CDS PART 1:- CDS- Explained: What is Chief of Defence Staff that PM Modi announced in I-Day speech

SOURCE:
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/explained-what-is-chief-of-defence-staff-cds-pm-narendra-modi-independence-day-speech-1581018-2019-08-15

CDS 

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

Part 28 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-28-cds-jointness-pla-snapshot.html

Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html

Part 22 of  N  Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html


Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html

Part 14 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of-n-parts-new.html


Part 13  of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-jointness-pla-pla-system-of-systems.html

Part 12  of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-12-cds-jointness-pla-military.html

Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part  9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part  8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html

Part 5 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-3-chief-of-defence-staff.html

Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of N Parts:
  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html

Part 1  of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html






          PART 1 of N Parts :
  CDS- Explained: What is Chief 
                            of 
    Defence   Staff that PM Modi                      announced in I-Day speech

The demand for having a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has been raised on multiple occasions by experts and veterans. The post is aimed at ensuring better coordination between the three services. 

Illustration by Saurabh Singh/IndiaToday

August 15, 2019

UPDATED: August 16, 2019

In his first Independence Day speech in his second term Prime Minister Narendra Modi today made a far-reaching announcement for India's defence forces. PM Narendra Modi said his government has decided to establish the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDF) for the three services -- the Indian Army, the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force.

The demand for having a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has been raised on multiple occasions by experts and veterans. It was first recommended after the 1999 Kargil War. The post is aimed at ensuring better coordination between the three services.

Announcing this big decision, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, "Our forces are India's pride. To further sharpen coordination between the forces, I want to announce a major decision from the Red Fort: India will have a Chief of Defence Staff- CDS. This is going to make the forces even more effective."

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PIB India

@PIB_India

Prime Minister

@narendramodi

announces the creation of position of Chief of Defence Staff

#IndependenceDayIndia #IndependenceDay2019 #HappyIndependenceDay

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WHAT IS CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

To put it in simple terms, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is a post that will act as the single-point advisor to the Government of India. The officer concerned will be in a position to advise on matters related to all the three services -- Army, Navy and Air Force -- thus making India's armed forces integrated.

The Chief of Defence Staff will be a 'first among equals', a fourth four-star officer who will be senior to the three other service chiefs.

WHY CDS WAS NEEDED: WHAT EXPERTS SAID

"Briefly put, the case for a CDS has been built around the argument that it is necessary to have a professional body of the highest standing to facilitate 'jointmanship' and render single-point military advice to the government on matters of national security," former Army chief General NC Vij had said in an article for India Today magazine in 2016.

Explaining his stand, Gen (retd) Vij said the intention behind creating CDS was to "reconcile possible differences" in service-specific opinions to enable the government to arrive at considered military decisions.

"The institution of a CDS is best justified by the importance of strategising for a robust and cost-efficient national defence policy. Implicit in this is the role the CDS would play in fostering inter-services jointness in terms of budgeting, equipment purchases, training, joint doctrines and planning of military operations-an imperative of modern warfare," Gen Vij had written.

In the book 'Reforming and Restructuring: Higher Defence Organisation of India', published by Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, Brigadier (Dr) Rajeev Bhutani (Retd) said,

"Probably, India is the only country in the world, where the Secretary Department of Defence -- a generalist civil servant drawn from diverse background and who serves in the Ministry of Defence for a fixed tenure -- has been made responsible for 'the Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence'."

In his 2016 book, Brigadier (retd) Bhutani wondered, 

"Does it mean that a bureaucrat heading the Defence Ministry will formulate the operational plans for war fighting and Chiefs of Staff will execute it. If that was an anomaly then it should have been rectified by now."

Meanwhile, reacting to the PM Modi's announcement, Gen (retd) VP Malik, who was the Army chief during Kargil War said,

"Thank you PM Modi for announcing historic step of institution of CDS. This step will make our national security more effective and more economical. It will ensure better jointmanship and multi-disciplinary coordination. Salute!"

KARGIL WAR AND NEED FOR CDS

The recommendation for creating the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was first made after the 1999 Kargil War. A high-level committee that was set up to examine the gaps in the country's security system in the wake of the Kargil War had recommended that the three services should have a Chief of Defence Staff.

The committee had said this person, a five-star military officer, should be the single-point military adviser to the Defence Minister.

Besides the high-level committee on Kargil War, a group of ministers that was formed in 2001 to explore necessary reforms required to improve India's national security had also favoured creating the post of Chief of Defence Staff.

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ALSO READ | India's unfinished agenda after Kargil

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Moving in a similar direction, in 2012, the Naresh Chandra Task Force recommended that post of a permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) should be created. The CoSC comprises chiefs of the Indian Army, Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force. The senior-most among them would act as the chairman.

WHY DID IT TAKE 20 YEARS?

In the past 20 years since it was first recommended, questions regarding the creation of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) have been raised in Parliament from time to time. A question in this regard was last raised on February 12, 2018 where the Modi government was asked if it proposes to create the post of CDS.

The government in its reply had said, "Creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was recommended by Group of Ministers in 2001. A decision in this regard was to be taken after consultation with political parties. Subsequently, Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security recommended creation of the post of Permanent Chairman Chief of Staff Committee in 2012. Both the proposals are simultaneously under consideration of the Government."

One of the reasons why a decision on creating the post of Chief of Defence Staff could not be taken in the past 20 years was that a political consensus could not be created on it. The Group of Ministers which had favoured CDS in 2001 had said it should be done with political consensus. In 2016, the government informed Parliament that this consultation process could not be completed because all political parties have not responded.

Correction: An earlier version of this article said the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) will be a five-star military officer. However, CDS will be a 'first among equals', a fourth four-star officer who will be senior to the three other service chiefs. The report has been updated and the error is regretted.

ALSO READ | Chief of Defence Staff: An idea whose time has come

ALSO READ | India needs chief of defence staff, but don't ape the west, says Lt Gen Shekatkar's report

ALSO WATCH | PM Modi announces creation of Chief of Defence Staff post

Article 370 - Bridge or Barricade?

SOURCE:
(14) Article 370 - Bridge or Barricade_ Seminar conducted by Daksha Legal - Mr. J Sai Deepak, Advocate - YouTube

Article 370 & 35A  - Bridge or Barricade?

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Article 370 - Bridge or Barricade? Seminar conducted by Daksha Legal - Mr. J Sai Deepak, Advocate

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Key Speaker - J Sai Deepak, Advocate, Supreme Court of India Organized by S Basavaraj, Daksha Legal & Supporters Held on August 2nd 2019 between 5pm to 8pm Article 370 & 35a discussed in detail; Covering Implications through. History Geographical Social Legal International Political

Revisiting Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest in 1953

SOURCE:
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/revisiting-sheikh-abdullah-s-arrest-in-1953/820225.html

           Revisiting Sheikh Abdullah’s

                     arrest in 1953 

                                By 

           Vappala Balachandran 

      (Ex-Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat)

The final break was the Jammu Praja Parishad agitation in the winter of 1952-53, demanding full integration with India. Sheikh Abdullah reacted by spewing communal venom against the agitators, which scorched the region. Nehru asked Mullik to proceed to Jammu and deal with the situation. His mission in Jammu was successful.

Towering: Abdullah emerged powerful in the elections after the Constituent Assembly was constituted for Kashmir in 1951.


Aug 21, 2019

Doubt exists even today whether Sheikh Abdullah was arrested in 1953 on a faulty reading of the mind and motives of that complex personality. Some say that he was a closet sympathiser of Pakistan, while others affirm that he was totally aligned to secular India. Some believe that he was pursuing the independence option, like his bete noire Hari Singh. There are others, like former Foreign Secretary Yezdezard Dinshaw Gundevia, who believe that he was arrested after a typecast police investigation. Gundevia was then handling Kashmir in our foreign office as Joint Secretary.

BN Mullik, then Director, Intelligence Bureau, who had prepared grounds for Abdullah’s arrest, says that the first rupture between the Government of India and the Sheikh came in January 1949 when the three-point proposals of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), especially plebiscite, were being discussed. Abdullah would not agree on plebiscite since the National Conference had passed a resolution in October 1948, favouring accession to India. This impression is not correct as Abdullah had clearly objected to the plebiscite idea in his anti-Pakistan speech at the UN Security Council on February 5, 1948.

Mullik joined the IB only in September 1948 from the Bihar police as Deputy Director. He had no experience on Kashmir. He mentions Abdullah's towering status in Kashmir, but found difficulties in judging the veracity of reports from there on account of deep rivalry between Hari Singh (Jammu) and Abdullah (Valley). His first conflict with Abdullah was in January 1949 when the local IB officer started inquiries about an interview with foreign correspondents Michael Davidson and Ward Price when Abdullah spoke of ‘independence’. Senior minister Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, who was handling Kashmir, advised Mullik to withdraw the IB officer ‘in larger interests’. Ayyangar had to intervene again when Abdullah objected to a new IB officer who was not ‘cleared’ by him. 

Mullik could not visit Srinagar earlier than August 1949 to build a rapport with top leaders, although Ayyangar had advised him to meet them regularly. He stayed for 10 days and was convinced that the reports indicating Abdullah's hostile intentions were unfounded. On return to Delhi, he submitted his report to his Director who passed it on to Home Secretary HVR Iyengar. The latter sent copies to Prime Minister Nehru and Home Minister Sardar Patel. Nehru circulated his report to our foreign missions. Patel who was ‘unhappy’ with Mullik's report,  summoned him, told him that he did not trust Abdullah and that Nehru should not have circulated it widely. Simultaneously, Patel was also getting reports from Hari Singh about Abdullah's communal agenda. 

Mullik, who became IB Director in July 1950, started dealing with Kashmir personally. Things changed in Kashmir at a frenetic pace from the middle of 1949, with Pakistan playing subversive cards, like subverting Pir Maqbool Gilani and NC leader Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra, who formed the pro-Pakistan Political Conference. The IB collected evidence of arms smuggling into the Valley. Abdullah started indulging in competitive communalism. His rhetoric often swung from the independence option to accession to India. 

On April 4, 1951, the Yuvraj constituted a Constituent Assembly for Kashmir. Mullik says that it was Gopalaswamy Ayyangar’s idea, but Abdullah used it for his political advantage. Its intention was to ratify accession to India, but its elections enabled Abdullah to emerge as the sole repository of power. This assembly also abolished Maharaja’s rule and created the post of Sardar-e-Riyasat, electing Karan Singh as the first incumbent from November 17, 1952. Mullik says that Abdullah attempted to frustrate attempts by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, DP Dhar and Sadiq for closer integration with India. Rumours started floating that Abdullah was keeping his options open. 

Here, Mullik introduces a surprise twist. He refers to a talk in New Delhi circles that “the Sheikh was the right person to succeed Pandit Nehru or to become his deputy in his lifetime.” Then he refers to an intelligence report that Abdullah was actually a suspected British agent for spearheading the liberation movement in the early 1930s since the British did not like Hari Singh “as he refused to be subservient to him.” “The British had also tried to use this channel to bring about a cleavage between Hindus and Muslims…. I mentioned this to Pandit Nehru and he was surprised.” It is odd that he had introduced an unverifiable factor in his book on Kashmir history published after Nehru’s death.  

The final break was the Jammu Praja Parishad agitation in the winter of 1952-53, demanding full integration with India. Abdullah reacted by spewing communal venom against the agitators, which scorched the region. Nehru asked Mullik to proceed to Jammu and deal with the situation. His mission in Jammu was successful. But he was received very coldly by the Sheikh. When he narrated this to Bakshi and Dhar, they asked him to convey to Nehru that “the Sheikh was using this agitation as an excuse to get out of his previous commitments to India.” Abdullah was dismissed by the Sardar-e-Riyasat on August 8, 1953, and arrested.

In his book Flames of the Chinar, Abdullah blames DN Kachru, Nehru's aide, for his rift with Nehru. In 1968, the Shabistan Urdu Digest published Abdullah's long interview. Its English edition was with YD Gundevia’s articles defending Nehru and Sheikh. Abdullah mentioned a 1965 incident while in Mecca when several Muslim countries offered him asylum in the wake of Indian media’s attacks on him. He refused. On his return, he was arrested again. 

A few months after Abdullah’s arrest, Mullik met C Rajagopalachari (Rajaji), then Chief Minister of Madras (1952-54) who was Governor-General (1948-50) and had succeeded as Union Home Minister in December 1950 after Patel’s death. Rajaji strongly felt that it was wrong to have arrested the Sheikh. “Rajaji said that the Sheikh should have been given a third alternative of autonomy or even semi-independence and the door should not have been shut against him. He apprehended that continued uncertainty and unrest would prevail in the Valley.” 

Should we remember Rajaji’s prognosis when we have now swung the pendulum in favour of Jammu, alienating the Valley?