Sunday, May 21, 2017

PLA MODERNIZATION - PLA : Strategic Assessment: China’s Northern Theater Command

SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-assessment-chinas-northern-theater-command/




             PLA  MODERNIZATION



                                 INDEX  


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  PLA  MODERNIZATION



                                 INDEX  


CLICK/GOOGLE  URL TO OPEN TEXT

     [ 1 ]    PLA MODERNIZATION : PLA  :China’s CENTRAL Theater   Command = "blank"                 DATA AWAITED


     [ 2 ]    PLA MODERNIZATION : PLA : Strategic Assessment:  China’s Northern Theater                      Command
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/pla-modernization-pla-strategic.html

     [3]     China’s Southern Theater Command 

              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/p-l-snapshot-chinas-southern-theater.html


      [4]    PLA MODERNIZATION :Snapshot: China’s Eastern Theater Command

               http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/pla-modernization-snapshot-chinas.html

      [5]    China’s Western Theater Command
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/p-l-snapshot-chinas-western-theater.html

       [6]    PLA SETUP PRIOR TO MODERNIZATION
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/04/pla-modernization-pla-setup-prior-to.html

     [7]    PLA Theater Joint Intelligence:Organization and Operations

                http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/search/label/PLA%20%20MODERENIZATION





            Strategic Assessment:

 China’s Northern Theater Command

      Publication: China Brief Volume: 17 Issue: 7



Guarding the Northern Gate
Each of China’s Theater Commands (TC) is defined by its geography and the international borders it defends. China’s Eastern Theater Command is largely focused on Taiwan. The Western TC protects China’s borders with India and guards internal stability and counter-terrorism stemming from Central Asia. The Southern TC deals with the South China Sea, and the Central TC protects Beijing and reinforces other theaters (for detailed analysis of each theater command see the following profiles in China Brief: Eastern TCSouthern TCWestern TC). The Northern Theater Command’s (NTC) role is similarly driven by geography and China’s relations with its neighbors.
The NTC covers five provinces: Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning and Shandong. Inner Mongolia is crescent shaped, and forms most of China’s northern border with Mongolia. Heilongjiang forms the northeastern-most border with Russia, and is named after the Chinese name for the Amur River (lit. Black Dragon River; 黑龙江) which separates the two countries. Jilin province forms a part of central Dongbei and the eastern half of the border with North Korea. Liaoning province curves around the Bohai gulf and touches both Hebei province (which surrounds Beijing and Tianjin) and the western half of the border with North Korea. Liaoning also includes strategic geography that connects Beijing with the rest of the northeast. This strategic geography has shaped historical events and even today dictates the deployment of some of China’s military units.
In Liaoning Province, Jinzhou controls the entrance to the northeastern end of the Shanhai Pass, part of the “Liaoxi Corridor” (辽西走廊), which connects land transportation between North China and Northeast China. The other end is protected by Shanhaiguan (山海关), a gate in the Great Wall wedged between the Khingan Mountains (大兴安岭) to the north and the Bohai Gulf to the South.
The Ming Dynasty’s defeat at Shanhaiguan in 1644 opened the path to Beijing and then into greater China, paving the way for a Qing victory. Nationalist and Communist forces fought over the same terrain during the Chinese Civil War—in particular during the Ping-Jin Campaign (平津战役), which ended with Communist control of Beijing and the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. Even today, PLA units are deployed to protect this strategic bottleneck.



To the southeast is the Yalu River, which forms the vital western half of the border between China and North Korea. It served as a tripwire for Chinese involvement in the Korean War (or “War to Resist America and Aid [North] Korea”; 抗美援朝战争). China’s intervention in October 1950, as UN forces neared the Yalu River, changed the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia. Chinese forces, along with Soviet air cover, pushed the UN back, and after a long series of assaults and counter-assaults, concluded an armistice with both sides occupying a line roughly contiguous with the 38th parallel. As a result of the Armistice (not an end to the war), and North Korea’s military threat, the U.S. keeps 28,500 troops (or personnel) stationed in South Korea. For China, North Korea’s 1,300 km border is a major source of instability. The small, isolated country is a trafficker of methamphetamines, a source of political refugees, and origin of violence as members of the Korean army regularly cross into China to commit robberies or even murders (China Brief, January 9, 2015).
Further to the north, the Ussuri River (乌苏里江) became the subject of tensions in the 1960s. Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the mi-1950s, eventually culminating in a brief conflict over Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island; 珍宝岛), which had the potential to spill into a broader conflict. Declassified threat assessments indicate that U.S. policymakers closely monitored the ramp-up of forces in the area before and in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. Chinese force disposition during this period was focused on counter-attacking after a Soviet incursion along multiple axes—from the west from the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, a strike through Mongolia toward Beijing and a multi-pronged assault through northeast China. Reflecting a realistic view of its forces capabilities and China’s “Lure the Enemy Deep” (诱敌深入) and “Active Defense” (积极防御) strategies, China’s forces were arrayed well back from the border to take advantage of China’s strategic depth. [1] According to a declassified National Intelligence Estimate from 1973:
Peking elected not to confront the Soviet forces directly along the border; instead the Chinese have been building fortified areas in good defensive terrain well back from the border, thus compensating in part for the greater mobility and firepower of the Soviet forces. [2]
China did not change its Strategic Guidelines (战略方针) to reflect an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union until 1985. Interestingly, the concentration of forces further south, away from the border with Russia does not appear to have changed significantly since 1973. When China changed its military regions into Theater Commands at the end of 2015 it also changed the protocol order, moving the NTC from its predecessors’ position as most important, to number 4, behind the Eastern, Southern, and Western TCs, indicating that the threat from Russia has receded, just as the importance of Taiwan, the South China Sea, and China’s borders with Central Asia have increased. However, the economic importance of the area remains unchanged.
Economics

Saturday, May 20, 2017

What Recent Tests Reveal About India’s Missile Proliferation?

 SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/19052017-recent-tests-reveal-indias-missile-proliferation-oped/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29





India's launch of the Agni V missile. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Wikipedia Commons.




What Recent Tests Reveal About India’s Missile Proliferation? 

                              By 

                     




MTCR is one of the four non-proliferation regimes that aim to curb missile technology that can be used for nuclear delivery systems. The other three are the Wassenaar Arrangement that deals with export control of dual use technologies and conventional arms. The Australia Group is related to export controls on technologies with regard to chemical and biological weapons. Lastly, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) is a cartel of 48 countries that aims to curb proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The members participate in decision making and are expected to play their role in implementing the international standards for responsible non-proliferation behavior. It works with the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic missile proliferation (ICOC) in order to restraint the production and spread of delivery systems capable of delivering WMD.

India gained candidacy to MTCR which sets guidelines to control the production and delivery of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of mass destruction. The MTCR restricts its members to export missile or missile-related technology and systems capable of carrying a payload of at least 500 kg to a distance of at least 300 km. The decisions made in MTCR are consensus based. In past, the regime has been successful in convincing Argentina, Iraq and Egypt to give up their ballistic missile programs.



Related: Forthcoming NSG-Plenary Meeting: Prospects For Pakistan-India Candidacy – OpEd




However, India’s entry in MTCR is being proved beneficial not only for India’s space and missiles program but it is also reinforcing its import export with other states possessing sensitive technologies without any vulnerability of facing sanctions. The significant improvement is the recognition of India’s nuclear legitimacy that will strengthen its credentials. It has been the quest of Indian strategic planners to be the members of elite nuclear clubs; therefore the candidacy to MTCR may help India in its ambition to join NSG and get the permanent seat in United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The 37th Plenary meeting of NSG will be held in June this year and this is yet to see if India would bargain for its inclusion in NSG with China, which has been rejected for MTCR’s membership in 2004. As now India will be in position to help China’s inclusion in MTCR. Last year, China protested India’s membership in NSG as non-NPT state but at that time India was not the member of MTCR.

MTCR Membership Helping India’s Missile Program







              India’s Agni missile range.
     Source: Michael, Wikipedia Commons



The MTCR membership is profoundly helping in India’s missile program. Previously India was denied sophisticated missile technology due to MTCR provisions standards or sanctions. Now when all these limitations have been removed, India is extending its missile’s ranges to improve its defense and striking capabilities. Other than missiles, India is now importing surveillance drones from US, before denied due to MTCR restrictions. On the other hand, Indian approval for acquiring Arrow II theatre missile defense interceptor from Israel was facing constant delay because the acquisition was subject to US approval. The US was bound to abide by the MTCR guidelines thus despite the willingness of Israel this technology transfer could not take place. But recently, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) announced the biggest security contact ever to supply long range air and missile defense systems.

Moreover, India’s space program was also facing setback because it was unable to export cryogenic technology from Russia. The technology was also required to expedite India’s Agni’s program and ICBM pursuit. In the next year after India joined MTCR, it successfully tested Agni-V which ranked India among few states possessing Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). India also developed capability to launch manned space missions. However the field of drone technology is being benefitted in the absence of confines after this regime’s membership and now India is looking forward to export drone’s technology from US.


Related: India’s NSG trials And Trump – Analysis




To conclude, the admission to MTCR largely proved beneficial to India in order to improve its offensive-defensive capabilities. The country is now extending its missile ranges which are helping the rationale of missile proliferation. Most of these capabilities might not be directly aimed at Pakistan yet the trend to develop variety of capabilities can allow India to adopt an aggressive strategy towards Pakistan in future. The fearsome aspect is that a debate has already been stirred up in strategic and policy circles about India reviewing its no-first policy. The signs of internal debate to reconsider nuclear posture and the acquisition of diverse along with missile proliferation will adversely impact the South Asian strategic stability.

*Maimuna Ashraf is a member of an Islamabad based think tank, Strategic Vision Institute (SVI). She works on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and South Asian nuclear equation. Furthermore, she regularly writes for national and international dailies.