Tuesday, September 10, 2019

CDS PART 3 : Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India

SOURCE:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2016.1196357

 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2016.1196357


CDS 

 Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

 Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

 Part 28 of N Parts

 Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

 Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

 Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

 Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html

 Part 22 of  N  Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html


 Part 21 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html


 Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html

 Part 14 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of-n-parts-new.html

 Part 13  of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-jointness-pla-pla-system-of-systems.html

Part 12  of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-12-cds-jointness-pla-military.html

 Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part  9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-8-making-cds-effective-is.html

Part  8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html

Part 5 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/chief-of-defence-staff.html

Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of N Parts:
  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html


                     




Amos Perlmutter Prize Essay



           29 MARTYRS 
              OF 
       SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY
 LAID DOWN THEIR LIFE DUE TO LACK             OF JOINTNESS 
                & 
DUE TO  FALSE  EGOISTIC PROBLEMS      WITHIN THE THREE SERVICES

....blamed the disastrous helidrop at Jaffna University, where an entire platoon save one got wiped out, on the inability of the Air Force to deliver on the planned number of helicopter sorties.52


The assessment – that appointing a CDS will weaken civilian control, has resonated with the Indian political class – even to this day. The idea for a CDS has been raised periodically by generations of Indian military officers, only to be consistently rebuffed





Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India

 

                            By
                  Anit Mukherjee

 Anit Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological ...

 Formerly, he was a Major in the Indian Army and is an alumnus of India’s National Defence Academy (NDA), Khadakwasla.

ABSTRACT

 How do countries transition from single service to joint operations? This article engages with the discussion on military innovation to argue that civil–military relations are the most important driver for jointness. In doing so it examines jointness in the Indian military. Relying on archival research and primary interviews this article sheds new light on the operations of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990, the 1999 Kargil War and the Post-Kargil defence reforms. The main argument is that the Indian military’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ primarily because of its prevailing model of civil-military relations. This model prevents civilians from interfering in the operational issues of the military, including on matters pertaining to jointness. It therefore recommends more forceful civilian intervention to overcome the prevailing single service approach.

KEYWORDS Indian Military; Jointness; Military Innovation; Civil-Military Relations; Military Effectiveness; Defence Reforms; Kargil War


 Introduction 

Jointness, succinctly defined as the ability of the Army, Air Force and the Navy, to plan and operate in a mutually reinforcing manner, has been a matter of debate in all militaries. This should not be surprising as getting the services to work together is, at best, controversial and, at worse, problematic. While most attribute problems to one of turf battle, at a more fundamental level it stems from differing visions of war. Each of the services, shaped by its own capabilities, doctrine, institutional prisms and threat perceptions, is strongly attached to its preferred strategy for war-fighting. Usually air forces consider counter-air missions including air defence to be of primary importance and assign countersurface operations a secondary priority. In addition, some air power proponents tout strategic bombing as the preferred way to ‘win’ the war.1 The army typically wishes to concentrate air assets to deal with tactical forces opposing them, including enemy air forces and prefers air power to be used for close air support. For the army, holding and capturing territory and destroying the enemy’s land forces is the best way to win a war. The navy is concerned about fleet protection from a variety of threats including submarines, surface ships, air threats and missiles. At the heart of the divide is the question of control and ownership over assets in the theatre of operations. Thus, there is a variance in how different services imagine war and the role that it envisages for itself and the other services.

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1 Strategic bombing is in reference to strategic war, i.e. the view that wars can be won by attacking critical targets, including cities, industries, infrastructure and military installations of the opponent, as opposed to tactical bombing, i.e. attacking ground forces in direct combat. I thank a reviewer for suggesting this clarification; also see Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) and Karl P. Mueller, ‘Air Power,’ in Robert A Denemark (ed.), The International Studies Encyclopedia, I (April 2010), 47–65.
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How do countries resolve these differing visions and transition from single service to joint operations? This article engages with this question by examining the experience of the Indian military, the world’s third largest. Grounding my analysis on recently available archival material in the UK and India combined with more than 30 interviews with key officials, I make two central arguments. First, left to themselves the services tend to settle upon the coordination model of jointness which adversely shapes military effectiveness and is fiscally wasteful. The coordination model envisages an independent role for the three services wherein they are free to plan, train, equip and prepare for their respective missions and agree to ‘coordinate’ their operations when required. This is the natural state when the single services are dominant. Second, as civilian intervention is crucial to overcome entrenched service interests, civil-military relations are the most important, but not the only, driver for jointness

This topic is important for a number of reasons. First, by treating civil-military relations as the primary explanatory variable for jointness, I highlight an under explored area of research. This is surprising as most militaries have moved towards greater jointness primarily due to pressure exerted by civilians.2 Second, jointness is contemporarily relevant as it is not only being debated in the Indian military but is also of current concern to Chinese, Russian and German military leaders, among others. In China, for instance, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013 proposed military reforms ‘[for] implementing and advancing joint operations capability’. 3 In Russia too jointness is a matter of current concern with, among other measures, the creation of joint strategic commands in 2010. 4

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2 For the role played by civilians in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the US see James R. Locher III and Sam Nunn, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). A similar role was played by civilians in UK and in Australia, see Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey’s, 1992) and Arthur Tange, Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments (Department of Defence, Canberra, 1973).
3 Kevin McCauley, ‘PLA Joint Operations Developments and Military Reform,’ China Brief, 17(7), 9 April 2014.
4 Katarzyna Zysk, ‘Managing military change in Russia,’ in Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers and Michael Raska (eds.), Security, Strategy and Military
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The Bundeswehr [ https://www.google.com/search?q=The+Bundesweh&rlz=1C1CHBF_enIN846IN846&oq=The+Bundesweh&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i64&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 ]  is also attempting to embrace jointness as a result of widespread defence reforms. 5 Examining an instance of ‘incomplete or partial’ jointness as in the case of the Indian military offers an important insight – civilian intervention and sustained attention is critical to the effort. Third, jointness shapes the effectiveness of the Indian military – an important topic in its own right. Much of the contemporary literature on the Indian military hints at problems in jointness without comprehensively examining it. 
Joint operations, according to Walter Ladwig, are key to the Cold Start Doctrine – India’s military response to the threat from Pakistan.6 Shashank Joshi also acknowledges the manner in which ‘inter-services rivalry’ impedes joint warfare.7 They do not however examine its history or provide an in-depth examination of jointness. Fourth, by studying jointness I shed new light on the military underpinning of India’s rise to great power status. Inter-services rivalry and the lack of jointness is a key inhibitor of India’s growing military power. For instance, many view India’s activities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as crucial to its effort to attain a position of ‘eminence in the Indian Ocean.’ 8 Chinese analysts have portrayed these islands as a ‘“metal chain” that could lock shut the Malacca Strait.’ 9 However, as discussed later, the ‘joint’ Andaman and Nicobar command has been considerably undermined – in terms of assets and capabilities, by interservices rivalry. A study of jointness in India therefore provides an assessment of the capabilities, and limitations, of its military.

The article proceeds as follows. It begins by conceptualizing jointness and explains the different approaches to it. Next it explains why jointness should be considered as an instance of military innovation, even though it has rarely been studied as such. Thereafter it engages with the literature on military innovation to put forward the main analytical argument – civilian intervention is the key driving factor for jointness. This section also explains the motivation for such type of civilian intervention. Next the article examines jointness and civil-military relations in India. In doing so it describes its model of civil-military relations which precludes civilian intervention, as jointness is considered to be in the military’s ‘domain’. In explaining the historical antecedents of this model, it describes Lord Mountbatten’s failed attempts to create a joint staff. Then it examines jointness in two of India’s most recent military experiences – the deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990 and the 1999 Kargil war. This highlights the main characteristics of the coordination model – single service approach to planning, training and operation and lack of interoperability. It also highlights the norm of civilian non-intervention on matters pertaining to jointness. Next it analyses an instance of peacetime innovation – the post-Kargil defence reforms.10 
This focuses attention on civilian reluctance to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff and how this undermined military reformers and perpetuates the single service approach. 

 The penultimate section discusses contemporary debates on jointness and explains civilian motivation for non-intervention. The conclusion identifies areas for future research.
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5 Martin Zapfe, ‘Strategic Culture Shaping Allied Integration: The Bundeswehr and Joint Operational Doctrine,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39(2) (2016), 246–60.
6 Walter C. Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ International Security, 32(3) (2007), 177.
7 Shashank Joshi, Indian Power Projection: Ambition, Arms and Influence, RUSI Whitehall Paper No. 85 (London: Routledge, 2015), 27–29. 
8 David Scott, ‘India’s Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean–Securing the Waves?’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 36(4) (2013), 508, 493–94.
9 As quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010), 125–26.

 10 This paper examines conventional military effectiveness and excludes the nuclear issue altogether. This is due to two factors. First, there is considerable secrecy and therefore unverified speculation surrounding the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), a tri-services organization handling India’s nuclear weapons. Second, there has been no discernible change in jointness among the services due to India’s possession of nuclear weapons.
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Conceptualizing Jointness

Despite being a widely used term, there is no commonly accepted definition for jointness. Highlighting this aspect, Don Snider notes that ‘all [definitions] tend to focus on the efficient integration of service capabilities at the level of joint force commander (JFC).’ 11 According to the US military doctrine, jointness ‘implies cross-Service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the capability of individual components).’ 12 For the purpose of this article, jointness is defined as the ability of the three services to plan, train and operate in a ‘synergistic’ manner.13

Jointness can be envisioned in two main ways: coordination and integration. As defined earlier, the coordination approach allows maximum autonomy to the services and does not require resolution of potentially contentious issues over turf, roles and, most importantly, command and control. Jointness is left to the discretion of the service commanders. On the other hand, the integrated model of jointness is one in which there is ‘unity of effort’ wherein the three services operate under a single commander.14
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11 Don M. Snider, ‘The US Military in Transition to Jointness: Surmounting Old Notions of Interservice Rivalry,’ Airpower Journal (Fall 1996), 19. 

12  JP1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, March 2013, ix. 

 13  For more on synergy between the services see William A. Owens, ‘Living Jointness,’ Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 1993-94), 7–14.

  14  The term unity of effort has been defined by John M. Collins as a principle that involves ‘solidarity of purpose, effort, and command. It directs all energies, assets, and activities, physical and mental, towards desired ends,’ see John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 1973), 28.
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This approach is informed by the assumption that ‘unity of command (or control) is one of several elements that make unity of effort possible.’ 15  Militaries adhering to the integrated model usually appoint Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have theatre commands and have a Joint Headquarters at the operational level. Most western militaries have transitioned from the coordination to the integrated model of jointness. Those militaries which have not are emulating and experimenting with this concept, for instance in Russia and China.

To be sure, an ideal model of jointness where in the capabilities of the different services complement each other perfectly and are always mutually supporting is unachievable. Indeed, many argue that even in the United States, where the concept originally took shape, jointness remains problematic.16 However jointness is a spectrum with different militaries facing varying kinds of problems, and located at different ends of the spectrum. Making such a distinction allows us to study levels of jointness in different militaries.

It is important to recognize that jointness is not an unmitigated good. It can, for instance, inhibit military innovation. Gholz and Sopolsky’s study of the US defence industry argues that jointness has led to the situation where the services have no ‘incentive to experiment with new approaches.’ 17 Other studies support the notion that inter-services rivalry is good for military innovation.18 Another criticism against jointness is that unifying the services creates problems for civilian control. Peter Feaver observed that a more unified military maybe ‘better able to resist assertions of civilian control.’ 19 As explained later, concerns about civilian control have been at the heart of reluctance in India to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff who would be the embodiment of joint planning, training and operations. Another argument against jointness is that it may prevent the services from investing in different capabilities which may, in the long run, still prove to be advantageous.20 As discussed earlier, jointness is impeded by the different ‘theories of victory’ (or war).21 Forcing the three services to plan for a single theory of victory – on the grounds of promoting jointness, may lead to a disaster if the ‘theory’ (or assumptions therein) turns out to be inadequate or incorrect. On the other hand, giving autonomy to the three services to implement their respective theories of war may lead to different capabilities that may still prove advantageous. This judgement of the correct degree of autonomy to be given to the services and the capability development therein is therefore context dependent and requires close analysis of individual case studies

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15 James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991 (Naval Institute Press, MD: Rand, 1993), 4. 
16 David Johnson, Learning Large Lessons The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post–Cold War Era (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007), 137–200.  
17 Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, ‘Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry,’ International Security, 24(3) (Winter 1999/2000), 50–51.
18 Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 29(5) (October 2006), 911–13. 
19 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-military relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 297; also see Harvey M. Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz and Caitlin Talmadge, US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy (Routledge, 2008), 37–47. 
20 I thank Stephen Rosen for this insight. 
21 The term ‘theory of victory’ refers to the fundamental idea of how to wage war, see discussion in Benjamin Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 1–26 and Christopher P. Twomey. The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences an
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While these trade-offs matter, it is widely recognized that jointness tends to enhance military effectiveness. As noted by Millet, Murray and Watman, an ‘operationally effective military organization is one that derives maximum benefit from its components and assets by linking them together for mutual support … this require[s] complete utilization of combat branches within and between military services… The greater the integration of these disparate elements, the better a military organization will generate combat power from its available resources.’ 22 Indeed, the advantages of interoperability and of ‘synergy’ between the services leading to increased effectiveness and efficiency have now been widely, if not universally, embraced.

 Jointness as military innovation

 Although military innovation studies have a rich history, it has largely neglected to examine jointness. This is perplexing as jointness based on its definition qualifies as a significant innovation. Adam Grissom’s overview of the study of military innovation defines it as one that consists of three components: ‘changes the manner in which military formations function in the field,’ ‘is significant in scope and impact,’ and ‘is equated with greater military effectiveness.’ 23 His ‘tacit definition’ of military innovation is one which results in a ‘change in operational praxis that produces a significant increase in military effectiveness’. 24 Based on these metrics jointness counts as an innovation as it is premised on increasing military effectiveness, is ‘significant in scope and impact’ and changes the manner in which the three services function in the field.25 However, rarely has jointness been studied as an instance of military innovation. One possible explanation has been suggested by Grissom – as most military innovation studies focus on ‘historical cases’ and jointness is a relatively recent phenomenon, it might not have fetched adequate scholarly attention
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22 Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,’ International Security, 11(1) (Summer 1986), 52. 
23 See discussion in Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies,’ 907. 
24 Ibid. 907. 
25 For an argument that jointness qualifies as an instance of major innovation see Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas G. Mahnken and Andrew L. Ross, ‘Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense and Military Innovation,’ in Tai Ming Cheung (ed.), Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 18.
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Despite this neglect, debates informing the study of military innovation apply to our understanding of the transition to jointness. The most pertinent one is between Barry Posen and Stephen Rosen. Posen examined interwar doctrinal developments in the UK, France and Germany to conclude that civilian intervention was crucial to innovation. While his study does not examine jointness per se, however, he anticipates inter-services rivalry and argues that as ‘each service – army, navy, air force – fights for its own interests … only civilian intervention can shake loose these interservice treaties and jealousies to produce an integrated grand strategy.’ 26 This argument gave rise to civil-military model of innovation which argued for forceful civilian intervention to overcome entrenched service (read military) interests.

 Rosen, on the other hand, argued that successful innovation occurs from within the military and requires the support of senior military officers. More specifically, senior officers have to propose a ‘new theory of victory’ and win the support of mid-level officers and create ‘promotion-pathways’( ?! ) to ensure its success.27 Civilians can, at the most, support such officers in their efforts to bring about major military change. This is also known as the intra-service model of military innovation.

 Their debate over the sources of innovation is by no means settled and a number of scholars have weighed in on one side or the other.28 Significantly, however, both Posen and Rosen only examined single service innovations. This characteristic – of examining only single service innovation, applies to the entire field of military innovation studies. As explained below, jointness involves different services and therefore has to involve civilian arbitration, participation and intervention – as argued by Posen. However, civilians need to be assisted in this task by military officers from all three services. These officers, as argued by Rosen, have to sell a ‘theory of victory’ invoking jointness. Therefore, in order to enforce jointness, we need to adapt the insights from both the approaches – civilian intervention is required and senior officers need to support this vision. Having one without the other, as our case studies will show, is insufficient to overcome bureaucratic inertia and resistance.
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26 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984), 226 
27 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991), 19–22. 
28 For more on the differences between the civil-military relations and intra-service models of military innovation see Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies,’ 908–10 and 913–16.
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Enforcing Jointness: Role of Civilians

Disagreements between the three services are inevitable whether over roles and missions, budget or defence plans. These disagreements, some of them crucial to the future of the institution, are, in most cases, only resolved by civilian arbitration. Making decisions relating to integration and resolving inter-services rivalry thus becomes one of the core functions of civil-military relations. This is especially true for jointness – which requires the subordination of parochial service interests to transition to a more efficient, and effective, ‘joint’ effort. Transitioning towards jointness therefore requires civilian arbitration, probing and interference. In this arrangement, civil-military relations is the independent variable and jointness the dependent variable. Understanding the transition to jointness, or the lack of it, therefore requires us to examine the form of civil-military relations prevailing in the country under discussion. Without civilian intervention we would expect to find the three services settling upon the ‘coordination model’ which maximizes their autonomy. Noticeably, in countries where civilian control is not strong, jointness is rarely an issue of discussion. This suggests that jointness maybe correlated with the strength of civilian control.

Civilian intervention for jointness however is unlikely to succeed without the cooperation and support of at least some members of the military. The support of such ‘reformist’ officers (those willing to overcome parochial service perspectives) is necessary to overcome the problem of information asymmetry which is inherent in civil–military relations. Their advice and expertise is essential to counter the arguments against jointness which, in all probability, will be made by the service chiefs. Hence, for instance, in both the US and the UK, the defence reforms process was supported by senior military officers, serving and retired.29 For pushing the jointness agenda, civilians therefore need to form an alliance with reformist officers.

Why do civilians intervene and push for greater jointness? There are at least three factors, not necessarily mutually exclusive, underlying civilian intervention. First, an argument rooted in realism, political leaders insist upon jointness to enhance the effectiveness of the military and thereby make them less likely to fail in battle. Posen  argues that balance of power theory, more specifically an external threat, makes it more likely that a state will innovate. The logic of enhancing military effectiveness animated the defence reforms process culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the United States.30 A similar logic – of improving operational effectiveness, drove defence reforms in Britain especially after the experience of the 1982 Falklands War. Significantly, however, ‘in the absence of a push from civilians, the British military were slow to redress this problem.’ 31 Some European countries, notably France, Italy and Germany among others, have also moved towards jointness to address shortcomings observed during coalition power-projection operations, mainly in the Balkans.32

The second factor motivating civilian leaders is financial efficiency. The single service approach to weapons acquisition, training and logistics often leads to unnecessary duplication and wasteful expenditure. Jointness, on the other hand, offers the promise of fiscal efficiency. Sticking with the example of the United States, ‘glaring inefficiencies in weapons procurement, led Congress to legislate greater tri-services integration.’ 33 The first and second factor need not be unrelated and the concept of jointness is appealing to civilians precisely for this reason – it promises increased military effectiveness and financial savings. In Britain, for instance, ‘acceleration of moves towards joint service organisations was widely recognised as sensible for both operational effectiveness and resource efficiency reasons.’ 34

The third factor possibly driving civilian intervention could be emulation. Civilians, especially bureaucrats in the Ministries of Defence and perhaps even the Defence Minister, may observe the role played by their counterparts in other countries and thereby push their military towards greater jointness. This is more likely for countries in a military alliance, although professional emulation is also possible by likely competitors. One study found that due to the influence of NATO, European countries ‘partially and selectively emulated’ ideas pertaining to jointness. 35

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29 In the US, General David Jones, then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, publicly called for restructuring and thereby supported others advocating for defence reforms, see Peter Roman and David Tarr, ‘The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness,’ Political Science Quarterly, 113(1) (1998), 97–99. Similarly, in the UK, Lord Mountbatten provided the intellectual vision for jointness which was gradually implemented with the support of like-minded military officers who assisted successive reform committees, see Timothy Garden, ‘Last Post for the Chiefs?’ RUSI Journal, 144(1) (February 1999), 47–51. 
30 Locher III and Nunn, Victory on the Potomac, 4 and Roman and Tarr, ‘The Joint Chiefs of Staff,’ 98. 
31 Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning and Terry Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain, France, and the United States, 1991-2012 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 123.
32 Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari, Transforming European Militaries: Coalition Operations and the Technology Gap (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 9–18, Piero Ignazi, Giampiero Giacomello and Fabrizio Coticchia, Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call it War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 108 and Sten Rynning, ‘From Bottom-Up to Top-Down Transformation: Military Change in France’, Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell (eds), A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 71–72.
33 Farrell, Rynning and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War, 123; also see Theo Farrell, Weapons without a Cause: The Politics of Weapons Acquisition in the United States (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 143–44.
34  Garden, ‘Last Post for the Chiefs?’ 47.
35 Alice Pannier and Olivier Schmitt, ‘Institutionalised cooperation and policy convergence in European defence: lessons from the relations between France, Germany and the UK,’ European Security, 23(3) (2014), 277.
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The arguments made in this article are two fold. First, that jointness requires civilian intervention as in its absence militaries will continue with the single service approach that maximizes their power and autonomy. In this endeavour civilians need to support, and need the support of, those within the military who are willing to break from parochial service loyalties to push their institutions towards greater jointness. Second, the coordination model of jointness that stems from the single service approach adversely shapes military effectiveness. This is because it is an inherently divisive model in which the services battle over roles and missions. Moreover the coordination model is not suitable for joint planning and operations or for inter-operability between the services
To support this argument I examine jointness and civil-military relations in India. Civilians in India have, by and large, refrained from enforcing jointness as it is perceived to be in the military’s domain. However, the 1999 Kargil war led to a process of defence reforms wherein civilians intervened to a limited degree and made incremental ( !! ) progress in enforcing jointness. Unfortunately, this intervention was not sustained or forceful enough as a result of which there has only been a ‘partial’ or ‘incomplete’ transition to jointness. Moreover, a lack of civilian support undid the efforts of some reformist military officers who were pushing for greater jointness. India’s transition to jointness has been incomplete because the political leadership is unconvinced about its necessity and has misgivings about a potential loss of civilian control          ( ....read PMO & MOD Offices )

Admittedly, there are limits to using a single case study, even one with multiple observations, to support a hypothesis. The argument that civilian intervention is a sine qua non for jointness is therefore a tentative one. However, this article also seeks to renew interest in the study of jointness, military innovation and civil-military relations. Moreover, in countries with low levels of jointness, civil-military relations appear to be a key variable as the military enjoys considerable autonomy. For instance, in Russia the military has a ‘high degree of institutional autonomy… [and civilians] have little leverage to impose unwanted policies.’ 36 Similarly, the Chinese military is ‘characterized by extremely weak civilian control and an almost total absence of oversight.’ 37 Significantly, in recent times, both militaries are slowly establishing ‘joint structures’ as a result of civilian pressure.38 Most recently, President Xi Jinping announced the creation of theatre commands and other measures that were viewed as the ‘most wide-ranging restructuring of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] since 1949.’ 39 These developments suggest that civil-military relations and jointness, regardless of the Indian case study, is a subject for further research.
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36 Alexander M. Golts and Tonya L. Putnam ‘State Militarism and its Legacies: Why Military Reform Has Failed in Russia,’ International Security, 29(2) (Fall 2004), 123.
37 Michael S. Chase, et al, China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 46.

  Click url  to read
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR893/RAND_RR893.pdf
38 Zysk, ‘Managing military change in Russia,’ 157, 164 and McCauley, ‘PLA Joint Operations Developments and Military Reform.’ 
39 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, ‘China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms,’ Strategic Forum (April 2016), 2.
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Distinct Domains: Civil-military Relations, Mountbatten and the Chief of Defence Staff Controversy

 Civilian control over the military has been one of the bigger success stories of India’s democracy. Most post-colonial states have struggled with it and hence it is to the credit of India’s politicians and soldiers that the tradition of civilian supremacy endures. This was not assured and it took the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership and the military’s desire to be ‘apolitical’ for civilian control to consolidate.40 
During the early years after independence the Ministry of Defence, staffed exclusively by civil servants, slowly came into being and started asserting itself. Inevitably this created tensions with the military. 
Lord Mountbatten played an important role in counselling India’s politicians, civilian bureaucrats and military officers during this time. More importantly, from the perspective of jointness, he lobbied time and again for creation of a joint staff under a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). This episode reveals much about India’s political class and its fear of the military

 India’s higher defence organization was set up on the advice of British officers, mainly Lord Mountbatten and General Ismay. While doing so they had discussed the creation of a permanent chairman of the chiefs of staff committee – a precursor to a joint staff. However Mountbatten thought that this post should be deferred by around 12 years as ‘the Indian Army was one generation ahead of the other two in producing experienced senior officers since the Indian Air Force and Navy were started so much later.’ 41 Exactly 12 years later, in 1960, Mountbatten approached Nehru and recommended the creation of a joint staff to be headed by a Chief of Defence Staff. 42 However, for reasons not exactly clear, Nehru demurred from doing so. After the 1962 war, Mountbatten once again made this suggestion and, as before, Nehru turned it down arguing that ‘there are all manner of considerations to be borne in mind.’ 43 While Nehru never clearly explained what these ‘considerations’ were,
however, it can be assumed that Nehru was concerned about a possible loss of civilian control.44 
This assessment – that appointing a CDS will weaken civilian control, has resonated with the Indian political class – even to this day. The idea for a CDS has been raised periodically by generations of Indian military officers, only to be consistently rebuffed.45 As discussed later, the debate on the CDS has contemporary relevance. Mountbatten’s efforts came to naught primarily because by the 1960s civilians, both politicians and civil servants were comfortable with the existing system and apprehensive of disturbing the status quo. Moreover, the military was divided on this issue – with the Air Force in firm opposition.
Perhaps a more consequential development of this period was the model of civil-military relations that emerged as a result of the 1962 China war. The Indian Army’s defeat in this war is its greatest military disaster and shapes perceptions to the day. The historiography of the war is still under debate, not helped by the government’s decision to withhold documents pertaining to this period. However, one of the narratives that emerged in the aftermath of this war blamed it on civilian ‘meddling’ in the professional ‘domain’ of the military. Due to the controversial role, and personality, of then Defence Minister Krishna Menon, this narrative – which suited the military, was readily accepted. According to Srinath Raghavan, civilians (both politicians and civil servants), ‘came to believe that the military must be given a free hand … a convention was established whereby the civilian leadership restricted itself to giving overall directives, leaving operational matters to the military.’ 46 This then became the norm in Indian civil-military relations wherein civilians give broad direction and enjoy unchallenged civilian control and the military has considerable operational autonomy. This arrangement can be imagined as one of different domains – with civilians exercising tight control over some matters, such as nuclear weapons, and the military enjoying autonomy in others, such as training, doctrine, operations, planning, etc.47



Flowing from this logic, jointness is considered to be within the military’s domain and civilians have rarely interfered. This left jointness to be deliberated upon by the services. The services have settled upon the coordination model that maximizes their power and autonomy. This, as the following analysis shows, has led to the single service approach to training, planning and operations and a lack of inter-operbility. The lack of jointness characterizes all of India’s military operations, however this article focuses on recent case studies. This is because the lexicon and operational emphasis on jointness really emerged – in the West and in India, in the 1980s. Therefore, this article deliberately excludes examining  jointness in the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars. In addition there were other minor operations which also revealed problems in jointness. 48 Instead of exploring all the case studies, I focus on recent tri-services operations and the most significant peacetime reforms undertaken by the Indian military.
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40  For more on civilian control see Stephen P. Cohen, ‘Civilian Control of the Military in India’ in Claude E. Welch, Jr. (ed.), Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1976).

 41  The following account relies on a note entitled ‘Creation of the Chief of the Defence Staff for India,’ prepared by Mountbatten for Defence Minister YB Chavan on 7 May 1965 that he shared in a Strictly Personal and Private letter with General JN Chaudhuri in MB1/J235/56, Mountbatten papers, University of Southampton.

 42 Personal and Private letter from Mountbatten to Nehru dated 9 December 1960 in MB1/J302, Mountbatten papers. It is not a coincidence that during this period Mountbatten was the CDS in the UK and was intellectually attached to the idea of jointness. Mountbatten had also influenced the creation of joint officer training at lower and mid-levels at the National Defence Academy (NDA) and Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) respectively. India was one of the first countries in the world to establish such joint institutes but it gradually lost out on this advantage.

43 Personal and Confidential Letter no. 290-PMH/63 from Nehru to Mountbatten dated 9 February 1963 in MB1/J302, Mountbatten papers.

 44 For more on this see Steven Wilkinson, Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2015), 130–31.

45  Almost all Army Chiefs, from the mid-1960 onwards, have petitioned, some publicly and some in private, for the creation of the post of CDS usually with an expectation that they would assume this post. 

46 Srinath Raghavan, ‘Civil-Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(1) (2009), 167.

 47 For more about distinct civil-military domains see Anit Mukherjee, ‘Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India,’ in Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Das and Manjeet Pardesi (eds.), India’s Military Modernization: Challenges and Prospects (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 196–229.

48 David Brewster and Ranjit Rai, ‘Operation Lal Dora: India’s Aborted Military Intervention in Mauritius’, Asian Security, 9(1) (March 2013), 62–74
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The Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, 1987–1990

The deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990 was India’s first and only expeditionary counter insurgency operation. This was a tri-services operation with the involvement of the Air Force and the Navy mainly in troop transport, logistical maintenance and casualty evacuation. On jointness there were two noteworthy developments. 

First, confusion and inter-service rivalry over command and control hampered joint operations. At the apex level the three Chiefs at that time enjoyed unusually good relations and even before the operation were launched insisted on establishing a tri-services Overall Forces Headquarters, called HQ OFC. This was headed by Lieutenant General Depinder Singh who had under his command three service component commanders. 
However, within a fortnight the naval and air force component commanders, in a coordinated move, returned to their respective formations and instead sent their juniors to act as Liaison officers 
– an arrangement that continued for the duration of the mission. Even though the service Chiefs wanted a type of joint theatre-command with senior component commanders, their formation commanders resisted this idea and instead preferred the older model of liaison officer to ‘coordinate operations’. Faced with this opposition from within their own service the Naval and Air Force Chiefs backed down.49
This resulted in the usual single service approach to operations wherein the OFC, IPKF did not command the assets of the other two services and instead had to depend upon the liaison officer to plan inter-services operations.50 According to Major General Harkirat Singh, whose Division was tasked to capture Jaffna and suffered heavily in the process, ‘the Air Force was commanding its own troops, Army its own troops, Navy its own troops

… Everybody went independently, there was no joint command.’ 51 


He blamed the disastrous helidrop at Jaffna University, where an entire platoon save one got wiped out, on the inability of the Air Force to deliver on the planned number of helicopter sorties.52



 Considering the criticism levelled at Major General Harkirat Singh some may call this a post-facto justification but there is no doubt that, without assured support, commanders were averse to planning joint operations. On this aspect Lieutenant General A.S. Kalkat, who was subsequently in charge of the IPKF, noted that ‘though Air Force and Naval assets were given but they were still taking orders from their headquarters and as they were not dedicated to me this resulted in delays affecting planning and operations.’ 53

The second issue on jointness was the lack of interoperability between the three services. Partly a result of single-service thinking and indicative of organizational priorities none of the services had prepared for joint operations. Unsurprisingly therefore the services did not have the capability to communicate with each other. On the rare occasion when they carried out joint tactical operations an army radio detachment was deputed to be located on helicopters or naval crafts.54 Among the few instances when naval fire support was requested by the army, it engaged targets 2 km away from where it was needed.55

Civilians had no role in facilitating jointness or even in the operational conduct of the war. The single service approach was evident from the lack of joint structures and from problems in interoperability. India’s overall military effort in Sri Lanka therefore suffered, as commanders were reluctant to plan for joint operations. Civilian involvement was also lacking to support the effort by the three chiefs to create a tri-services command. Their vision, perhaps ahead of its time, was overcome from opposition from within their services. This was indicative of a strong single service culture that emerged from the coordination model of jointness

Why did civilians not impose jointness or undertake defence reforms after the IPKF operations? In fact an attempt at defence reforms was made in the aftermath of this experience and was spearheaded by Arun Singh, a former Minister of State for Defence, and was called the Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE).  
               This report made wide-ranging recommendations but these were unacceptable to civilian bureaucrats and military officials and the report was quietly buried.56
They were successfully able to do this as, during this time, there were frequent changes in the political dispensation and, moreover, there was a collective wish to turn the page on the IPKF episode. In addition, jointness and higher defence management did not capture public attention. For these issues to come to the limelight it would take a much bigger crisis – which duly came around a decade later in the form of the Kargil war.

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49 This account of events at OFC and the Service Headquarters is based on an interview with Vice Admiral P.S. Das who was the Chief of Staff, Eastern Naval Command, at that time, New Delhi, 15 July 2010, also see Harkirat Singh, Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 125
50 For criticism of inter-services operations from the then OFC Commander see Depinder Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka (Delhi: Trishul publications, 1991), 59–60, 168–69; also see Kalyan Raman, ‘Major Lessons from Operation Pawan for Future Stability Operations,’ Journal of Defence Studies, 6(3) (July 2012), 43–44. 
51 Interview with Josy Joseph, ‘Till the LTTE get Eelam, they won’t stop,’ Rediff.com, March 2000. 
52 Interview with Josy Joseph, ‘Nobody sounded even a last post for our dead in Colombo,’ Rediff.com, March 2000; also see Jagan Pillarisetti, ‘Descent into Danger: 

The Jaffna University Helidrop,’ Bharatrakshak.com, 
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/index.html 

53  Interview, New Delhi, 27 October 2009. 
54 Yashwant Deva, Sky is the Limit: Signals in Operation Pawan (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007), 231–34, for more on inter-services communications see 322–23.
55  Depinder Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka, p. 169; for more criticism of the navy’s role during these operations see S.C. Sardeshpande, Assignment: Jaffna (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992), 57–59.

56  For more on this see Anit Mukherjee, Failing to Deliver: Post-Crises Defence Reforms in India, 1998–2010 (New Delhi: IDSA, 2011), 9–10.
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Air-Land Battle in the 1999 Kargil War

The 1999 Kargil war between India and Pakistan was primarily an Air–Land operation although the Indian Navy was on high alert and played an important role in signalling resolve. There was considerable acrimony between the Indian Air Force and the Army at the highest levels before, during and after the war. One of the enduring controversies was regarding the Air Force’s willingness, and promptness, to support the Army’s operations. The prevalent view in the Army is that the Air Force dithered over their requests and, according to one account, the Chief of Air Staff ‘almost gave a shut up call’ to the Vice Chief of the Army when he was requesting air support.57 Air Force officers argue that the Army was not clear or forthcoming about the operational picture and were making unrealistic demands, like using attack helicopters in high altitude areas.58 These tensions were partially resolved when Chief of Army Staff, General V.P. Malik, returned from his foreign visit and lobbied the other chiefs to present a joint plan to their political leaders.59 However, this episode set the tone and the war of words between the two services and the bitterness reverberates to this day.60 Apart from tensions between senior officer and inter-services rivalry, there were two other problem areas pertaining to jointness.

First, execution of joint operations was difficult because of ‘faulty structures’ which did not facilitate joint planning, training and information sharing. This issue of ‘faulty structure’ began from the very top with the functioning of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). 


The views of the services could not be more different as General V.P. Malik claimed that the COSC is the ‘worst organization for joint planning’ 61 

while a senior Air Force officer who was present at the meetings called it ‘a very effective body.’ 62 This divergence reflected an institutional divide on the proper model for jointness as the Air Force prefers to continue the ‘coordination’ model and the Army argues for a more ‘integrated’ approach preferably under its control. Regardless, the COSC which functions as a consensus committee could not resolve the differences between the services. Apart from problems at the highest level, there were other issues at the functional level of planning. There was no Forward Air Controllers (FAC) in the entire theatre as the Air Force did not feel the need for it. Instead, army aviation helicopters were diverted to be used as airborne FAC’s but this ad-hoc arrangement, which suffered from a lack of training, proved to be rudimentary and largely unsatisfactory.63

There were problems even in information-sharing between the two services. Conditioned by a single-service approach the services maintain separate operations rooms and are traditionally averse to information sharing. As a result, Air Force officers argue that the Army at different levels – army, command and corps headquarters, did not fully share their operational plans, future tasking and contingencies.64

The localized theatre of conflict also meant that the ‘Tactical Air Center’ (TAC) system did not work.’ 65 As a result Air Force operations were almost incidental to the ground attack plans. Tellingly, General V.P. Malik was even approached by one of his field commanders to halt the air strikes as it was interfering with his battle plans, but declined to do so.66 In sum, judging by training, capabilities and planning it does not appear as if the Air Force had prioritized close air support during the preceding years.
The prevalent notion within the Air Force was that the ‘use of air power in direct support of ground battle is its most inefficient utilization’ 67 and that the Army only wanted it to be used for ‘artillery support.’ 68 Indicative of this the Air Force had experimented with ground-based laser designators since 1983, but when faced with difficulties it justified away their need.69

Another major problem pertaining to jointness was the lack of interoperability. Most evident while examining communications systems, the three services operated their own systems and did not have the ability to securely communicate with each other. To resolve this, 15 Corps allotted a signals detachment to be co-located with relevant Air Force units.70 However, lacking ground to air communications, troops in contact could not guide aircrafts onto desired targets.71 There were other issues too, for instance, ‘maps used by Army and the Air Force were completely different and this led to a lot of problems.’ 72 These problems however should not have been too surprising as the concept of interoperability was never emphasized

As before, civilians did not concern themselves with the issue of jointness during this war. While aware of the differences between the services however, they remained loyal to the principle of non-interference in ‘operational affairs’. Jointness was a matter that was left to the services to deliberate upon and resolve. The Kargil war revealed major weaknesses in the capability of the Indian military to undertake joint operations and the problems inherent to the coordination model of jointness. The casualties suffered by the Indian military during this war and the resultant public outcry put pressure on political leaders. This also created an opportunity for civilians to intervene in what was considered the operational matters of the military and to push for greater jointness. However, as described in the next section, this was an incomplete transition and
the single service approach still largely dominates.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------57 Mohan Bhandari, ‘Kargil: An IAF perspective,’ Indian Defence Review, 25(2) (April-June, 2010), 134. In the same issue also see Harwant Singh, ‘Revisiting Kargil,’ 130–33; for more on problems in jointness during this war see Benjamin Lambeth, Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2012). 
58 Narayan Menon, ‘The Ghosts of Kargil,’ Indian Defence Review, 25(3) (July-September, 2010), 122–23. 
59 For a description of this see V.P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins 2006), 119–24
60 ‘Ex-Air Marshal returns army fire,’ Rediff News, 8 June 2004.
61Interview with General V.P. Malik, Chandimandir, 1 June 2010.
62Interview with officer who wishes to remain unnamed, Gurgaon, 30 August 2010. 
63Interview with Air Marshal Vinod Patney, 2 September 2010. Air force jets did not have the capability to communicate directly with army helicopters and instead information about the accuracy of the airstrikes was conveyed to the fighter pilots once they returned to the operations room. 
64Telephone interview with then Air Officer Commanding (Jammu and Kashmir), Air Marshal Narayan Menon, 27 May 2010; also see his ‘Kargil – 10 years after,’ first published in Indian Defence Review and reproduced at Bharat-rakshak.com, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Kargil/1059-Menon. html
65Telephone interview with Air Marshal Narayan Menon, 27 May 2010. 66Interview with the General V.P. Malik, Chandimandir, 1 June 2010, and with Lieutenant General Mohinder Puri, Gurgaon, 25 May 2010. General Malik argued that he wished to maintain interservices unity and continue the diplomatic pressure on Pakistan. 
67A.Y. Tipnis, ‘Operation Safed Sagar,’ Force, 4(2) (October 2006), 11. 68Interview with Air Marshal Vinod Patney, Gurgaon, 2 September 2010. 69Interview with Air Marshal Vinod Patney Gurgaon, 2 September 2010. 70Telephone interview with Air Marshal Narayan Menon, 31 August 2010. For more on problems of interoperability see his article ‘The Ghosts of Kargil,’ 126. 71Y.M Bammi, Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquered (New Delhi: Gorkha Publishers, 2002), 401–402. 
72Telephone interview with Air Marshal Narayan Menon, 27 May 2010. 73Anit Mukherjee, Failing to Deliver. 
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Jointness and Post-Kargil Defence Reforms

After the 1999 Kargil war, India undertook its most comprehensive, post independence defence reforms.73 The report of the Kargil Review Committee, set up to examine security weaknesses leading to the war, led to the creation of a Group of Ministers (GOM) to review different aspects of national security. Its Task Force on Defence was led, ironically, by Arun Singh, and comprised 10 other officials, including serving and retired military officers and civil servants. The main thrust of the Task Force was on achieving jointness. 74 It aimed to do this by two principal recommendations – simultaneously creating the post of Chief of Defence Staff and a joint, tri-services command called Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). These initiatives however failed in degree 
– a CDS was never appointed and the ANC was subverted in practice by the services

 As previously discussed, the post of a CDS has been a matter of considerable historical debate.75 Members of the Arun Singh led Task Force on defence made the creation of a CDS a principal idea allowing for a number of follow on recommendations such as establishing an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and other joint agencies. While the government accepted the follow-on recommendations however, it did not create the post of CDS. This, according to a member of the Task Force, ‘ripped the heart out of the GOM recommendations.’ 76 There was opposition to the CDS post from the Indian Air Force and from some civil servants, however the government was willing to overrule their objection and was poised to create such a post, when the Congress Party firmly expressed its opposition.77 

 The government then backed down and since then the official position of the Ministry of Defence is that the CDS post is awaiting the ‘consensus of all political parties.’ 78

Even without a CDS, the government went ahead with the proposal to create the joint ANC. A brainchild of Arun Singh, there was an expectation that this experiment would lead to geographically located Joint Commands in the future.79 However, the services were resistant to the idea of joint commands and viewed them as a threat to their autonomy and institutional interests. They therefore worked against this command. This was done primarily by starving the command of assets.80 In addition, they retained strong administrative, maintenance and logistical control over the service components stationed on the islands. According to a former Commander-inChief of the ANC, Lieutenant General Aditya Singh, 
‘the respective services function under own service arrangements and so the equipment and logistical details as well as the posting of personnel is all controlled by the services.’ 81
 Among career officers the ANC was soon considered an unattractive posting. In the face of all these developments the ANC lost its importance and according to some reports there are currently plans to revert this command back to the Navy.82
This episode offers insights into reformist officers, service interests and the role of civilian officials. Prior to the ANC, all military forces on the island chain were commanded by Fortress Commander, Andaman and Nicobar (FORTRAN), a post held exclusively by the Navy. When the GOM was convened the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Chief of Naval Staff, was Admiral Sushil Kumar. One of his priorities was on integrating the three services by replacing the ‘separate single service commands with joint commands.’ Accordingly, he gave up the navy’s prerogative over FORTRAN in order to create a joint command with the expectation that this would be a ‘starting point and an experiment.’ 83 This vision was shared by other reformist officers, such as Admiral Arun Prakash, who was later appointed as the Chief of Naval Staff and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee in 2005–2006. He argued that the ANC should be a ‘template for replication’ 84 leading to other geographically delineated joint commands. However, the other two services did not share their enthusiasm or vision for joint commands. Opposition from the services was predictable – joint commands would result in fewer promotion opportunities, but this was supposed to be overcome by the proposed CDS. Admiral Kumar had flagged this as a vital requirement and publicly stated that ‘the system to be a success needs a CDS in place.’ 85 Civilian hesitation in appointing a CDS ensured that the ‘experiment’ with joint command would fail and single service commands would continue. Some argued that even without the CDS, civilians should have insisted on creating more joint commands. According to Admiral Arun Prakash, if the Ministry of Defence ‘had ANY vision, they would have, by 2005-06, replicated ANC in (say) a Southern Theatre Command with HQ in Trivandrum or a Joint Training Command or Logistics Command.’ 86 The experience with the ANC highlights the critical role that civilians need to play in supporting reformist officers especially on matters pertaining to jointness. Admiral Sushil Kumar and Admiral Arun Prakash – both of whom functioned as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee could not impose their will in favour of jointness on the other services.87 Tellingly, Admiral Sushil Kumar is now criticised by current generation of naval officers for giving up a command in the service of an ideal
The post Kargil defence reforms provided an opportunity for civilians to enforce jointness. This effort was led by Arun Singh who was brought into the Defence Ministry at the behest of Jaswant Singh, who in turn was ‘temporarily’ in charge of the Ministry for seven months.88 Their efforts improved jointness to an extent, particularly with the creation of the Integrated Defence Staff, Andaman and Nicobar Joint Command and Strategic Forces Command. However, central to Arun Singh’s efforts was appointing a CDS and once the government demurred from doing so – the services remained dominant. Amidst the media controversy over the CDS issue, Arun Singh was personally attacked ‘as an extra-constitutional authority who [had] exceeded his brief.’ 89 Jaswant Singh and Arun Singh left the Ministry at the same time, effectively ending civilian attempts at enforcing jointness. The next Defence Minister George Fernandes was not attached to implementing the Group of Ministers Report. In 2004, the Congress coalition came to power and the issue of jointness and defence reforms was put on the backburner.90
The defence reforms process reveals a number of insights. First, this was the only instance wherein civilians intervened in enforcing jointness. Therefore, variation in civilian involvement led to improvement in the degree of jointness. This reinforces the key argument – as jointness requires working across different services it can only be imposed by civilian leaders . [read POLITICAL / PROFESSIONAL  LEADERS  & not BUREAUCRACY ] Second, one time nudges by civilians are insufficient for imposing jointness. India’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ mainly because, after Jaswant Singh, there was no political  interest. Therefore, sustained civilian intervention is crucial in imposing jointness.91
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73Anit Mukherjee, Failing to Deliver.
74There were 15 references to ‘joint’ in the 21 page redacted report of the Task Force on Defence, see Reforming the National Security System: Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security (New Delhi: Government of India, 2001), 97–117.
75 Apart from Mountbatten’s efforts in the 1960s, the argument about creating a CDS has been periodically debated, see Jerrold F. Elkin and W. Andrew Ritezel, ‘The Debate on Restructuring India’s Higher Defence Organization,’ Asian Survey, 24(10), (Oct. 1984), 1069–85.
76Arun Prakash, ‘India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Implications for National Security and Jointness,’ Journal of Defence Studies, 1(1) (August 2007), 24. 
77Inder Malhotra, ‘Security Misstep,’ Indian Express, 15 May 2014.
78This was the official position of the government under then Prime Ministers A.B. Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh and the current position of the Narendra Modi government, see Standing Committee on Defence, Thirty Sixth Report: Status of Implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, February 2009), 5, and reply to unstarred question no. 846 on ‘Chief of Defence Staff,’ Lok Sabha Questions, 24 July 2015.
  79Interview with Vice Admiral P.S. Das, who was a member of the Task Force on Defence, New Delhi, 24 June 2009.
 80 Patrick Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the Andaman and Nicobar Command,’ Strategic Analysis, 36(3) (May-June 2012), 447.
81 Interview, Gurgaon, November 5, 2013; also see Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands,’ 447-48.
82 Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘India Gives Navy Control of Andaman and Nicobar Command,’ Defense News, 29 November 2013.
83 Email to author, 3 September 2015.
84 Arun Prakash, ‘A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,’ in From the Crow’s Nest: A Compendium of Speeches and Writings on Maritime and Other Issues (New Delhi: Lancer Publications, 2007), 147.
85 Gaurav Sawant, ‘Interview with Admiral Sushil Kumar,’ The Indian Express, 6 January 2002.
86 Email to author, 18 April 2014, emphasis in the original.
 87 This also revealed the weakness inherent to the existing Chiefs of Staff Committee system. As this committee functions on the basis of consensus it is unable to deliberate upon substantive issues, see Arun Prakash, ‘Three Invisible Men,’ Force, 9(4), (Dec 2011), 10.
 88 Jaswant Singh was ‘temporarily’ in charge as George Fernandes, who held the post previously, was under investigation in a corruption scandal. After being cleared, Fernandes resumed his duties.
89 John Cherian, ‘In Defence of Changes,’ Frontline, 18(19) (September 2001), http://www.frontline.in/ static/html/fl1819/18190250.htm
 90 For an assessment of defence reforms under the Congress government see Anit Mukherjee, ‘Cleaning the Augean Stables,’ Seminar (658) (June 2014)
91 This finding is supported by other studies examining jointness in the US, see the Project entitled ‘Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), http://csis.org/pro gram/beyond-goldwater-nichols
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An Incomplete Transition: Civilian Motivation and the Future of Jointness in India

An analysis of the history and debates surrounding jointness in India reveal three trends. First, India adheres to the ‘coordination model’ of jointness with its attendant problems in interoperability, joint planning, training and operations. This has led to ‘institutionally independent Services, acting in accordance with their own priorities and perceptions under debatable centralised control and direction… [resulting] in an un-integrated force structure.’ 92 Second, training, education, planning and operating procedures and processes are geared towards the single-service approach. This becomes more apparent in the field as there are ‘nineteen commands between the three services and the Integrated Headquarters but not one of them is co-located with the other; and there is no co-relation, linkage, etc.’93 A combination of these two factors has an adverse impact on the overall effectiveness of the Indian military as the operations of the three services are not synergized – and are merely coordinated.94 This approach also results in duplication across the services and is fiscally wasteful – an argument that has not gained much attention. Third, civilians have played a limited role in fostering jointness. Civilians did play a role in the post-Kargil defence reforms, and some incremental progress was made; however, the single service approach and the coordination model of jointness continues.
What explains this reluctance to impose jointness? Civilian hesitation towards appointing a CDS is due to a fear that this may weaken civilian control and upset the supposedly ‘delicate’ civil-military balance. This sentiment has animated the Indian political class from the 1960s – when the CDS was first proposed by Mountbatten – to this day.95 Even apart from this issue civilians are reluctant to support other measures supportive of jointness, for instance joint commands, as this will entail overruling professional military opinion. The services in India have not been able to come up with a commonly accepted roadmap towards jointness and prefer the existing coordination model. Without a consensus, civilians are unwilling to accept the risks of imposing their vision of jointness. They are fearful that doing so will make them responsible for military setbacks, if any.96 In addition, civilians, especially bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence, are hindered by a lack of expertise.97

 A final, related factor against civilian intervention is the perception that the Indian system is adequately structured to deal with the existing threat environment. As argued by Ashley Tellis, Indian security managers are comforted by the country’s large size and have therefore ‘consciously refrained from altering the structure of strict civilian control no matter what benefits in increased military efficiency might accrue as a result.’ 98 Varied threat assessment may also explain why Indian civilians took action, albeit limited and short lived, after the failures in Kargil, a war imposed on India. In contrast, civilians may have concluded that the lesson of IPKF was not to engage in expeditionary wars of choice and hence did not concern themselves with post-IPKF military reforms.99 All these arguments support Posen’s argument that civilian intervention for military innovation is more likely in the face of deteriorating threat environment

 Fortunately for military reformers, jointness in a matter of contemporary debate in India. In 2011 the government appointed a committee – called the Naresh Chandra committee, to revisit the defence reforms process. One of its central recommendations was the creation of a quasi-CDS to be called a Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In a departure from the past there was consensus for such a post among all three services. However, the Congress-party-led coalition government took an inordinate time in processing the report and did not implement its recommendations. Shortly after assuming office the current Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar, had raised hopes for defence reforms when he stated that ‘Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is a must… because the three forces’ integration does not exist in the present structure.’ 100 However, within a few months he seemingly backtracked and said that the decision was not his to make.101 In December 2015, Prime Minister Modi, while addressing the Combined Commanders Conference, made a comprehensive speech encouraging jointness and defence reforms and argued that it would be an ‘area of priority’ for him.102 For some this was a clear indication that a CDS-type post would soon be appointed. It remains to be seen whether such a position will be created and, more importantly, if the post will be empowered to, if required, overrule the service chiefs.103

 Despite all the controversy regarding the post of a CDS it is an oversimplification to imagine it as the one-stop solution to ushering in jointness. Instead, there is a need for enhancing functional jointness in the field, emphasizing interoperability and strengthening joint planning, training and operations. Keeping all this in mind some have called for a more wideranging set of reforms, an ‘Indian version’ of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.104 In order for that to occur, however, civilian fears about a politically empowered, or unified, military needs to abate. Or perhaps a deteriorating threat environment may force civilians to emphasize military effectiveness. For civilians to intervene in a forceful manner, by overruling the services, to enforce jointness, however, would be a significant departure from the existing practice of India’s civil-military relations. Such a measure would therefore strengthen the central argument advanced in this article – jointness requires civilian intervention.
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92 A.K. Tiwary and A.S. Gill, ‘Jointmanship- An Air Warriors Overview,’ Purple Pages, 1(1) (November 2006), 39, emphasis added.
  93Arun Prakash, ‘Keynote Address,’ Proceedings of USI Seminar on Higher Defence Organisation (New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2007), 9.
94For more on the advantages of a proposed integrated approach over the current coordinated one, see Vijai Singh Rana, ‘Enhancing Jointness in Indian Armed Forces: Case for Unified Commands,’ Journal of Defence Studies, 9(1), (January-March 2015), 33–62 and Deepak Kapoor, ‘Need for Integrated Theatre Commands,’ CLAWS Journal, Summer (2013), 52–60. 
95 For other sources of opposition to the CDS see S.K. Sinha ‘The Chief of Defence Staff,’ Journal of Defence Studies, 1(1) (August 2007), 135–36.
96 Interview with former Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt, New Delhi, 22 September 2015.
 97 Anit Mukherjee, ‘The Absent Dialogue,’ Seminar, (599) (July 2009), 24–28. 
98 Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, RAND, 2001), 285. 
99 I thank an anonymous review for pointing this out. 
100‘ Manohar Parrikar for integration of three Services, creation of CDS,’ Zee News, 13 March 2015. 
101 Dinakar Peri and Amit Baruah, ‘I am the Defence Minister, and my concern is India’s defence,’ The Hindu, 26 May 2015.
102 Press Information Bureau, ‘PM chairs Combined Commanders Conference on board INS Vikramaditya at Sea,’ Government of India, Prime Minister’s Office, 15 December 2015, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133265 
103 Arguably the lack of political impetus on this issue is indicative of the minimal electoral pressure on matters pertaining to national security in India, see Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland ‘Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy,’ India Review, 11(2) (2012), 76–94. 
104 Sureesh Mehta, ‘India’s National Security Challenges,’ Outlook India, 12 August 2009, http://www. outlookindia.com/article/indias-national-security-challenges/261738
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Conclusion

India’s weakness on jointness calls into question its ability to formulate a coherent tri-services response to the ‘two-front threat’ posed by ongoing territorial disputes with Pakistan and China.105 Problems in joint operations in the event of a possible conventional war with Pakistan have already been highlighted.106 But the lack of jointness could be even more consequential along the China border where both the Army and the Air Force are ramping up their capabilities. It is not assured whether these assets are mutually supportive or are hindered by inter-services rivalry. India’s power projection capability from the strategically located Andaman and Nicobar Islands has been seriously hindered by inter-services rivalry.107 The lack of jointness is problematic not just from the perspective of military effectiveness but also on grounds of fiscal efficiency. The services are engaged in a bureaucratic battle over the defence budget and are pushing their vision of war – the Army wants more manpower, the Air Force is lobbying mainly for air superiority fighters and the Navy wants platforms to project power in the Indian Ocean. In all this there is unnecessary duplication of training and operating assets. An effective political-military strategy requires India’s political and military leadership to resolve these differing visions, prioritize acquisitions and strengthen inter-services cooperation to ensure that they are mutually supportive. It is not assured if the leadership has been able to do so.

  By focusing on jointness and civil-military relations this article highlights some areas for future research. First, is jointness only possible when enforced by civilians or are there other drivers? Intuitively it appears that jointness requires assertive civilian intervention but there could be other drivers. For instance, in Japan jointness was seemingly driven by its alliance with the United States.108 There might also be a strong case for emulation between militaries, as ideas on ‘jointness’ spread via professional military education. Fiscal considerations could also provide a strong rationale for jointness, as it seemingly did in the Canadian armed forces.109 One could also examine if some national organizational cultures are more amenable to jointness than others.110 Currently, the militaries of India, China and Russia are simultaneously, and erratically, transitioning towards jointness. There is scope therefore for a comparative study of the role of civil-military relations, reformist military officers, defence expertise and threat environment, among other factors, in facilitating or hindering jointness. In sum, there is a need for comparative studies examining drivers for jointness in different militaries. 
Another area for future research is to examine whether there is a tradeoff between jointness and civilian control? While this has been hinted at as one of the unintended consequences of unifying the services however, it requires further empirical evidence. A final area for further research is the assumption that jointness automatically enhances military effectiveness. As some argue, jointness may have, unintentionally, stifled ‘creativity’ and created less space for military innovation.111 The ‘coordination model’ may also prove advantageous in terms of enabling different ‘theories of victory’ across the services and therefore diversifying operational risks. The assumption that jointness automatically enhances military effectiveness therefore needs serious, evidence based research. In sum, scholars and practitioners need to refocus their attention on the benefits and potential disadvantages that accrue from a more ‘joint’ military.



Notes on contributor

Anit Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He was a post-doctoral fellow at the Centre for the Advanced Study of India (CASI), University of Pennsylvania and has a PhD from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. From 2010–2012, he was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. While in the doctoral programme, he also worked at the Brookings Institution and was a Summer Associate at RAND Corporation. He has published in RUSI Journal, India Review, The Caravan, The New York Times, and Indian Express, among others. His most recent publication is a co-edited volume (with C. Raja Mohan) titled India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (Routledge, 2015).
Formerly, he was a Major in the Indian Army and is an alumnus of India’s National Defence Academy (NDA), Khadakwasla.















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