Thursday, June 6, 2019

THE KRA CANAL

SOURCE:
https://takshashila.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/TDS-The-Kra-Canal-MK-AK-KK-2019-02-1.pdf

THE KRA CANAL

: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR INDIA?

Why is China attempting to build a canal through the Isthmus of Kra?

How does this impact regional dynamics?

What are India’s interests in the project?
BY
Manoj Kewalramani , Anirudh Kanisetti & Kunaal Kini

March 2019

Executive Summary

A canal along the Isthmus of Kra could alter the strategic calculus for states across Southeast Asia, with China expected to benefit the most. In light of recent discussions around building the canal with the help of Chinese investors, this study examines the potential impact and pitfalls of this project from an Indian interests perspective. The following are the key conclusions of this assessment:

1. The Kra Canal is not going to materialise immediately and has several challenges.

Thailand has many misgivings about the project, with divided elite and public opinions. It is a diplomatically, politically and economically risky undertaking. In addition, China is working on less controversial alternatives to address the Malacca Dilemma.

2. The Kra Canal is not necessarily “aimed” at India, and can serve Indian interests.

The Kra Canal is not an economic risk to India and will likely boost trade with East Asia. The potential security threats it poses can be managed through contingency planning.

3. For India to benefit from the canal, it needs to take action immediately.

India must avoid direct involvement in the project. But if it materialises, India should deepen bilateral ties with key ASEAN members, pursue a “sea denial” strategy to address security concerns and invest in port and transshipment capacity.

What is the Kra Canal?

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that could route shipping from the Andaman Sea directly to the Gulf of Thailand. It’s in the news thanks to reports of a 2015 MoU between two private entities and the Thai leadership commissioning a feasibility study

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that aims to directly connect the Gulf of Thailand to the Andaman Sea through the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand, providing an alternative route for shipping that is now concentrated on the Straits of Malacca. If built, the canal would cut travel time from South Asia to East Asia by at least 3 days and 1200 kilometres.

In 2015, a Chinese company reportedly signed an MoU to construct the canal. Since then, there have been concerns about the canal’s impact on India. This Slidedoc discusses Thai and Chinese interests in pursuing the canal, the project’s feasibility and prospects, and proposes actions for India to maximise its interests.

How far along has the project come?

The Kra Canal is a project often discussed at times of geopolitical competition. Despite the support of Chinese academics and elements within the Thai military, it has not yet secured a green light. A feasibility study has recently been commissioned, but it is not the first and may not be the last.

The idea of a canal through the Isthmus of Kra is more than 300 years old, and has been periodically revived in times of geopolitical competition. The late 19th century, for example, saw competition between France and Britain, the former in support while the latter opposed. The late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen more systematic and technology-backed proposals, with multiple feasibility studies being carried out.

In 2015, an MoU was inked between the China-Thailand Kra Infrastructure Investment and Development company and Asia Union Group, to build the canal. Both the Chinese and Thai governments have since officially distanced themselves from the deal. But many Chinese academics and influential Thai businessmen - who also happen to be retired military officers - have spoken in favour of it.

Most recently, Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Board and the National Security Council have been tasked to conduct a feasibility study (Pakkawan 2018). So far, neither the ruling military junta nor the democratic opposition have taken a clear, decisive stance supporting the canal, or outlining how it would be constructed.

What does Thailand stand to gain or lose?

There are compelling arguments for and against the Canal. It is potentially a very lucrative project, but comes with immense risks for Thailand

Economics
Gains
The canal could aid Thailand’s rise as a shipping and financial hub, create employment, incentivise business and boost growth.
Losses
To benefit from the canal, transhipment facilities and an SEZ must be built, bringing the total cost anywhere between $30-$80bn. The debt incurred may be difficult to repay – especially given that Singapore would remain a competitor and the canal could adversely impact the environment, hurting tourism.

National Security
Gains
Economic development and employment generation may well lead to increased social and political stability.
Losses
The Canal would physically divide the South of Thailand from the North. This impinges on Thailand’s territorial integrity. It could also fuel the existing insurgency by Malays in the south. Unsustainable debt burden owing to the canal could also comprise Thai sovereignty. All of this could lead to greater political and social instability.
Geopolitics
Gains
The Kra Canal would significantly buttress Thailand’s position as a swing power in Southeast Asia
Losses
A shift in trade away from the Straits of Malacca could lead to frictions among ASEAN states. Debt owed to China could increase Thailand’s dependence on it and risk embroiling it in the growing Sino-US competition (Bloomberg 2018).
Environment
Gains
Cutting the maritime travel time by 2-3 days and 1200 km would result in less energy consumption and reduced emissions (Murdoch 2017).
Losses
There are fears that increased shipping would adversely impact marine ecology and potentially pose an existential risk to tourist sites such as Phuket.

What does China stand to gain or lose?
China has much more to gain from the construction of the Kra Canal and is also less exposed to risk. However, some concerns remain.

Economics

Security

Geopolitics

Monday, June 3, 2019

Our PM and CMs are puppets of the IAS

SOURCE:

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/seeing-the-invisible/our-pm-and-cms-are-puppets-of-the-ias/

Our PM and CMs

are puppets of the IAS

By

Sanjeev Sabhlok

Sanjeev Sabhlok joined the IAS in 1982 but resigned after 18 years upon concluding that India's corrupt socialist governance system cannot be reformed from within. He concluded that the IAS itself is a major cause of India’s misery. Since then he has attempted to build a liberal party for India even as he earns his living as an economist in the Treasury in the Victorian government in Australia. In 2013 he was instrumental in forming Swarna Bharat Party (SBP) which takes inspiration from Rajaji’s Swatantra Party and stands for comprehensive political, social and economic liberty. Sanjeev holds the pen on SBP’s manifesto and believes the document now contains all the essential reforms to transform India into a First World nation. He is author of Breaking Free of Nehru (2008, Anthem Press), and manuscripts such as The Discovery of Freedom and Seeing the Invisible (economics for children). He sometimes writes about SBP and its policies in the Times of India editorial page and in other outlets.

June 1, 2019,

I’m simplifying things quite a bit when I say that our elected politicians are puppets of the bureaucracy, but as I will show presently, this is a fair comment given our institutional arrangements. Our bureaucracy – taken as a whole – is not only more powerful than any elected chief minister, it is more powerful than the Prime Minister.

This situation is a complete violation of the principles of liberal political theory. In a democracy, the executive should be checked and balanced by the judiciary and parliament. The idea that the unelected machine of government (the bureaucracy) will itself check the executive by exercising independent power was never intended by any theorist of political science.

This huge power of the bureaucracy in India – much greater than the power that even the British Indian bureaucracy wielded – came about during the haste of the 1947 partition and Constitution drafting. Sardar Patel made a strong case in the Constituent Assembly to continue with the colonial bureaucracy. There was no time to think about alternative models. He asked: “Is there any Premier in any province who is prepared to work without the services? He will immediately resign. He cannot manage.”

This panic led to not only the Constitutional inclusion of the all-India services (India is unique in having the public services form part of its Constitution) but the way Part 14 of the Constitution was drafted, enormous restrictions were imposed on the sovereignty of the executive and the People of India. In all democracies, the executive is supreme, with almost unlimited discretionary powers to hire and fire public servants. Not so in India. Article 311 massively dilutes this power and makes it virtually impossible for the executive to remove public servants.

As a result over the past 70 years, even the PMs of India haven’t been able to easily remove corrupt IAS officers, leave alone the incompetent ones. A PM’s entire tenure can go by in chasing up a single case through the courts. There are cases in the Modi government where even compulsory retirement has been insufficient to get rid of bad officers. Our bureaucracy thus sits on a pedestal well above elected representatives. Effectively, it is the IAS that is sovereign in India, not the People.

There is a widely cited but spurious argument that has enabled the IAS to hold on to their powers: that Indians trust their politicians less than they trust IAS officers. The people perceive the IAS to be incompetent, self-interested and arrogant but they trust their political leaders even less. Further, many honest IAS officers, in their genuine concern for India, want the IAS to continue so it can block corrupt politicians. But their remedy does not address the cause of the problem. Fixing the problem of corrupt politicians requires a different approach (which I’ve elaborated elsewhere) and we should not use the existence of bad politicians to justify the world’s most powerful but incompetent bureaucracy.

The main puppet-master in the IAS is the Establishment Officer (EO) in the Ministry of Personnel, about whom most people do not the slightest clue. The EO’s sole purpose is to defend (and expand – to the extent possible) the powers that Patel gave to the IAS. The EO operates behind the scenes, manipulating and controlling (mainly frustrating) the elected government. He dramatically reduces options for the elected representatives on almost all major appointments. And of course, the Cabinet Secretary plays a crucial role in defending the IAS empire directly at the Cabinet. This itself is a huge anomaly. In genuine democracies, a bureaucrat must not have a seat at the political table. In Victoria, an elected MP serves as Cabinet Secretary.

Such is the clout of the EO and Cabinet Secretary that Ministers and Chief Ministers need to send their emissary to the lowly EO to try to influence his decisions. This clearly shows where power lies in India. Our elected politicians have no real powers to deliver their election commitments. Our democracy is thus being choked from within – by the unaccountable and ultra-powerful IAS.

The IAS is unfit for the task of taking India from the Third World to the First World. From my personal experience (and I continue to have good friends within the IAS), no IAS officer comes even remotely close to the competence of middle-level managers in the Australian government. If the pool of administrative leaders in India is so poor, how can India possibly succeed? We need to urgently broaden the talent pool for each job and ensure the right incentives and systems of accountability. The function of EO might have worked for the colonial British government but it simply can’t work in a modern democracy.

This hugely powerful Indian bureaucracy (of which I was once a member) contrasts with the situation in Victoria where the Premier (Chief Minister) of Victoria is the unquestionable boss. He appoints Secretaries, who then appoint other officers down the line. No one can tell the Premier that he can appoint officials only from a “shortlist” prepared by a petty bureaucrat. And if a Secretary doesn’t perform, he is fired without notice. The Premier is fully empowered to get the job done. The link between the voter, his taxes and the performance of the government is direct and unambiguous. No EO sits behind the scenes, stymying the elected executive.

The saving grace for India is that the PM does have a few powers to shop outside the IAS. The recent lateral entry program has been one such rare instance. Some people have questioned the Constitutional power of the PM to do so, but I believe the Constitution allows such limited powers.

The State governments, on the other hand, are in really bad shape. Their freedom to appoint outside the IAS is almost completely circumscribed. In particular, all important posts in the states have been captured by the IAS through IAS cadre rules. These include senior positions in local government bodies, such as municipal corporations. While the IAS system doesn’t, of course, control precisely who is appointed, it ensures that only one of them can hold these posts. In that sense, the Chief Ministers of the States have even less flexibility than the PM.

As a result, IAS officers are able to thumb their nose at State governments. They can go to the EO and get themselves posted to another state or to the Government of India or even abroad. Everything depends on the officer’s relationship with the EO and Cabinet Secretary. That’s why the IAS is such a cosy and exclusive club.

It is high time to bring this dysfunctional and undemocratic system to an end. Within two years the BJP government will have the opportunity to amend the Constitution. IAS is the first thing that must go.

Saturday, May 25, 2019

Real Buddha Quotes

Source:
https://www.realbuddhaquotes.com/author/admin/page/6/

Saturday, April 27, 2019

‘Anatomy of an Attack’.

SOURCE:
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/sri-lanka-terror-attacks-isis-ntj-emergency-churches-5696924/

Informed theorising can help put together motives, assess potential and piece ideas together to create a narrative.

THOSE WHO ONLY LIVE FOR TODAY AND ARE OBLVION OF TOMORROW AND CARE TWO HOOTS ABOUT YESTERDAY ARE DOOMED

Yet such is India’s lack of a sense of remembrance that it laid the Kartarpur Corridor’s cornerstone on the 10th anniversary of 26/11, with an oblivious Indian vice president calling it a “historic day”. Pakistan couldn’t have received a better gift from India.

‘Anatomy of an Attack’.
By
Syed Ata Hasnain

THE CARNAGE

The Islamic State (IS) has lately taken responsibility. Yet,the international connection is a matter of piecing the complex jigsaw of international terror, Islamist networks, the situation post the 2009 war with LTTE and other events.

God has often been unkind kind to the island nation of 21 million people. Such a beautiful land and such good people but Sri Lanka seems doomed to its unfortunate fate of violence of different forms. The latest carnage involving bombings by as many as seven suspected suicide bombers, leading to over 250 fatalities at eight locations, is apparently a manifestation of some large-scale clandestine external support to a set of proxies. Since investigation is underway, there is as yet informed conjecture about the (NTJ), an Islamic entity. It is suspected to be a radical Islamist group, which came into the spotlight only in 2017 after the Buddhist radical group Bodu Bala Sena reportedly undertook a campaign against the Muslim minority in Sri Lanka. At this stage, it is sufficient to believe that religious and ethnic differences are behind the carnage. The Islamic State (IS) has lately taken responsibility. Yet, the international connection is a matter of piecing the complex jigsaw of international terror, Islamist networks, the situation post the 2009 war with LTTE and other events. How this deadly cocktail comes together to smother a quiet island nation perhaps needs deeper investigation. At this moment we can, at best, theorise.

Informed theorising can help put together motives, assess potential and piece ideas together to create a narrative. It commences with the immense potential for sectarian violence in Sri Lanka. There is the defeated LTTE, which would desire to rise again since the Tamil population remains as un-integrated and, perhaps as subjugated as it was during the 30 years of the civil war. The government has done little to prevent its resurgence and diaspora networks remain fully alive. The LTTE is expected to return one day with vengeance, but not yet. Besides, the LTTE is hardly likely to target Christians and their places of worship because many are Christians themselves. For them to act as subsidiary of another international group is least likely. International intelligence agencies including those from India had warned Sri Lanka on April 11 about the possibility of NJT undertaking some form of terrorist action around Easter.

Sri Lanka has a 7.4 per cent Muslim minority; an undetermined number are from the Wahabi sect and others are Sufis. However, in that country’s majority and hard-boiled nationalism, everyone other than Sinhala Buddhists are suspected of being anti-national. A severe trust deficit exists based upon years of internal civil war and internecine violence between various faiths and groups. As an island nation under the larger shadow of India, where 190 million Muslims reside, its sectarian tend to be ignored. It is just the kind of situation tailor made for two things; first, a demonstration of international radical extremist capability; second to send home a message that these terror networks exist across the world and mother organisations still control them. That is why the finger of suspicion points to confirmation of the IS, which has staked claim for the carnage.

After its defeat in the Middle East, the IS has made efforts towards sustaining itself in third countries or locations. Efforts are on in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Southeast Asia it was the Philippines where it attempted to ride on a surrogate group such as Abu Sayyaf. In the competitive world of international terror, the IS perceives a need to continue retaining its current primacy; any leeway given to other major groups such as al Qaeda will see many years of effort in the Middle East wasted. With an intelligence appreciation, placing oneself in the shoes of IS leadership, it is not difficult to determine that with the loss at Marawi in the Philippines, little progress in Af-Pak and the recent losses at Idlib in Syria, the IS was desperate to show case itself. Targeting the Sinhala majority would be counterproductive as the retaliation from radical Sinhala groups such as Bodu Bala Sena would be intense. Targeting the Tamil community would similarly be counterproductive since the LTTE’s networks may eventually be needed. The Christian community is 9.7 per cent of the population and historically no Christian-Muslim feud exists in the island. That is all the more reason that the chances of retaliation against Muslims would be low.

A second chain of events involving bombings remains alive as per the US intelligence agencies. The IS, with its caliphate-like aspirations, would have viewed the killings at Christchurch, New Zealand as just the event to avenge with an act against Christians anywhere on the globe. Easter was the most appropriate time as was the selection of churches and five-star hotels where western tourists (again largely Christian) would be present in large numbers. The questionable part of this rationale is the short interval since the Christchurch killings — March 15 to April 22. The type of suicide bombings witnessed in Sri Lanka would have called for resource collection, planning, motivation of seven suicide bombers and very careful coordination without even an iota of a leak. Five weeks to plan is far too little time. Christchurch probably only became a justification. The IS’s organisational skills are well known. It could be deduced that the operation was in the planning stages already and given greater justification by Christchurch. It is reported that just a year ago, a cache of explosives and ammunition linked to NTJ was found just north of Colombo.

For us in India, it’s a narrow escape. It could well have happened in southern India but the Indian intelligence system is a reasonable dampener for the IS. Little do we realise the worth of our intelligence agencies, which have kept India safe ever since 26/11 with no major targeting outside J&K (excluding Pathankot which too is a military station). If the narrative built above is true, then the IS has obviously sneaked in through surrogate returnees who fought its cause in the Middle East. Maldives nearby too has many, Sri Lanka some. India has over a hundred, mostly logistic support personnel — many could be motivated as potential suicide bombers. With the same threat developing in J&K, these are dangerous portents. India and Sri Lanka need intense intelligence cooperation and even more an understanding of social dynamics which contribute to the hard ideologies behind such acts.

The writer, a former corps commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, is currently associated with the Delhi Policy Group and the Vivekananda International Foundation.

PART 2

SOURCE : https://theprint.in/world/sri-lankas-easter-bombings-have-indian-links-pose-a-serious-security-threat/228064/

Sri Lanka’s Easter Bombings

have Indian links and pose a serious security threat

BRAHMA CHELLANEY

New Delhi must outlaw the Tamil Nadu NTJ. India

cannot become a victim of Thowheed Jamat terror

after warning Sri Lanka about the bombing plot.

27 April, 2019

The Sri Lanka bombings — one of the world’s deadliest acts of terrorism — highlight the growing terrorist threat to democratic, secular states. Far from a concerted and sustained global war on terror, the anti-terrorism fight is being undermined by geopolitics. The global ideological movement fuelling terrorism is Wahhabi jihadism. Yet, the US-ordered total ban on Iranian oil exports from May 3 will reward this jihadism’s financiers.

Despite specific and detailed Indian intelligence warnings, Sri Lanka failed to avert the bombings, in large part because of a divided and dysfunctional government. However, Sri Lanka was quick to detain the bombers’ family members for questioning once the suicide killers were identified. By contrast, the Pulwama bomber’s family members not only remained free but also gave media interviews rationalising the suicide attack.

Sri Lanka has a blood-soaked history, but the scale and intensity of the latest attacks were unprecedented. The coordinated bombings, in less than 30 minutes, killed more people than the 2008 Mumbai terrorist siege, which lasted nearly four days. Actually, in terms of sophisticated methods and synchronised lethality, they were eerily similar to the 1993 serial bombings that targeted Mumbai. Jihadists have long used India as a laboratory: Major acts of terror first tried out in India and then replicated elsewhere include attacks on symbols of State authority, mid-air bombing of a commercial jetliner and coordinated strikes on a city transportation system.

The series of extraordinary steps Sri Lanka took after the bombings — blocking social media, imposing a daily dusk-to-dawn curfew, closing schools until April 29 and proclaiming an emergency law — may seem unthinkable in terrorism-scarred but rights-oriented India. But such measures were necessary to maintain control and to deter large-scale reprisal attacks against Muslims.

Ironically, in the days leading up to the Sri Lanka bombings, the 2008 Mumbai attacks were back in the news in India because of Bharatiya Janata Party candidate Pragya Thakur’s controversial comment on Hemant Karkare, the police officer gunned down in that siege. The irony of ironies is that those 26/11 attacks received more Indian attention this month than on their 10th anniversary five months ago. This underscores a troubling truth:

Nothing draws the attention of Indians more

than political controversy, however petty.

The Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana famously said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This is especially true of India, which — far from heeding the 26/11 lessons — doesn’t remember its martyrs. How many Indians know the name of Tukaram Omble, the “hero among heroes” of 26/11? An ex-army soldier, who became a police assistant sub-inspector, Omble — by ensuring terrorist Ajmal Kasab’s capture alive — provided the clinching evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in 26/11. Kasab was captured after the ambush killing of six cops, including Karkare and additional commissioner Ashok Kamte. Omble grabbed the barrel of Kasab’s AK-47 and took a volley of fired bullets, allowing others to seize Kasab.

Also read: Online petition calls BBC report on Sri Lanka blasts an ‘attempt to blame Sinhalese’

All the 10 Pakistani terrorists involved in 26/11 wore red string wristbands for Hindus that Pakistani-American David Headley got for them from Mumbai’s Siddhivinayak Temple. But for Kasab’s capture (and confession) helping to indisputably establish Pakistan’s direct involvement,

Pakistan’s wicked plan was to portray 26/11 as exemplifying the rise of Hindu terrorism by capitalising on the then Manmohan Singh government’s classification of the 2006-07 blasts in Malegaon, Ajmer Sharif, Mecca Masjid and Samjhauta Express as “Hindu terror”.

Omble’s extraordinary bravery thus should never be forgotten. Nor the sacrifices of the other 26/11 martyrs awarded the Ashok Chakra — Sandeep Unnikrishnan, Gajender Singh, Vijay Salaskar, Karkare and Kamte. The 26/11 siege affected the national psyche more deeply than any other terrorist attack. Yet such is India’s lack of a sense of remembrance that it laid the Kartarpur Corridor’s cornerstone on the 10th anniversary of 26/11, with an oblivious Indian vice president calling it a “historic day”. Pakistan couldn’t have received a better gift from India.

Make no mistake: The Sri Lanka attacks hold major implications for Indian security, in part because the main group behind the bombings, the National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ), is an ideological offspring of the rapidly growing, Saudi-funded Tamil Nadu Thowheed Jamath (TNTJ). The TNTJ, wedded to fanatical Wahhabism, rails against idolaters. It helped establish the Sri Lanka Thowheed Jamath, from which the bomber outfit NTJ emerged as a splinter.

Like the 2016 brutal Dhaka café attack, the Sri Lanka slaughter was carried out by educated Islamists from well-off families. And just as Bangladesh blamed Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for the attack, the NTJ has ties with ISI’s front organisation, Lashkar-e-Taiba, which, through its Sri Lanka operations, has sought links with the TNTJ in India. NTJ leader Zaharan Hashim was inspired by fugitive Indian preacher Zakir Naik’s sermons and received funds from Indian jihadists. It would be paradoxical if India, which tipped off Sri Lanka about the bombing plot, became a victim itself of Thowheed Jamat terror. First of all, it must outlaw the TNTJ.

Also read: Sri Lanka attacks give Modi campaign opportunity to exploit high-octane nationalism