CDS
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.htmlPart 15 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of-n-parts-new.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-jointness-pla-pla-system-of-systems.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-12-cds-jointness-pla-military.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html
Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-3-chief-of-defence-staff.html
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html
Part 2 of N Parts:
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Part 1 of N Parts
SOURCE
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT488/RAND_CT488.pdf
https://jamestown.org/program/the-chinese-military-reforms-and-transformations-in-the-new-era/
SOURCE
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-strategiSOURCE>
SOURCE:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/118296/1/602201.pdf
China’s Strategic Ambiguity
Since the end of the Cold War, leading Western military leaders and strategists have consistently pressured China to answer a meaningless question:
“What are your intentions for the
massive military buildup?”
massive military buildup?”
This practice testifies the degree to which China has succeeded in manufacturing a strategic ambiguity to blur its motive to challenge militarily the United States, the only adversary militarily capable of stopping China’s rising ambitions to replace the U.S. as the preeminent global superpower.
China usually adopts two approaches in achieving such strategic ambiguity, both inherited from the country’s ancient strategic wiles, and both are currently studied in China’s many military colleges and defense universities. The first one is called
“Hide a dagger in a smile,” the
second is “Battle of Pride.”
“Hide a dagger in a smile,” the
second is “Battle of Pride.”
“Hide a dagger in a smile” is famously celebrated as Strategy Ten of the renowned military classic The Thirty Six Strategies. [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty-Six_Stratagems ] AND [ https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Thirty-Six_Strategies }
The actual text is this: “Reassure the enemy to make it slack, work in secret to subdue it; prepare fully before taking action to prevent the enemy from changing its mind: This is the method of hiding a strong will under a compliant appearance.” Or as China’s late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping put it as an overall national policy,
“Hide your strength,bide your time.”
“Battle of Pride” refers to the tactic of showering your enemy with flattery, making it proud of its own virility to soften its vigilance against your own plan. Thus senior U.S. military leaders or defense officials are usually told repeatedly by their Chinese counterparts that the U.S. is much stronger than China militarily and there should be no worry about China’s military buildup and that the U.S. should feel proud about its military might.
The well-studied Chinese military classic One Hundred Marvelous Battle Tactics [Baizhan qifa] devotes a whole chapter to this “Battle of Pride.” It says that “When the enemy is strong and cannot be easily overcome, we should puff it up with humble words and ample gifts and wait until it reveals its weak point to subdue it once and for all. The principle goes: ‘when the enemy is humble, make it proud.’”
Under China’s new supreme leader Xi Jinping, China’s strategic ambiguity has become less blurry as its military might has taken a leap forward since 2013, and its behaviors have become more aggressive due to America’s penchant for non-confrontation and Washington’s obsession with “engagement with China” at any cost, which still nourish illusions and confusion about China’s ultimate objective.
The good news is that China’s ploy has collapsed swiftly since the Trump Administration came along.
While China has never given American military
leaders a straight answer to the question “What
leaders a straight answer to the question “What
are your intentions for the massive
military buildup?” the new national security and defense teams under the new administration has provided a belated answer on behalf of China.
The December 2017 National Security Strategy presents a comprehensive, blunt, and long over-due analysis of the startling threats posed by China to the United States in key areas of national security including economic and industrial base, conventional and emerging weapons platforms including cyber and space. It also pronounces the unprincipled at-all-cost “engagement with China” policy has failed.
But it is the January 2018 National Defense Strategy that bluntly calls China a “revisionist” nation bent on changing international norms and geostrategic status quo mostly maintained by the United States. It unequivocally states that China’s all-of-nation long-term strategy is to seek “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”
The last pivotal moment like this in U.S. history occurred in 1946 when George Kennan, profoundly bothered by a lack of America’s understanding of the Soviet Union’s true motives and intentions, sent his “Long Telegram,” and the next year published a version of it known as the “X Article.” In it he conclusively delineated Moscow’s true motive for world domination and how the U.S. should respond accordingly. It is time for a strategic clarification again, but this time about China, America’s new adversary in a new age.
PLA Military Modernization: Drivers, Force Restructuring, and Implications
Testimony of
Cortez A. Cooper III 1
The RAND Corporation 2
Before the U.S.-China Economic
&
Security Review Commission
[ https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT488/RAND_CT488.pdf ]
February 15, 2018
.......Xi has consolidated power over the key organs of party, military, and state to guide structural, systemic reforms aimed at improving China’s ability to control its domestic population,......
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has launched the most extensive restructuring of China’s national defense establishment since the reforms of the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping. While Xi’s predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, made significant contributions to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy, doctrine, and force modernization, the changes underway since early 2016 are far more ambitious in terms of aligning China’s military prowess with its regional and global interests. Xi’s principal objective in restructuring is to ensure the absolute loyalty of the PLA to the CCP and to Xi personally as the party’s paramount leader. His organizational and structural changes, if successful, also address major command, control, and operational deficiencies that have plagued the PLA for decades.3 [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR893/RAND_RR893.pdf ]
Xi sees both objectives as essential to reinforcing CCP control and guiding China’s ascendance as a great, global power. Xi refers to this broader grand strategic vision as the “Chinese Dream.”
In Xi’s explanation, the Chinese Dream is “the goal of completing the building of a wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized nation” by the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China in 2049.4 Interim goals to achieving the “dream” are encapsulated in a set of policy objectives to be achieved by 2021 (the centennial of the CCP’s founding) and 2035, spanning political, military, social, cultural, and economic fields.5 To realize these objectives and overcome opposition from powerful vested interests, Xi has consolidated power over the key organs of party, military, and state to guide structural, systemic reforms aimed at improving China’s ability to control its domestic population, compete in the global economy, and defend China’s expanding array of national interests. Structural reform stood out as the primary focus of the Third Plenum of the 18th CCP Congress in November 2013, and this continues to pervade much of Xi’s agenda. With the start of China’s 13th Five-Year Program in 2016, Xi set in motion the massive PLA restructuring effort that will define missions and determine capabilities for the Chinese military over the coming decades
Defense spending patterns and Xi’s personal interest in PLA restructuring indicate that the Chinese military will meet many of the modernization goals it seeks to achieve between 2020 and 2049. These goals focus on giving the PLA capabilities to conduct what Chinese military strategists call informatized, integrated joint operations. 6 By 2035, if not before, the PLA likely will be able to contest all domains of conflict—ground, air, sea, space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic—throughout the Indo-Pacific region, greatly increasing the risks and costs of U.S. and allied responses to regional contingencies.
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1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
2 The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.
3 Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, and Samuel K. Berkowitz, China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-893-USCC, 2015.
4 “Xi Jinping Addresses Exhibition on China’s Renaissance,” Xinhua, November 29, 2012. As of January 30, 2018: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-11/29/c_113852724.htm.
5 “Full Text of 18th Party Congress Report,” Xinhua, November 17, 2012. As of December 15, 2017: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259.htm. The general military milestones include the following:
The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and being capable of winning informatized wars by the mid-21st century
“China’s National Defense in 2006,” Xinhua, December 29, 2006. As of December 15, 2017:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/29/content_771191.htm.
6 The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) describes “informatization” as “conditions in which modern military forces use advanced computer systems, information technology, and communication networks to gain operational advantage over an opponent” and interprets the concept as referring to “high-intensity, information-centric regional military operations of short duration.” See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2011, p. 3. See also Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 2010, March 2011.
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U.S. responses to PLA modernization should plan to fund and deploy the capabilities to meet these challenges and mitigate future risk to U.S. interests and forces posed by PLA modernization. Such responses should, on the one hand, maintain or even increase China’s perception of the prohibitive risk involved in using force to settle regional disputes or threaten U.S. interests, and on the other, signal to China that the United States and its allies will maintain the edge in applying advanced technologies to military purpose. In both areas, U.S. actions will drive Chinese reactions. Congress, in its oversight of the Intelligence Community and the Departments of Defense and State, may wish to stress the importance of assessments that evaluate Chinese responses to counter U.S. and allied security initiatives
In terms of maintaining or increasing Chinese risk aversion, the United States should consider the following responses:
• Develop a menu of proportional response options linked to various levels of Chinese coercion or aggression in the region. Such options could include increased Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea; semipermanent air, naval, and special operations forces rotations to the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia; exercises or joint patrols with Vietnam; and legal and economic disincentives for unilateral Chinese effort to increase military and paramilitary presence and infrastructure in contested areas.
• Increase the number and/or scope of bilateral and multilateral training exercises with regional allies and partners to rapidly deploy forces to new, austere, dispersed locations near regional hot spots
• Demonstrate improved capabilities and new operational concepts for sea control operations and mobile defense of maritime features and lines of communication.
• Demonstrate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and concepts of operation that provide flexible communications and intelligence to widely dispersed forces in the Indo-Pacific
• Prioritize funding for existing or repurposed systems that have the potential to disrupt Chinese plans, concepts, and operations but are currently insufficient in quantity, such as extended range cruise missiles, mobile integrated air and missile defenses, multirole unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles, and improved protective measures for high-value platforms and bases.7
Although the resource weight that the CCP and Chinese state put behind the development of militarily applicable disruptive technologies is of growing concern, most of the military modernization underway in China corresponds to achieving what the United States has already attained in its networked, precision-strike capabilities. To ensure that China doesn’t “leapfrog” the United States and its allies in future capabilities, the United States should:
• clearly signal the intent to lead in any military application of disruptive technologies through DoD innovation programs or other channels
• consider defense authorization guidance that calls for a comprehensive assessment of how China defines and prioritizes the utility of specific civil-military technologies
• through appropriations and oversight auspices, consider building an integrated government-commercial sector counterintelligence effort to mitigate the compromise of U.S. intellectual, technical, and industrial capital.
The remainder of this testimony is organized into four sections. The first section analyzes the drivers of PLA modernization and the current restructuring effort. The second section provides an overview of the consolidation of Xi’s power through PLA restructuring. The third section reviews the operational implications of restructuring, and the associated timelines. The final section considers implications and recommendations for the United States.
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7 For a more complete discussion of potential options and associated costs, see David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Myers, and Carter C. Price, U.S. Military Forces and Capabilities for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1782-RC, 2017. In this study, the authors posit that increasing the U.S. defense budget by $50 billion (to 3.5 percent of GDP) to fund additional systems as noted on this list, would provide significant improvements in U.S. conventional deterrence vis-a-vis China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
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PLA Modernization Drivers: Restructuring to Meet the Threat
As was the case with his predecessors, Xi’s military modernization programs and priorities are based on concepts delineated in CCP strategic guidelines to the military. Over the course of the People’s Republic of China’s history, three iterations of these guidelines represented major new military strategies, and several others represented adjustments to the strategy existing at the time.8 The most recent major or new guideline, issued in 1993 and encapsulated by the directive to the PLA to prepare for “winning local wars under high-technology conditions,” has been adjusted twice, once in 2004 and again in 2015. The 2004 adjustment directed the PLA to prepare to “win local wars under conditions of informatization,” and the current guidance, as revealed in China’s 2015 defense white paper, directs the PLA to “win informatized local wars” with emphasis on struggle in the maritime domain.9
Chinese military science sources describe key modernization efforts as driven by an “information system–based system-of-systems” approach, akin to U.S. network-centric warfare.10 The “system-of-systems” and “informatization” approaches have focused on the development and employment of an integrated network for information collection, fusion, dissemination, and command decision in joint campaign operations as well as the formation of task-based organizations to conduct the “integrated joint operations” (IJO) enabled by such a network.11 In addition to the focus on local, informatized war, the latest strategy also highlights the importance of “active defense”—a term that has deep historical roots in Chinese military thought but has evolved to conform to a new security environment and a new era in warfare. Active defense in its current form requires offensive, regional force projection capabilities to defend China’s interests beyond her land borders.12 The 2015 strategy particularly stresses the importance of projecting capabilities in the maritime and informational domains.
China’s leaders have developed the strategic guidelines largely based on perceived threats to national interests given changes to the geostrategic environment and the evolving nature of warfare.13 PLA force transformation and modernization are therefore inextricably tied to and driven by CCP threat perceptions as promulgated through multiple official channels. These threats were expressed in the Mao, Deng, and early Jiang years via many documents to include military strategic guidelines. From 1998 to the present, China’s biennial defense white papers have been a primary conduit for delineation of the threats to Chinese national interests and objectives, both domestic and foreign, for which the PLA must prepare and modernize.
China’s national interests revolve around stability of political (i.e., CCP) and social systems, national sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, national unification, and economic and social development. Chinese leaders often speak of three specific core interests, summarized by Xi during a 2014 meeting with the PLA’s delegates to the National People’s Congress as “national sovereignty, security, and development interests.”14 Security generally refers to the maintenance of CCP control over the breadth and depth of the Chinese state. Sovereignty refers to territorial integrity and national unification interests, focused specifically on Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang;15 but also bearing on maritime sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas.16 Development concerns those economic and other interests deemed vital to sustained economic growth critical to the nation’s development. The 2013 defense white paper points out the increasing importance of protecting resources, trade routes, and citizens overseas. 17 In March 2017, Xi participated in a meeting of the PLA delegation to the National Party Congress, where he and the delegates discussed the importance of protecting China’s overseas interests. 18 Authoritative sources also make the same argument with regards to China’s interests in new strategic domains, such as space and cyberspace.19
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8 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Military Strategy: ‘Winning Informatized Local Wars,’” China Brief, Vol. 15, No. 13, July 2, 2015.
9 For the official English translation of the white paper, see “Full Text: China’s Military Strategy,” China Daily, May 26, 2015. As of February 6, 2018: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm.
10 DoD’s 2013 China report describes the system of systems concept as: “This concept requires enhancing systems and weapons with information capabilities and linking geographically dispersed forces and capabilities into an integrated system capable of unified action.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2013, p. 12.
11 For a discussion of system of systems operational capability, see Kevin McCauley, “System of Systems Operational Capability: Key Supporting Concepts for Future Joint Operations,” China Brief, Vol. 12, No. 19, October 5, 2012. China’s interpretation of IJO focuses on the development of joint command organizations with integrated command networks to enable rapid combat decision and execution. See the Academy of Military Science’s journal, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, Vol. 4, October 2010.
12 For a discussion of the “active defense” concept, see Timothy R. Heath, Kristen Gunness, and Cortez A. Cooper, The PLA and China’s Rejuvenation: National Security and Military Strategies, Deterrence Concepts, and Combat Capabilities, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1402-OSD, 2016, pp. 34–35.
13 Fravel, 2015.
14 “Xi Jinping Attends PLA Delegation Plenary Meeting” [习近平出席解放军代表团全体会议], People’s Daily [人民网], March 11, 2014. As of January 30, 2018: http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2014npc/n/2014/0312/c376707- 24609511.html
15 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America [中华人民共和国驻美利坚合众国大使馆], “MND: Adjustments to Mainland Military Disposition Toward Taiwan Will Depend on the Situation” [国防部：大陆对台湾军事部署是否调整将视情况而定], January 20, 2008. As of January 30, 2018: http://www.chinaembassy.org/chn//zgyw/glyw/t709316.htm
16 Caitlin Campbell, Ethan Meick, Kimberly Hsu, and Craig Murray, China’s “Core Interests” and the East China Sea, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 10, 2013. As of December 15, 2017: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Core%20Interests%20and%20the%20East%20China %20Sea.pdf. “China’s Core Interests Are Not to Be Challenged” [中国核心利益不容挑战], People’s Daily [人民网], May 25, 2015. As of December 15, 2017: http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0525/c70731-27053920.html
17 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国国防部], National Defense White Paper: The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces [国防白皮书：中国武装力量的多样化运用], April 16, 2013. As of January 30, 2018: http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2013-04/16/content_4442839_3.htm
18 Wang Shibin [王士彬], “Xi Jinping Attends PLA Delegation Plenary Meeting and Delivers Important Speech” [习近平出席解放军代表团全体会议并发表重要讲话], Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国国防部], March 12, 2017. As of December 15, 2017: http://www.mod.gov.cn/leaders/2017- 03/12/content_4775317.htm
19 Xiao Tianliang, ed. [肖天亮主编], Science of Strategy [战略学], Beijing: National Defense University Publishing House [国防大学出版社], 2015, p. 2.
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The 2013 and 2015 white papers include a fairly extensive list of “security threats and challenges” to China’s interests. These include:
• the U.S. adjusting its Asia-Pacific strategy to strengthen alliances and expand military presence
• a Japanese threat to territorial sovereignty and maritime rights
. Taiwan “separatism”
• natural disasters, security accidents, and public health incidents
• factors affecting social harmony and stability
• increasing risk to China’s overseas investments
• major powers developing more sophisticated space and cyber technologies.20
Through examining threat perception patterns across the defense white papers and other authoritative sources, it is possible to discern Beijing’s “top priorities” for adjustments to strategy and subsequent modernization initiatives. Taiwan separatism figures prominently, and most white papers cite general separatism, including in Tibet and Xinjiang, as a threat. The United States is directly mentioned in a threat context, and every version of the white paper cites “hegemonism” as a threat—an oblique reference to the United States. There are also mentions of “power politics,” “neo-colonialism,” “color revolutions,” and even “neo–gunboat diplomacy” that likely are indirect references to the United States. Combined, all these references put the United States above all other listed threats. All versions also cite advanced military technologies as posing a threat to Chinese national security.
U.S. and Japanese alliance actions in the Asia-Pacific region are grouped as a general threat. Defense white papers and other authoritative sources have mentioned the United States increasing its military presence in the region in conjunction with Japan pursuing remilitarization. In effect, whenever the United States does the former, it emboldens Japan to do the latter.21 China’s concern about improvements in military technologies (the Revolution in Military Affairs) also follows this logic. The more technologies improve, the more states will pursue them to gain a strategic advantage over their competitors or to at least avoid losing ground, thereby sparking a possible global arms race and increasing the possibility that local wars will become more disruptive to the global economy
To be sure, PLA modernization is not always linked to specific threats. CCP leaders from Deng forward have stressed the goal of establishing a strong army in conjunction with creating a wealthy nation. However, this Strong Army Concept and the threat-based logic of PLA modernization are not mutually exclusive and are even interconnected. Official CCP and PLA writings stress the need for a strong army not for its own sake but rather to guard against threats in an increasingly complex security environment and preserve China’s economic gains. The 2015 China’s Military Strategy white paper argues that a “Strong Army” is part of the Chinese dream, necessary to protect the nation and deal with a range of threats.22
PLA doctrine follows from the threat-based strategic guidelines. Operational regulations that likely represent PLA doctrine followed each of the three major guidelines—another set of new regulations was issued following an adjustment to guidelines in the 1970s. 23 The 1993 guidelines drove the development of the fourth and current set of PLA operational regulations, which were issued in 1999 and included campaign guidance documents that for the first time included both service-specific and joint campaigns.24 Although “fifth generation” operational regulations have not been issued, there is evidence that doctrine is in a period of flux and new regulations bearing the mark of Xi’s restructuring goals likely are imminent.25 These regulations will almost certainly stress improved joint capabilities in line with current restructuring efforts.
The path from party strategic guidelines to the formation of doctrine carries forward to defense research, development, and acquisition (RDA), force structure adjustments, training guidance, and development of new capabilities and concepts for deterrence and combat operations. This is particularly in evidence from the issuance of the 1980 guidelines to the present. The trajectory of strategic guidance, operational regulations, force structure changes, and defense programs since 1980 clearly indicate Chinese leaders’ understanding of the fundamental changes to the nature of warfare due to information technology and the “revolution in military affairs.” Party threat perceptions from 1999 to the present indicate a particularly acute sense of vulnerability in the maritime, electro-magnetic, space, and cyberspace domains.
These vulnerabilities appear even more acute considering the potential for China’s forces to come into conflict with the U.S. military in a regional contingency. Most of China’s short- to mid-term defense industrial programs are driven by a CCP requirement for the PLA to address capability gaps faced by the force should it be called upon to defeat a regional adversary with competing sovereignty or territorial claims, and confront U.S. or allied forces responding to such a contingency. The warfighting potential presented by U.S. operational forces in support of Taiwan is largely behind China’s successful drive to extend PLA capacity to find, fix, and target forces and installations in the region to hundreds of kilometers from Chinese shores and borders. A large body of Chinese professional military education materials make clear that China has absorbed lessons learned from U.S. performance in contemporary conflicts and harnessed those insights to shape its development of an informatized reconnaissance-strike capability.26
The full military modernization that the CCP expects by mid-century, if achieved, will be completed because the PLA achieves networked C4ISR and counter-C4ISR capabilities that enable very complex combinations of systems and subsystems to kinetically or nonkinetically defeat or paralyze key points and nodes in enemy operational systems, all within the enemy’s decision cycle.27 Priority programs include but are not limited to:
• an integrated air defense systems (IADS) to defend against American airpower over Chinese territory or on its periphery
• large numbers of conventional land attack and antiship ballistic missiles to threaten U.S. land-based aircraft in the region, aircraft carrier operations, and U.S. basing and supply chains
• platforms, such as the new Type 055 cruiser’s vertical launching system, to launch cruise missiles in quantities to overwhelm U.S. or allied defenses
• an undersea sensor system and improvements to China’s relatively weak antisubmarine warfare capability to detect, track, and degrade U.S. submarines operations off the Chinese coast
• long-range radar, jamming, antisatellite, and cyber capabilities to detect U.S. movements and blind, jam, and/or incapacitate U.S. space and radar systems
• unmanned aerial vehicles and other systems to conduct ISR missions as well as strikes and battle damage assessment. 28
Chinese strategists clearly believe that the threat of regional conflict, particularly involving the U.S. and/or Japan, will require a much higher level of interservice integration and survivable, multipurpose command and control (C2) systems and networks than the PLA has ever managed. Closely analyzing PLA campaign literature paints a picture of a force that will use a blend of offensive and defensive concepts to gain information dominance at the outset of conflict, and to use this advantage to conduct long-range precision strikes against a technologically advanced enemy’s most valued high-tech weapons systems and supply lines.29
Restructuring Command and Control: Consolidating the Chairman’s Power
Since 2014, Chinese media references to the “Central Military Commission [CMC] Chairman Responsibility System” have forcefully driven home the degree to which Xi, as chairman of the CMC, exercises direct control over disciplinary, administrative, and operational activities of the PLA.30 [ https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm47jm.pdf ] Although Xi inherited and is forwarding the logic and direction of modernization discussed earlier in this paper, he alone among the post-Tiananmen leaders has been able to overcome bureaucratic hurdles to force the organizational changes needed to realize modernization objectives. The first objective is to sustain the absolute loyalty of the PLA to the CCP in the person of the CMC chairman, and the second is to achieve a C2 structure at all levels of the PLA that enables joint operations in informatized local war.
With the reorganization set in motion in early 2016, Xi places the PLA more tightly under the institutional control of the CCP and makes it more personally obedient to him. Xi laid the groundwork for restructuring in large part via his anticorruption campaign. The anticorruption sweep to date has netted over 50 general officers, including the most senior general officers to have been purged in the last 20 years. 31 [ https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/54b9/9260c1a1837a46dd034e7c23f31e4c0ea6e0.pdf?_ga=2.149109366.1193331790.1567874326- 246451959.1567874326 ] Although undoubtedly aimed at destroying corrupt patron-client links and abuses of privilege associated with control over administrative and resource decisions, the anticorruption campaign has also, at least to this point, given Xi the power needed to clear obstructions to his reorganization goals
In terms of eradicating alternate power centers to Xi and the CMC, the key changes are the elimination of the four PLA General Departments and streamlining of the seven Military Regions (MRs) into five Theater Commands. The old General Department functions are subsumed by 15 functional organs established directly under a revamped CMC, centralizing C2 in the CMC and its chairman. 32 While transitioning the MR system to a more joint Theater Command structure may be primarily oriented to improve interservice operability, it also enhances CCP control. With the change, the PLA services are now principally responsible to the CMC for manning, equipping, and training activities, while the theaters assume operational control of forces under the supreme command of the CMC. 33 Along with the anticorruption drive, having separate entities to manage administrative and operational functions may enable CMC efforts to break up relationships based on bribery and corrupt procurement practices. 34 It remains to be seen if the PLA will rotate officers among different theaters to inculcate a joint culture, but such activity would further weaken old patron-client relationships.
Any reform of this magnitude, which also includes a force reduction of 300,000 personnel, entails risk to the reformer. Xi has softened the blow by not only continuing the trend of double digit defense budget increases, but also through several initiatives to raise both the standard of living of service members and their status in the eyes of Chinese society. He has actively promoted the importance of the PLA through a schedule of visits to PLA units across China that dwarfs those of his predecessors. Presiding over a massive military parade marking the 90th birthday of the PLA this past summer, Xi dressed in camouflage and expressed his pride in the PLA as guarantor of China’s security and prosperity—a coming-out party reinforcing both Xi’s control and the PLA’s priority in party and state resource decisions. 35
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20 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2013, p. 2.
21 Ge Dongsheng [葛东升], On National Security [国家安全战略论], Beijing: Military Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], 2006, pp. 30–39.
22 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2013.
23 Elsa B. Kania, “When Will the PLA Finally Update Its Doctrine?,” The Diplomat, June 6, 2017.
24 Wang An and Fang Ning, Textbook on Military Regulations and Ordinances, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1999, pp. 124–138.
25 Kania, 2017.
26 Michael S. Chase, Cristina L. Garafola, and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Chinese Perceptions of and Responses to Conventional Military Power,” Asian Security, 2017, p. 5.
27 McCauley, 2012.
28 For more information on specific systems, please see Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, Santa Monica, Calif., RAND Corporation, RR-392-AF, 2015, pp. 28–35.
29 Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., On Military Campaigns, Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000.
30 See James Mulvenon, “The Yuan Stops Here: Xi Jinping and the ‘CMC Chairman Responsibility System,’” China Leadership Monitor, No. 47, Summer 2015. As of February 1, 2018: https://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/summer-2015-issue-47
31 Li Xiaoting,“Cronyism and Military Corruption in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era: Rethinking the Party-Commandsthe-Gun Model,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, No. 107, 2017, pp. 696–687.
32 Chien-wen Kou, “Xi Jinping in Command: Solving the Principal-Agent Problem in CCP-PLA Relations?” China Quarterly, No. 232, December 2017, p. 7.
33 See Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Sanders, “Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications,” China Strategic Perspectives 10, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, March 2017, p. 19.
34 Li Shaomin, “Assessment of an Outlook on China’s Corruption and Anticorruption Campaigns: Stagnation in the Authoritarian Trap,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2017, p. 142.
35 Kou, 2017, pp. 8–9.
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Restructuring Theaters and Services: Preparing for Integrated Joint Operations
operations under informationized conditions.”5 Perhaps the most striking point that emerged from this assessment was just how profoundly different the Soviet and American approaches to C3 were. Soviet theory and practice attributed far greater importance to C3 than did the longstanding emphasis on firepower evident in American doctrinal thinking. One might have expected the discovery of these differences to precipitate some rethinking of American attitudes toward the importance of C3 in combat interactions and outcomes. Nevertheless, there was only fleeting interest within the U.S. military services in making the intellectual effort to develop a more comprehensive understanding of C3’s role in modern warfare.
Informatized Operations
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Other/Litigation%20Release%20-%20Countering%20Enemy%20Informationized%20Operations%20in%20Peace%20and%20War.pdf
With greater centralization of military authority, Xi desires to make the PLA a more effective and capable fighting force by revamping combat formations for joint, informatized operations. The primary impediment to progress for the PLA on its path to integrated joint operations was the MR organizational structure, which had both operational and administrative obligations and was heavily geared to ground force dominance. On February 1, 2016, the CMC officially replaced the MR system with four Theater Commands responsible for operations in each of the cardinal directions and a fifth responsible for defense of Beijing. The reorganization also established a distinct PLA Army headquarters, granted military service status for the PLA Rocket Force (formerly 2nd Artillery Force), established a Joint Logistics Support Force, and created a Strategic Support Force that consolidates many intelligence, space, cyber and electronic warfare organs and responsibilities. The reorganization is a major step toward reducing the dominance of the ground forces while promoting joint organizations with greater Navy and Air Force leadership and re-engineering logistics and support systems.
While the command lines from Theater headquarters to the separate service units are nascent and somewhat unclear, each theater has a joint operations command center (JOCC) to exercise operational C2 of its forces. The CMC also has a JOCC in its Joint Staff Department to exercise joint C2 at the supreme command level. Assigning responsibility for joint planning and C2 at theater echelon is in part justified by the need to push C2 closer to the operational space, particularly considering the requirement to operate outside the traditional confines of China’s borders.36 The Theater Command system, complemented by the establishment of a central PLA JOCC, potentially provides full-time joint planning staffs in strategic directions along its periphery. The PLA also will have the opportunity to achieve more effective C2 to integrate joint C4ISR capabilities and plan for multiregion campaigns that require subordination of one command to another.37
The MR system emphasized “mechanized and semimechanized” warfare with fixed boundaries and armor operations.38 This downplayed air and naval operations and inhibited the development of training and concepts to contend with operations that occur outside the territorial boundaries. By instituting a JOCC at each theater, Beijing has put the structures in place both for managing crises and conflict on the periphery, as well as potentially for overseas deployments over the coming decades. Possibly the most consequential progress from the restructuring will come from the development over time of joint force packages for overseas operations in line with the CMC’s expectation of “unprecedented global change.”39
[ C4ISR
https://www.google.com/search?q=C4ISR&safe=active&rlz=1C1CHBF_enIN846IN846&sxsrf=ACYBGNTkdkxniQ04l_yAvbHvjm1Sbm2StQ:1567855013731&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&fir=oUxEK8TLP0Yf6M%253A%252CwYebdmvbaUVZbM%252C_&vet=1&usg=AI4_-kRig8FFc4gGTtBikyMr-Pnr9s58LQ&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiakJyJy77kAhUYfSsKHWnVCH0Q9QEwAHoECAUQAw#imgrc=oUxEK8TLP0Yf6M: ]
The C4ISR and the air and naval capabilities needed to support expeditionary operations— i.e., operations thousands of miles from China’s shores—likely remain beyond China’s grasp for at least the next decade. Combined with the structural reforms underway, however, China’s advances in space-based capabilities, drone technology, and information processing could provide sufficient means to provide targeting quality data to deployed Chinese forces anywhere in the world by 2030 or 2035. 40 China can build on the experience of a near-continuous naval presence in the Gulf of Aden for over a decade. Although China has only just begun to negotiate with foreign governments for the rights and authorities needed for overseas basing and operations, the PLA’s recent establishment of a base in Djibouti could provide an initial basis for deploying forward command staffs, facilities, and even forces.
PLA restructuring is very likely to improve joint operational capabilities in the next five to ten years, but available sources are unclear about the unit levels at which “jointness” will occur and the specific concepts for issues such as force allocation, deconfliction, and lower-level C2. China’s ability to achieve the types of effects and capabilities they have observed in U.S. operations will largely depend on continuing to evolve away from large maneuver elements of the MR system to smaller, more flexible units with more combat and combat support capability at the tactical level. For example,
the PLA Army is currently experimenting with battalion-level formations that have artillery, reconnaissance, armor, intelligence, and air defense assets under battalion command.
While this is notable progress and represents advances within a service to improve combined arms operations—translating this to “jointness” remains a time- and resource intensive endeavor that will consume at least the next decade and probably beyond.
In addition to the time it will take to fully restructure national and theater C2, complete joint organizational experimentation and implementation, and establish doctrine and training regulations, the PLA faces the following hurdles to the realization of restructuring goals:
• Adapting to restructuring and reorganization demands will produce some level of turmoil in war mobilization plans and processes.
• Creating a “joint-minded” officer corps remains aspirational for the PLA. The PLA has not established a culture that develops commanders to manage complex joint operations in an information-saturated environment, and the rate of change driven by information technology compounds the problem.
• China’s ground force-centric culture appears to be changing, but revamping thought processes and the professional military education system across the force will be tortuous.
• The CCP’s ubiquitous focus on internal security responsibilities may divert resources from a more outward-looking PLA as economic growth slows. 41
Beyond the restructuring itself, perhaps most important for the PLA to attain joint, informatized capabilities will be the marriage of new and potentially disruptive technologies to military concepts. Historically, China’s military scientists are active and productive when CCP leadership provides priority and resources. The priority and resources are available now, and barring a more severe economic downturn than expected, this likely will remain the case for at least the next 15 to 20 years. The PLA’s weapons and equipment plan for that period is not openly available, but Chinese science and technology priorities and civil-military integration goals clearly indicate that China intends to achieve military advantage from key technologies such as quantum computing and communications, hypersonics, artificial intelligence, big data applications, cloud computing, 3D printing, nanomaterials, and biotechnology.42 Success in these areas will to great extent determine the nature of U.S.-Chinese military competition over the next three decades.
Based on the trajectory of PLA reform and reorganization efforts to date, China likely will achieve a high level of proficiency commensurate with integrated joint operations goals by the mid-2030s or a little beyond—approximately a decade ahead of CCP mid-century objectives. This may render by 2035 (if not before) a PLA that is capable of greatly increasing the risks and costs of U.S. and allied contingency responses throughout the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA in this time frame likely will be able to contest all domains of conflict—ground, air, sea, space, cyberspace, and the electro-magnetic environment.
Implications and Recommendations for
the United States
In developing responses to PLA modernization, given both the path of advanced military technologies and major restructuring, U.S. decisionmakers should remember two salient facts. First, China recognizes that major war with the United States would likely be ruinous in terms of China’s stated national development objectives. The logic of China’s defense policy and security strategy suggests a growing, but still low, tolerance for risk, and China’s risk acceptance is to some extent tied to the willingness of the United States and its allies to confront Chinese behavior in hot spots, such as the South and East China Seas. Second, most of the military modernization underway in China corresponds to achieving the types of capabilities the United States has already attained. Many of China’s capability development programs are direct responses to U.S. programs and capabilities that have been demonstrated from the first Gulf War to the present. Activities or initiatives to deter China from resolving regional or, in the future, global disagreements through military force should take into consideration these points.
Maintaining or increasing China’s risk aversion may be increasingly difficult as PLA military capabilities improve, and some Chinese sources on crisis management and war control indicate that China’s risk perception might already be changing in ways detrimental to peaceful resolution of regional disputes.43 The precise nature of this change is difficult to assess, but likely involves Chinese perceptions both of an increase in Chinese strength relative to the United States and its allies and of reduced U.S. willingness to pay the price of extended deterrence in Asia. The strength of our alliances, defense capacity of our allies and partners, and our military presence in the region impacts China’s risk analysis. U.S. and allied leaders and planners should develop a menu of relatively proportional response options to various levels of Chinese coercion and aggression in the region, and should clearly exhibit in training and in actual crisis situations below the threshold of open combat the capability and will to confront China. 44
Such options could include an increase in FONOPS in the South China Sea; semi permanent air, naval, and special operations forces rotations to the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia; exercises or joint patrols with Vietnam; and pursuit of legal and economic disincentives for unilateral Chinese effort to increase military and paramilitary presence and infrastructure in contested areas. While there is escalation risk even in proportional responses, the capacity of the United States and its allies to have and use such options might increase China’s perception of risk, complicating Beijing’s security calculus. Specifically, U.S. decision makers could consider:
• increasing the frequency of bilateral and multilateral training exercises with regional allies and partners to rapidly deploy forces to new, austere, dispersed locations near regional hot spots
• demonstrating improved capabilities and new concepts for sea control operations and mobile defense of maritime features and sea lines of communication
• demonstrating C4ISR capabilities and new concepts of operation in training and exercises to provide flexible communications and intelligence to widely dispersed forces in the Indo-Pacific and highlighting them in media and strategic communications channels.
These same activities and demonstrated U.S. and partner capabilities will also impact the direction of Chinese RDA and capabilities development, particularly in high-technology areas. Adjustments to U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, better integration with Japanese and South Korean forces, and transformation of Japanese concepts of collective self-defense influence how the PLA invests in its future weapons programs, including hypersonic vehicles and other disruptive technologies. If it chose to do so, Congress, in its oversight of the Departments of Defense and State, and the Intelligence Community may wish to stress the importance of assessing how China responds to counter U.S. and allied security initiatives.
Perhaps most importantly for deterrence is ensuring that the U.S. invests wisely in the systems and capabilities today that can bolster extended conventional deterrence in the IndoPacific. This is primarily a matter of funding, not of technology. Congress may wish to consider appropriations for existing or repurposed systems that have the potential to disrupt the Chinese plans, concepts and operations described earlier in this testimony.45 China is concerned about a future U.S. “third offset,” but there are systems and capabilities at our disposal today that potentially cause Chinese planners to question their capability to execute the campaigns they have outlined in their doctrinal writings—there are just insufficient quantities of them to accomplish this effect. Additional funding for extended range cruise missile systems, mobile integrated air and missile defenses, multirole unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles, and improved protective measures for high-value platforms and bases would help in this regard
Regarding China’s ability to attain capabilities learned from U.S. joint operations and advanced weapons programs, it is incumbent upon U.S. leaders to ensure that we maintain technological and operational superiority and prevent China from “leapfrogging” us in networked, precision-strike capability through their “system-of-systems” approach. Whether through “third offset” innovation or other channels, the United States must clearly signal the intent to lead in any military application of potentially disruptive technologies. This will be difficult, given the resource weight that the CCP and the Chinese state put behind the development of artificial intelligence, super-computing, and bio-technology programs, but the United States cannot afford complacency. In this regard, Congress may wish to consider defense authorization guidance to DoD that calls for assessing and evaluating how China defines and prioritizes the utility of specific civil-military technologies, considering their “system-ofsystems” approach
A necessary first step to maintaining U.S. technological superiority is to shore up U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement efforts that protect U.S. defense and dual-use technologies. Congress, through appropriations and oversight auspices, may wish to focus on building an integrated government-commercial effort to counter the compromise of U.S. intellectual, technical, and industrial capital. This involves, but is not limited to, cyber espionage threats and Chinese strategies to gain competitive advantage via state-sponsored economic initiatives
U.S. defense planners should assume that China’s restructuring and modernization programs will produce a PLA capable of conducting the informatized, integrated joint operations clearly described in military science sources. Defense spending patterns and Xi’s personal interest in PLA restructuring indicate that the Chinese bureaucracy will see various priority military goals met between 2020 and 2040. The inherent difficulties and even contradictions in and between some of these priorities, however, are daunting. U.S. policymakers and decisionmakers must strive to fund and deploy the capabilities that will hold Chinese “informatized” joint plans and concepts at risk into the future and show the intent to maintain the strength of key alliances and the technological superiority that have underpinned regional stability and prosperity in the Indo Pacific region for over six decades.
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People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Modernisation - An Assessment
By
Gaurav sharma
Introduction
In the last twenty years the People’s republic of China (PrC) has invested and matured on two fronts: the economic and the military front. the ‘White Paper’ series on Chinese national defence have been issued every two years since 1998, but details about the Chinese military ground combat forces have been minimal. also, China’s total military-related expenditure for 2010 was estimated to be over $160 billion dollars 1 and in the past decade, China’s military has benefitted from robust investment in modern hardware and technology
The current Chinese capabilities and its intentions in the regional neighbourhood are unclear and viewed with scepticism. the study of Chinese Land based military capability is important to understand Chinese military modernisation, military posture, and China’s role within its neighbourhood. as PLA attempts to integrate many new and complex platforms, and to adopt modern operational concepts, including joint operations and network-centric warfare, China’s expanding military capabilities increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation, in its regional neighbourhood. this paper seeks to provide an overview of China’s current capabilities in five types of land based weapon systems – tanks, infantry Combat Vehicles, air-defence, artillery and infantry Layered Crew Served Weapons.
this article will focus on the Chinese ground forces weapon systems developed and in use by the PLAA (army). the aim is to provide an overview of major advanced ground based weapon systems in use and assess the current strength (in numbers) of the PLAA ground forces weapon systems
PLA’s Military Doctrine and Command Structure a rand study asserts that
“…certain Chinese defence-industrial enterprises are designing and producing a wide range of increasingly advanced weapons that, in the short term, will enhance China’s military capabilities.....and, in the long term, China’s military position in Asia”.2
Beijing actively pursues the ‘Core interest’3 which refers to China’s longterm, comprehensive military modernisation, improvement in PLA’s capacity to conduct high-intensity, regional military operations, including anti-access and area denial (a2ad) operations. the book ‘Zhanyi Xue’ or ‘On Military Campaigns’ is used as a text instructing PLA officers on the new doctrine 4. PLA’s current general war fighting tenets are found in the ten ‘Basic Principles of Military Campaigns’ which inculcates integrated operations and key point strikes 5. the General armament department (Gad) created in 1998, played a critical role in ensuring that military end-user requirements are served. the Gad looked abroad to acquire capabilities that best serve the PLA’s requirements and played an important role in coordinating military strategy and doctrinal planning with weapons and technology developments
Military Doctrine
Beijing is developing “deep battle” strike capabilities 6, making its forces highly mobile, agile and effective in the area of land warfare. PLA’s operational doctrine emphasises on pre-emption, surprise and shock value 7. PLA is engaged in an ambitious “generation leap” strategy – in a “double construction” transformation effort of simultaneously pursuing both the mechanisation and informatisation of its armed forces 8. the current operational component of China’s national Military Strategic Guidelines is known as “active defence” (jiji fangyu). the 11.2% increase in China’s military budget 9 is a testament of PLA’s continued investment in strengthening its ‘active defence’.
China’s defence white paper of 2004 had specifically acknowledged that priority has been given to the second artillery, navy and air force, to strengthen the “comprehensive deterrence and war fighting capabilities” of the PLA. 10 China continues to modernize its ground combat units indicating the evolution, sustenance and development of armoured brigades, air-defence brigades, and Short-range Ballistic Missiles. Figure 1 provides an overall estimate of Chinese Ground Forces capability.
Figure1: PLA Ground Forces Capability 11
Command Structure
The national level of command authority for PLA consists of three major organisations, divided further into three levels; mostly headquartered in Beijing as depicted in Figure 2. the Central Military Commission (CMC) is the supreme command and leadership organisation for the Chinese armed forces, headed by the PRC president and assisted by several vice-chairmans. CMC is inclusive of the four General Headquarters departments and the Service Chiefs. the PLA is very much integrated with the CMC and sets a great example for civil-military co-operation, thus increasing ‘jointness’ in preparing for military options
PLA Ground Forces are deployed in seven Military regions (MR) across China that host a total of 18 Global armies (GA), with each GA comprising of about 60,000 men 12. Combat Ground Forces are comprised of four service branches – infantry, armour, artillery and air defence 13. Four service arms helping the four combat arms are – aviation, engineering, chemical defence and communication and other specialised units, including electronic Counter Measures (ECM), reconnaissance and mapping 14. 10-20% of PLA combat forces across all the three services are combat ready called as ‘Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF)’ at all times 15 maintaining a high level of readiness, better equipment and training. Figure 3 portrays the composition of a single Group army.
Figure 2: Chinese National Level Organisation 16
Figure 3: Composition of PLA ‘Group Army’*17
People’s Liberation Army
– Ground Forces Composition
The PRC’s military expenditure from year 2000-2010 is depicted in Figure 4, which showcases China’s vigorous and steady advances in its armed forces, thus strengthening PLA’s planning and management efforts.
Figure 4: China’s Military Expenditure*18
The PLA has about 1.25 million ground force personnel. under “active defence,” ground forces are tasked with defending China’s borders, ensuring domestic stability, and exercising regional power projection. PLA ground forces are transitioning from a static defensive force allocated across seven internal military regions (MRSs ) (oriented for positional, mobile, urban, and mountain offensive campaigns; coastal defence campaigns; and landing campaigns) to a more offensive and manoeuvre oriented force organized and equipped for operations along China’s periphery. the 2010 defence White Paper 19 asserts that the ground force has:
China’s ground force modernisation programmes include production of new tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. There have been advances in almost every area of PLA ground forces with new production capacity to accommodate surge requests. examples of ground unit modernisation include the Type 99 third-generation main battle tank, a new-generation amphibious assault vehicle, and a series of Multiple rocket launch systems. in october 2010, the PLA conducted its first Group army-level exercise, which it called ―Mission action (SHiMinG XinGdonG). The primary participants from the Beijing, Lanzhou, and Chengdu Military regions practiced manoeuvre, ground-air coordination, and long-distance mobilisation via military and commercial assets as they transited between Military regions. Given that these MRS are located along China’s land borders, especially INDIA, the exercise scenarios are based on border conflict scenarios and rules of engagement in case of a limited conflict.
PLAA now favours brigades in relation to divisions. there are currently seven mechanised brigades in the PLAA and five out of these seven are considered to be elite formations. The mechanised brigades are divided into light and heavy, with each heavy equipped with wheeled armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) such as type 92/92a. the light consists of tracked infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)/ APCs such as type 63/89. all mechanised brigades consist of at-least one or two battalions of tanks and three battalions of infantry. all Chinese battalions follow the 3+3 organisation of three companies with three platoons. the brigade commander has direct control over an artillery regiment. this consists of one battalion each of the 122mm and 152mm howitzers with one company of 122mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). in addition, each infantry battalion consists of one platoon of 82mm/100mm mortars and two platoons of 82mm/120mm recoilless rifles. there is also a mixed air-defence battalion and an anti-tank(AT) company with 100mm A/Tk guns and two platoons of A/Tk missiles (HJ-8/HJ-73 – discussed later).20 Figure 5 shows the organisational chart of the PLA brigade formation.
PLA Brigade Formation
Fig 5: PLA–Army BrigadeFormation*21
Tanks And Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs)
Figure 6: PLAA Main Battle Tanks*22
The PLAA has combined the Russian and Chinese indigenous technologies and has produced some of the best in class of ICVs.
in 1999, China started a new 9958 Main Battle tank (MBt) Project that took its elements from the earlier 9289 project under the leadership of the China north industries Corporation (norinCo). the new MBT is called the CSu 152 heavy combat vehicle and is understood to have commenced its trials programme in 2003. it is believed that Russia may have supplied China with some of the technology for CSu 152 in an effort to obtain valuable foreign exchange, in order to fund its own tank development programmes. no current information has been released by the Chinese on the current status of the CSu 152 MBT23. also, specifications of CSu 152 remain unknown
The most advanced tank currently in front line service with the PLAA is called the type-98, with significant improvements in the key areas of armour, mobility and firepower. Further development of type-98 has resulted in type – 99. the type – 99 is also known as WZ123. type – 99 provides significant improvement in firepower, mobility and protection and is termed as a ‘high end’ tank.24 the type-99 is in quantity production for the PLA and was initially deployed by two elite armour regiments in Beijing and Shenyang military regions respectively.25 The type-99 is based on the Russian T-72 chassis and has modern features in every aspect of tank building. While other countries have experience with the laser dazzle device, the PLA is the first country to operationally deploy such a system on both, MBT’s type – 98 and type – 99. the PAAA also has type 90-ii MBT, type 85-iii, type 85-ii, the type-80 – also called the ‘Second Generation’ MBtT type -79, type -69, and type-59 – the earliest of the MBts with China supplied by RUSSIAin early 1950s. 26
PLA also has three variants of ‘Light tanks’ in excess of 800, namely – type 05 aaaV Ztd-05, 200 type-62 and 400 type-63a.
Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs)
The infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs) or infantry fighting vehicles as they are commonly known, have bridged the gap between the infantry and armour in the PLAA. the PLAA has combined the russian and Chinese indigenous technologies and has produced some of the best in class of iCVs which are both, amphibious and have a good cross country capability. the 1997 China–russia technology co-operation agreement yielded its first fruits in 1999 with the delivery of the first upgraded ‘Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty’ (BMP) (english translation – infantry Fighting Vehicle) BMP-3 series fire control system, along with associated weapons and ammunition. Since then, PLA has made good investments and has produced some of the best in class ICVs.
The famous and modern families of the ICVs constitute ZTS-04 and ZBD-04 series. ZBD-04 is the most powerful vehicle of its type deployed by the PLAA. ZBD-04 is fully amphibious and made its first appearance during the major parade of 2009. The NORINCO VP1 is another marvel of PLA’s armoured personnel carrier (APC), fitted with a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance (NBC) system, and an automatic fire detection and suppression system. Some of the famous ICVs possessed by the PLA include the ZBD-97, ZBL-09 and ZTS/ZBD-04 series which are all amphibious in nature27, and Type 90 ICV variant, Type WZ501 ICV which are supposed to be direct copies of Russian Kurgan BMP-2 and BMP-1 respectively28. In addition, there is the Type YW307 and Type YW309 which is essentially a variant of the Type – 89 and Type – 85 APCs. All the mentioned ICVs possess advanced fire control, satellite navigation, night vision and advanced communication systems29. The development of ICVs has been done with multiple variants and some of the more specialised ICV versions include ambulance, command post vehicle and self propelled mortar. The high mobility ICVs empower the motorised Infantry brigades in high altitude areas neighbouring India – the region of Ladakh and conflict area of Aksai Chin, and their deployment in the region will alter the security advantage in China’s favour. Figure 7 provides a snapshot view of the current numbers of ICVs in service with the PLA.
Figure7: PLAA Infantry Combat Venhicles*30
Artillery
PLAA maintains a large inventory of artillery pieces, including towed field artillery howitzers, self-propelled howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers. An estimated Artillery Strength in China for the year 2010 is shown in figure 8. The PLA ground forces artillery branch commands a small number of ballistic missiles too. Trends show that the total number of artillery is increasing slightly, with a greater share of self-propelled howitzers in service. The total number of towed howitzers in the year 2006 had increased by almost 17% in comparison to the year 2000.
Figure 8: PLA – Artillery Strength 2010*31
Guns and Howitzers:
. Self-Propelled Guns and Howitzers (Tracked): The 2009 parade commemorating the 60th anniversary of the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) showcased many new artillery weapons for the first time. This included a new 155mm self-propelled artillery system called the PLZ-05 and 122 mm self-propelled gun howitzer (SPGH) PLZ-07. It is believed that Chinese defence officials made a close study of the 2S19M1 155 mm/52 calibre prototype system developed by Russia and that the new PLZ-05 is based on this analysis. The new NORINCO 155mm PLZ-05 fires the standard North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) artillery ammunition. The PLZ-05 has a range of up to 50 km due to the development of new Extended Range Full Bore (ERFB) high explosive projectile ammunition.32 PLZ45 is another of standard production 155 mm/45 calibre Self-Propelled Gun (SPG) that has been exported to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in significant numbers.33 The PLZ07 (122mm SPGH) has been developed to supplement and eventually replace some of the older 122 mm self-propelled howitzers like the 122 mm Type-89, 85, 70 and 70-1. The SH-3 is another 122 mm self-propelled howitzer (SPH), replacing the older 122 mm SPH systems. The Type-83, 152 mm is another SPGH in service with the PLA. 34
. Self-Propelled Guns and Howitzers (Wheeled & Towed): In 2007, NORINCO revealed that they had completed the development of a new 155 mm/52 calibre self propelled (SP) (6*6) artillery system (SPAS) called the SH-1 and 122 mm SPAS called SH2. The SH1 can also fire the NATO 155 mm artillery and locally manufactured 155 mm laser homing projectile for pinpoint accuracy which is based on the Russian Krasnopol design. It is claimed that SH1 is very accurate and it is fitted with a computerised fire-control system and also a fibre optic north seeking positioning and navigation system. Other SPAS include the Type 96 122 mm which is a copy of the D-30 Russian Howitzer. PLA is now heavily investing in the development of fleet of ‘Wheeled Armoured Fighting Vehicles’ (WAFV) with the 122 mm (8*8) self-propelled artillery system being at the forefront of development.35 Further development of the SH series has resulted in the SH5 105 mm SPAS with the major difference being the ordnance used.36 NORINCO is also marketing three towed 155 mm artillery systems the AH1 155mm/45 calibre, AH2 155mm/52 calibre and the AH4 155mm/39 calibre. The AH4 is claimed to use advanced materials and is lightweight, similar in appearance to the BAE Systems Global Combat Systems 155 mm/39- calibre M777. 37 The other towed artillery guns include the 152 mm Type 83 equipping the reserve artillery units and the 152 mm Type 66 similar in appearance to the Russian D-20. The 130 mm Type – 59, the first of the towed arty guns manufactured by NORINCO is a virtual direct copy of the Russian 130 mm M-46.38
. Multiple Rocket Launchers: China holds an inventory of about 2,400 multiple rocket launcher systems (MRLS). Longer-range artillery includes the Type-96 320mm MRLS, that can reach up to 200km with WS-2 rockets. Reports indicate that ongoing MRLS extensive development includes the Wei Shi series. The 400 mm WS-2 (Wei Shi 2) series has been developed by the Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corporation (SCAIC). The WS series is being developed to bridge the gap between conventional towed and self-propelled artillery systems and tactical missile systems. The WS-6 122 mm Multiple Launcher Rocket Weapon System (MLRWS) is the latest in the series. Beijing has also developed the 300 mm calibre (8-round) ANGEL-120 multiple rocket launchers with guided rockets. The lethal radius of one rocket round is stated to be 100 m while a full eight-round salvo can cover a 300 m radius.39 The ANGEL-120 has high mobility, long range, high accuracy, great lethality and high volume of fire. Jane’s Armour and Artillery reports that some PLA ground forces units are receiving the 300mm A-100 MRLS, which is based on the Russian Smerch. The A-100 is reported to have global positioning system, a fully computerised targeting, and potentially advanced ammunitions. Chinese sources indicated that the new A100 MRS has been developed to bolster the PLA’s surface –tosurface firepower capability. Some of the other Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) include the AR2 (12-round) and AR1A (10-round) 300 mm systems based on the Russian Spav 300 mm 9A52 – Smerch. Other prominent MRLS in service with the PLAA include the Type 90 (40-round), Type 81 (40 round), Type 83 (24-round) and Type 63 (12-round) – mostly belonging to the Soviet era of exports and re-engineered by NORINCO. 40 m Missiles - Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs): The Pentagon has described China’s missile programme as “the most active land-based ballistic and cruise-missile programme in the world”.41 It had been reported that in 1995, a complete Russian nuclear missile production facility had been transferred to China.42 China has concentrated more on short and medium range missiles and the figure 9 provides their numbers and range. As of December 2010, the PLA had somewhere between 1,000-1,200 SRBMs. The PLA also continues to field advanced variants with improved ranges and more sophisticated payloads providing true “precision strike” capability.
The current account of Strategic SRBMs missile forces is speculated between 200 to 250 with DF-11/M-11A (CSS-7 Mod) around 120+ and 100+ DF-15/M-9 (CSS-6).43 The HY or the CSS series of SRBMs have simpler S based nomenclature, for example the CSS-2 is called the ‘Silkworm’ and the CSS-3 is termed as ‘Seersucker’ and lastly the CSS-6 is called the ‘SeaHorse’.44 The WS – 2 or the Wei Shi-2 is reported to be a low-cost guided SRBM, having variants like the WS-2C and WS-2D possesing a range of 300 km and 400 km respectively. It also has the short range guided ballistic missile – the Guided Guardian 2 or the WM-80, with a range of 80 km. All the SRBMs deployed by the PLA have the capability of launching from both, ground and ship based platforms and mostly use solid propellant as fuel. Even going by liberal estimates, it is likely that this strategic missile strike force is going to increase at about 100 missiles year on year.
Figure 9: China’s Missile Capability*45
The 600 km range CSS-6 and the 300 km range CSS-7 add a new dimension to the land based attack cruise missile system.46 Many of these missile systems are fitted with satellite-navigation guidance for improved accuracy and have a potential to strike within a radius of 50 meters. Many new types of warheads such as cluster ammunition and fuel-air explosives are being fitted on these missiles for higher lethality. The DF-11 and DF-15 are the best in the world and even the anti-missile systems, like the Patriot are rendered ineffective against the DF class of SRBM missiles. Thus, the SRBMs provide a great strategic advantage to the PLA against India, especially in the Chengdu military region bordering the conflict north-east state of Arunachal Pradesh.
Air Defence When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, China’s air defence capabilities were of debatable effectiveness, built around indigenous clones of the Soviet S-75 Dvina and SA-2 guideline. In the last two decade, three Surface to Air Missile (SAM) divisions, one mixed SAM/Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) division, and ten other air defence brigades have been raised as part of PLAAF’s air defence forces.47 Figure 10 illustrates some known numbers for SAM systems
The PLAA’s air defence capabilities are transforming from a legacy force with static and un-deployable systems to a state of the art force, which is highly deployable in-country and demonstrably expeditionary as it matures. The scale of growth in the PLAA’s capabilities is revealed in the full gamut of area and point defence SAM systems being deployed and developed.
Figure 10: PLAA Air Defence Surface
To
Air Missile Systems*48
Anti-Aircraft Guns & Missile System: The inventory of about 7,700+ air defence guns is phenomenal. Air defence divisions make up for large calibre weapons (37mm and higher) and the PLA is currently in stage of replacing its legacy air defence cannons with air defence missiles.49 NORINCO has developed a Ground-Based Close In Weapon System (GB-CIWS) called LuDun (Land Shield) and referred to as LD2000 – the self-propelled anti-aircraft gun. The system could also be complemented with the ‘Yitian’ (described below) self-propelled surfaceto-air-missile system (SPSAM) providing an integrated multi-layer gun-missile air-defence system.50 Two of the new anti-aircraft guns in service by the PLA are:
. Type 80 (twin 57 mm) and Type 95 (quadruple 25 mm) PLA still maintains a high inventory of Towed-Anti Aircraft guns which hail from the Russian era. These towed anti-aircraft guns vary in calibre from 12.7 mm to 57 mm. Some of the prominent examples of towed anti-aircraft guns in service by the PLA are as follows:
. 23 mm Type 80 – The famous double barrel light anti-aircraft gun and a reverse engineered copy of Soviet ZU-23-2.
. 25 mm Type 85.
. 35 mm Type 90 – This is a licensed copy of the then Swiss Oerlikon Contraves GDF series.51
. 37 mm Types 55, 65, 74, 74SD and P793 – 37 mm series is a direct copy of the Soviet 37 mm M1939, with multiple advances incorporated in each advance versions to include radar fire control, high rate of fire and is suited to Chinese manufacturing methods. Type 74, 74 SD are capable of engaging targets above clouds and at night and work in multiple configurations to include two guns and a PL-9C missile launcher.52
. 57 mm Type 59 – is a close copy of Soviet 57 mm S-60.53
The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) has developed a new family of Ground-Based Air-Defence (GBAD) systems with the export title of FL – (Flying Leopard).54 FL class weapon systems are small vehicular highly mobile SAM systems having both, radar and electro-optical target tracking facilities.55 China has also developed self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and missile systems (SPAAGM) called the FB-6A, FLG-1 and Type - 95. The FB-6A is a missile launching vehicle (MLV) which is almost identical to the US Boeing Avenger air defence system.56FLG-1 is another one of the FL based Air-Defence gun/missile system.
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs): The air defence missile component of China’s regional strategy includes long-range, advanced SAMs, such as the Russian SA-10 and SA-20 PMU1/PMU2, as well as the indigenously made HQ-16 and HQ-9. HQ-16 SAM is the newest of these weapons and have been designed to be modular and possess all-weather, all-direction and multidirectional interception capabilities, as well as resistent to electronic counter-measures (ECM).57 The S-300 PMU-2 is widely used as part of a theatre missile defence system.58
The HQ programme is an indigenous SAM programme. HQ stands for ‘Hongqi’, which translates into ‘Red Flag’ and the series consists of multiple indigenous versions inclusive of HQ-2A, HQ-2B, HQ-61A and currently HQ-16 and HQ-17 – all in service with the PLA. The HQ-7 also called FM (Feiming = Flying Midge)-80 is a shelter and container based surface-to-air missile system. The HQ-7 resembles the French Crotale SAM system and similar in physical and technical characteristics.59 A newer SAM series called as Lieying-60, translated to ‘Falcon’ has been deployed by PLA since 1994 and is similar to the Italian Alenia Aspide.60
China has developed several newly designed self-propelled surface-to-air missile (SPSAM) systems with the help of China Aviation Industries Corporation (AVIC I), and its subsidiaries like the China Air-to-Air Missile Research Institute (AAMRI). The China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CNPMIEC) developed the FT-2000, a Chinese enhancement to the Russian S-300PMU/PMU1 missile system.
The SA-2 remains numerically significant and it has been further upgraded. In addition, the Patriot class S-300PMU, SA-10 Grumble and SA-20 Gargoyle long range SAMs have been acquired in strategically significant numbers. The Tor M1/SA-15 have been deployed and a range of indigenous short range SAMs has been developed, by the PLAA. While most of the PLA’s investment in SAMs has been focused on expanding and enhancing the long range area defence coverage, much effort has been put into the modernisation of point defense SAM capabilities also China is also offering the sale of the FM-90 SAM and the HQ9 (Chinese in country name)/FT-2000 to the international market with the suspicion that either Pakistan or Iran may have already acquired these systems. FT-2000 and FT-2000A are supposed to be highly developed SAM systems comparable to the US Patriot system and the Russian S-300P family.
China is also promoting low altitude SAM systems. PL-9C/D and Yitian are the preferred SAM systems that the PLAA has in service. The Chinese call PL-9C either ‘Pili’, meaning ‘Thunderbolt’ or ‘Pen Lung’ meaning ‘Air-Dragon’. The PL –9C is similar in appearance to the Israeli Python 3, which is a single missile launch platform possessing the single-shot kill probability (SSKP) of 0.8 for an approaching target. Yitian is a new modular design SPSAM, first promoted in 2004/05 by NORINCO. Yatian provides mobile air-defence capability for mechanised units against Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs), helicopters and cruise missiles in addition to providing close-in protection against high value targets like command centres.61 There are 8 missile bases in Tibet, inclusive of 80-100 medium range and short range missiles.62 With increased accessibility to the Tibet heartland, these missile bases translate into a direct threat to mainland India.
Infantry – Layered Crew Served Weapons
The Infantry Layered Crew Served Weapons (LCSW ) with the Chinese military are mostly identical copies of Russian, American or French manufacturers with minor dimensional differences. Figure 11 provides an estimate of the Layered Crew Served Weapon systems with the PLA.
Figure 11: PLAA Land Crew Served Weapons*63
Mortars: China has a diverse variety of mortars both in calibre and range. Most of these mortars are offered for export sales to the international market. The following varieties of Mortars with Chinese state arsenals are listed as under.
. Jerboa 50 mm silent grenade launcher – much of its concept and design appear to be French. It is intended to be light and simple portable weapon that produces no flash, sound or smoke as a grenade is launched.
. Type 55 120 mm mortar.
. Type 63-1 60 mm mortar.
. Type 67 82 mm mortar.
. Type 71 100 mm mortar.
. Type M-83A 60 mm mortar.
. Xinshidai Type W86 120 mm, Type W87 81 mm, Type W84 82 mm, Type W91 81 mm and Type W99 81 mm rapid-firing mortars – These mortars are part of a recent series of Chinese mortars which have been given a ‘W’ prefix to the Model number.
Anti-Tank Weapons: PLA possesses a large number of Anti-tank weapons both in form of guns and missiles. In total, an approximate 2006 weapons are possessed by the PLAA. 64 HJ-73 and HJ-8 are primary anti-tank guided missiles in service by the PLAA. Both these series have been modified, improved and made effective to be fired from tripods, vehicle mounts and from helicopters.65
The build-up of military regions in Tibet and Chengdu would help mobilize the PLA strike force to conduct fast paced operations and military exercises close to the borders.
. Red Arrow 8 guided weapon system is a second generation guided missile system intended to be used against tanks and other armoured targets. Examples of the Red Arrow 8 were encountered during the internal conflicts in former Yugoslavia.66
. Queen Bee 120 mm anti-tank rocket launcher
. Type 56 40 mm, Type 69-1 40 mm and Type 70-
. 62 mm are all examples of anti-tank grenade launchers known to be in service with the Chinese armed forces.
. Type 2004 portable rocket launcher
. PF89A 80 mm and PF89-1 80 mm are two variants of anti-structure and light anti-armour weapon
Automatic Grenade Launcher and Cannon: Most of the AGLs are inspired by Russian designs. The QLZ87 enlisted below was first shown in International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) March 2003 and is supposed to be an improvement over the design W87 35 mm (also mentioned below).
. NORINCO 30 mm automatic grenade launcher.
. Type QLZ87 35 mm automatic grenade launcher.
. Type W87 35 mm automatic grenade launcher.
. Type LG3 40 mm automatic grenade launcher.
China has NORINCO 23 mm chain gun, whose existence was discovered in March 2001, which is reportedly based on a former US chain gun design, which was exported to China in early 1990s. Very few details of the gun have so far been released and the exact nature of the ammunition is also uncertain 67.
Why the PLA’s Ground Combat Forces matter?
China’s between the countries assertiveness towards India and the long-standing border dispute have always been critical in the regional security context. China’s bolstered military presence in Tibet and its involvement in infrastructure projects in South Asia is suspicious due to the potential for dual civil-military use. The concerns are genuine as China is heavily developing the 4000 km line of actual control (LAC), and building road, rail lines and airports, thus providing enhanced and quick access to the PLA into the region. The extension of world’s highest railway line from Lhasa (the capital of Tibet) to a city called Xigaze, near the Nepalese border, the extension of the railways in the east towards Nyingchi,68 less than 50 km from the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh and the fifth functional airport in Tibet in Xigaze are all signs of China’s continued assertive stand along the LAC.
The build-up of military regions in Tibet and Chengdu would help mobilize the PLA strike force to conduct fast paced operations and military exercises close to the borders. There are 17 secret radar stations, 8 missile bases, 14 military airfields, more than 100 short and medium range missiles and troop deployment in excess of 2, 00,000 only in Tibet 69. This transcends into a direct ground based military threat to the Indian sub-continent. The Tibetan and Xinjiang MD units are manoeuvre formations under the direct control of MR’s and are independent of Group Armies, thus providing better operational flexibility and changing assertive postures for PLAA, against any possible aggression into India. Also, the primary military posture of both Tibetan and Chengdu Group Armies is ‘Defensive, Offensive CT’70 which is a dangerous position, bearing in context the unresolved border disputes between India and China.
In addition, the Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) program and cruise missile program is a cause of concern and projects serious security implications for India.71 The PLAA’s continued development of new types of combat forces, retrofitting of main battle weaponry, deployment of new types of weapon platforms, boosted capabilities in long-distance manoeuvres and integrated assaults with improvements in combat system (combining heavy, light, amphibious and air borne assault) will prove effective in carrying out precision operations and tactical in-depth strikes.72 The PLA has intensified joint operations, advances in development of high-tech weaponry and equipment; and developing new types of combat forces in order to win ‘local wars’ swiftly.73 This evolution in capabilities has been sufficient to elicit alarm for India and India needs to prepare credible deterrence against any such eventuality.
Conclusion
The PLA has moved towards smaller and more mobile forces. It has disbanded dozens of heavy divisions and created smaller brigades – producing a core of mobile mechanised forces and motorised functions. PLA has also inducted ‘special mission battalions’ for quick-reaction missions and rapid deployment. The formation of ‘combined battalions’ from a company-sized unit to a dozen different branches of the armed forces, has significantly improved the operational flexibility of the PLA. The integration of the civilian transport network into PLA’s logistical infrastructure has provided efficient troop transport and dramatically increased the mobility of PLA ground formations, especially in Southern Tibet and along the disputed Sino-Indian border. The civil-military cooperation has allowed PLA to deploy its key formations faster, thus enhancing its military might along the borders and consolidating more effective control in remote regions.
The Chinese Central Military Commission and the PLA headquarters visited 14 neighbouring countries in 2011, and had profound cooperation in military exercises. This is indicative of military diplomacy projecting PLA’s military might in the region. As China continues to focus on developing its military operations within Asia and invest in long-range power projection by investing in aircraft carriers, heavy bombers, strategic transport, amphibious assault vehicles; by 2025 PLA will definitely be a formidable force to reckon in both Asian and global context. People’s Republic of China will gain a formidable regional powerprojection capabilities and PLAA ground forces would be at the forefront of this hard-power projection wherewithal.
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Gaurav Sharma is a Research Assistant at CLAWS
Notes 1. Recent Trends in Military Expenditure, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ resultoutput/trends , accessed on 10-Jan-2012 2. Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, James C. Mulvenon, “A new direction for China’s Defense Industry”, RAND Project Air Force, Santa Monica 2005, pp. xv –xvi 3. Yoshihara Toshi, James R. Holmes, Can China Defend a “Core Interest” in the South China Sea? http://project2049.net/documents/pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_lin_ hsiao.pdf , accessed on 31-Jan-12 4. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and transformation for the 21st century, p - 98 5. Ibid 6. Annual Report to Congress, Department of Defence, United States of America, ‘Military Power of People’s Republic of China’, 2006, p-15 7. Richard A. Bitzinger, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore, The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia, http:// www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP126.pdf , p - 4
8. You Ji, “China’s Emerging National Defence Strategy” in China Brief, 24 November 2004 9. China military budget tops $100bn, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china17249476, accessed on 06-Mar-2012 10. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing, December 27, 2004), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ doctrine/natdef2004.html , accessed on 26-Jan-2012 11. Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011). Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment
in active service. *Light Tank numbers are taken from ‘Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development’ Report by Centre for Strategic and International Studies
12. Cordesman H. Anthony, Martin Kleiber, Main Report, “Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, August 11, 2006, p - 29 13. Military Balance 2011, Asia, China, p - 230 14. Ibid 15. Cordesman H. Anthony, Martin Kleiber, Main Report, “Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, August 11, 2006, p - 29 16. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and transformation for the 21st century, p - 25 17. Based primarily on content taken from http://sinodefence.com/army/orbat/grouparmy. asp , Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment and the Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011). Figures might not be exact. 18. Based on data provided by SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research. Institute: http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 19. Chinese 2010 Defense White Paper, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/ node_7114675.htm , accessed on 20-Jan-2012 20. The Military Balance 2011, Asia, p - 199
21. ‘Military Balance 2011’ (London: Routledge, 2011) 22. Based primarily on content taken from ‘Military Balance 2011’ (London: Routledge, 2011). Figures are approximate 23. Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2010-2011, CHINA, p - 4 24. ZTZ99 Main Battle Tank, http://www.sinodefence.com/army/tank/type99.asp , accessed on 19-Jan-2012 25. Ibid 26. Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2011-2012, China/MBT’s, p 11-14 27. Chinese Military Might on Display, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/ past-issues/volume-15-2009/volume-15-issue-8/chinas-military-might-on-display/ , Volume 15, Issue 8 – October 2009, accessed on 25-Jan-2012 28. Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2011-2012, China, p 310 - 311 29. Ibid 30. Based primarily on content taken from ‘Military Balance 2011’ (London: Routledge, 2011). Figures are approximate. 31. Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011). Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service. 32. Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2011-2012, China, Self-Propelled Guns & Howitzers (Tracked), p – 795 - 800 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid, p - 796 35. Ibid, p - 798 36. Ibid, p - 799 37. Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2011-2012, China, Towed Anti-Tank Guns, Guns & Howitzers, p – 931 - 940
38. Ibid 39. Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2011-2012, China, Multiple Rocket Launchers, p – 1030 - 1052 40. Ibid 41. China’s missiles – The Economist, 06-Dec-2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/ dailychart/2010/12/chinese_missile_ranges, accessed on 17-Jan-2012 42. Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Fifty Five, Offensive Weapons, China, p - 33 43. The Military Balance 2011, Asia, China, p - 230 44. Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Fifty-five, China, Offensive Weapons, p - 34 45. The Economist online, Dec 6th 2010, 13:46 http://www.economist.com/blogs/ dailychart/2010/12/chinese_missile_ranges, accessed on 12-Feb-2012 46. Richard A. Bitzinger, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore, The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia, http:// www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP126.pdf , p - 3 47. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, China and Northeast Asia, Air Force, 7 November 2005, p. 8. 48. Military Balance 2011, p - 231 (London: Routledge, 2011). Figures might not be exact 49. Dennis J. Blasko, ‘The Chinese Arms Today, tradition and transformation for the 21st century’, Routledge 2006, p - 135 50. Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence 2011-2012, China, Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns/Surfaceto-Air Missiles Systems, pg - 109
51. Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence: 2011-2012, Towed Anti-Aircraft Guns, China, p - 290 52. Ibid 53. Ibid, p - 290 54. Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence 2011-2012, China, Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns/Surface to Air Missile Systems, p - 110 55. Ibid 56. Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence 2011-2012, China, Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns/Surfaceto-Air Missiles Systems, pg - 109 57. Chinese Military Might on Display, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/ past-issues/volume-15-2009/volume-15-issue-8/chinas-military-might-on-display/ , Volume 15, Issue 8 – October 2009, accessed on 25-Jan-2012 58. Jane’s Land Based Air Defence 2011-2012, Inventory, China, p - 518 59. Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence 2011-2012, China, Shelter and Container based Surface to Air Missile System, p - 458 60. Jane’s Land Based Air Defence 2011-2012, China, Static and Towed Surface to Air Missile Systems, p – 365-372 61. Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence 2011-2012, China, Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missiles, p - 137 62. The Chinese Effect, http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/eco.html, accessed on 20-Mar2012 63. Military Balance 2011, (London: Routledge, 2011). Figures might not be exact 64. The Military Balance in Asia: 1990 – 2011, A Quantitative Analysis, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/110516_South_Asia-AsiaMilitaryBalance2011.pdf , accessed on 26-Jan-2012
65. Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, Chinese ATGM, http://www.pmulcahy.com/PDFs/heavy_ weapons/atgms.pdf , accessed on 27-Jan-2012 66. Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2010 – 2011, Anti-Tank Weapons, China, p - 400 67. Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2010 – 2011, Cannon – China, p - 437 68. ‘A railway will be connecting Lhasa and Nyingchi’, http://www.tibettravel.org/tibettravel/ Html/201041411831-1.html, accessed on 17-Mar-2012 69. The Chinese Effect, http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/eco.html, accessed on 20-Mar2012 70. Chinese Ministry of National Defense, http://z9.invisionfree.com/21c/ar/t10025.htm, accessed on 20-Mar-2012 71. Ian Easton, The Assassin Under the Radar, http://project2049.net/documents/assassin_ under_radar_china_cruise_missile.pdf , accessed on 02-Feb-2012 72. China’s National Defense in 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/ node_7114675.htm , accessed on 22-Jan-2012 73. Ibid
