ROCKET FORCE : PLA Second Artillery Corps

SOURCE:
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Second-Artillery-Corps.html#mozTocId836202

   



                PLA :  ROCKET FORCE


                           

                            PLA  MODERNIZATION



                                                     INDEX  


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     [ 1 ]    PLA MODERNIZATION : PLA  :China’s CENTRAL Theater   Command = "blank"                                      DATA AWAITED

                        [  1  A  ]   PLA MODERNIZATION :   PLA  ROCKET  FORCE  
                                                                                                                                                                      http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/rocket-force-pla-                                                   second- artillery-corps.html

    

     [ 2 ]    PLA MODERNIZATION : PLA : Strategic Assessment:  China’s Northern Theater                                    Command
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/pla-modernization-pla-strategic.html

     [3]     China’s Southern Theater Command 

              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/p-l-snapshot-chinas-southern-theater.html


      [4]    PLA MODERNIZATION :Snapshot: China’s Eastern Theater Command

               http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/pla-modernization-snapshot-chinas.html

      [5]    China’s Western Theater Command
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/p-l-snapshot-chinas-western-theater.html

       [6]    PLA SETUP PRIOR TO MODERNIZATION
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/04/pla-modernization-pla-setup-prior-to.html

     [7]    PLA Theater Joint Intelligence:Organization and Operations

                http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/search/label/PLA%20%20MODERENIZATION

  

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear for the result of a hundred battles.  If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.  If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle”.  (SunTsu, Chap 3, (18))   

ROCKET FORCE  PLA Second Artillery Corps

Technical Report APA-TR-2009-1204 Sean O'Connor, BA, MS (AMU) December 2009 Updated April, 2012Text © 2009 Sean O'Connor Layout, Line Artwork © 2009 Carlo Kopp

Second Artillery Corps DF-21C TEL during rehearsals for the 60th Anniversary PLA parade. Background - China's Missile Force Second Artillery Corps - General Deployment 51ST BASE 52ND BASE 53RD BASE 54TH BASE 55TH BASE 56TH BASE Training Facilities Test Facilities Development and Production Nuclear Weapons Industry Operational Employment Future Force Development Conclusion References and Notes Background - China's Missile Force China possesses one of the largest land-based missile forces in the world. While intercontinental ballistic missile parity with the US or the USSR was never one of the goals of the PLA during the Cold War, a rapidly modernizing 2nd Artillery Corps is becoming a far more viable international deterrent force in the current world. Capable of inundating the region surrounding China with hundreds, if not thousands, of conventional and nuclear armed missiles, the PLA's 2nd Artillery Corps deserves credit and recognition as one of the most devastating military branches found in any military worldwide.  The Chinese land-based ballistic and cruise missile force comprises 38 operational missile units spread throughout the nation. The force is heavily oriented towards mobile short and theater range systems, with only eight facilities supporting ICBMs. The locations of the PLA's operational missile units can be seen in the image below: Second Artillery Corps - General Deployment The 2nd Artillery Corps of the People's Liberation Army controls China's land-based missile forces. The 2nd Artillery Corps is responsible for both ballistic and cruise missiles, with varying ranges and differing payloads. With the introduction of new conventionally armed ballistic missiles and the new CJ-10 GLCM, the 2nd Artillery Corps should not merely be considered a nuclear missile force. The 2nd Artillery Corps headquarters is located north of Beijing, directly south of the 2ndArtillery Corp's research and development complex, as seen in the image below. An alternate HQ is likely found in the hardened underground launch control facility located beneath  Yuquanshan Mountain to the west. Second Artillery Corps missile units are organized into what the PLA refers to as “bases”. There are six bases, each located in a different geographical area. Described in the terms used by the Russian military, these bases are analogous to Russia's “Missile Armies”. Each base has numerous subordinate missile brigades, with each brigade maintaining one or more garrisons, various underground facilities (UGFs), rail transfer points, and field launch positions. Missile garrisons are not difficult to identify once their location can be narrowed to a certain geographical area. These facilities will typically contain administrative and support infrastructure for assigned personnel, and various garages for housing missile TELs and support equipment. Garrisons supporting field deployable systems such as the DF-21 or DF-31 will typically possess high-bay garages or other similar structures used for the assembly and checkout of system components. Rail transfer points are not typically easy to identify with any certainty, unless missile equipment is visible at the railyard. However, the likely rail transfer points are those railyards in closest proximity via roadway or connecting railspur to the missile garrisons. Ergo, these facilities have been marked as the likely rail transfer points. Identifying field launch sites for the 2nd Artillery Corps' missile force can be a difficult proposition, and there are likely hundreds of such locations as yet unlocated. Careful analysis can be used to identify likely locations, however. The majority of these positions will contain a hardened concrete pad where the associated missile will be erected for launch. Certain missile systems will typically have very similar or even identical launch positions. Usually, it appears that most units within a given base will adopt a similar launch site design for a given missile type, although this is not uniform. Typical launch site dimensions for common used systems are as follows: DF-11: 15 meters in length DF-15: 26 meters in length DF-21: 45 meters in length As a comparison, consider the following image. DF-21 launch positions from the 51st and 56thBases are depicted. Note the similarity to the Datong and Delingha sites. The Huanglong and Liuqingkao examples depict identical dimensions but different, more concealed configurations. Such concealment efforts can make launch sites difficult to identify without considerable examination and are often employed by units in areas which are more likely to be potentially engaged. Knowing the dimensions or configuration of a given launch site for a specific missile type allows analysts to determine which sites in a mixed garrison are employed by which missile systems. Shangrao's 815th Brigade, for example, employs both the DF-11 and DF-15. Given that both missiles utilize dimensionally different launch positions due to the different size of the launch vehicles, an examination of the launch sites near Shangrao will provide an indication of which sites will be used by which missile system. Once this is determined, a more accurate assessment of the strength of the unit may also be made. These are standard practices when analyzing missile units through overhead imagery. Nearly every missile brigade is located in close proximity to one or more hardened UGFs. It is thought that these facilities may provide staging areas for missile systems which have left garrison. Alternatively, they could provide storage for missiles and/or warheads, as these are not likely to be kept on TELs in-garrison indefinitely. These facilities may also serve a purpose unrelated to the 2nd Artillery Corps, but are included nonetheless as their true purpose cannot be accurately determined. It is known that UGFs support aspects of the 2nd Artillery Corps, and the included facilities represent the most likely locations operating in support of nearby missile units. For a representative brigade layout, consider again the 815th Brigade at Shangrao. The following image depicts the locations of the garrison, three identified UGFs, and twelve identified launch sites for the assigned DF-11 and DF-15 missiles. Note the relatively linear progression from garrison to UGF to launch site. A TEL could leave the garrison during hostilities and travel to a UGF for either arming or to await a launch order. Once ordered, the TEL could then proceed to a launch point, all with a minimum of exposure. The icons used above are used throughout this article and are present in the associated downloadable file. The only alteration is that ICBM units are marked on the images of each Base's associated sites with blue flags instead of red flags. This allows the reader to differentiate between theater and intercontinental assets with ease. 51ST BASE The 51st Base consists of six missile units in northeastern China. These units are as follows: 806th Brigade, DF-21, Huanglong/Hancheng 810th Brigade, DF-3A and DF-21, Dengshahe 816th Brigade, DF-15, Tonghua 822nd Brigade, DF-21, Laiwu U/I Brigade, U/I missile, Fengrun U/I Brigade, U/I missile, Jingyu The locations of these units can be seen in the following image: Some sources claim that the 816th Brigade is equipped with the DF-21. 52ND BASEThe  52nd Base consists of twelve missile units in southeastern China. These units are as follows: 807th and 811th Brigades, DF-3A and DF-15, Lianxiwang/Jingdezhen 815th Brigade, DF-15C, Leping 815th Brigade, DF-11 and DF-15, Shangrao 815th Brigade, DF-15, Xindian 817th Brigade, DF-11A, Yong An 818th Brigade, DF-15, Meizhou 819th Brigade, DF-15, Gangzhou 820th Brigade, DF-15, Jinhua U/I Brigade, DF-11 and DF-15, Jiangshan U/I Brigade, DF-15, Nanping U/I Brigade, DF-11A, Xianyou U/I Brigade, U/I missile, Ningbo The locations of these units can be seen in the following image: The 807th Brigade, reportedly located at Chizhou, is likely co-located with the 811th Brigade at Lianxiwang/Jingdezhen. DF-3A missiles associated with these units may have been replaced by DF-21s, according to some sources. 53RD BASE The 53rd Base consists of four missile units in southern China. These units are as follows: 802nd Brigade, DF-21, Jianshui 802nd Brigade, DF-21, Kunming 808th Brigade, DF-21, Chuxiong 821st Brigade, CJ-10, Luorong The locations of these units can be seen in the following image: 54TH BASE The 54th Base consists of six missile units in eastern China. These units are as follows: 801st Brigade, DF-5A, Lushi 804th Brigade, DF-5A, Luoning/Luoyang 813th Brigade, DF-31, Nanyang U/I Brigade, DF-4, Sundian U/I Brigade, DF-31, Xixia U/I Brigade, U/I missile, Sanmenxia The locations of these units can be seen in the following image: Launch sites located near Xixia, once thought to serve the 813th Brigade at Nanyang, may support a separate DF-31 or DF-31A unit. Garrison facilities have not been identified, but the different launch site style may be indicative of a separate unit.  55TH BASE The 55th Base consists of two missile units in southern China. These units are as follows: 803rd and 814th Brigades, DF-5A, Jingxian 805th Brigade, DF-4, Tongdao The locations of these units can be seen in the following image: The 803rd and 814th Brigades are both found in close proximity and may share some of the garrison and support facilities located nearby. Dongkou, often claimed to be home to the 55thBase's 824th Brigade, is in actuality a training facility and is not included as part of the 55thBase. 56TH BASE The 56th Base consists of eight missile units in northern China. These units are as follows: 809th Brigade, DF-21, Datong 812th Brigade, DF-31A, Beidao/Tawanli 823rd Brigade, DF-21, Korla U/I Brigade, DF-11 and DF-15, Da Qaidam U/I Brigade, DF-4, DF-11, DF-15, DF-21, and DF-31, Delingha U/I Brigade, DF-21, Liuqingkou U/I Brigade, DF-11 and DF-15, Mahai U/I Brigade, DF-21 and DF-31, Xining The locations of these units can be seen in the following image: The Delingha brigade is often referred to as a training unit. This may be the case, but it is included here as it is far more expansive than typical ballistic missile training fields. It is likely home to operational units, even if the facilities are also employed for training purposes. The 812th Brigade is often erroneously referred to as being based at Tianshui when in actuality the main garrison facilities are located east of Tianshui at Beidao. Training Facilities Seven facilities provide classroom and field training for 2nd Artillery Corps personnel. Six facilities are garrisons or launch areas providing hands-on training and missile launch capabilities. The seventh facility is the 2nd Artillery Corps Engineering School in Xian. The locations and identifications of the 2nd Artillery Corps' training facilities can be seen in the image below: Many of the training facilities do not provide significant garrison areas, implying that they are manned by deployed units who arrive with their own equipment. This does not imply that crew training is not conducted at home garrison, but rather that a capability to field deploy and conduct training launches is available within the 2nd Artillery Corps. This is similar to the presence of dedicated training facilities for PLAAF SAM units. Such a layout also allows locations to be identified as training rather than operational garrisons. A representative training facility can be found at Linyi. This facility houses numerous training launch pads and minimal support facilities. It can be seen in the image below: Two of the training facilities provide crew training on the DF-5A missile system. These two facilities, at Dongkou and Luoyang, are fitted with missile silos to provide a realistic training environment. Not only are crews theoretically able to undergo certification or training on launch procedures, but the presence of realistic silos allows maintenance personnel to effectively train on operational tasks such as silo reloading and in-silo missile servicing. This is a significant training capability to possess; with DF-5A ICBM silos in relatively short supply, training can be conducted without affecting the operational status of the primary Chinese strategic deterrent force Test Facilities Seven test facilities support the development and testing of ballistic missiles in China. Six of these locations are equipped with facilities to launch various types of ballistic missiles. The seventh facility is an impact range equipped with mock targets used to assess missile accuracy. The locations and identifications of the 2nd Artillery Corps' test facilities can be seen in the image below: The two primary ballistic missile test facilities are at Wuzhai and Shuangchengzi. These facilities contain multiple launch positions and support facilities, allowing for large-scale development programs to be conducted at each site. Wuzhai is considerably larger and is likely the primary ICBM test facility. It is the only test facility to be outfitted with a DF-5 series silo for trials launches, and has been cited in the open press as the launch site for DF-31 and DF-31A trials. Shuangchengzi, therefore, is likely primarily tasked with supporting SRBM/MRBM/IRBM development programs, although there is no reason why any type of missile could not be fired from either location. Four other facilities, located at Bayan Hot, Huludao, Jinzhou, and Songlin, are also available for test launches. The Songlin site is noteworthy as it supports the development of China's ASAT missile. This location fired the SC-19 ASAT weapon used to destroy an orbiting satellite in January of 2007. Apart from the six launch facilities supporting missile testing, an impact zone located 100km northwest of Dunhuang provides targets for weapons fired in test and training launches. Close examination of this facility proves to be very revealing. The facility consists of five primary targets, seen in the image below. These targets consist of three mock airstrips and two concrete pads. The concrete pads provide a great deal of insight into Chinese warhead development. Both the small western pad, measuring 115 meters by 115 meters, and the large eastern pad, measuring 250 meters by 250 meters, show considerable evidence of submunitions impacts, implying that submunitions warheads have been actively tested. The eastern pad was untouched as of May 2005, but began to show evidence of submunitions impacts in September 2006 imagery. By March of 2007 the eastern pad showed evidence of large HE warhead strikes.  The eastern pad is significant as it is divided into four 150 meter by 150 meter sections, allowing for missile accuracy to be measured accurately. All of the HE warhead impacts are contained within the northeastern section. The characteristics of the impacts themselves suggests that they were all made by the same type of warhead. While it is possible that this represents evidence of an MRV-equipped missile test, possibly that of the DF-21C, it cannot be conclusively determined if the impacts were made during the same test using the available imagery. As the weapons all impacted in the same segment of the pad, it does allow for an assessment of the accuracy of the launch platform to be made. Details of the eastern impact pad can be seen in the image below: All of the impacts can be contained within a circle having a 100 meter radius. This indicates that the CEP of the weapon is approximately 50 meters. Given the fact that the target site is 580 kilometers from Shuangchengzi, it is possible that a DF-15C test series resulted in the HE impacts on the pad. The DF-15C is reported to have a 600 kilometer range and terminal homing. The inclusion of a dual GPS and active radar terminal homing system on the DF-15C allows for an accuracy reportedly between 30 and 50 meters CEP, matching what is visible at the impact site. The integration of terminal homing with conventional warheads of high accuracy provides more credibility to the Chinese ASBM threat as well as indicating that accuracte, conventionally armed ballistic missiles may be more likely to be employed in a conflict than previous nuclear-only weapons. In a conventional conflict this could result in a significant increase in the number of ballistic missiles fired at targets, potentially allowing any ATBM or ABM systems in the area to be oversaturated. Development and Production The development and production of ballistic and cruise missiles in China involves numerous different facilities throughout the nation. These facilities can be seen in the image below: Missile final assembly is conducted at one of the missile plants or assembly facilities. Solid propellant motors are produced by the facilities near Xian, with the Lantian Solid Rocket Motor Academy being responsible for their design and development. The Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology is responsible for liquid propellant motors, and the marked “Ballistic Missile Development Facility” may be CALT's main test facility, although this has yet to be verified. TELs are produced by three factories, and may be produced at the Beijing Nanyuan facility as well. Nuclear Weapons Industry Little is known about the actual design and production of Chinese nuclear weapons. Five facilities have been identified that have a known nuclear-related purpose. They are as follows: CIAE Nuclear Research Complex, Tuoli 404 Plutonium Production Plant, Jiuquan 504 Uranium Gasseous Diffusion Plant, Lanzhou 821 Plutonium Production Plant, Guangyuan Lop Nur Nuclear Test Site These facilities are annotated on the image below: While these facilities may have civillian nuclear power and research purposes, their nature indicates that they may also serve the Chinese nuclear weapons industry. Lop Nur is well known as the test site for Chinese nuclear weapons, and the three plants annotated above could be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material. Operational Employment During wartime, control over the 2nd Artillery Corps' missile brigades differs depending on their payload. Units fielding nuclear armed weapons, most notably the ICBM brigades, report directly to the Chinese national command center west of Beijing. Conventionally armed brigades are treated differently. A regional command cell, called a “war front” command, would assume control of relevant conventionally-armed ballistic missile units as part of a conventional missile corps. This missile corps would be subordinate to the war front command, acting as part of a total force package consisting of air, land, sea, and missile elements. Beijing's leadership and 2nd Artillery Corps commanders would be able to communicate directly with the war front command, and would retain the ability to directly control assigned missile brigades should the need arise or the situation warrant it. At the brigade level, individual firing battalions would be assigned operating areas consisting of presurveyed and/or prepared launch positions. As previously mentioned, it is likely that the garrisoned TELs are not kept uploaded with missiles and armed with warheads. Inside a missile brigade's force structure, there are six departments: headquarters, political, logistics, technical and equipment, missile storage, and launch battalions. These are present in both conventional and nuclear missile brigades. The missile storage department consists of a central depot, and a missile/warhead transfer section. This implies that there is a storage facility for the missiles and warheads, or perhaps separate facilities for each. No garrison facility possesses the secure, hardened facilities needed to adequately store and protect these assets, so it must be assumed that they are located off-site. The logical assumption is that the vast network of UGFs located near the missile garrisons and launch sites are used to protect, store, and transfer these items. Storing warheads and missiles in UGFs allows TELs to be loaded and armed under protected cover, and away from the prying eyes of intelligence satellites attempting to gauge force readiness. This also allows the garrisons themselves to be situated in or near large population centers, as most of them are, without fear of any accident or incident leading to a catastrophe. Apart from the ICBM force, which at present only provides a token deterrent lacking in any sort of credible counterforce or counterstrike capability, the 2nd Artillery Corps is equipped primarily for a regional mission. The most significant unit is the 52nd Base, controlling the weapons directed across the strait at the Taiwan Authority on the island of Taiwan. The twelve units of the 52nd Base control a large number of DF-3A, DF-11, DF-11A, DF-15, and DF-15C ballistic missiles. Apart from the DF-3A which can range far out into the Pacific Ocean, the remaining missile forces have sufficient range to blanket the island of Taiwan without venturing far from their garrisons. The following image depicts 2nd Artillery Corps ballistic missile coverage of the island of Taiwan. DF-11 range rings are orange, DF-11A range rings are yellow, and DF-15/DF-15C range rings are red.  With a limited ATBM capability provided by Tien Kung II, Tien Kung III, and PATRIOT PAC-2 SAM batteries, the island of Taiwan could easily be overwhelmed by incoming weapons, even considering the October 2008 approval by the United States Congress of a PAC-3 sale to the Taiwan Authority. The deployment of accurate, conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles makes the missile threat to the island of Taiwan far more likely to become part of a military option. In short, a determined missile strike on the island of Taiwan could be carried out in a manner guaranteeing its success, should the Chinese government wish to expend the number of weapons necessary to oversaturate the ATBM capable systems. Given the number of missiles deployed by the 52nd Base, it would appear that at least part of that equation has already been satisfied. The most important feature of the 2nd Artillery Corps is mobility. A great deal of effort was made during the 1970s and 1980s to improve mobility and reduce the readiness time of deployed systems. Developmental systems which reached maturity in the 1990s and 2000s were all designed to be highly mobile; a great deal of the successes in this regard have stemmed from the maturation of the solid rocket motor industry. Mobility enhances the survivability of deployed assets, making it harder to accurately target them due to a potential lack of consistently accurate positioning data. The only issue with mobile systems is the need for accurate pretargeting position data to prepare the onboard guidance systems. Using presurveyed and prepared launch sites alleviates a portion of this problem, but provides enemy forces with locations to monitor for deployed missile systems. Adequate intelligence and indications and warning information must also be possessed in order to ensure that missiles are field deployed prior to the outbreak of armed conflict, lest the launchers be destroyed in-garrison before they have a chance to be loaded and deployed. Future Force Development The current ICBM force in China represents a token strategic deterrent incapable of waging a nuclear counterforce or counterstrike campaign. While silo-based DF-5A missiles are survivable to a degree, silo positions can be located and targeted for preemptive strike should the need arise. China has taken measures to conceal these positions, but they can still be located through thorough imagery analysis. To increase survivability and reduce launch preparation time, the solid propellant DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs have been developed and are being fielded. Liquid-fueled DF-5A missiles may not employ storable liquid fuel propellant, possibly requiring a lengthy fueling process before firing. The DF-31 appears to have been superceded by the longer-ranged DF-31A capable of reaching the entire United States, with only the 813th Brigade at Nanyang and possibly the unidentified brigade at Xixia definitely operating the system. The main drawback of the DF-31, apart from the shorter range when compared to the DF-31A, is the lack of an off-road capability. It is believed that a new off-road capable TEL is being developed for the DF-31A, allowing the weapons to be deployed further afield from garrisons in areas where launch positions would be much harder to identify. The deployment of increased numbers of DF-31 and DF-31A systems will finally allow China to obtain a survivable, credible counterforce and counterstrike capability. The presence of UGFs supporting these systems allows them to remain hidden prior to launch, perhaps deploying after an initial nuclear attack to perform a counterstrike mission. MIRVing these weapons would increase the effectiveness of each launcher, and when combined with the PLAN's evolving SSBN fleet would allow a smaller number of launch platforms to serve as a counterforce option and credible deterrent to any nuclear strike, should a “launch on warning” posture be adopted with sufficient support assets. One mission being developed for the 2nd Artillery Corps is that of anti-carrier strike using precision-guided conventionally armed ballistic missiles.  Conclusion While the 2nd Artillery Corps does not currently represent a significant nuclear deterrent force against either the United States or Russia, it represents a very substantial risk to  lesser regional nations, due to the large number of SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM assets currently deployed. As ICBMs with higher mobility are deployed and more accurate conventional theater weapons enter service, the 2nd Artillery Corps will evolve into a true strategic deterrent and even more devastating regional military force.   The ground launched CJ-10 Long Sword is a strategic cruise missile modelled on the United States BGM-109G GLCM and Soviet RK-55 Relief, the latter both scrapped under treaty obligations. Chinese sources credit this missile with a range of up to  1,100 nautical miles. It carries a range of different 770 lb or 1,100 lb warheads. The PLA Second Artillery Force has currently up to 30 deployed TELs (Chinese internet).  References and Notes A Google Earth file containing the placemarks used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here. This file contains every identified facility associated with the units and locations described above. Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition To Credible Deterrence; Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes DoD Annual Report To Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China (2008 and 2009 reports) The DH-10 Reaches IOC Chinese Strategic Missiles 2nd Artillery Units & Inventory Chinese Missile Facilities Chinese Nuclear Facilities SC-19 Designation Revealed Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning China's Ballistic Missile Programs More information on ASBM developments can be found here.

PROJECT SARASWATI : Derawar Fort: A 9th Century Human Marvel On the Verge of Collapse (R)

SOURCE:
https://www.dawn.com/news/1311657


               PROJECT SARASWATI

Derawar Fort: A 9th Century Human Marvel On the Verge of Collapse

                                     BY

                      FAZAL KHALIQ

 FEB 01, 2017

With its landmark architecture symbolizing centuries of grandeur, the Derawar Fort is a standout attraction in the Cholistan desert.

Despite its awe-inspiring allure, however, it seems on the verge of collapse due to the neglect of authorities.

The Derawar Fort was first built in the 9th century under the kingship of Rai Jajja Bhati, a Hindu Rajput from Jaisalmir in India's Rajasthan state.

The fort as it looks from the balcony of the mosque in its courtyard.─ Fazal Khaliq

However, it was the Nawab of Bahawalpur, Sadeq Mohammad Khan I, who captured the fort in 1733 and had it rebuilt to how it looks today.

View of the 9th century Derawar Fort amid Cholistan desert, Bahawalpur.─ Photo by Fazal Khaliq

30-metre-high bastions surround the fort, along with walls that span over 1.5 kilometres. In the scorching summer of the Cholistan desert, the fort's red-bricked facade seems to glow with the heat and is visible for miles.

Altaf Hussain, a watchman and tour guide at the fort, says even the architecture of the fort's dungeons, which could once be accessed through a stairway made of tunneled pathways, has a charm of its own. He also speaks of a long underground railway tunnel that connected the Sadiq Ghar Palace to the fort.

A stairway leads to the underground portion of the fort.─Fazal Khaliq

"The Derawar fort was also connected to other forts in Cholistan through a network of underground tunnels. On the ground floor, there were offices, a small prison, a gallows, a water pond and residential rooms," he says.

Hussain says that every Thursday, nawab sahib visited the fort and held an open court with his attendants, passing judgement on different cases, including those on capital crimes.

He says three watchmen at the fort were still employed by the Nawab’s family as the fort is still in their possession.

The fallen structures inside the fort.─ Photo by Fazal Khaliq

The fort attracts a large number of local, national and international tourists in the winters.

"I visited this place recently after ten years and I was shocked to see its dilapidated condition. It had many rooms that are no longer there," says Mohammad Jamil, a visitor from Ahmedpur tehsil.

Interior of the royal room in disrepair.─Fazal Khaliq

"We used to be able to climb down to the underground section by a stairway, but today that is not possible as the tunneled pathways are blocked," Jamil says, adding that the entire fort would crumble to the ground if authorities continued to neglect it.

Tragically, tourists are also to blame, as they carelessly walk on various structures, eat at the site and throw trash inside the fort.

"I visited the fort when I was a student in the tenth grade. That was almost 12 years ago. At that time, the fort was in a considerably good condition. We walked in the tunnels for a mile and could see a network of tunnels leading to different rooms. But the stairs leading to the top of bastions have now collapsed. The majority of the bastions have developed cracks, with bricks from some falling off," says Abdul Ghafar, a local cultural activist.

Owing to its run-down condition, the entire fort may soon collapse, Ghafar fears.

The intricate facade of the royal room, from where the rulers would look at the view outside, is evident of neglect.─Fazal Khaliq

"There is immediate need for its conservation and preservation. Otherwise, we will lose this important heritage," he laments.

"At least UNESCO and other international organisations should come forward and protect the fort if Punjab government cannot live up to the task," the activist says.

Sahibzada Muhammad Gazain Abbasi, a former MPA from the area, says his family was aware of the deteriorating condition of the fort and that it was willing to collaborate with any organisation — government or non-government — to preserve its history.

"We want it properly preserved and protected as this is now the heritage of the entire country. We are open to anyone to come and talk with us about its preservation, with the government as a mediator," Abbasi says.

A local makes his way through the outermost gate of Derawar Fort amid the Cholistan desert, Bahawalpur.─Fazal Khaliq

"Negotiations are underway with the Chinese and some other organisations for its preservation and we are hopeful that the site will be protected for future generations," the former MPA told Dawn.

ARMED FORCES & JUDICIAL OVERREACH : Do reconsider, My Lords...

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/do-reconsider-my-lords-/410620.html




                    ON GUARD

    : The Indian Army is responsible

                            and 

     acts only when it absolutely must.

        Do reconsider, My Lords...

                               BY

        Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (Retd)



Judicial overreach in some cases puzzling





WE in the military and,  indeed, the bulk of the citizens of the country, have always looked upon the higher judiciary with great respect. Despite a few ‘bad apples’ in its midst, which were recently found to be infested with the proverbial worms, the sagacity of the higher judiciary continues to be admired. 

Lately, however, the overreach of the judiciary is puzzling to say the least. I feel it a duty to draw the attention of the honourable Lordships to some jarring judgments that have upset a large number of citizens, particularly the men and women who belong to the uniformed fraternity. 

My Lords, let me start by your recent judgment on lodging FIRs against Army personnel who kill a terrorist, insurgent, militant, or any person breaking the law of the land while carrying out assigned tasks of neutralising any and everyone who is spreading mayhem, panic, attacking the military or other uniformed personnel and civilians too; or destroying government or private property.

My Lords, being highly learned, I am sure you are aware that the Army, personnel of the Central Armed Police Forces, state armed police and other police personnel deployed in J&K are waging a new and extremely difficult kind of war against insurgents of all kinds, in areas that are highly disturbed, at the express behest and full support of a dastardly neighbour, well-known for its hatred for all things Indian. 

Your Lordships must be aware that this is a war against an unseen enemy, who sticks to no rules of war or high-grade conflict; who is religiously motivated by self-serving religious heads, even to the extent of committing suicide because that is what their motivators, trainers and leaders have drilled in their heads over and over, till they have shifted from thinking men and women to zombies of the worst kind.

I am certain your Lordships are also aware that the Indian Army is fighting this vicious war under the rubric of ‘Aid to Civil Authority’, a well-known and formalised doctrine for the Army’s secondary role. The important tenets of this doctrine are ‘use of minimum force’; ‘all actions in good faith’; ‘adhering to the law of the land’; and always keeping in mind that they are dealing with misguided (a highly inadequate word for these ‘violent’ people) country men and women. All ranks of the Army are fully aware and act under these tenets while conducting operations, but when their own life and the task assigned to them have reached the highest and thinnest point of the needle, they act, and even in doing so ensure that there is no or least collateral damage.

Even when there was ample scope for a de novo look at the entire issue, when a curative petition had been filed by the government, you chose to uphold your earlier directions of July 8, 2016, wherein the registration of an FIR against armed forces personnel has been made mandatory for every encounter death:-

My Lords, is it then not a judgment that completely ignores ground realities?

My Lords, you are no doubt aware of the well-known saying ‘the law is an ass’. This proverbial expression of English origin (from a play published by English dramatist George Chapman in 1654, Revenge for Honour), calls into question the rigid application of the law and by no means casts any aspersions on the grasp of the law by person(s) pronouncing judgment. Hence, the present issue does not fall into this category either.

However, a point relative to this is that the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) continues to be in force in J&K; and Section 7 of the Act stipulating that no legal proceedings shall be instituted against armed forces personnel acting in good faith, except with the previous sanction of the Central government, continues to be operative. So, the young men and women laying their lives on the line cannot understand two diametrically opposite judgments! No officer or soldier wants to kill wantonly, but if there is a threat to the country’s sovereignty, he will either kill or get killed. Surely, My Lords, these could not have been your intentions.

My Lords, the next issue relates to a landmark judgment by your august court, delivered on December 10,  2014, relating to the issue of broad-banding or rounding off of disability pension of all military personnel. In this judgment, you had forthrightly dismissed all appeals of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) made over a number of years and had given full relief to over 800 affected military personnel that forced the ministry to remove all impediments and give all dues to the affected personnel, with arrears.

While this was a historic judgment hailed by all, no one perhaps has pointed it out to your Lordships that the MoD, instead of cancelling their policy letter of January 31, 2001, chose to wrongly interpret your wise decision and insisted that this judgment was only applicable to those who had filed cases in the higher courts, which you had so wisely clubbed together. Resultantly, it has refused to give benefits of your judgment to thousands of others, who were directed to approach AFTs or High Courts for their cases to be eligible for the benefits of broadbanding! My Lords, is this not a travesty of justice when the highest court in the land has dismissed all excuses and submissions made by the MoD?

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[ ONLY AN  " ARSE "  WILL FAIL TO SEE THROUGH THAT INVENTING LEGAL CASEs HAS BECOME AN INDUSTRY WITH THE NEXUS OF VAKIL- BABUs  IN THE MINISTRY BESIDES CUTs IN THE PROCUREMENTS.........the list is endless -VASUNDHRA ]

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My Lords, I ask you in all humility whether our disabled jawans can file such suits or need to, when your sage judgment prevails.

My third issue has little to do with the military but has affected businesses and jobs at a large scale. I am referring to your recent judgment, My Lords, on imposing a ban on the sale of liquor within 500 metres of a national highway. In an era when the numbers of unemployed are increasing because of the inability of the government to create sufficient jobs, your judgment has resulted in additional large-scale laying off; brought down drastically the price of property along highways and exponentially increased property prices artificially away from highways. I am sure you were clearly focused on reducing fatalities on account of drunk driving. 

My view as a layman has always been that the government has no business in trying to change how the polity dresses, eats, drinks and carries out its day-to-day functions. Unfortunately, our political leaders have not learnt this basic issue of governance. Now, the judiciary, as the highest and most important watchdog of the nation, has meddled with this aspect, when other options are available to reduce fatalities. 

May I request your Lordships to revisit this judgment too and bring succour to the affected people?

The writer is a former Vice-Chief of Army Staff