Sunday, September 22, 2019

Part 14 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA The New PLA Joint Headquarters and Internal Assessments of PLA Capabilities ( R )

SOURCE :
https://jamestown.org/program/the-new-pla-joint-headquarters-and-internal-assessments-of-pla-capabilities/

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf?ver=2017-03-21-152018-430


CDS 

 Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

 Part 28 of N Parts

 Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

 Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

 Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html

 Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

 Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html


 Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html


Part 14 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of-n-parts-new.html

Part 13  of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-jointness-pla-pla-system-of-systems.html

Part 12  of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-12-cds-jointness-pla-military.html

Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part  8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-3-chief-of-defence-staff.html


Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of N Parts:
  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html

Part 1  of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html




















     The New PLA Joint Headquarters

                             and                                        Internal Assessments of PLA Capabilities

                                                 By 

                    



Publication: China Brief Volume: 16 Issue: 10


 Age: 3 years



The creation of new multi-service (joint) headquarters organizations at the national (strategic) and theater (operational) levels is a major component of the current tranche of reforms underway in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These changes further concentrate ultimate leadership of the armed forces in the Central Military Commission (CMC), led by Communist Party General Secretary and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, supported by an expanded joint organizational structure replacing the former four General Departments. Directly beneath the CMC, five new joint Theater Command headquarters have superseded the seven former Military Region headquarters.
These new headquarters contribute to the reforms’ goals to resolve problems in military readiness and weaknesses in combat capabilities, build an integrated joint operations system, and increase the PLA’s ability to, according to Xi’s guidance, “fight and win” informationized war. Under the new structure Theater Commands are responsible for planning joint operations for a specific strategic direction and executing large-scale joint training. The four service headquarters, the newly formed Army headquarters along with the Navy, Air Force, and upgraded Rocket Force headquarters, are responsible for “construction” or “force building,” which includes organizing, equipping, and training operational units to prepare them to participate in operational deployments and large joint exercises. These changes seek to reduce levels of command, shrink the overall number of headquarters personnel, and streamline decision-making, planning, execution, and evaluation throughout the PLA (Xinhua, January 1).
The adjustments to the PLA’s headquarters structure are to be accomplished by 2020, the date announced a decade ago as the second milestone in the “Three-Step Development Strategy” to modernize China’s national defense and armed forces (Defense White Papers, 2006 and 2008). This date is underscored in the recently announced “five-year military development plan,” which has the goal of completing the mechanization and making “important progress” on “incorporating information and computer technology” in the PLA by 2020—exactly the same goal as the milestone announced by the 2008 White Paper (China Military Online, May 13). The five-year implementation period implicitly acknowledges that many details remain unsettled and must be refined to eliminate overlaps or gaps in responsibilities. Additional reforms are expected in coming decades as the PLA continues its “Three-Step Development Strategy” with the final completion date of mid-century, 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic.
These reforms come as the Chinese military has reached a critical point in its long-term modernization process. The PLA has recognized that many traditional strategic and operational concepts and practices must be revised as potential threats and economic imperatives have changed. Fundamental to this new thinking are the official statements that “China is a major maritime as well as land country” and “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned.” Therefore, “great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests…” (Defense White Papers, 2013 and 2015). Both statements are related to the goal of breaking the “big Army” concept (“大陆军”观念 or 思维) (China Military Online, February 3).
Though these new requirements have been verbalized officially only in recent years, the trends in PLA force development toward greater emphasis on missile, naval, air, and cyber/electronic warfare capabilities have been apparent for the past two decades. Employing these “new-type combat forces” in new missions demands integrated command and control of units operating at much greater distances from China’s borders than ever before. Though ground forces have not been left behind totally in the current phase of modernization, this shift in doctrine comes at the expense of the PLA’s traditional base of power and leadership, the Army and Army generals.
The following sections describe the efforts in motion to satisfy the PLA’s increased need to develop joint headquarters and officers capable of commanding joint forces. As with other aspects of modernization, these efforts begin with the realistic acknowledgement of existing shortfalls in PLA capabilities.
Internal Assessments of PLA Capabilities
Critiques of inadequacies in joint training and command capabilities in all services are perennial topics found in the domestic Chinese military literature though often buried in long texts. For example, less than a year ago, the commander and political commissar of the former Nanjing Military Region commented that the low level of joint training and poor joint training mechanisms have restricted integrated operations and are fundamental issues in the transformation of the military (Xinhua, July 3, 2015). More recently, the English-language edition of China Military Online stated that there is a “shortage of officers who have a deep knowledge of joint combat operations and advanced equipment.” Moreover, the PLA has “developed and deployed many cutting-edge weapons, including some that are the best in the world, but there are not enough soldiers to use many of those advanced weapons. In some cases, soldiers lack knowledge and expertise to make the best use of their equipment” (China Military Online, April 28). Similar criticism is common in the Chinese-language military media.
Internal critiques like those above, along with the identification of other shortcomings in organization, doctrine, training realism, and logistics, are intended to inform PLA personnel of areas that need to be improved and motivate them to work harder to improve overall capabilities. These assessments frequently follow descriptions of positive developments and often are couched in terms of “some units” or “some commanders,” but are widespread enough to indicate that the problems are serious systemic shortcomings for much of the entire force.
Generally speaking, the PLA sees itself as not having the military capabilities and capacity to be confident in accomplishing many of the tasks it may be assigned. In 2006, then-CMC chairman Hu Jintao summarized the situation in a formula known as the “Two Incompatibles” (两个不相适应), which referred directly back to his own doctrinal vision known as the “historic missions” (China Brief, May 9, 2013). The “Two Incompatibles” said the PLA’s “level of modernization does not meet the requirements of winning local war under informatized conditions and its military capability does not meet the requirements of carrying out its historic missions at the new stage of the new century.” Though appearing frequently during Hu’s tenure as CMC chairman, the formula has been used less regularly since Xi replaced Hu, but as recently as mid-April 2016 (China Military Online, April 19).
Since 2013, under Xi’s leadership, the “Two Big Gaps” (两个差距很大) and the “Two Inabilities” (两个能力不够 – translations of the Chinese terms vary) have come to prominence as general descriptions of PLA capabilities. Similar to the “Two Incompatibles,” the “Two Big Gaps” states “(1) there are big gaps between the level of our military modernization compared to the requirements for national security and the (2) level of the world’s advanced militaries” (China Air Force, April 16, 2013).
The “Two Inabilities” reinforces these points and further identifies problems specifically in officer capabilities: The PLA’s ability “(1) to fight a modern war is not sufficient, (2) our cadres at all levels ability to command modern war is insufficient” (China Air Force, July 12, 2013). These two formulas sometimes are paired together and have been associated with the “Two Incompatibles” (China Military Online, February 5, 2015 and CPC News Network, December 11, 2013).
Beginning in 2015, the “Five Incapables” (五个不会) formula began to be used which criticizes “some” leaders’ command abilities: “Some cadre cannot (1) judge the situation, (2) understand the intention of the higher up authorities, (3) make operational decisions, (4) deploy troops, and (5) deal with unexpected situations” (China Military Online, February 5, 2015). This assessment is a particularly stark acknowledgement of operational and tactical leadership shortfalls. It is an example of why the PLA prioritizes officer training over troop training as reflected in another common slogan: “in training soldiers, first train generals (or officers)” (练兵先练将 or 练兵先练官) (China Military Online, January 13 and April 12).
Though the public acknowledgement of weakness may sound strange to foreign ears, in Chinese military thinking which is based on Marxist theory, these assessments represent the “thesis” of positive developments balanced by the “antithesis” of remaining problem areas, which are to be overcome through scientific efforts leading to a “synthesis” signifying progress. The process is then repeated, especially when new technologies and weapons are issued to the force.
The judgments described above are well known to the PLA senior leadership and frequently repeated in their own writings or speeches. The reforms underway are intended to address the shortcomings in joint command organization and officer development.
The New Joint Headquarters
The new CMC staff organization consists of 15 departments, commissions, and offices (China Military Online, January 11) [ http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/11/content_6852723.htm ]    . These new staff offices expand a few previously existing CMC organizations, incorporate the functions and many of the personnel from the former four General Departments, and, in the case of the National Defense Mobilization Department, take over the responsibilities of the Military Regions in commanding the provincial Military Districts, PLA reserve units, border and coastal defense units, and the militia.
The CMC staff organization primarily supports the members of the CMC, presently composed of the supreme civilian party and government leader, Xi, and 10 senior PLA officers, 6 Army generals, 1 Navy admiral, 2 Air Force generals, and a Rocket Force general. As such, the CMC itself is a joint organization with its personnel distributed among the services very close to how the 2.3 million personnel in the PLA (prior to the 300,000 man reduction) were allocated: approximately 73 percent Army/Second Artillery, 10 percent Navy, and 17 percent Air Force. The composition CMC leadership is not set by law and is subject to change.

A photograph of the CMC and the “new heads of [its] reorganized organs” revealed 69 officers, including the 10 CMC generals/admiral and another 59 CMC staff directors/officers, of which 51 were Army/Rocket Force, five Navy, and three Air Force. [1] (Xinhua, January 11). Though the CMC is a joint organization, its leaders and its primary staff officers still are mostly Army officers. The percentage of non-Army officers in lower-level CMC staff billets is not known.
Continuing the dominance of Army officers, all the new commanders and political commissars of the five Theater Commands are from the Army. [2] Each Theater is assigned responsibility for a strategic direction (战略方向) and is to develop theater strategies, directional strategies, and operational plans for deterrence, warfighting, and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Theater headquarters may command units from all services in joint operations and MOOTW tasks and are responsible for organizing and assessing joint campaign training and developing new methods of operation (China Military Online, February 1 and March 3). [ REFER ANNEXURE  "A" BELOW ]
The Theater Commands are structured as joint headquarters with Army and non-Army deputy commanders and political commissars, a joint staff from all services, and service component commands. Each Theater has a subordinate Army headquarters and Air Force headquarters, while the Eastern, Southern, and Northern Theater Commands also have Navy components that retain the names East Sea Fleet, South Sea Fleet, and North Sea Fleet, respectively. These component headquarters are the key link to both the Theater Commands and national-level service headquarters. Service component headquarters have operational command of units in war and may serve as campaign headquarters (战役指挥部) under the Theater Commands. They also perform “construction” leadership and management functions under the supervision of the service headquarters in Beijing. Moreover, they may act as emergency response headquarters for MOOTW missions. [3]
Rocket Force staff officers are assigned to Theater Command headquarters, but Rocket Force units appear to remain under the direct command of the Rocket Force service headquarters in Beijing with conventional (non-nuclear) units available to support theater missions.
<See attached chart at the bottom of this page>
Training and Developing a Contingent of Joint Officers
Since their establishment, Theater Command headquarters have been engaged in functional training and evaluation to ensure their staff officers are qualified to perform their duties. For example, the Northern Theater conducted a month-long “joint operations duty personnel training camp” focused on conditions in the services and the Theater’s area of responsibility consisting of lectures, demonstrations, hands-on training, and assessments (China Youth Online, February 25).
Many Theater staff officers were selected from the best of the former Military Region officers. Within the Northern Theater headquarters staff officers were required to have spent at least two years in a headquarters at or above group army level plus have participated in or organized a large-scale joint exercise. Yet even with this background many officers express lack of confidence, known as “ability panic” (本领恐慌), in their new positions. Accordingly, the Theater has created a “Three-Year Program for Building Joint Operations Command Personnel” (《联合作战指挥人才建设3年规划》) (China Military Online, May 5). 

 Such programs will be necessary not only for the first batch of Theater-level staff officers, but also for new staff officers assigned at that level in the future.

Over the past decade, the Military Regions and the services experimented with a number of programs to develop joint officer capabilities. In December 2014, the Ministry of National Defense spokesman provided this update:
After a trial period, the PLA is now applying the professional training scheme for joint operation commanding officers in the whole military. This scheme aims to optimize the command posts for joint operation commanding officers, conduct differentiated training for joint operation commanders and administrative officers, and for joint operation staff officers and other staff officers, and establish a new mechanism for the selection, training, evaluation and appointment of joint operation commanding officers, so as to improve the training of joint operation commanding officers (China Military Online, December 25, 2014).
These programs will be even more important with the establishment of the Theater Commands. Likewise, the PLA educational system of universities and academies will need to adapt its curricula and student composition to prepare officers for joint assignments and the PLA’s new maritime orientation.

Conclusions
The current leadership line-up of CMC members, CMC staff, and Theater headquarters is certain to change before 2020. A measure of the PLA’s commitment to jointness will be the percentage of non-Army senior officers assigned to these billets. One of the most substantial developments, both symbolically and operationally, would be the assignment of Navy or Air Force officers to command one or more Theaters, particularly the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands where the immediate need for integrated maritime and aerospace operations is greatest.
Over the long run, the PLA must develop an education, training, and assignment scheme to prepare officers of all services for joint command and staff duties. The best practices learned from experimentation from previous years will need to be codified and applied throughout the entire force. This process will affect many aspects of the personnel system as it has been implemented for the past 60 years.
Meanwhile, doctrine and strategy must continue to evolve to support the PLA’s expanded missions, technology, and potential areas of operation. The shift in mindset from a continental Army to an integrated joint force capable of operating both inside and beyond China’s borders and three seas will probably take at least a generation to achieve. Commanders and staffs at all levels must prove themselves qualified to perform these new tasks not only in academic settings but also in real world missions. They will raise their level of confidence in their own abilities through the actual performance of missions, not just talking or reading about them. A significant level of unease among operational and tactical commanders and staff is clearly evident in the official Chinese military literature.
The military’s senior leadership understands the many challenges confronting the PLA as it continues its multi-decade, multi-faceted modernization program. In the immediate future, the disruptions caused by changes underway could result in a more cautious attitude toward the employment of force by China’s military leadership, but not necessarily its political decision-makers.

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Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), is a former U.S. army attaché to Beijing and Hong Kong and author of The Chinese Army Today, second edition (Routledge, 2012).

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Notes
1. The Rocket Force does not yet have a distinctive uniform different from the Army, so it is not possible to distinguish between Army and Rocket Force officers in the photo.
2. Each Theater commander has provided at least one interview to the Chinese media.
3. China Military Online, February 2, 2016 and May 10, 2016 http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-02/01/content_6883951.htm and http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-05/10/content_144076.htm, spells out these missions for Theater Command Army headquarters. I assess the other services’ Theater Command headquarters have similar functions.



FURTHER STUDIES

CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 10
Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping  Drivers, Challenges, and Implications

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                                                                                                                                                 ANNEXURE  "A"



 source:                                                     

The new theater of the People's Liberation Army is moving toward unity in the running-in



Li Xianghui, Wang Qinghou, Special Reporter, Wang Jun, China Youth Daily (February 25, 2016, 11th edition)
    The staff of the Northern Theater observed the operation of a certain base of the Rocket Army and discussed how to better perform duty duties. Li Xianghui / photo



    The Shenyang Military Region Office in Shenyang City, Liaoning Province has been in existence for decades. Now the lights of the office building are still extinguished until late at night. The sentinels at the gate of the camp are still the soldiers of the past, but the careful people will It was discovered that the original army entering and leaving the compound every day was a uniform army. Recently, many officers and men dressed in navy and air force uniforms have been added. This is now the camp of the northern theater.
    Nowadays, in this theater compound, the color of military uniforms has become colorful from a single one, including the army's pine branches and greens, as well as the navy's spray whites, as well as the air force's sky blue... these are dressed in different military uniforms from the north of the country. The soldiers, unified wearing the new armband of the "Northern Theater", are working together to push the theater into operation.
    In the past, eating and drinking Lazard was all in charge, and now I’m trying to fight.
    On the morning of February 18, the author walked into the Joint Staff of the Northern Theater and opened the door of a conference room. The overall staff was working hard to plan the new year. The large screen of the conference room showed the work plan for the new year.
    “It is easy to set up a new department, but it is not easy to change the original inertia thinking and working methods.” A leader of the bureau told the author that some people are unconsciously immersed in inertia thinking when planning their work, and always want to organize observation activities. Great management work, etc. "We must concentrate on studying and fighting, and we are ready to lead the troops to fight." Repeatedly studying the instructions of the president, the bureau unified thoughts, actual combat, and decisively cut off six work plans that deviated from the war. Since the establishment of the theater of war, the Joint Staff and the Political Work Departments have convened a global comrade to gather ideas and focus on the planning and planning of the new year.
    "In the battle of the main battlefield, all work should be focused on war, all resources tend to fight, and one mind should think about it." At the symposium held in the theater, the leadership of the theater firmly proposed to start strategic operations research, organize joint training and other key tasks. Determined and willing to fight.
    At the beginning of the formation of the theater, in order to further strengthen the awareness of the main battle in the theater, and to provide guidance and grasp for the transformation of ideas and concepts as soon as possible, the Northern Party Committee decided to further clarify the functional tasks of the theater and further their respective roles. Qing, the preliminary measures were taken for preliminary research. According to reports, nearly 100 people from the Standing Committee of the Party Committee and the deputy director of the predecessor of the Party participated in the symposium. The participants put forward more than 130 constructive countermeasures and suggestions.
    On February 22nd, the author came to the joint operational command center of the theater, and a strong "war zone taste" and "sniffing taste" came to the fore: the officers in the army, navy, air force, and rocket army camouflage uniforms are participating in the joint operation. Combat duty training, everyone from time to time together to judge the situation and jointly plan decisions.
    "The theater is the highest command organization for joint operations of various military units in this strategic direction. The staff officers must have joint operational literacy, be proficient in the principle of command information system, and organize joint combat duty training has become a top priority." Based on this understanding, the theater party committee decided to concentrate 1 In the month of the month, the "joint combat personnel training" was launched.
    In order to ensure that the participants can quickly, accurately and steadily handle all kinds of emergencies, they will get the “employment certificate” and “qualification certificate” of the independent duty as soon as possible. They will take the teaching guidance, observe the teaching, operate the training and check and accept the work. Pre-training. During the training, they arranged the leaders of the theater and the relevant comrades of the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Army, around the "Basic Situations of the Armies of the Theater, Air Force, Navy, and Rocket Army", "Basic Knowledge of Joint Operational Watches," "Operation and Operation of Command Information Systems." The surrounding military affairs are taught in 4 categories and 10 items. 
    During the first week of the Spring Festival, they organized more than 100 representatives of staff officers on duty to enter the theater air force, observe how the daily combat handover classes are organized, listen to the daily air defense readiness briefings, and visit the command and regional information center; At the base, the staff members of the theaters who came to observe the school to learn more about the daily combat readiness of the base command post and visit the communication and intelligence support elements.
    "Through the tutoring and field visits, we have enriched our professional knowledge and arms knowledge, broadened our horizons and vision, and laid a solid foundation for the joint combat of high standards in the theater." The leaders of the theater joint staff said that as of now, the theater Hundreds of staff officers have initially mastered the basic situation of the land, sea, air and rocket forces in the theater and the relevant arms knowledge, and have mastered the ability to operate and use information equipment and systems for operational readiness.
    The sense of mission is stronger, and the entrepreneur’s entrepreneurial spirit is even stronger. 
    On January 9 this year, the leaders of the North Sea Fleet told Li Xinan, the deputy director of the fleet logistics department, that he would be transferred to work in the northern theater. Li Xin'an did not hesitate, and immediately stated: "Resolutely obey orders!"
    On the morning of January 19th, the fleet selected dozens of cadres in the northern theater to line up in the cold wind, ready to go to the theater authorities to report. Before the departure, Li Xinan reported to the head of the fleet that "when I heard the commander of the fleet issued a "departure" command from Hong Liang, I suddenly felt a bloody, but a sense of sacred mission and responsibility." Li Xinan recalled. .
    "After serving in the theater, every time I attend a meeting, study, and shift, my heart is full of mission, responsibility, and pressure. I feel that the taste of the war zone is getting stronger and stronger." The current director of the Bureau of Political Work of the Northern War Zone Li Xinan told the author.
    In the face of the initial work of the war zone, Li Xinan has led the overall personnel to change their concepts, change their style of work, change their working methods, seriously consider planning and implementing the work of the department, and work hard to fulfill the new mission of the theater. Make a contribution.
    Like Li Xin'an, after the reform was initiated, the military commissions ordered the cadres who were selected to work in the theater to come from all over the world with their dreams and gather under the banner of the northern theater. For many cadres, it seems that the scene of joining the army in the same year has reappeared, and they will once again start another journey as a "new recruit." The difference is that when enlisted in the same year, behind the eyes of the parents staring. Today, there are still lover and child watching.
    On January 15th, Zhang Wei, the political department officer of the North Sea Fleet Logistics Department, received an order to report to the theater. On the same day, his father died unfortunately. On the one hand, the military command was like a mountain, and on the other hand, his father loved the mountain. Just when he made a difficult choice, he received a notice from the superior to report to the time on January 18. He immediately took the unit for three days off, returned to his hometown to cook his father's aftermath, and rushed to the theater to report within the specified time.
    In the northern theater, from the former Jinan Military Region, the former Shenyang Military Region Air Force, the former Jinan Military Region Air Force and the Rocket Army’s cadre, some family members just hoped that the stars would look forward to the reunion of the army and the two families. Some just held a wedding. They have been hurriedly separated, and some have just taken up the post of director and other positions and are now re-appointed as staff officers... but everyone has taken the initiative to overcome these difficulties and actively participate in new work.
    After the "four beams and eight pillars" of the war zone have been put together, it is necessary to pay close attention to the bricks and tiles. The more the career start-up period, the shorter the running-in period will be. The more the period of ideological fluctuations, the more the morale will be united." Based on this consideration, the second day of the war zone began to be grasped. Joint combat personnel training, after the Spring Festival, at the beginning of the work, we will carry out in-depth study and implementation of the special education of President Xi’s instructions, and guide everyone to take the “first step”, do the “first”, and run the “first stick”.
    Improve the ability of "joint" to achieve "hard" from "finger" to "hard fist"
    "As the first staff officer of the theater, in the face of the sacred mission and the requirements of the training instructions, I deeply feel that there is still a big gap." On February 22, Meng Qinglei, deputy director of the Warfare Joint Staff Department, told the author that the Central Military Commission made an order. Next, the cadres of the theaters have overcome all kinds of difficulties and immediately rushed to Shenyang to report in all directions. Everyone is unequivocal in listening to the party’s command at a crucial moment, but this is only the turnaround after completing the big break, far from being reborn and nirvana. Rebirth.
    "If we realize the synergy of the co-editing, it is the main problem to be solved at the beginning of the formation of the theater. The current state is probably that the editors are already in harmony, the mind is in harmony, and the forces are not in harmony. Many theater workers are still not thinking about their actions. Completely get rid of the shackles of the military system and the traditional system of the Continental Army."
    "The next step is to urgently eliminate the gap between the military services and break the boundaries of the region." Meng Qinglei said that, as the leaders of the theater said in the tutoring class, they must step out from the previous independent planning and individual warfare modes. And to overcome the problem of "the connection between the gods and the gods", "there is no connection between the watch and the union", and the "basic skills" of the alliance, improve the "basic skills" of the association, improve the practical ability of the association, and achieve a hard from "finger" to "fist" ".
    The theater is the main warfare agency and command organization, and the core is in command and the key is in unity. At present, the joint architecture has been established, and it has been compiled from the "shape". The next step is to integrate on "God". Qi Chengjun, deputy director of the Military Demand Bureau of the Joint Staff of the Theater, said that to strengthen the sense of unity, we must first have a harmonious concept. Everyone should consciously talk about the overall situation, talk about unity, talk about cooperation, break the boundaries of the military, learn from each other, complement each other, and form a game of chess. In a spur of the moment, relying on the gathering of wisdom to overcome difficulties, truly form a joint and integrated high-efficiency command organization.
    At 12 o'clock on the night of February 2, the North Theater Joint Command Center officially started the trial operation. On that day, the staff officers of the theater wearing camouflage uniforms of various military services were seated in various command posts to perform their duties. Meng Qinglei said that when he sat in his own position, he seemed to be able to hear the horn of the urging war, smell the looming smoke, and feel the burden of shoulders and the ability to perform his duties and panic.
    "The first time after the Spring Festival, the first division of the theater refers to the handover of the center. The "six-domain" battlefield situation of the land, sea and air network, and the "four major service types" of the land, sea and air fires are in front of us. I have really realized the same as many cadres of the theater. Lack of modern warfare, joint command, and military knowledge." 
    At the end of the interview, Deputy Director Meng Qinglei told the author that the theater has declared a dynamic response to joint operations and a strong response to modern warfare in a new organizational form. The word "joint" is used in the training exercises. Become a "theme" for preparations for war. However, the formation of the organization does not necessarily lead to the generation of capacity, the joint thinking needs to be deepened, the command relationship needs to be straightened, the command process needs to be optimized, and the command capability needs to be improved... This is a warning to the staff of the theater and the command responsibility of the military commission. Landing and achieving efficient command of the troops in the theater, we will have to work harder in the next step.














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