SOURCE ::http://swarajyamag.com/ideas/siachen-the-strategic-inevitability/
Siachen: The Strategic Inevitability
Syed Ata Hasnain
L/Nk Hanumanthappa’s miraculous rescue and most regretful demise despite prayers of a billion people left the nation emotionally shattered. Rare are occasions when all Indians rally emotionally behind an event or a personality. It also led to a very appropriate media hype which was needed and an attempt by the media to look for the right people who deserved credit even in the face of disaster.
The events led to some ill-informed speculation about the worth of retaining our hold over Siachen. It ranged from potential total withdrawal to mutual pull back in agreement with Pakistan. Ideas were also generated about satellite and other electronic surveillance means to keep a watch over the icy wasteland. Figures of 300 million USD annual expenditure and 890 lives lost over the last 30 years added to the arguments.
The media did a fine job and discussions were serious without hyperbole. At least the public was showing interest in a strategic security issue as was evident from social media and an element of inquiry was in the air. The perceptions of those who favored status quo were based more on patriotic concerns and mistrust of Pakistan and not any solid strategic reasoning.
What the nation and its leadership needs is a clear vision of the threats posed by the vacation of Siachen and China-Pakistan collusion. It must also ask itself what has changed which demands an alteration in our security perceptions. The threat to life and limb from vagaries of climatic conditions has existed ever since the glacier was occupied. Does the emotional connect with soldier casualties necessitate the vacation of national interest?
The location of Siachen Glacier needs a geo strategic-analysis afresh. The wedge of territory between NJ 9842, Karakoram Pass and the Shagsgam Valley is the bone of contention (see map).
MAPS ARE ONLY INDICATIVE AND FOR PURPOSES OF UNDERSTANDING AND DO NOT REPRESENT ACTUAL OR PROJECTED BOUNDARIES (click for full screen)
Our claim for the LoC is the line along the Saltoro ridge which separates the 76 km long Siachen Glacier from the Konduz Galcier to the West. Pakistan claims that the LoC should run from NJ 9842 to Karakoram Pass thus laying claim to the Saltoro Ridge and the Siachen Glacier. Due to pro-active occupation of Saltoro and the denial of all passes to Pakistan for access to the sub glaciers since 1984, India has virtually sealed Pakistan’s fate. Pakistan has no visibility over the glacier and has been desperate for a toehold on the Saltoro in the vicinity of the passes so as to have a ‘peep’ at Siachen. All hype about Siachen in Pakistan is to project what the Pakistan Army wishes to sell back home. The sales pitch is to brand India the aggressor, draw moral support and promote a perception that its troops are deployed at Siachen.
India’s line of defence against Pakistan’s threats is along the Saltoro, which does not end at the snout of the glacier but continues to flow south and south-west towards Turtuk and Chalunka in the valley below. Against China it is in the East Karakoram Range and continues into the plains towards Aksai Chin. If we were to give up the Saltoro and pull back, the next line of defence cannot lie in the Shyok and Nubra Valley; that is where the delaying elements would be deployed, the covering troops, so to say. The next line would have to be the Ladakh Range on which the two major passes, Khardungla and Chang La exist. That’s a stone throw from Leh and the Leh Valley.
Siachen Glacier is the source of the Nubra River that flows into the the Shyok River which in turn flows into the Indus. Water resources are weapons of last resort and if nothing else their control strengthens deterrence.
In 1963, post the disastrous Sino-India border conflict, Pakistan was emboldened to illegally hand over 5000 square km of territory in the Shaqsgam valley to China. This valley lies at the north-eastern tip of Gilgit Baltistan (GB). Although Siachen itself has no direct connect with Shaqsgam its northern tip at Indira Col can facilitate approach to it. The China–Pakistan strategic connect therefore remains narrow and given the potential infrastructural build up in the sector, after the decision to construct the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the desire to broaden this connect through a larger swathe would always be present rather than leaving it to a sliver of territory.
The boundary of Gilgit Baltistan with China is long but the northern parts are all impassable and uninhabitable. Our presence in the Siachen sector would prevent this broadening of useable terrain contact. Given the state of fragility of borders in Ladakh, both with Pakistan and China anything which risks future status should be avoided by us.
The investment that India is making in expensive infrastructure for the security of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) is all north of the Ladakh Range. Thus it would make no strategic sense to weaken our defensive posture in the Nubra/Siachen sector while strengthening the same in the East Karakoram area.
Gilgit Baltistan is a part of J&K state and as per the Instrument of Accession of 26 October, 1947, the entire territory of the state of J&K belongs to India. Thus Gilgit Baltistan forms a part of the territories that come under the scope of the Joint Resolution passed by both Houses of India’s Parliament on 22 February, 1994. The CPEC which also entails presence of China’s PLA troops in Gilgit Baltistan, for its protection, is violative of all norms of disputed territories. India’s deployment in Siachen sector is on the flank of the CPEC and gives us flexibility in future negotiations.
India’s earlier stance had always been the need for authenticating the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), both sides of which troops of the Indian and Pakistan Armies are deployed, before any mutual withdrawal could be considered and agreed upon. The AGPL is a virtual extension of the LoC north of NJ 9842. Its authentication has always been resisted by the Pakistan Army because that would belie its claims of being in Siachen.
There have been reports that after the massive avalanche at Gyari in 2012, which buried 138 Pakistani soldiers, the Pakistan Army was willing to authenticate the AGPL to facilitate mutual withdrawal. This has led to ideas being generated even on our side that mutual withdrawal should be executed and technology be exploited to monitor any violations in the virtual no man’s land that will be created.
It needs to be realized that any withdrawal to lower heights while benefitting us in terms of reduction in loss of lives and expenditure, compromises our position of dominance enjoyed by our deployment at the Saltoro Ridge. Even if surveillance and early warning devices give us indicators of reneging of the agreement by Pakistan, our response time in glaciated terrain cannot counter such intent. There are far too many people situating the issue to desert terrain where reactions are almost lightning in speed. It has taken us years of experience and toil to establish a fool proof logistics system which supports the deployment. That cannot be duplicated at a whim if we ever have to return to the heights again.
Last, is the issue of trust. Pervez Musharaf’s recent rants on television, irritating as they are, should give us enough indications of what we are up against. Subterfuge, double speak, denial and backstabs are a part of Pakistan’s military-diplomatic posturing. There is never uniformity of policy, or continuity and progression of any process. The foreign and defence policy remains obfuscated due to multiple controls of the Deep State. We are dealing with a nation where leaderships welcome breakthroughs in neighbourly relations on a given day and sponsor proxy terror attacks six days later. In such an environment, can a strategic deployment which has matured over 30 years of experience be compromised?
Without taking away anything from the sacrifice of the ten bravehearts of 19 Madras, there could be occasions when such tragedies may occur again and the expenditure will continue as before. Yet, India cannot afford to fritter the strategic advantage it has gained through the years even though emotional constraints and factors may dictate many reviews. The principle of boots in defence of national borders hasn’t yet reached a point where it can be rescinded.
![[IMG]](https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/blogger_img_proxy/AEn0k_sFASgTkbiKFnPNUWhQRzpqktPoXugjmpwtDq_4miyN4JkIe1uiU6xqzvN1NJToLk4qiki9T3TmrzOBqfXVi_Ghk4irX17PJcTxFN2p-UbNoudy-1LESErVHpFQC3KrCSNOMVq_4eGkMbGCQFKx12VzwToiFHJzuxUO84tvHMfz5hdCu4sQJplPU_i1UVrQiDQT2v3ErMujBDz6FT8joQ=s0-d)
MAPS ARE ONLY INDICATIVE AND FOR PURPOSES OF UNDERSTANDING AND DO NOT REPRESENT ACTUAL OR PROJECTED BOUNDARIES (click for full screen)
Source: http://defence.pk/threads/siachen-the-strategic-inevitability.421940/#ixzz409mjN98h
In the early hours of 3 February, a major avalanche struck the Army post in Northern Siachen Glacier trapping 10 soldiers, 9 out of which have been reported to be dead*. Lt. Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd.) narrates the experience of the troops stationed there.
Nine more good men down; victims of Siachen Glacier’s unpredictable climatic and terrain dynamics. 19 Madras, to which the soldiers belonged, is as good a unit as any from the Indian Army’s Infantry. I have always admired these soldiers from the only infantry regiment of purely south Indian troops.
Far from any perception that may prevail that south Indians may not be great fighters in high altitude and glaciated terrain these units prove just the opposite. Climatic and terrain-based accidents occur in the glacier with regularity and unpredictability.
Luck more than anything else plays a major role in survival here. Equipment and training is in plenty but the glacier needs more than just that for survival. A few things need to be placed in perspective for the public to glean what glaciated operations really mean. And I won’t start the traditional way, by relating how Siachen became an issue between India and Pakistan
The Siachen Glacier, 75 km in length, is a river of snow/ice, many hundreds of feet deep. Its ‘snout’ is where the base camp of the Indian Army is. It is not really flat but compared to the high mountains on its flanks it is almost like a table top. The Army occupies the glacier with its bases, smaller camps, headquarters and artillery gun positions.
We are at a major advantage over the Pakistan Army since we occupy the western ridge of high mountains called the Saltoro Ridge and therefore deny Pakistan Army any peep on to the Siachen Glacier. However, that makes the task of deployment far more difficult as much as it affects the logistics of maintenance.
Coming down from the Saltoro Ridge towards the main glacier are a number of sub glaciers; these facilitate the routes and camps which support the deployment of the Indian Army at the Saltoro. The latter deployment is on razor sharp peaks and ridges where construction of any shelters becomes near impossible. The final ascent to the deployment areas is sometimes by use of ropes over vertical ice walls.
As few as two to six men may remain at a post, because there isn’t space for more. Snow caves are used in some cases. There are small snow-beaten helipads in the main glacier and at logistics hubs at the sub glaciers (example Bila Fond La) but the helipads which need to be seen to be believed are tucked away at the Saltoro Ridge in nooks and corners. Helicopters are the lifeline because they transport radio batteries, kerosene oil, tinned food and special rations besides letters from home.
The system is usually something like this. Kerosene and other bulk loads are packed at Base Camp and loaded into Mi-17 helicopters (the medium sized helicopter). They are para dropped at the designated dropping zones (DZs) in flat portions of the glacier near the logistics hubs. It is not easy for the Mi-17 to hover at the altitudes of the glacier. These loads are collected with the help of snow scooters and sledges and taken to a bulk breaking point at the hub.
An oil pipeline to at least one bulk breaking point also exists and is a marvel of innovative engineering. The lighter helicopters arrive from Base Camp with a few luxury loads like mail and a few fresh items. These helicopters deliver the initial stores and then ferry kerosene oil, men and other material between the hubs and the posts on the Saltoro Ridge where there have to be small detachments to receive the stores, oil, food and mail and send them ahead to the smaller posts through patrols.
The number of flights from bulk breaking points to forward helipads could be as many as 10-12 a day with the first one or two sorties carrying just a jerry can of kerosene oil due to the bulk of their own weight of fuel. This is how life goes on at the icy heights. Everything is contingent upon weather. For days on end no helicopter may fly; which is why it is important to stock up reserves whenever the weather is good. Movement of snow scooters and patrols or links as they are called also cease the moment the weather deteriorates because navigation even for a few meters becomes extremely difficult.
It is on one such post near a helipad at the Saltoro that the ice wall has collapsed and come cascading down on the 10-man post which existed there for the purpose of receiving and distributing supplies. Ice walls are usually not susceptible to collapse but higher up with excessive snowfall, ‘overhangs’ form. These are also called ‘cornices’ and as they become larger they threaten to come down the moment the weather turns a little warmer by day. There are thousands of such cornices but all do not collapse.
Sometimes, experienced mountain men fire rockets or automatic grenade launchers to loosen the cornices and allow them to come cascading down in a controlled way. However, this procedure is not an easy one, especially if there are troops residing at the top of ice walls where the cornices have formed. Rockets also perform in unpredictable ways in the rarefied atmosphere.
The science of prediction of avalanches has not reached that level where it can predict the exactly location where these may occur. The Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE) at Manali has many of its detachments in Ladakh and Kashmir but its capability is restricted to generic warnings about areas where avalanches could occur. The entire Siachen area usually falls within that scope.
The Indian Army’s avalanche drills are well established. However, if 30 feet of snow comes atop a post in an isolated area where movement in winter is only possible by helicopter, rescue becomes a nightmare. Even if 10-15 men can be inducted, their very survival also gets threatened due to lack of cover, icy working conditions and limited working efficiency.
The question is can some of these posts be evacuated for winter and reoccupied in summer (just like the concept elsewhere, where winter vacation is a norm)? By trial and error the Indian Army has established patterns of snow activity and accordingly there do exist some winter vacated posts.
However, despite ceasefire (and an effective one too) risk cannot be taken. It essentially means that no chances can be taken with our Pakistani brethren who may well be found occupying such a post of ours when we return after winter.
Why is the potential occupation of a winter vacated post by the Pakistan Army fraught with danger? This is important to know if you wish to understand the entire concept of the Indian Army’s deployment. Currently the Pakistan Army occupies the Konduz Glacier which is lower and almost parallel to the Siachen Glacier but separated by the Saltoro Ridge.
To get to the Siachen Glacier or train observed artillery fire on to it, the Pakistan Army needs to perch itself on a toehold on the Saltoro. That toehold can then be expanded to form a firm base for the conduct of operations.
In various attempts from 1984 till 2003, the Pakistan Army made valiant efforts to dislodge us and secure that toehold, but failed. Pervez Musharaf, in his avatar as an SSG commander, is known to have guided some of these attempts in 1987-88. Then ceasefire came on 26 November 2003 and here in the Siachen Glacier it has held most effectively. The Indian Army can take no chances with losing ground of such importance at the Saltoro heights and hence has to hold even some well-known avalanche-threatened areas.
Life threats are not limited to avalanches and snow slides. The temperatures, going as low as -53 degrees C, combined with low oxygen levels at 18,000 to 22,000 feet create an acutely uncomfortable environment. Headaches, insomnia, lack of hunger and bowel movement, all reduce human efficiency and in some cases leads to enlarged hearts and High Altitude Pulmonary Oedema (Hapo). While special rations are provided to troops their consumption is unpredictable and based upon different human responses.
The second life threatening phenomenon is ‘crevasses’. These are large chasms in the frozen river of ice which are temporarily iced over by prevailing cold conditions. By day as the sun rises the temperatures can also rise unexpectedly, making the iced-up covers of the crevasses quite deceptively thin. Men have been known to have disappeared into these crevasses never to be recovered.
That is why all movement at the glacier is in minimum strength of six and all have to be trained and roped up for survival should they encounter crevasses. For sheer interest readers would do good to read a story online at this link . It is all about a patrol which suffered the trauma of a soldier in a crevasse.
One other fact being misreported by the media is the length of stay of a soldier and his unit at the glacier. The rule is no soldier should spend more than 90 days on the glacier; this does not include the period spent in training and induction which may itself extend to two months or so.
An infantry unit spends six months on top and its period of reconnaissance; training, equipping and deployment is usually one year. Depending on weather conditions, relief of troops sometimes gets delayed, forcing officers and troops to spend longer than mandated periods at the heights.
The reported figure is 890 lives lost by the Indian Army at the Siachen Glacier with hundreds more maimed by frost bite and other such accidents or by enemy action in the past. The estimated cost of maintenance of the Indian Army’s deployment at Siachen Glacier is approximately Rs 4 crore a day.
Is it worth holding a piece of land where not a leaf nor a blade of grass grows? We have held it since 1984 and Pakistan has been desperate to evict us from it since then; there obviously has to be a strategic importance which takes some explaining.
The Pakistanis term it ‘low hanging fruit’, ready to be plucked for a negotiated agreement. They too lost 138 soldiers in a devastating one kilometer long avalanche on the Gyari deployment in 2012. The desire for a negotiated settlement has gained weight since then.
It will need a second part of this essay to analyse whether the fruit is really hanging so low or is it our gullibility that Pakistan wishes to exploit. The necessity for India to hold the glacier, as it does, and occupying the Saltoro Ridge in strength will be the subject of a full essay in Swarajya in the very near future.
Source: http://defence.pk/threads/siachen-the-strategic-inevitability.421940/#ixzz41l1da7e9
The Siachen warriors know what their sacrifice achieves for the nation, Mar 01, 2016
http://m.ibnlive.com/blogs/india/lt-gen-syed-ata-hasnain/the-siachen-warriors-know-what-their-sacrifice-achieves-for-the-nation-14405-1210252.html
Saving Siachen’s Soldiers
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/saving-siachens-soldiers/
Siachen: The Strategic Inevitability
Syed Ata Hasnain
Siachen: The Strategic Inevitability
Why it is imperative for the Indian Army to stay put in SiachenL/Nk Hanumanthappa’s miraculous rescue and most regretful demise despite prayers of a billion people left the nation emotionally shattered. Rare are occasions when all Indians rally emotionally behind an event or a personality. It also led to a very appropriate media hype which was needed and an attempt by the media to look for the right people who deserved credit even in the face of disaster.
The events led to some ill-informed speculation about the worth of retaining our hold over Siachen. It ranged from potential total withdrawal to mutual pull back in agreement with Pakistan. Ideas were also generated about satellite and other electronic surveillance means to keep a watch over the icy wasteland. Figures of 300 million USD annual expenditure and 890 lives lost over the last 30 years added to the arguments.
The media did a fine job and discussions were serious without hyperbole. At least the public was showing interest in a strategic security issue as was evident from social media and an element of inquiry was in the air. The perceptions of those who favored status quo were based more on patriotic concerns and mistrust of Pakistan and not any solid strategic reasoning.
What the nation and its leadership needs is a clear vision of the threats posed by the vacation of Siachen and China-Pakistan collusion. It must also ask itself what has changed which demands an alteration in our security perceptions. The threat to life and limb from vagaries of climatic conditions has existed ever since the glacier was occupied. Does the emotional connect with soldier casualties necessitate the vacation of national interest?
The location of Siachen Glacier needs a geo strategic-analysis afresh. The wedge of territory between NJ 9842, Karakoram Pass and the Shagsgam Valley is the bone of contention (see map).
MAPS ARE ONLY INDICATIVE AND FOR PURPOSES OF UNDERSTANDING AND DO NOT REPRESENT ACTUAL OR PROJECTED BOUNDARIES (click for full screen)
Our claim for the LoC is the line along the Saltoro ridge which separates the 76 km long Siachen Glacier from the Konduz Galcier to the West. Pakistan claims that the LoC should run from NJ 9842 to Karakoram Pass thus laying claim to the Saltoro Ridge and the Siachen Glacier. Due to pro-active occupation of Saltoro and the denial of all passes to Pakistan for access to the sub glaciers since 1984, India has virtually sealed Pakistan’s fate. Pakistan has no visibility over the glacier and has been desperate for a toehold on the Saltoro in the vicinity of the passes so as to have a ‘peep’ at Siachen. All hype about Siachen in Pakistan is to project what the Pakistan Army wishes to sell back home. The sales pitch is to brand India the aggressor, draw moral support and promote a perception that its troops are deployed at Siachen.
India’s line of defence against Pakistan’s threats is along the Saltoro, which does not end at the snout of the glacier but continues to flow south and south-west towards Turtuk and Chalunka in the valley below. Against China it is in the East Karakoram Range and continues into the plains towards Aksai Chin. If we were to give up the Saltoro and pull back, the next line of defence cannot lie in the Shyok and Nubra Valley; that is where the delaying elements would be deployed, the covering troops, so to say. The next line would have to be the Ladakh Range on which the two major passes, Khardungla and Chang La exist. That’s a stone throw from Leh and the Leh Valley.
Siachen Glacier is the source of the Nubra River that flows into the the Shyok River which in turn flows into the Indus. Water resources are weapons of last resort and if nothing else their control strengthens deterrence.
In 1963, post the disastrous Sino-India border conflict, Pakistan was emboldened to illegally hand over 5000 square km of territory in the Shaqsgam valley to China. This valley lies at the north-eastern tip of Gilgit Baltistan (GB). Although Siachen itself has no direct connect with Shaqsgam its northern tip at Indira Col can facilitate approach to it. The China–Pakistan strategic connect therefore remains narrow and given the potential infrastructural build up in the sector, after the decision to construct the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the desire to broaden this connect through a larger swathe would always be present rather than leaving it to a sliver of territory.
The boundary of Gilgit Baltistan with China is long but the northern parts are all impassable and uninhabitable. Our presence in the Siachen sector would prevent this broadening of useable terrain contact. Given the state of fragility of borders in Ladakh, both with Pakistan and China anything which risks future status should be avoided by us.
The investment that India is making in expensive infrastructure for the security of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) is all north of the Ladakh Range. Thus it would make no strategic sense to weaken our defensive posture in the Nubra/Siachen sector while strengthening the same in the East Karakoram area.
Gilgit Baltistan is a part of J&K state and as per the Instrument of Accession of 26 October, 1947, the entire territory of the state of J&K belongs to India. Thus Gilgit Baltistan forms a part of the territories that come under the scope of the Joint Resolution passed by both Houses of India’s Parliament on 22 February, 1994. The CPEC which also entails presence of China’s PLA troops in Gilgit Baltistan, for its protection, is violative of all norms of disputed territories. India’s deployment in Siachen sector is on the flank of the CPEC and gives us flexibility in future negotiations.
India’s earlier stance had always been the need for authenticating the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), both sides of which troops of the Indian and Pakistan Armies are deployed, before any mutual withdrawal could be considered and agreed upon. The AGPL is a virtual extension of the LoC north of NJ 9842. Its authentication has always been resisted by the Pakistan Army because that would belie its claims of being in Siachen.
There have been reports that after the massive avalanche at Gyari in 2012, which buried 138 Pakistani soldiers, the Pakistan Army was willing to authenticate the AGPL to facilitate mutual withdrawal. This has led to ideas being generated even on our side that mutual withdrawal should be executed and technology be exploited to monitor any violations in the virtual no man’s land that will be created.
It needs to be realized that any withdrawal to lower heights while benefitting us in terms of reduction in loss of lives and expenditure, compromises our position of dominance enjoyed by our deployment at the Saltoro Ridge. Even if surveillance and early warning devices give us indicators of reneging of the agreement by Pakistan, our response time in glaciated terrain cannot counter such intent. There are far too many people situating the issue to desert terrain where reactions are almost lightning in speed. It has taken us years of experience and toil to establish a fool proof logistics system which supports the deployment. That cannot be duplicated at a whim if we ever have to return to the heights again.
Last, is the issue of trust. Pervez Musharaf’s recent rants on television, irritating as they are, should give us enough indications of what we are up against. Subterfuge, double speak, denial and backstabs are a part of Pakistan’s military-diplomatic posturing. There is never uniformity of policy, or continuity and progression of any process. The foreign and defence policy remains obfuscated due to multiple controls of the Deep State. We are dealing with a nation where leaderships welcome breakthroughs in neighbourly relations on a given day and sponsor proxy terror attacks six days later. In such an environment, can a strategic deployment which has matured over 30 years of experience be compromised?
Without taking away anything from the sacrifice of the ten bravehearts of 19 Madras, there could be occasions when such tragedies may occur again and the expenditure will continue as before. Yet, India cannot afford to fritter the strategic advantage it has gained through the years even though emotional constraints and factors may dictate many reviews. The principle of boots in defence of national borders hasn’t yet reached a point where it can be rescinded.
![[IMG]](http://vnz09vting1y7vq63zfizb29.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Siachen-glacier-and-Zone-of-Conflict.jpg)
MAPS ARE ONLY INDICATIVE AND FOR PURPOSES OF UNDERSTANDING AND DO NOT REPRESENT ACTUAL OR PROJECTED BOUNDARIES (click for full screen)
Source: http://defence.pk/threads/siachen-the-strategic-inevitability.421940/#ixzz409mjN98h
In the early hours of 3 February, a major avalanche struck the Army post in Northern Siachen Glacier trapping 10 soldiers, 9 out of which have been reported to be dead*. Lt. Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd.) narrates the experience of the troops stationed there.
Nine more good men down; victims of Siachen Glacier’s unpredictable climatic and terrain dynamics. 19 Madras, to which the soldiers belonged, is as good a unit as any from the Indian Army’s Infantry. I have always admired these soldiers from the only infantry regiment of purely south Indian troops.
Far from any perception that may prevail that south Indians may not be great fighters in high altitude and glaciated terrain these units prove just the opposite. Climatic and terrain-based accidents occur in the glacier with regularity and unpredictability.
Luck more than anything else plays a major role in survival here. Equipment and training is in plenty but the glacier needs more than just that for survival. A few things need to be placed in perspective for the public to glean what glaciated operations really mean. And I won’t start the traditional way, by relating how Siachen became an issue between India and Pakistan
The Siachen Glacier, 75 km in length, is a river of snow/ice, many hundreds of feet deep. Its ‘snout’ is where the base camp of the Indian Army is. It is not really flat but compared to the high mountains on its flanks it is almost like a table top. The Army occupies the glacier with its bases, smaller camps, headquarters and artillery gun positions.
We are at a major advantage over the Pakistan Army since we occupy the western ridge of high mountains called the Saltoro Ridge and therefore deny Pakistan Army any peep on to the Siachen Glacier. However, that makes the task of deployment far more difficult as much as it affects the logistics of maintenance.
Coming down from the Saltoro Ridge towards the main glacier are a number of sub glaciers; these facilitate the routes and camps which support the deployment of the Indian Army at the Saltoro. The latter deployment is on razor sharp peaks and ridges where construction of any shelters becomes near impossible. The final ascent to the deployment areas is sometimes by use of ropes over vertical ice walls.
As few as two to six men may remain at a post, because there isn’t space for more. Snow caves are used in some cases. There are small snow-beaten helipads in the main glacier and at logistics hubs at the sub glaciers (example Bila Fond La) but the helipads which need to be seen to be believed are tucked away at the Saltoro Ridge in nooks and corners. Helicopters are the lifeline because they transport radio batteries, kerosene oil, tinned food and special rations besides letters from home.
The system is usually something like this. Kerosene and other bulk loads are packed at Base Camp and loaded into Mi-17 helicopters (the medium sized helicopter). They are para dropped at the designated dropping zones (DZs) in flat portions of the glacier near the logistics hubs. It is not easy for the Mi-17 to hover at the altitudes of the glacier. These loads are collected with the help of snow scooters and sledges and taken to a bulk breaking point at the hub.
An oil pipeline to at least one bulk breaking point also exists and is a marvel of innovative engineering. The lighter helicopters arrive from Base Camp with a few luxury loads like mail and a few fresh items. These helicopters deliver the initial stores and then ferry kerosene oil, men and other material between the hubs and the posts on the Saltoro Ridge where there have to be small detachments to receive the stores, oil, food and mail and send them ahead to the smaller posts through patrols.
The number of flights from bulk breaking points to forward helipads could be as many as 10-12 a day with the first one or two sorties carrying just a jerry can of kerosene oil due to the bulk of their own weight of fuel. This is how life goes on at the icy heights. Everything is contingent upon weather. For days on end no helicopter may fly; which is why it is important to stock up reserves whenever the weather is good. Movement of snow scooters and patrols or links as they are called also cease the moment the weather deteriorates because navigation even for a few meters becomes extremely difficult.
It is on one such post near a helipad at the Saltoro that the ice wall has collapsed and come cascading down on the 10-man post which existed there for the purpose of receiving and distributing supplies. Ice walls are usually not susceptible to collapse but higher up with excessive snowfall, ‘overhangs’ form. These are also called ‘cornices’ and as they become larger they threaten to come down the moment the weather turns a little warmer by day. There are thousands of such cornices but all do not collapse.
Sometimes, experienced mountain men fire rockets or automatic grenade launchers to loosen the cornices and allow them to come cascading down in a controlled way. However, this procedure is not an easy one, especially if there are troops residing at the top of ice walls where the cornices have formed. Rockets also perform in unpredictable ways in the rarefied atmosphere.
The science of prediction of avalanches has not reached that level where it can predict the exactly location where these may occur. The Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE) at Manali has many of its detachments in Ladakh and Kashmir but its capability is restricted to generic warnings about areas where avalanches could occur. The entire Siachen area usually falls within that scope.
The Indian Army’s avalanche drills are well established. However, if 30 feet of snow comes atop a post in an isolated area where movement in winter is only possible by helicopter, rescue becomes a nightmare. Even if 10-15 men can be inducted, their very survival also gets threatened due to lack of cover, icy working conditions and limited working efficiency.
The question is can some of these posts be evacuated for winter and reoccupied in summer (just like the concept elsewhere, where winter vacation is a norm)? By trial and error the Indian Army has established patterns of snow activity and accordingly there do exist some winter vacated posts.
However, despite ceasefire (and an effective one too) risk cannot be taken. It essentially means that no chances can be taken with our Pakistani brethren who may well be found occupying such a post of ours when we return after winter.
Why is the potential occupation of a winter vacated post by the Pakistan Army fraught with danger? This is important to know if you wish to understand the entire concept of the Indian Army’s deployment. Currently the Pakistan Army occupies the Konduz Glacier which is lower and almost parallel to the Siachen Glacier but separated by the Saltoro Ridge.
To get to the Siachen Glacier or train observed artillery fire on to it, the Pakistan Army needs to perch itself on a toehold on the Saltoro. That toehold can then be expanded to form a firm base for the conduct of operations.
In various attempts from 1984 till 2003, the Pakistan Army made valiant efforts to dislodge us and secure that toehold, but failed. Pervez Musharaf, in his avatar as an SSG commander, is known to have guided some of these attempts in 1987-88. Then ceasefire came on 26 November 2003 and here in the Siachen Glacier it has held most effectively. The Indian Army can take no chances with losing ground of such importance at the Saltoro heights and hence has to hold even some well-known avalanche-threatened areas.
Life threats are not limited to avalanches and snow slides. The temperatures, going as low as -53 degrees C, combined with low oxygen levels at 18,000 to 22,000 feet create an acutely uncomfortable environment. Headaches, insomnia, lack of hunger and bowel movement, all reduce human efficiency and in some cases leads to enlarged hearts and High Altitude Pulmonary Oedema (Hapo). While special rations are provided to troops their consumption is unpredictable and based upon different human responses.
The second life threatening phenomenon is ‘crevasses’. These are large chasms in the frozen river of ice which are temporarily iced over by prevailing cold conditions. By day as the sun rises the temperatures can also rise unexpectedly, making the iced-up covers of the crevasses quite deceptively thin. Men have been known to have disappeared into these crevasses never to be recovered.
That is why all movement at the glacier is in minimum strength of six and all have to be trained and roped up for survival should they encounter crevasses. For sheer interest readers would do good to read a story online at this link . It is all about a patrol which suffered the trauma of a soldier in a crevasse.
One other fact being misreported by the media is the length of stay of a soldier and his unit at the glacier. The rule is no soldier should spend more than 90 days on the glacier; this does not include the period spent in training and induction which may itself extend to two months or so.
An infantry unit spends six months on top and its period of reconnaissance; training, equipping and deployment is usually one year. Depending on weather conditions, relief of troops sometimes gets delayed, forcing officers and troops to spend longer than mandated periods at the heights.
The reported figure is 890 lives lost by the Indian Army at the Siachen Glacier with hundreds more maimed by frost bite and other such accidents or by enemy action in the past. The estimated cost of maintenance of the Indian Army’s deployment at Siachen Glacier is approximately Rs 4 crore a day.
Is it worth holding a piece of land where not a leaf nor a blade of grass grows? We have held it since 1984 and Pakistan has been desperate to evict us from it since then; there obviously has to be a strategic importance which takes some explaining.
The Pakistanis term it ‘low hanging fruit’, ready to be plucked for a negotiated agreement. They too lost 138 soldiers in a devastating one kilometer long avalanche on the Gyari deployment in 2012. The desire for a negotiated settlement has gained weight since then.
It will need a second part of this essay to analyse whether the fruit is really hanging so low or is it our gullibility that Pakistan wishes to exploit. The necessity for India to hold the glacier, as it does, and occupying the Saltoro Ridge in strength will be the subject of a full essay in Swarajya in the very near future.
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Source: http://defence.pk/threads/siachen-the-strategic-inevitability.421940/#ixzz41l1da7e9
The Siachen warriors know what their sacrifice achieves for the nation, Mar 01, 2016
http://m.ibnlive.com/blogs/india/lt-gen-syed-ata-hasnain/the-siachen-warriors-know-what-their-sacrifice-achieves-for-the-nation-14405-1210252.html
Saving Siachen’s Soldiers
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/saving-siachens-soldiers/
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