SOURCE:
http://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/is-pak-army-using-nawaz-sharif-as-a-bait-in-its-engagement-with-india/ar-AAcRL9n
WARNING
PAKISTAN IS A SCORPION
BY NATURE IT WILL ALWAYS STING.
NO ESCAPE PLEASE
VIDEO: India-Pakistan thaw in Russia. Will the new experiment work?
Is Pak Army Using Nawaz Sharif As A Bait In Its Engagement With India?
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It is unthinkable to believe that Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could have walked even a step, leave alone walking the whole distance, in having his first summit with Narendra Modi thirteen and a half months later in Ufa (Russia) on 10 July without the express permission from Rawalpindi, the seat of military power in Pakistan.
He did.
It is unthinkable to believe that Nawaz Sharif could have agreed to the language of the India-Pakistan statement, jointly read out by the two foreign secretaries, which looks like a draft by the Indian foreign office.
He did.
What does it mean? For the Pakistani civilian government? For the Pakistani military establishment? And for Pakistan on the whole?
The India-Pakistan summit in Ufa is regarded as Indian diplomatic victory at the expense of Pakistan. It put on record several Indian concerns and made a specific mention of expediting the 26/11 trial without any reference to the K word.
Nothing could be better than this for India!
Nothing could be better than this for India!
The question is: can this happen without the prior approval and blessings of Rawalpindi. It is highly unlikely.
In fact, the likely scenario is that the Pakistani military establishment is firing the gun from the shoulders of Nawaz Sharif, knowing well that it is the credibility and image of Nawaz Sharif, not theirs, which is at stake.
An Indo-Pak statement, jointly read out by the two countries' foreign secretaries at a joint press conference is too good to be true, after all!
But wait!
What if it is a pre-meditated strategy of the Pakistani military establishment!
But wait!
What if it is a pre-meditated strategy of the Pakistani military establishment!
First of all, let's put under microscope the following India-Pakistan statement, read out by the two foreign secretaries after the Ufa summit.
Here is the full statement.
Here is the full statement.
The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India met today on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Ufa. The meeting was held in a cordial atmosphere. The two leaders exchanged views on issues of bilateral and regional interest.
They agreed that India and Pakistan have a collective responsibility to ensure peace and promote development. To do so, they are prepared to discuss all outstanding issues. Both leaders condemned terrorism in all its forms and agreed to cooperate with each other to eliminate this menace from South Asia. They also agreed on the following steps to be taken by the two sides:
- A meeting in New Delhi between the two NSAs to discuss all issues connected to terrorism
- Early meetings of DG BSF and DG Pakistan Rangers followed by that of DGMOs
- Decision for release of fishermen in each other's custody, along with their boats, within a period of 15 days
- Mechanism for facilitating religious tourism
- Both sides agreed to discuss ways and means to expedite the Mumbai case trial, including additional information like providing voice samples
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reiterated his invitation to Prime Minister Modi to visit Pakistan for the SAARC Summit in 2016. Prime Minister Modi accepted the invitation.
The last line of second paragraph which talks of the two sides agreeing to "discuss all outstanding issues" should be seen as including a discussion on the Kashmir issue which Rawalpindi views as a "core issue" and an unfinished business.
One should not forget that here Pakistan has agreed to "discuss" all outstanding issues; it is not a blanket endorsement of the Indian policy.
One should not forget that here Pakistan has agreed to "discuss" all outstanding issues; it is not a blanket endorsement of the Indian policy.
As for talks between chiefs of the chiefs of BSF and Pakistan Rangers, the two have been staying engaged anyway over the years and there is nothing new about it.
For that matter, even the biggest announcement that the two sides' National Security Advisors would be meeting to carry forward the talks, does it not suit Pakistan that India has not only agreed for talks but has also elevated the level of these talks as NSA is a notch higher than the foreign secretary?
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More on this story
Ex-RAW chief was not totally honest about IC-814 hijackingWhy did Modi meet Nawaz Sharif in Russia?
'We will give befitting response to any Indian aggression'
'Address K-issue through back-channel talks'
'Modi diluting India's position on 26/11 trial in Pakistan
Modi-Sharif meet 'unfortunate': Sena
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The only unexplained point is why the Pakistanis agreed to put in a reference to exp editing the 26/11 trial without any mention of the Kashmir issue.
This is indeed a major concession from Pakistan to India and also a major give-away of the mindset of Rawalpindi.
It is no secret that Pakistan Army today finds itself stretched beyond limits in fighting terror outfits within, irrespective of the fact whether these outfits are home-grown or not.
Pakistan today is in dire straits economically and power outages across the nation are becoming not just an embarrassment but also a strategic issue for the Pakistan government. The Chinese offer of funneling in a whopping investment of $46 billion into Pakistan, much of it predicated on the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, has come in as a potential saviour for the country.
The Chinese investment would be like snowflakes in an oven if the security scenario of the country remains as worrisome as it is today. Therefore, it is logical to think that China would like Pakistan to bury its hatchet with India for the time being.
In a way, the CPEC and China's offer of $46 billion investment in Pakistan, is a lifeline for Pakistan which can be threatened if Pakistan's security scenario is not improved considerably in double quick time.
This is the real reason for Nawaz Sharif giving concessions to India as reflected by the India-Pakistan statement mentioned above.
Had Sharif acted like a hawk at his summit meeting with Modi in Ufa, he would have compromised Pakistan's long-term national interests and trouble would have been brewing for him at home.
One will have wait and watch for the reaction, if any, of the Pakistani military establishment on Sharif's talks with Modi in Ufa and the India-Pakistan roadmap for near-term engagement.
Next few days would be crucial how the Pakistani military establishment takes the post-summit statement read out by the two countries' foreign secretaries which did not mention Kashmir but pointedly referred to the two sides agreeing "to discuss ways and means to expedite the Mumbai case trial, including additional information like providing voice samples."
But Rawalpindi is unlikely to rap Sharif because this is exactly what he was told to do. It looks quite probable that Pakistan Army is using PM Sharif as a bait in its engagement with India.
VIDEO: India-Pakistan thaw in Russia. Will the new experiment work?
In-Depth Coverage
by Anjana Pasricha July 10, 2015
A meeting between Indian and Pakistani leaders on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Russia on Friday produced a thaw in tense relations between the South Asian rivals.
A joint statement outlining measures to restore ties was issued after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Pakistani counterpart, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, held one-on-one talks. Foreign Secretary Pakistan Aizaz Chaudhry said that the meeting was held in a cordial atmosphere and the two leaders exchanged views on bilateral and regional interest. He added that the two leaders agreed that both countries have a collective responsibility to ensure peace and promote development.
The Indian premier accepted Nawaz's invitation to Pakistan for the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation summit in 2016. Other measures include upcoming counterterror strategy talks in New Delhi between Indian and Pakistani national security advisers, along with direct bilateral talks between border security officials.
The breakthrough occurred nearly a year after peace negotiations between the estranged neighbors stalled last August, when New Delhi called off high-level talks.
"They agreed that India and Pakistan have a collective responsibility to ensure peace and promote development,' Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Chaudhry said, signaling that the two countries are ready to pick up the threads again. 'To do so they are prepared to discuss all outstanding issues. Both leaders condemned terrorism in all its forms and agreed to cooperate with each other to eliminate this menace from South Asia."
The two sides also discussed the primary issue that has strained ties: India's accusations of Pakistani foot-dragging on bringing justice to those responsible for Mumbai's November 2008 terror attacks that killed 164 people and wounded at least 308. Recent months have seen bitter exchanges over a Pakistani court's release of Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the attacks' alleged mastermind.
Pakistan says India has failed to provide crucial evidence, such as recordings of conversations between the attackers and their handlers.
Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar reported there was some progress at the talks in Ufa on addressing each country's concerns.
"Both sides agreed to discuss ways and means to expedite the Mumbai case trial, including additional information like providing voice samples," he said.
While the ice between the South Asian rivals may have been broken, progress in ending the freeze in their relations is likely to be slow.
Friday's meeting was the first between the two leaders since Nawaz attended Modi's swearing-in ceremony in May 2014.
Some material for this report came from Reuters.
Further Reading
Cold Start Doctrine SOURCE : ( http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/cold-start.htm )
Cold Start DoctrineIndia unveiled its “Cold Start” War Doctrine to Army Commanders on April 28, 2004. The plan would be used in the case(s) of perceived acts of strategic de-stabilization of India, proxy war, and/or terrorism perpetrated by or linked to Pakistan. The initiative is aimed at mobilizing the entire Indian armed forces within 72 hours and mounting a rapid , time- and distance- limited incursion into Pakistan.Adittionally, "It assumes that militants from Pakistan, and not home grown Indian radicals, are responsible for any actions". Territory would be captured and then used to compel Islamabad to negotiation with the goal of reigning in militant groups that have acted against India.The assumptions of the Indian Doctrine are: (1) act offensively against Pakistan for any perceived acts of strategic destabilisation of India, proxy war and terrorism (2) move away from India's defensive mindset of the past 50 years (3) prepare to undertake offensive military operations at the outset (4) undertake offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold (5) the vast majority of Indian public will support any war putting Pakistan into place and forces it "to desist from proxy war and terrorism against India." India's doctrine of "Cold Start" involves swift penetration of Pakistan with the aim of isolating, destroying or capturing vital points (such as nuclear stores and other installations). A battle strategy such as "Cold Start" could only be successful if the following political parameters were met: Any future conflict scenario involving a “blitzkrieg” type strategy would require joint operations involving the Indian Army, Indian Air Force, and Indian Navy. After the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the government asked the army to mobilize 'Operation Parakram', a full military mobilization. It took 27 days to do so. After numerous training exercises, the full mobilization of the Indian armed forces had been cut down to 48 hours. The Indian Army, Air Force, and Navy have carried out 11 exercises involving 50,000 troops between 2004 and 2011. As of July 2011, the Indian military carried out a 6-day-long joint exercise, “Vijay Bhava”, in the Bikaner-Suratgarh axis in the Rajasthan desert, only 70 kilometers from the Pakistan border. This exercise involved blitzkrieg-type armored penetration into Pakistan followed by mechanized infantry and rapid divisions and testing of the Indian Army’s night-time operational capabilities. India has made it clear that it will undertake offensive operations against Pakistan, short of the nuclear threshold, if properly provoked. India could initiate a pre-emptive strike as a warning or initiate full offensive operations straight away without giving Pakistan the time to bring diplomacy into the equation; a short mobilization time of 48 hours gives Indian the element of surprise. From the 1965 war through the Indian Army's Brass Tacks exercise in 1987, Pakistan's emphasis was on static defence at the border. Three heavy infantry holding formations, IV, XXX, and XXXI Corps, were tasked with countering Indian thrusts in their immediate areas. Penetration of Indian territory would be undertaken only on an opportunity basis. This concept of operations was inadequate, given the lack of strategic depth in Pakistan. Eventually it was realized that a "stand and fight" doctrine would probably result in deep penetration by Indian forces, without Pakistani forces being able to maneuver effectively. The Indian Army could gain the initiative, destroying Pakistani formations piecemeal as they reacted to Indian thrusts. Pakistan's "Riposte" was simple in concept: the two Strike Corps would conduct a limited advance along narrow fronts to occupy Indian territory near the border, probably to a depth of about 50 kilometers. I Corps (Mangla) and II Corps (Multan) were armor heavy "strike" corps. Independent Armoured and Mechanized Brigades were intended for quick counter attack and exploitation and would add weight to advances by the Strike Corps. Pakistan was thought to believe that international pressure would result in a ceasefire after a maximum of 3 weeks of conflict, which would be enough time to gain some territory to be used in subsequent bargaining. The "Riposte" was practiced at all levels. Major excercises involved the crossing of water obstacles and minefields at night with emphasis on subsequent break-out and rapid advance. Complete mechanization of the Strike Corps and other formations to achieve desired mobility was slowed by the effects of US sanctions. By 2008, US Army surplus equipment was being rapidly delivered, and local manufacture and rebuilding of US supplied AFV/APC had received considerable impetus, thus improving the mechanization process. Initially there was acceptance of Indian penetration of Pakistani territory, which was seen as inevitable, given the comparitive lack of mobility within the Infantry Divisions. India's doctrine of "Cold Start" resulted in some modification to the Riposte, since acceptance of penetration could be fatal to counter-penetration plans. In the event of an Indian advance reaching or crossing the line of the main Lahore-Karachi highway, there could be consideration of employment of tactical nuclear missiles. The Indian army/airforce excercise Vajra Shakti (Thunder Power) conducted in Punjab from 1 to 10 May 2005), emphasized maintaining mobility while operating under nuclear attack. Pakistan's nuclear battlefield preparedness was patchy, and it was doubtful that even the Strike Corps could fight under nuclear attack. Others suggested that "instead of seeking a better bargaining position vis a vis India, through capture of sensitive territory, a riposte, Pakistan should adopt a destruction-oriented strategy, fighting on our own territory, permitting penetrations by the enemy. This would allow Pakistan to destroy the forces that make these penetrations by using the reserves. Such a strategy would erode India's numerical superiority and its ability to threaten Pakistan with a long war." The Indian Army’s combat potential could be best realized by eliminating the distinction between "strike corps" and "defensive corps" in ground-holding roles. The Defensive Corps, in the form of independent armored brigades and mechanized brigades, would serve as the spearhead for the operation due to their forward locations; they would be employed at the first go and mobilized within hours. The Strike Corps would then be regrouped and reinforced to provide additional offensive elements for these eight or so “battle groups” to launch strikes into Pakistan. All combatants would be fully integrated with the Indian Air Force and with naval aviation assets in the Southern Sector. To achieve this, India’s strike corps elements would have to be relocated from existing garrisons closer to the border. India can deploy four Strike Corps against Pakistan, one each against the Southern part of Azad Kashmir, Central Punjab, Southern Punjab and one against Sindh. They have the necessary balance to focus their attack in a combination of two or even three corps but time and space dictate they cannot move more than one strike corps on any axis and they have to cater for Pakistan's counter-offensive. With all 3 Armoured Divisions and 4 RAPID Divisions, and 2 out of 5 Independent Armoured Brigades concentrated in Rajasthan, the resource allocation makes the offensive targets either along the Jaisalmer-Rahimyar Khan axis or along the Barmer-Mirpurkhas axis. In 2005 the "South-Western Command" was created at Jaipur. Their likely main thrust remains the deep South Barmer-Mirpurkhas axis with secondary effort in the Jaisalmer-Rahimyarkhan area. Since no ground offensive is possible in the Thar Desert without heavy air cover, India's air deployment in 2002 suggested that the focus of their strike corps could well be in the south (Western and Southern Commands). The physical deployment of Indian forces on Pakistan’s borders was downplayed by the Indian military. As of 2011, the deployment consisted of the following: Pakistan's assumptions about "Cold Start" are: (1) offensive operations would commence without giving Pakistan time for diplomacy and (2) offensive operations would not cross the nuclear threshold or prompt Pakistan into crossing it. India implies that, should Pakistan opt for crossing the threshold, the onus would lie squarely on Pakistan. The ability to hold limited portions of Pakistan with military might and use this for political leverage against Pakistan would be unacceptable, triggering a ground war as well as a possible nuclear exchange. Foreign Relations - IndiaSince partition, relations between Pakistan and India have been characterized by rivalry and suspicion. Although many issues divide the two countries, the most sensitive one since independence has been the status of Kashmir. At the time of partition, the princely state of Kashmir, though ruled by a Hindu Maharajah, had an overwhelmingly Muslim population. When the Maharajah hesitated in acceding to either Pakistan or India in 1947, some of his Muslim subjects, later aided by tribesmen from Pakistan, revolted in favor of joining Pakistan. In exchange for military assistance in containing the revolt, the Kashmiri ruler offered his allegiance to India. Indian troops occupied the eastern portion of Kashmir, including its capital, Srinagar, while the western part came under Pakistani control. India submitted this dispute to the United Nations on January 1, 1948. One year later, the UN arranged a cease-fire along a line dividing Kashmir but leaving the northern end of the line not demarcated and the Vale of Kashmir (with the majority of the population) under Indian control. India and Pakistan agreed to a resolution that called for a UN-supervised plebiscite to determine the state's future. This plebiscite has not occurred because the main precondition, the withdrawal of both nations' forces from Kashmir, has failed to take place. Full-scale hostilities erupted in September 1965, when India alleged that insurgents trained and supplied by Pakistan were operating in India-controlled Kashmir. Hostilities ceased 3 weeks later, following mediation efforts by the UN and interested countries. In January 1966, the leaders of India and Pakistan met in Tashkent, U.S.S.R., and agreed to attempt a peaceful settlement of Kashmir and their other differences. Following the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict, President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi met in the hill station of Shimla, India, in July 1972. They agreed to a line of control in Kashmir resulting from the December 17, 1971, cease-fire, and endorsed the principle of settlement of bilateral disputes through peaceful means. In 1974, Pakistan and India agreed to resume postal and telecommunications linkages and to enact measures to facilitate travel. Trade and diplomatic relations were restored in 1976 after a hiatus of 5 years. India's nuclear test in 1974 generated great uncertainty in Pakistan and is generally acknowledged to have been the impetus for Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program. In 1983, the Pakistani and Indian Governments accused each other of aiding separatists in their respective countries--Sikhs in India's Punjab state and Sindhis in Pakistan's Sindh province. In April 1984, tensions erupted after troops were deployed to the Siachen Glacier, a high-altitude, desolate area close to the China border not demarcated by the cease-fire agreement (Karachi Agreement) signed by Pakistan and India in 1949. Tensions diminished after Rajiv Gandhi became Prime Minister in November 1984 and after a group of Sikh hijackers was brought to trial by Pakistan in March 1985. In December 1985, President Zia and Prime Minister Gandhi pledged not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. A formal "no attack" agreement was signed in January 1991. In early 1986, the Indian and Pakistani Governments began high-level talks to resolve the Siachen Glacier border dispute and to improve trade. Bilateral tensions increased in early 1990, when Kashmiri militants began a campaign of violence against Indian Government authority in Jammu and Kashmir. Subsequent high-level bilateral meetings relieved the tensions between India and Pakistan, but relations worsened again after the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque by Hindu extremists in December 1992 and terrorist bombings in Bombay in March 1993. Talks between the Foreign Secretaries of both countries in January 1994 ended in deadlock. More recently, the Indo-Pakistani relationship has veered sharply between rapprochement and conflict. After taking office in February 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif moved to resume official dialog with India. A number of meetings at the foreign secretary and prime ministerial level took place, with positive atmospherics but little concrete progress. High-level Indo-Pakistani talks resumed after a 3-year pause. The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met twice and the foreign secretaries conducted three rounds of talks. In June 1997, the foreign secretaries identified eight "outstanding issues" around which continuing talks would be focused. The dispute over the status of Jammu and Kashmir, an issue since partition, remains the major stumbling block in their dialogue. India maintains that the entire former princely state is an integral part of the Indian union, while Pakistan insists that UN resolutions calling for self-determination of the people of the state must be taken into account. In September 1997, the talks broke down over the structure of how to deal with the issues of Kashmir and peace and security. Pakistan advocated that the issues be treated by separate working groups. India responded that the two issues be taken up along with six others on a simultaneous basis. In May 1998 India, and then Pakistan, conducted nuclear tests. Attempts to restart dialogue between the two nations were given a major boost by the February 1999 meeting of both Prime Ministers in Lahore and their signing of three agreements. These efforts have since been stalled by the intrusion of Pakistani-backed forces into Indian-held territory near Kargil in May 1999, and by the military coup in Pakistan that overturned the Nawaz Sharif government in October the same year. The relationship improved markedly when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee traveled to Lahore for a summit with Sharif in February 1999. There was considerable hope that the meeting could lead to a breakthrough. In spring 1999, infiltrators from Pakistan occupied positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control in the remote, mountainous area of Kashmir near Kargil, threatening the ability of India to supply its forces on Siachen Glacier. By early summer, serious fighting flared in the Kargil sector. The infiltrators withdrew following a meeting between Prime Minister Sharif and President Clinton in July. Relations between India and Pakistan were particularly strained during the 1999 coup in Islamabad. Then, just weeks after the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, an attack on India's Parliament on December 13 further strained this relationship. The prospects for better relations between India and Pakistan improved in early January 2004 when a summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) permitted India's Prime Minister Vajpayee to meet with President Musharraf. Both leaders agreed to establish a Composite Dialogue to resolve their disputes. The Composite Dialogue focuses on eight issues: confidence building measures, Kashmir, Wullar barrage, promotion of friendly exchanges, Siachen glacier, Sir creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, and economic and commercial cooperation. The first round of the Composite Dialogue was held in New Delhi on June 27-28, 2004. Relations further improved when President Musharraf met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New York in October 2004. Additional steps aimed at improving relations were announced when Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh visited Islamabad in February 2005 and in April 2005 when President Musharraf traveled to India to view a cricket match and hold discussions. In a further display of improved relations, bus service commenced from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to Srinagar in April 2005. After a destructive earthquake hit the Kashmir region in October 2005, the two countries cooperated with each other to deal with the humanitarian crisis. Musharraf and Singh met in September 2006 at the Non-Aligned Summit in Havana. At this meeting, the two leaders condemned all acts of terrorism and agreed to continue the search for options acceptable to both sides for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The foreign secretaries of both nations opened the fourth round of the Composite Dialogue in Islamabad on March 13-14, 2007. Thanks to the peace process, at least until the terror attack on Mumbai in November 2008, the tone and tenor of India-Pakistan relations were very encouraging and far from confrontational. Despite the grave provocation, the Mumbai issue did not lead to any military crisis of the kind that was witnessed in the aftermath of the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001.Though, progress in 2009 remained stagnant after both countries blamed each other for being unhelpful during the investigations towards the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. On 10 February, 2011, India agreed to resume talks with Pakistan which were suspended after 26/11 Mumbai Attacks. India had put on hold all the diplomatic relations saying it will only continue if Pakistan will act against the accused of Mumbai attacks. When Osama Bin Laden died in early May 2011, the reaction in India was with jubilation. The headline in The Times of India read: “Osama Killed, Pak Wounded.” India Today described Pakistan on its cover as “Terroristan.” Indians relished the fact that Bin Laden was found in Pakistan, in a large mansion, in the company of a wife. The situation confirmed India’s official position that it is in Pakistan’s nature to protect terrorists. On July 13, 2011, another terrorist attack occurred in Mumbai, India. Three bombings were confirmed in Zaveri Bazaar. Over 130 people were injured and 19 people were killed in the attacks. Mumbai has been hit by terrorist incidents at least half a dozen times since the early 1990s, with over 600 people dying in these attacks. No one initially came forward to claim responsibility. India accused "foreign" elements in being behind the attacks, though it did not publicly implicate Pakistan. Pakistani authorities immediately condemned the attacks and said that the bombings should not hamper continued peace talks. India’s opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was expected to emerge as the largest parliamentary force after the general elections, paving the way for its controversial leader Narendra Modi to become the next prime minister. Critics fear the Hindu nationalist leader’s possible rise could worsen ties with neighboring Pakistan, but leaders and observers in Islamabad think otherwise. In Pakistani political circles, the relatively optimistic outlook on Narendra Modi’s possible rise to power is rooted in history. Many cite the example of former BJP Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who undertook a historic bus journey to Lahore in 1999 to promote peace with Pakistan. That visit laid the foundation for a wide-ranging peace dialogue aimed at normalizing relations and trying to resolve territorial disputes. It led to increased transportation and trade links, and a reduction in tensions. The peace process since suffered repeated setbacks and been stalled for more than a year. Despite a lack of progress on territorial disputes, trade ties between India and Pakistan have significantly improved in recent years. In Marach 2014 Islamabad was on the verge of granting New Delhi long-awaited trade concessions under Pakistan’s international obligations, but Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif withheld the decision at the last moment
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