and infantry commander innovated and caused much destruction on the Pakistan Army. Among others the name of Brigadier Jasbir Lidder (later Lt Gen), Commander of the high profile 12 Infantry Brigade (Uri) is well known for his famous quip “When Uri rumbles, Chakhoti (PoK town opposite Uri) crumbles”. The ingenius LC fence constructed along the 16 & 15 Corps frontages under the outstanding leadership of then COAS Gen Nirmal Vij greatly altered the odds of infiltration. This needs to be understood in the right perspective as the annual reconstruction of the Fence (an expensive exercise in men and material) is very often questioned within the Army and the less informed bureaucratic circles. 

The LC Fence

The LC Fence changed much more than just the awe inspiring landscape of the Pir Panjal and Shamshabari ranges. It altered what we call the ‘mathematics of terror’ in Jammu & Kashmir. Prior to 01 Jul 2004 (the date the Fence officially came in existence) Pakistan successfully infiltrated 2000-3000 terrorists across the LC each year. On an average 1400-1500 were killed in engagements with the Indian Army on the LC or in the hinterland. The residual figures were always in favour of Pakistan. Then came General Nirmal Vij who led the construction of the Fence from the plains to the obscene heights of the Shamshabari, flaying the ‘nay sayers’. It altered everything. The Indian Army now had an obstacle to concentrate upon and converted it from a mere line of barbed wire to a system comprising steel, lead, electronics, ether and human beings.

By 2006 the Indian Army had acquired the knowledge and experience of exploiting the LC Fence which was leaking just a few hundred terrorists annually while the Army eliminated double the number in its CI/CT operations. The mathematics were now reversed leading to the situation in 2011-12 when less than 300 terrorists roamed the Valley and 19 top terrorists leaders were eliminated with focused CT operations. The transformational ‘Heart Doctrine’ combined with this approach almost brought Kashmir to the doorstep of conflict stabilization awaiting conflict resolution.

The media and the public have often questioned how BATs can enter 400 500 meters into our side and conduct an operation. There is a simple answer to this. In 2003-4 when the LC Fence was constructed there was no ceasefire for most of the period; hence the Fence had to be constructed well away from the LC at most places. Where ever we were/are in domination the construction was well forward, hugging the LC. The Fence gives natural protection against rogue actions but where it is aligned well inside we per force have picquets/posts/detachments ahead but not necessarily on the LC as long as the area ahead can be dominated by fire. Small patrols are used to dominate this space and these are the patrols which are vulnerable to BAT actions. BATs can therefore enter minefields with considerable risk but no other obstacle prevents them from accessing the Indian Army’s patrol bases or routes of patrolling near (400-500 metres) the LC.

To expect Pakistan Army to use BATs more extensively after the Indian Army’s successful handling of the situation in J&K in 2011-12, is to state the obvious. We often hear of the phrase ‘keeping the pot boiling’ in Kashmir while Pakistan handles the Afghan border and its internal security threats. To execute this concept Pakistan requires its terrorist foot soldiers (boots on the ground) in J&K; to allow the fast dwindling strength to reduce even further would be a catastrophe for the ISI’s post 2014 strategy in J&K. Hence the necessity to once again force creation of gaps on the LC to facilitate infiltration.

Many veterans of the Army would recall some of the well known BAT actions which were launched against Indian Army units and the counter actions taken by the same units. The Indian Army has foiled many more BAT actions than the ones which have succeeded. Only a year ago 16 PUNJAB foiled a major action in the Tangdhar Sector. 

Handling BATs at Different Levels

In my long years handling the LC from unit to a Corps Commander I always found the threats from BATs as the most challenging and relished countering these. In 2008 a Pakistan Army unit decided to send a 15 man officer led team across the LC to dislodge a small detachment of my brave Rajputs who had temporarily occupied a patrol base to dominate an area of the LC not usually visited or patrolled. In the ensuing clash between four young Rajput soldiers without a senior leader and the 15 Pakistanis the Rajputs lost one soldier and killed 7 Pakistanis. All hell broke loose on the LC in a frontage of about 3 to 4 Km. My orders to the CO were crystal clear “’the night is yours, I do not want the Pakistani bases, from where the soldiers had emerged, to remain standing”. The Rajputs shocked me next morning when they reported the destruction caused to the Pakistan Army posts. The last hurrah was when a Pakistan Army helicopter emerged late the next afternoon and took away the Pakistani Brigade Commander; it was later learnt that he was removed from command; so much for the moral ascendancy achieved by the Rajputs. As the General Officer of the division I asked no one and no one advised me. It was my calling and the risk was also mine.

The above example displays just how Pakistan Army’s proactive and provocative stance on the LC needs to be handled. The offensive response by Indian Army units has to be reflected in their attitude from the moment they step into their area of responsibility. Most BAT actions take place during handing/taking over between units when command and control is supposedly loose. Infantry units do not realize that each action of theirs even before they arrive in their AOR is under surveillance. Many units having fearsome reputation will never be tested; others with lesser credentials and poor body language of their troops would get tested early. The first engagement if handled with professional aggression will allow a unit a tenure with little turbulence. Destiny has brought many units of both Armies from the Kargil war once again face to face on the LC. 

The reader must not go away with the impression that the Pakistan Army and terrorists rule the roost on the LC, far from it. Yet, it is imperative that our commanders be bold, trust their instinct, train their troops hard and wargame contingencies regularly. This is 24 x 7 soldiering where every movement has to be controlled and reactions kept ready; most important of all — time is the worst enemy of effectiveness on the LC. As a sector cools down so does the vigil and then one fine day it happens; there is only one solution to this constant reminders to all at the oddest time of the day or night. There is no rest on the LC; those who rest seldom live to tell the tales.

About the Author

Besides the optimum combination of ground soldiering, staff work and academics, Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain, the scholar warrior, is best known for his path breaking tenure as Corps Commander of the high profile 15 Corps in the Kashmir Valley, where he employed the most unique methods to stabilise the turbulence that the Valley had experienced giving it the best chance for a return to peace. He remains the only officer of the Army to be decorated six times by the President of India and was recently honoured by the Vice President with the Capital Foundation Society’s award for excellence in the field of military leadership. This article first appeared in South Asia Defence and Strategic Review defstrat.com.

India may use BrahMos for cross-LoC strikes

SOURCE:

India may use BrahMos for cross-LoC strikes

India may use BrahMos for cross-LoC strikes

                                    [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l53gYzqqBB4 ]

The Army has begun weighing its options to retaliate against Pakistani forces on the Line of Control, after their troops, employing jihadi extremists, killed and beheaded two Indian soldiers near Poonch on Monday, top generals said.

It is learnt that the incident took place when an Indian patrol of 8-10 soldiers was checking the border fence, a perilous task involving physically moving along the fence, very close to the LoC, to check that it has not been cut or its electronic sensors damaged.

According to the modus operandi of Pakistani troops on forward LoC posts, the exposed patrol first came under intense fire from automatic weapons, which Pakistani soldiers had stealthily deployed in temporary positions, just across the LoC.

With two Indian jawans injured in the firing, a ‘border action team’, comprising jihadi fighters, darted across the LoC to the border fence. Covered by the Pakistan army’s firing, the jihadis killed the two jawans, beheaded them, and returned to their side of the LoC, bearing the heads as trophies.

The employment of a BAT is a well-rehearsed Pakistani tactic that creates deniability by using jihadis to cross into the Indian side.


The employment of a BAT is a well-rehearsed Pakistani tactic that creates deniability by using jihadis to cross into the Indian side. If any jihadis are killed or captured, the Pakistan army disowns it as an infiltration attempt.

Regular soldiers remain on their side of the LoC, firing on Indian posts and patrols to cover the BAT’s move.

A range of retaliatory measures are being weighed by India’s generals, including attacks by ground forces on Pakistani posts, or strikes by aircraft, missiles or massed artillery guns.

Army Vice-Chief Lieutenant General Sarath Chand, on Tuesday, said, "Humko kya karna hai woh hum yahaan bataana nahin chahte hain. Apni karyavahi hum apne aap karenge, at a time and place of our choice (I don’t want to give out here what we intend to do. We will take action at a time and place of our choice)."

On Monday, the Army's Director General of Military Operations, Lieutenant General A K Bhatt, warned of retaliation during a phone call to his Pakistani counterpart. A defence ministry release stated: ‘The DGMO of the Indian Army conveyed that such a dastardly and inhuman act is beyond any norms of civility and merits unequivocal condemnation and response.'

Defence Minister Arun Jaitley also sounded a warning on Monday, "The country has full confidence and faith in our armed forces, which will react appropriately to this inhuman act. The sacrifice of these soldiers will not go in vain."

However, army sources emphatically rejected Indian media claims -- by India Today TV and Dainik Jagran newspaper -- that the Indian Army had already visited retribution, killing 10 Pakistani soldiers in an attack.

Last September, the Indian Army had retaliated to a jihadi strike on an army post near Uri with multiple cross-LoC ‘surgical strikes’ that are believed to have killed several jihadi fighters and a handful of Pakistani soldiers.

After another attack in November, the Indian Army secretly moved 155 millimetre Bofors guns into forward firing positions, destroying two Pakistani posts in a massed fire assault.

Even so, senior generals admit there are limitations on how much, and how often, Pakistani posts on the LoC can be punished, even in retaliating to an inhuman violation that involved mutilating Indian soldiers.

Inadequate punishment fails to deter Pakistani violations, while an excess could set off a cycle of escalation that could spiral out of control.

Moreover, the Indian military does not have a tri-service plan for immediate retaliation to such incidents.

This would involve pre-selecting Pakistan army or jihadi targets, earmarking the aircraft, missiles, guns or Special Forces to hit them and devising defensive measures for the inevitable Pakistani retaliation.

In what might be an unlinked development, the Army on Tuesday test-fired a BrahMos land-to-land missile, demonstrating what an official release described as ‘the weapon’s unmatched lethality of hitting the centre of a designated target with ‘bull’s eye’ precision’.

The BrahMos would be an important component of any concerted Indian cross-LoC strike capability

GEO STRATEGY : Dynamics Of Strategic Stability In South Asia

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30042017-dynamics-of-strategic-stability-in-south-asia-oped/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

            Dynamics Of Strategic Stability

                                     In

                              South Asia

                                     By

                               Asma Khalid*

 

April 30, 2017 

Strategic stability in South Asia is complex phenomena due to adversarial relationship between two traditional rivals India and Pakistan. Existence of an Action-Reaction Spiral between both nuclear rivals is increasing the fragility of the South Asian strategic stability.

Though, the both states have successfully achieved the principal requirements of strategic stability by enhancing their nuclear capabilities and maintaining the deterrence. But different postures of military strategies have negatively affected nuclear equation of the region. Balance of power in South Asia revolves around the competition over nuclear and conventional military build-up between India-Pakistan and powers politic among United States, China and Russia.

The territorial dispute over Jammu and Kashmir is an actual bone of contention and previous events of the war of Kargil, the Mumbai attack, and the most recent attacks of Pathankot and Urri, has severely shattered the stability paradigm and these events have brought both countries on the brink of war. Most significantly the Indian claim of surgical attacks in Pakistan held Kashmir has seriously disturbed the existing strategic stability paradigm in South Asia.

Though the introduction of nuclear weapon has brought the fundamental change in regional security calculus but Stability-Instability paradox is operational in south Asia.

The dilemma of the South Asian region is that with the passage of time, strategic stability is becoming more fragile instead of becoming strong. Deterrence stability and Crisis stability in the region is not yet stabilize due to various internal and external factors Historical events, social, economic, political aspects and external powers especially United States (US) has played crucial role in disturbing the strategic force balance and strategic stability in the region. Internal challenges such as territorial disputes (Sir Creek, Kashmir, and Siachen), increased border tension on LOC, defence production gap and Indian military modernization, Indian ballistic missile program, and absence of arms control regime are the main source of tension in the region. In such a strategic landscape three possible threats to regional strategic stability are: crisis instability, arms race, security dilemma and escalatory danger have worsened the situation.

Power politics among super powers has also played a crucial role in disturbing the regional equilibrium as the sub-continent has remained under the influence of great powers. During the cold war period USSR and U.S exercise their power struggle over South Asia; where as in china emerged as third competitor during the Post-Cold war era.

At the end of Cold-War, India-US bilateral ties were strengthened by economic and defence co-operation. In post 9/11 indo-US stronger ties were the biggest threat to regional stability. Growing Indo-US strategic partnership, Indo-US nuclear deal, recent defence co-operation and U.S support to Indian candidacy for NSG has drastically halted the process of stability. Defence bond between U.S and India is biggest threat to regional stability as well as to the global non-proliferation efforts.

At the broader aspect the Indo-U.S strategic partnership has put the question mark on the aspiration of both states and it may force the other regional states to take the measure to ensure their safety and security.

In response to Indo-U.S strategic co-operation, China and Pakistan are making a strong partnership in economic, military and nuclear fields. China can play the crucial role to maintain the balance of power in the region by providing assistance to Pakistan in military and nuclear fields. At the same time, Pakistan and China are pursuing the strategies to counter the threats and challenges to regional strategic stability but not by violating the international laws or norms as US did to support India’s membership for NSG. Subsequently, Pakistan’s vision is to promote the idea of regional cooperative development; CPEC is the most significant example of that.

Two categories of strategic partnerships: the Indo-U.S strategic partnership and China-Pakistan Strategic co-operation has evolved the unique kind of equilibrium in the South Asia. However, India’s military modernization plane, missile program, Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal and discriminatory approach of U.S towards Pakistan have directly challenged the regional strategic balance.

In this regard, the absence of crisis stability and deterrence stability mechanism is increasing the fragility of South Asian strategic stability. So it is imperative to develop a framework comprised of conventional force balance, arms control regime and conflict resolution. Unfortunately, India has always rejected such proposals regarding nuclear restrains. In order to ensure the regional stability it is necessary to take the establishment of restraint regimes seriously for durable peace in the South Asian region.

*Asma Khalid, Writer is Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) Islamabad. Asmaakhalid_90@hotmail.com

DEPORT HER TO INDIA! INDIA NEEDS HER !!

      DEPORT HER TO INDIA !  INDIA NEEDS HER  !!

                           Way to go Granny!!!

            The Rambo Granny of Melbourne, Australia

Gun-toting granny Ava Estelle, 81, was so ticked-off when two thugs raped her 18-year-old granddaughter that she tracked the unsuspecting ex-cons down and shot off their testicles.

The old lady spent a week hunting those men down and, when she found them, she took revenge on them in her own special way,
said Melbourne police investigator Evan Delp.

Then she took a taxi to the nearest police station, laid the gun on the sergeant's desk and told him as calm as could be:  "Those bastards will never rape anybody again, by God."

Cops say convicted rapist and robber Davis Furth, 33, lost both his penis and his testicles when outraged Ava opened fire with a 9-mm pistol in the hotel room where he and former prison cell mate Stanley Thomas, 29, were holed up.

The wrinkled avenger also blew Thomas' testicles to kingdom come, but doctors managed to save his mangled penis, police said.

"The one guy, Thomas, didn't lose his manhood, but the doctor I talked to said he won't be using it the way he used to," Detective Delp told reporters. "Both men are still in pretty bad shape, but I think they're just happy to be alive after what they've been through."

The Rambo Granny swung into action August 21 after her grand-daughter Debbie was carjacked and raped in broad daylight by two knife-wielding creeps in a section of town bordering on skid row. "When I saw the look on my Debbie's face that night in the hospital,I decided I was going to go out and get those bastards myself because I figured the Law would go easy on them," recalled the retired library worker. "And I wasn't scared of them, either because I've got me a gun and I've been shooting all my life. And I wasn't dumb enough to turn it in when the law changed about owning one."

So, using a police artist's sketch of the suspects and Debbie's description of the sickos, tough-as-nails Ava spent seven days prowling the wino-infested neighborhood where the crime took place 'till she spotted the ill-fated rapists entering their flophouse hotel. "I knew it was them the minute I saw 'em, but I shot a picture of 'em anyway, and took it back to Debbie and she said sure as hell, it was them," the oldster recalled.

"So I went back to that hotel and found their room and knocked on the door, and the minute the big one opened the door, I shot 'em right square between the legs, right where it would really hurt 'em most, you know."
"Then I went in and shot the other one, as he backed up pleading to me to spare him. Then I went down to the police station and turned myself in."
Now, baffled lawmen are trying to figure out exactly how to deal with the vigilante granny.

"What she did was wrong, and she broke the law, but it is difficult to throw an 81-year-old woman in prison," Det. Delp said, "especially when 3 million people in the city want to nominate her for Mayor.

         Granny you are welcome in India 
                                
                                   &     

     if possible get a couple  of more like you. 

   This country is in dire need of  like your ilk



                                                                        AND

          BE ASSURED YOUR STATUE  WILL BE                              INCARNATED 
                                     AS
              AN AVTAR OF MAA KALI