Friday, December 30, 2016

Choosing an Army Chief: The Perils of Choice

SOURCE:
http://www.rediff.com/news/column/choosing-an-army-chief-the-perils-of-choice/20161228.htm




Choosing an Army Chief: The Perils of Choice                                               

                                   By


                      Ajai Shukla  

 December 28, 2016

With ambitious generals knowing that political patronage might be rewarded, a worrying era of politicisation of the military looms ahead, observes retired Colonel Ajai Shukla who has known Generals Rawat, Bakshi and Hariz for a long time.




In 1949, when Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was appointing India's first commander-in-chief (downgraded in 1955 to 'chief of army staff'), he faced a choice between three top professionals.

The senior-most was General K M Cariappa, a dead-honest Anglophile with a marked aversion to dhotiwalas, as the army disparagingly referred to Congress leaders.

Next in line was General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji, the princely brother of the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar.

The third was General Nathu Singh, an earthy, Rajput son of the soil.

Rajendrasinhji and Nathu Singh together told Nehru that Cariappa deserved to be appointed, given his seniority and competence.

Nehru, fearful that an over-assertive general might destabilise India's foundling democracy as was happening in several newly independent countries, wondered aloud whether the Indian Army should continue to have a British commander-in-chief, because of the inexperience of Indian generals.

After all, British generals had commanded the army till then, and the navy and air force continued with British chiefs for several more years.

However,  Gen Nathu, with his patriotism offended, told Nehru only half-humorously that, by that token, maybe India should have a British prime minister as well.

Cariappa was appointed without further ado.

It might be unrealistic to expect a similar sense of fair play today.

Indeed, it is more or less accepted now that seniority should not be the single criterion for appointing an army chief, with merit also counting towards the government's eventual choice.

Even so, with the government having named Lieutenant General Bipin Rawat as the next army chief, superseding two lieutenant generals senior to him -- Praveen Bakshi and P M Hariz -- on the grounds that Rawat is better equipped to handle the challenges of the future

 important questions arise over what 

constitutes 'merit.'

I am no dispassionate observer in writing on this supersession drama. I have personally known all three protagonists for four decades, especially Bakshi and Rawat, with whom I shared a squadron in the National Defence Academy.

Later, Bakshi, Hariz and I commanded our regiments together, after which I left service prematurely to become a defence journalist, while the other three went on to high command.

As one who has observed them closely, I can confidently state that all three are superbly equipped to lead the army.


Like Bakshi and Hariz, I was a mechanised forces officer, which meant I spent long years in the deserts of Rajasthan and the plains of Punjab.

Yet, like all armoured corps and mechanised forces officers, I also served tenures in Nagaland, Manipur, Jammu and Kashmir and even Africa.

To argue, as government mouthpieces have done since December 17, that Bakshi's shorter experience (Note: Not absence of experience) of counter-insurgency operations renders him ill-equipped to be army chief is as mischievous and misleading as declaring that Rawat's shorter experience in the plains renders him unfit to command the army in a war with Pakistan, when the bulk of India's offensive power will be applied through its mechanised strike corps.

This criticism of Bakshi and his supersession by Rawat amounts to accepting that the army's prime job is no longer conventional war, but counter-insurgency operations.

And that is tantamount to admitting defeat to Pakistan, whose military strategy has always been to tie down India's military with sub-conventional forces (jihadi militants), while its nuclear arsenal deterred India from retaliating with conventional warfare.

Today, as always, a chief's first preoccupation must remain conventional operations and full-scale war.

Low-intensity operations against separatists must remain a secondary business.

Political decision-makers should also be aware that the side-lining of two mechanised forces officers is being watched with dismay by three quarters of the army, which is deeply divided over the inequitable cornering of promotion vacancies by the infantry and artillery -- the two arms that have monopolised the army chief's office for two decades.

In February, the Supreme Court finally intervened, ordering more vacancies to be distributed to other arms. Yet, there are continuing lawsuits against skewed promotion policies that favour the infantry with disproportionate promotion vacancies.

Now, after two decades, when an armoured corps general was becoming chief in the natural course, an infantry general has superseded him on grounds that would apply, with only minor modifications, to every non-infantry general who is considered for chief in the future.

This is not going unnoticed in the army.

Given the emerging consensus that service chiefs should be selected on the basis of merit, not just seniority, the central question then becomes: 

'Should there be an objective set of 

criteria to evaluate merit?'



There are absolutely none at present.


It could be argued that a general found professionally meritorious enough to be made an army commander (the lieutenant generals one rung below the army chief, who command the Northern, Western Command, etcetera) would also possess the qualities needed to become army chief.

That, however, is only partially true. An army chief has two other important functions.

First, he must be the symbolic and inspirational figurehead for the entire army, a man with the communication skills and media savvy to portray the service in a positive light and create public confidence.

Second, the political leadership must have confidence in the army chief.

Currently, given the leaders' superficial and transactional relationship with the military, the apex political leadership has negligible personal 

interaction with the gaggle of 17 army, navy and 

air force commanders that have sprung up over the years.

While selecting, say, an army chief, the defence minister and prime minister would have only superficially interacted with the generals they are choosing from.

Implementing the long-proposed structures of 'tri-service geographical commands' would narrow down the field to just 5 to 7 geographical commanders, who political leaders might come to know as individuals.

Until then, leaders would be forced to make the 'choice' based on others' inputs, possibly motivated or parochial.

Finally, as evident from Rawat's appointment, a so-called 'merit-based' choice permits the politicisation of the country's most apolitical institution.

Further, it incentivises senior military officers to establish political contacts, which inevitably diminish the military's own channels of authority.

Till now, the military had managed to walk the tight-wire, accepting nominal political authority while resisting political meddling in internal decisions.

This was possible because successive governments were content to allow the military to make its own choices.

Now, with ambitious generals knowing that political patronage might be rewarded, a worrying era of politicisation of the military looms ahead.
Ajai Shukla
Source: 



























Thursday, December 29, 2016

USA CHINA POLICY : An open letter to Donald Trump on the One-China policy



SOURCE:https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/12/13/an-open-letter-to-donald-trump-on-the-one-china-policy/?utm_campaign=John+L.+Thornton+China+Center&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=39832103

An open letter to Donald Trump on the One-China policy

Richard C. Bush

Dear President-elect Trump:


You told Chris Wallace on Fox News Sunday that you “fully understand the One-China policy.” I have no reason to doubt you. But because you may not have received a briefing from the State Department on this matter, I’d like to fill you in on a few aspects of a complicated policy that has not always been well-understood—even by experts on China—through the years. I won’t go over all the history and theology of U.S.-China relations and the Taiwan issue. Just the basics.

Author


First, the One-China policy is something the United States adopted and has upheld for itself. Beijing did not impose it. And it dates back decades, to before our establishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China.
Second, the core of the United States’ One-China policy is that we don’t pursue a Two-China policy. The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing and the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan (ROC) each insisted during the Cold War that it was the sole, legal government of China. We would have been perfectly happy to have diplomatic relations with both, but they insisted that we had to choose sides. So, in 1972 the Nixon administration began a process to transfer recognition and diplomatic relations from the ROC (Taiwan) to the PRC, and the Carter administration completed that process in 1979 in return for statements of China’s “fundamental policy” to pursue reunification by peaceful means. In a 1982 communique with China, the Reagan administration formalized this position by saying that the United States does not pursue a policy of two Chinas, or one China-one Taiwan.
Third, because we gave up any hope of a Two-China policy, one consequence of recognizing the PRC was that we could no longer have diplomatic relations with the ROC (no country in the world has diplomatic relations with both). But the Carter administration and Congress created a mechanism to preserve the substance of our relations with Taiwan by working through a nominally unofficial organization, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT; point of transparency: I was a senior officer of AIT from 1997 to 2002). In fact, AIT is a wholly owned subsidiary of the U.S. government. Its personnel are government personnel, and the business it conducts is government business. The United States does a lot with and for Taiwan, and as long as we do it behind the facade of unofficial relations, China does not complain.
The mechanism isn’t the equivalent of diplomatic relations: Taiwan’s president has not had face-to-face meetings with the U.S. president, but through the years numerous channels have been created to facilitate communications between the two on political, security, economic, cultural, and people-to-people issues. There are some limitations on the conduct of relations, but many of these have been relaxed over time and can probably—but quietly—be relaxed further. Would Taiwan prefer the dignity of something closer to diplomatic relations? Of course it would. But it also understands that the hand it holds is the hand it was dealt and that, at the end of the day, its substantive achievements with Washington through the unofficial relationship are much more important. When bilateral communication has deteriorated, it’s not because of mechanism defects, but because American and Taiwan leaders have adopted conflicting goals.

A Taiwan Air Force U.S.-made F-16 fighter jet gets washed after a drill at the Chiayi Air Force base, southern Taiwan, January 26, 2016. REUTERS/Pichi Chuang - RTX2416O
A Taiwan Air Force U.S.-made F-16 fighter jet at the Chiayi Air Force base, southern Taiwan, January 26, 2016. REUTERS/Pichi Chuang.

Fourth, there is the issue of the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship. Washington sells a variety of weapons systems to Taiwan. The George W. Bush and Obama administrations each sold over $12 billion in arms to Taiwan. There is robust interaction between our two defense establishments, including on the fundamentals of Taiwan’s defense strategy. The United States warns Beijing about using force against Taiwan, the unstated implication being that we would come to Taiwan’s defense. It’s ironic: We have defense cooperation with a government that we do not recognize, to help it ensure its security vis-à-vis a government that we do recognize.
The PRC military threat to Taiwan arises because it has always asserted that the island is part of the sovereign territory of China. It has stated its fundamental policy to seek to resolve its dispute with Taiwan peacefully, yet Beijing has never renounced the use of force—and the People’s Liberation Army continues to acquire capabilities that would be useful in a war against Taiwan. Hence the need for U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation to ensure Beijing does not resort to force.
One of the PRC’s stated reasons for its military build-up is to deter a movement on the island to create a Republic of Taiwan, totally separate from China. Beijing is particularly anxious, for historical reasons, that the Democratic Progressive Party—which President Tsai Ing-wen chairs and which is now in power in Taiwan—will move toward independence. But that’s highly unlikely: Taiwan’s core problems are domestic, the great majority of the island’s population and President Tsai want to preserve the status quo, and Taiwan people pragmatically understand that a move to independence would lead to an attack from China.
As part of the U.S. One-China policy, American officials have long said that the differences between Taiwan and China should be resolved by peaceful means. That should remain the cornerstone of American policy. Bill Clinton stated an important supplement to the One-China policy in May 2000 when he said: “the issues between Beijing and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.” 
That last phrase was a welcome recognition that during the 1990s, Taiwan had become a democracy. That meant that Washington believed that the people of Taiwan should now have a seat at the table whenever leaders in Taipei and Beijing argued about the island’s future, and that Beijing had to tailor its unification proposals to accommodate their wishes. It also meant that the people of Taiwan have a stake in any discussions between the United States and China about Taiwan. Taiwan people know that there were times in Taiwan’s history when Washington ignored their wishes when conducting its China policy, and this statement was meant to reassure them that such days had passed.
This leads to two important takeaways regarding the state of the U.S. One-China policy:
  • Washington and Beijing decided to establish diplomatic relations in 1979 to facilitate cooperation between the two countries on a whole range of issues. How we interact with Taiwan was a consequence of the decision and a part of a packaged deal. Whatever the current problems in the U.S.-China relationship today, our reneging on the Taiwan part of the packaged deal would not provide leverage on trade, North Korea, the South China Sea, or any of the other issues that roil the relationship. More likely, it would rattle the entire framework of the relationship, and cause Beijing to rethink its policy of seeking reunification by peaceful means. To make matters worse, Taiwan could suffer collateral damage as a result.
  • Not only would it not work as a practical matter to try to use the One-China policy to leverage U.S. objectives on other issues, it would be immoral to do so. Taiwan is not a “tradeable good.” It is an island composed of 23 million people who have created a prosperous, stable, and democratic society—a society, by the way, that China might emulate. They are good friends of the United States. They don’t deserve to be treated as a bargaining chip.
To enter into negotiations with China on the One-China policy is to create a zone of uncertainty that puts Taiwan at risk.
Yours sincerely,
Richard Bush

Legacy of Dignity for Army Chief

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/legacy-of-dignity-for-army-chief/343057.html




            Legacy of Dignity for Army Chief

                                      By

                 Lt Gen Baljit Singh (retd)





When a Chief assumes office through ‘deep selection’ and superseding ‘equals’, he must stand by his better military judgement and follow his conscience to remain prepared to even resign, if need be.




Army Chief-designate Lt General Bipin Rawat paying homage to the martyrs of the 1971 India-Pakistan war. 


George Orwell was born in India in 1903, to British parents. As was the practice in those times, he was banished to spend most of his childhood and adolescent years in England; schooling at the exclusive Eton College, followed by graduation from Christchurch College, in Cambridge University. Again, as was the “done thing” for such well born and aspiring young men, he qualified for entrance to the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and was appointed to the Imperial Police cadre, to serve in Burma.


By all counts, George Orwell was a distinguished police officer but he had made a poor choice of profession as he was intellectually inclined, or rather driven, for seeking equitable social opportunities for the teeming economically poorer segments of human society. He espoused his dream brilliantly through the book Animal Farm, which after numerous rejections was ultimately published in early 1945.


As may be imagined, the characters of the book are essentially pigs, horses, et al, who are harnessed to toil at the Manor Farm for their human master, Mr Jones. And one fine day, all animals assemble and in a kind of coup take over the farm to usher in Utopia, and adopt seven commandments, the most important being:
All animals are equal, and whatever goes on two legs is an enemy.



However, George Orwell had witnessed how the principle of equality was soon turned into dictatorial tyranny by Stalin in the USSR. So the utopian philosophy in Animal Farm is modified by the leader of animals to read: “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”. Now it may be tad oversimplification of what in the armed forces today goes as the system of “Selection Grade Promotions”, but in essence that is what it is.


There are very well-honed step-by-step merit-evaluation checks applied at multiple levels of the screening process on all aspirants for the next elevation in rank. It would be hard to fault the system per se, particularly as it also provides opportunity for redress by those who may deem it rightful.


Having said all this, let me go back to the mid-1950s for the selection of the successor to General SM Shrinagesh.  As this has been brought to my notice by a friend, retired Maj General PK Mallick, by quoting from the book, Leadership in the Indian Army: Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, by Maj General V K Singh of the Corps of Signals published by SAGE Publications, 2005; I find it most appropriate for all Indian citizens to be better informed:


“In May 1955, Thimayya was appointed GOC-in-C, Southern Command. His tenure was uneventful, except for an attempt by Pakistan to infiltrate in the Chad Bet region of the Rajasthan desert, which was effectively dealt with by a motorised battalion. In September 1956 he moved to the Eastern Command, thus becoming the first officer to command all three field armies in India. In the Eastern Command he had to deal with insurgency by the Naga tribes, in North-East India. At that time, General S.M. Shrinagesh was the Chief of Army Staff. He was due to retire in May 1957, and there were several contenders for the post. Lieut Generals Sant Singh and Kalwant Singh were from the same Sandhurst batch, having passed out on 29 January 1925. The other two were Thimayya and PN Thapar, who had also passed out from Sandhurst together, on 4 February 1926. Thimayya had been placed 15th in order of merit (Sic. at Sandhurst), while Thapar was 18th. Hence, he was technically senior to Thapar. However, the most important factor was Thimayya's impressive war record — he had won the DSO, and was the only Indian to have commanded a brigade in battle. The others did not have any notable achievement to their credit. As expected, Thimayya was selected for the top job in the Army, and on 8 May 1957, he was promoted to General, and took over as Chief of Army Staff. He superseded Lieut General Sant Singh, who resigned, as well as Lieut General Kalwant Singh, who decided to continue....”



What is not stated about General KS Thimayya and what additionally may have singled him out in the “deep selection” process is that he was in command of Siri Division (later 19 Infantry Division), which oversaw practically all operations to include the capture of Zozi La on November 1, 1948, personally led the first Dakota landing at Leh (an improvised landing strip) on May 24, 1948, and the liberation of Ladakh right up to the Karakoram Pass!



Subsequently, after two years of stalemate at the UN General Assembly, when it was finally agreed to set up the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, Maj General Thimayya became its Chairman on July 27, 1953, and his delicate and impartial handling of the acrimony was universally applauded. It was to his credit that North Korea amicably accepted 70,183 of their prisoners of war.



I had less than two years’ service at the time, but I recall that General Thimayya as the Chief was the toast of the entire Army. And with his vast experience of war from up front, he was believed not to favour “showing the flag” posts deployed in Ladakh and along the McMahon Line in the East. In terms of numbers, fire power and logistic access, these posts were a “push over” for the better placed Chinese.



General Thimayya’s war wisdom and political astuteness proved correct. Sometime in August-September 1959, the Chinese in a short and swift move inflicted heavy loses to our isolated post at Longju, in the Siang Valley close to where the Brahmaputra river descends into India. Another post at Machuka was so terribly isolated that our troops chose to abandon it when challenged by the Chinese. Admittedly, that was a disgraceful soldierly conduct but that is how it ended.



These foregone defeats imposed on the military against the better judgement of their Chief, and Defence Minister Krishna Menon’s inability to engage the Army Chief in a meaningful discussion, was the fundamental reason that drove General Thimayya to tender his resignation. Far worse was to follow when Prime Minister Nehru persuaded the Chief to retract his resignation and in the next breath, berated him in the Lok Sabha.



So when a Chief assumes office through deep selection and superseding two “equals”, he must stand by his better military judgement and follow his conscience to even resign, if need be.




And lastly, when General KM Cariappa became the first Indian Chief on January 15, 1949, he had followed the age-old tradition, that is, the incumbent Chief demits office at the stroke of midday and the Chief-designate quietly walking into his office the following morning. And performs his first duty to his Army by way of the “Special Order of the Day”, which basically is a motivational epistle focused on upholding the oath of fidelity, come what may.

 Of late, an unsavoury deviation has crept in, that is, the Chief-designate walks into the office accompanied by his wife, where they are received by the incumbent Chief together with his spouse.

This does not go well with the dignity of that exalted office.