SOURCE:
http://swarajyamag.com/ideas/jandk-the-army-need-not-worry-about-criticism-its-media-engagement-is-welcome
J&K : The Army Need Not Worry about Criticism, Its Media Engagement Is Welcome BY
Syed Ata Hasnain
Snapshot
The nation is suddenly deeply excited about how its men in uniform function and operate under challenging circumstances. There is questioning and there is information seeking.
Three events of the recent weeks have combined to give information on military matters a fillip; first was the Pathankot air base sneak action, second the unfortunate tragedy wrought by the avalanche at Sonam post in Siachen Glacier and third the Pampore anti-terrorist operation.
The academic world and the media have much to contribute to the affairs of the military. The Army need not be defensive about it and should involve itself in debate by moving more than halfway.
Three events of the recent weeks have combined to give information on military matters a fillip; first was the Pathankot air base sneak action, second the unfortunate tragedy wrought by the avalanche at Sonam post in Siachen Glacier and third the Pampore anti-terrorist operation.
The academic world and the media have much to contribute to the affairs of the military. The Army need not be defensive about it and should involve itself in debate by moving more than halfway.
It must start on a positive note. Gone are the days of ignorance of what is happening on India’s frontlines and insurgency ridden areas; the decided disinterest in what the Armed Forces do is fast becoming history. The nation is suddenly deeply excited about how its men in uniform function and operate under challenging circumstances. There is questioning and there is information seeking.
Unfortunately it is also ending up with much unsavory and ill-informed advice to the warriors up in front and much disinformation to the public. That is because the advice is coming from quarters where experience is lacking. I still consider this a positive development because the information revolution is creating interest in matters military and not everyone can have a boots on ground experience to accompany his academic pursuits. It is just that the information being generated needs to be authentic.
Three events of the recent weeks have combined to give information on military matters a fillip; first was the Pathankot air base sneak action, second the unfortunate tragedy wrought by the avalanche at Sonam post in Siachen Glacier and third the Pampore anti-terrorist operation. This ongoing phenomenon, a positive development no doubt, should be seen from an angle of the media taking security related issues beyond emotional rhetoric and satiating the latent patriotic fervor which is being seen all around.
The other positive from this is the fact that the warriors are once again entering the eye of the citizen as a segment apart; people to be trusted and in possession of values that are worth emulating. The OROP movement (can’t call it an agitation) has also contributed its bit. The recent havoc brought about by the Jat agitation and the speed with which the Army had to move as first responder has brought even greater recognition for the Army being the core institution in which all Indians repose faith. A media report questions why 5,000 Army troops perform better than 50,000 cops.
I strongly believe that the academic world and the media have much to contribute to the affairs of the military because unless ‘conflict’ (and not geopolitics alone) is recognized as a proper academic subject in India and treated as an entity for research it will remain rooted in the world of non-intellectualism in India. One does not have to be a driver first to be the managing director of a taxi or bus company.
In other words ground experience is not necessarily the only criteria for advice on matters military and especially in a hybrid warfare environment. There is so much more in conflict, especially the hybrid variety, to which academia can contribute but the realm of tactics and operations should preferably remain the domain of specialists.
Recent articles in leading dailies and online media however, betray the readers and the warriors. Let us take a few examples. One piece referring to the Pampore operation states, ‘the terrorists, equipped with the latest techniques, are now prepared for the long haul. Old tactics cannot work.’
In my experience of J&K, terrorists have always come for the long haul, do not give themselves up and are willing to bite the bullet while attempting to cause as much mayhem and inflicting maximum casualties on the security forces. So what’s new about that; it has been the maxim for years especially since the suicide attacks commenced in July 1999.
Unfortunately it is also ending up with much unsavory and ill-informed advice to the warriors up in front and much disinformation to the public. That is because the advice is coming from quarters where experience is lacking. I still consider this a positive development because the information revolution is creating interest in matters military and not everyone can have a boots on ground experience to accompany his academic pursuits. It is just that the information being generated needs to be authentic.
Three events of the recent weeks have combined to give information on military matters a fillip; first was the Pathankot air base sneak action, second the unfortunate tragedy wrought by the avalanche at Sonam post in Siachen Glacier and third the Pampore anti-terrorist operation. This ongoing phenomenon, a positive development no doubt, should be seen from an angle of the media taking security related issues beyond emotional rhetoric and satiating the latent patriotic fervor which is being seen all around.
The other positive from this is the fact that the warriors are once again entering the eye of the citizen as a segment apart; people to be trusted and in possession of values that are worth emulating. The OROP movement (can’t call it an agitation) has also contributed its bit. The recent havoc brought about by the Jat agitation and the speed with which the Army had to move as first responder has brought even greater recognition for the Army being the core institution in which all Indians repose faith. A media report questions why 5,000 Army troops perform better than 50,000 cops.
I strongly believe that the academic world and the media have much to contribute to the affairs of the military because unless ‘conflict’ (and not geopolitics alone) is recognized as a proper academic subject in India and treated as an entity for research it will remain rooted in the world of non-intellectualism in India. One does not have to be a driver first to be the managing director of a taxi or bus company.
In other words ground experience is not necessarily the only criteria for advice on matters military and especially in a hybrid warfare environment. There is so much more in conflict, especially the hybrid variety, to which academia can contribute but the realm of tactics and operations should preferably remain the domain of specialists.
Recent articles in leading dailies and online media however, betray the readers and the warriors. Let us take a few examples. One piece referring to the Pampore operation states, ‘the terrorists, equipped with the latest techniques, are now prepared for the long haul. Old tactics cannot work.’
In my experience of J&K, terrorists have always come for the long haul, do not give themselves up and are willing to bite the bullet while attempting to cause as much mayhem and inflicting maximum casualties on the security forces. So what’s new about that; it has been the maxim for years especially since the suicide attacks commenced in July 1999.
This piece wanted the Army to be prepared for the long haul in tactical operations forgetting that the Army’s stamina is immense and it works on a simple principle of ‘relief of troops in contact.’ Units can remain deployed for months and be effective throughout. It is obvious the perception of the writer was linked to the criticism that the Army hurried the operation at Pampore thus leading to the casualties. This issue is explained later in this essay.
The same article goes on to state - “the Army has taken certain things for granted and taken its eyes and ears off the ground, where Kashmiris have developed a psyche of drawing a vicarious pleasure from the prolonged exploits of militants in their fight against the security forces.”
To add further insult it states that Sadbhavna, the hearts and minds campaign has almost become an obsession and which is what has forced the Army to virtually become benign. If there is anything further from the truth this is it. The Indian public cannot be misled and needs the opinion of those who have been practitioners and continue to advise on doctrinal and conceptual aspects of the operations.
Authors who write on J&K’s security environment must understand the dynamic nature of the sponsored conflict there. From 1989 to 1997 the Army sequentially used hard power and contained terrorism to manageable levels. In 1997 it introduced Sadbhavna, an institutionalized hearts and minds program with a separate budget.
It was based on the recognition that in such conflicts the people are the Center of Gravity and therefore need to be kept away from influence of the terrorists, separatists and the Deep State of Pakistan. It was a run-away success. However, at no stage of the balancing act between hard and soft power did the Army ever take its eyes off the main task it was to perform until the situation became manageable.
The Army’s intent must be known to all; it has never changed except for minor modifications in priorities based on the dynamics of the times. The intent has and will remain the elimination of ‘terrorism’ and ‘not terrorists’ alone. This implies eliminating terrorists in the hinterland and at the LoC from where they infiltrate and having such controls as to deny them space to operate, recruit fresh terrorists or influence the population.
It also implies the creation of such conditions in cooperation with the government of the day and its agencies that prevent the people supporting the terrorists and in fact assist in isolating them. With this task in hand it is clear that it is not by killing alone that the conflict will be won. For the Army, there is no rest until normalcy returns in the lives of the people and that can only happen once people stop supporting terrorists in their mission.
Thus the notion that the Army must leave everything else aside and concentrate on killing terrorists is instantly a misnomer smacking of utter ignorance of the principles of fighting a hybrid conflict.The death of the two Captains of the Special Forces has drawn criticism from many armchair strategists with no ear to the ground.
This unfair criticism needs to be effectively countered. To think that there will be foolproof measures available to negate every possible action by the terrorists is utopian to say the least. Questioning where was the quick reaction team of the CRPF convoy, which was ambushed, is like asking for copybook actions which will never take place in such an environment.
It is the QRT which chased the terrorists and the first entry to eliminate them was made by the CRPF, an action which needs to be lauded. The CRPF had lost men and legitimately wished to conduct the operation to hunt down the perpetrators. The entry by terrorists into the EDI building was just situational and not preplanned. It became a completely new situation because the building has a structure never addressed before.
The armchair strategists question why the Army and the CRPF did not have a contingency for that. Contingency planning has its limitations and is based on ongoing experience gained from time to time. Post the 1999-2003 period, when suicide attacks were the norm, security at entry points to major buildings and to institutions was strengthened. However, it did not imply that every building was catered for in contingency planning.
Intervention was usually the last resort; huts, cow sheds and small houses in villages where terrorists holed up were regularly destroyed using rocket launchers and flame throwers. However, this was a five floor building and to bring it down meant wiring up explosives all around which itself makes the explosive handling parties extremely vulnerable. RLs could have been fired for the next three days at every window to no avail.
It was the norm to do intervention only where destruction of buildings could not be executed and that is exactly what Victor Force of the Army’s RR did. That there will be no casualties can never be a guarantee in such operations. Even with revised procedures, if any, no commander at any level will ever give you a guarantee.
The fairness of critique gets further marred when it is pointed out that senior officers are more involved with media briefs than operations. Whatever may be said there is no doubt that we are at the dying stages of a terror campaign. The LoC is well controlled to prevent infiltration although here too there will never be a guarantee of a hundred percent effectiveness; from the arm chairs in New Delhi there will be much questioning again once a terrorist track succeeds in reaching Sopore or Baramula.
The ups and downs will continue with much regularity unless the political leadership gets into the act of effective governance. The Army can take the situation up to this point and work towards preventing slippages; a few will invariably take place because such situations cannot remain in suspense. The media act by the Army is something to be lauded. It has got into the information game at last. In hybrid conflicts of this nature the information domain is nearly as important as the kinetic operations.
For long the Army was shy in engaging media and employing social media as part of the outreach and countering of adversary propaganda. Dealing with media does not mean that eyes are not focused on intelligence and operations. Even in the heyday of militancy there could never be a hundred percent actionable intelligence. With lesser quantum of terrorists than ever before intelligence is far better but again not enough to prevent terrorist acts of this nature.
There is a fallacious notion that today’s new militancy is far more violent and dangerous than during the peak of the campaign. This is believable by people who have no memory or those who never ever studied the militancy and the manner it panned out. Undoubtedly, there is no room for dilution of the quantum and quality of operations but at the same time there is no scope for believing that it is back to the Nineties.
The J&K model remains one of the most solid case studies of cooperation between the various security forces led by the Army and with the intelligence agencies. It needs to be only tweaked from time to time. The agencies are adept at handling the ‘intifada’ like demonstrations and stone throwing which has now taken a new turn over the last two years.
There is clear understanding of division of prime responsibility among the forces on handling this and it is maturing by the day. There will be glitches along the way recalling that even the Israeli Defence forces (IDF) who are the most proficient in handling such strife, combining civil disorder and terrorist operations, still continue to suffer failures from time to time.
Take it from experienced practitioners that the Indian Army’s flexibility goes along with its ‘gung ho’. Both are necessary in this complex conflict situation where the dying embers are sometimes hotter than the logs which kindled the fire. Yet, the advent of academic and media interest in war fighting techniques is a welcome departure from the past.
The Army need not be defensive about it and should involve itself in debate by moving more than halfway. It could well be the beginning of the search for the elusive strategic culture witnessed all these years.
