Showing posts with label INDIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION. Show all posts
Showing posts with label INDIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION. Show all posts

Sunday, January 8, 2017

Agni Trials: By Threatening India over test-firing of ICBMs, China has revealed its Insecurity (R)

SOURCE:
http://www.firstpost.com/world/agni-trials-by-threatening-india-over-test-firing-of-icbms-china-has-revealed-its-insecurity-3193010.html



Agni Trials: By Threatening India over test-firing of ICBMs, China has revealed its Insecurity

 



Jan 7, 2017

 There is something curious about the latest round of confrontation between India and China on the former's final testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile. It's not as if that by testing one ICBM, albeit with a capacity to carry a nuclear warhead into Chinese mainland, India has caught up with China's military might and drew parity with their vastly superior strategic nuclear weaponry.


With a GDP five times that of India's and a defence budget that at $150 billion outstrips India's by four times, China is bent upon world domination and dreams of replacing US as the next global superpower.



It therefore sounded a little jarring when Chinese media on Thursday in.dulged in nakedly aggressive posturing over India's final test-firing of Agni-IV and played its Pakistan card rather openly, warning India that more missile testing will develop into an arms race in south Asia because it won't shy away from arming Islamabad to match India's arsenal
This represents an interesting new deviation in Chinese policy. Though this wasn't an "official response" to India's flight-testing of Agni-IV that carries a strike range of 4,000km, the country's state-run media is traditionally used to convey messages that are considered too incendiary for official conduits. The diplomatic reaction, transmitted through China's foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, wasn't too staid either as Beijing accused India of breaking UNSC resolutions through the testing of ballistic missile.
Under President Xi Jinping, China has long given Deng Xiaoping's '24-character strategy' a quiet burial in favour of a muscular, assertive foreign policy but that geopolitical aggression is usually masked by plausible deniability or an exaggerated show of humility. Not exactly Gandhian principle of "true power speaks softly" but China rarely indulges in sabre-rattling even as under Jinping it goes about pursuing the 'Chinese Dream' and translating aggressively its might as world's second-largest economy into hard military power.
Its revisionist policies under the new "core leader" and leveraging of economic prowess into geostrategic depth and political weight-throwing has always gone hand in hand with a perverse modesty.
Not this time.
India's test-firing of DRDO-developed long-range weaponry that may carry nuclear weaponry deep into Chinese territory seems to have touched a raw nerve that prompted Beijing to launch an open threat and use the one card that it prefers to hide beneath its sleeves Pakistan.
The Global Times editorial wrote: "In general, it is not difficult for India to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles which can cover the whole world. If the UN Security Council has no objection over this, let it be. The range of Pakistan's nuclear missiles will also see an increase."
Beijing's use of Pakistan to contain India is nothing new. It has exploited the animosity between the neighbours to great effect. Whereas on one hand, it has built strategic depth inside Pakistan by almost-colonising the economically bankrupt nation, it has also propped up the warmonger Rawalpindi generals by supplying arms and military technology so that they may remain up to scratch in an arms race and keep India within their crosshairs. But in every step of the way, China has maintained a façade of neutrality. 

What explains the departure?
In his book Choices, former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon provides some valuable insights. According to Menon, who served as India's foreign secretary and was instrumental in engineering the 1993 Border Peace Agreement with China during the Narasimha Rao regime, the balance of power between India and China is of great importance to the latter. Though Beijing never shies away from pointing out the difference between India and China in terms of economic and military might, it is perennially worried about India inching towards some sort of parity.
The shades of this were evident in the border dispute between the two countries. While China had vastly improved its military and civilian infrastructure along the Sino-Indian border in the 1980s and 1990s, it became — according to Menon who served as India's envoy to China from 2000-03 — extremely annoyed when New Delhi tried to close the infrastructure gap and enhance military deployments and capabilities along the LAC. The Chinese, says the author, has been pressing hard of late for an agreement that would "freeze the existing imbalance" along the border.
Not surprisingly, this has become the latest flashpoint of conflicting interests and Chinese irritation has been further exacerbated by Indian steps along the 120,000 square-mile long LAC. As a Times of India report points out, New Delhi has decided to base 

[A] the first squadron of Rafale fighter jets at Bengal's Hashimara base from 2019 as part of "conventional deterrence against China". 

[B] Other steps include

( i ) additional Sukhoi-30MKI fighters,
(ii) spy drones & helicopters in the North East,  (iii)deployment of T-72 tanks in eastern Ladakh and Sikkim,  (iv)new infantry divisions, Mountain Strike Corps, Super Hercules Aircraft and the works, according to the report.
The Chinese threats, therefore, are an expression of insecurity that should help India gain strategic leverage against the Dragon.

RELATED:

Eye on China, India to base first squadron of Rafale fighter jets in Bengal 

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/eye-on-china-india-to-base-first-squadron-of-rafale-fighter-jets-in-bengal/articleshow/56384484.cms



        ******************************************

Deng Xiaoping’s "24-Character Strategy"

           SOURCE: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/24-character.htm&gws_rd=cr&ei=az5yWMm8IYPavAS8tLfABg]



Deng Xiaoping’s "24-Character Strategy" first emerged in 1990 in response both to the global backlash from the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown and to the CCP’s sense of alarm following the collapse of the communist states of Eastern Europe.49 The strategy provided basic principles on how China should protect its national interests while increasing its interactions with the world. The "24-Character Strategy’’ has been roughly translated as:
"Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership."
As stated in a 2010 essay posted on an official CCP website, "Hide our capabilities and bide our time, make some contributions" and related thoughts were put forward by Deng Xiaoping for the ‘special period’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the midst of sudden changes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the socialist camp. . . . Currently, there are people in other countries who have produced misunderstandings and distortions of ‘hide our capabilities and bide our time.’ These people believe that China’s foreign policy strategy has a long-term, undeclared content and purpose:
This is that China believes that its current strength is insufficient, and the time has not yet come to announce and implement this great strategy, and consequently must ‘Hide our capabilities and bide our time,’ concealing the true situation and waiting for the right time of opportunity. . . . However, this is . . . a serious misunderstanding and distortion of the ‘hide our capabilities and bide our time’ idea stated by Comrade Deng Xiaoping . . . the original idea of using the expression ‘hide our capabilities and bide our time’ was the strategy of ‘developing ourselves,’ and not at all to ‘seek revenge on others’ after we have developed."
CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin continued this policy throughout the 1990s, making it a central tenet of Chinese foreign policy for more than ten years. The result was that China’s strategic orientation ‘‘demonstrate[d] unusual consistency from the 1980s through the 2000s,’’ with China’s leaders "insisting on the importance of sticking to Deng Xiaoping’s realist legacy."
The phrase tao guang yang hui, “keep a low profile” was used by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s as part of a famous description of China’s foreign policy. Zhao Qizheng, dean of the School of Journalism of Renmin University of China and formal head of State Council Information Office, argues that some foreigners misunderstand the real meaning of Deng Xiaoping’s proposal.
But some foreigners read it as advocating deception about China’s true strength. Zhao maintains that “keep a low profile” is not a trick, but an expression of a particular approach. Yet other scholars point out that in a classical context, the phrase is used to indicate a strategic ruse. But the key problem is not in which dynasty or in which book the term first appeared or whether the ancients used it in reference to strategic trickery. The core is how to understand the context in which Deng used the term.
Chinese civilization is always developing and the context of the same word or idiom is changing, and our understanding of an idiom should follow its own development and changes. No matter how scholars of various dynasties understood the term “tao guang yang hui,” in the 1990s, Chinese used it to express the meaning of “maintaining a low profile,” focusing on developing China.
The Chinese people have traditionally valued “enduring humiliation in order to carry out an important task, self-reliance, hard work and plain living.” The Chinese like to believe they aren’t expansionist, colonial, or imperial, and don’t hit out in all directions to grab and keep territory.
The idiom tao guang yang hui could be translated as “to keep a low profile” in modern times and it could even be translated as “to be self-effacing.” However, it could never be translated as “to hide one’s ability and pretend to be weak” or “hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time” in a modern context.
After 30 years of reforming and opening-up, China experienced rapid developments in all aspects and grew into the world’s second largest economy. The building up of national defense began to be modernized and the society is more diverse. A brief study of the background of Deng's 24-character principle will give people a better understand as to the meaning of "hide our capacities and bide our time". Deng made the remarks after the drastic changes in Eastern Europe, when people in foreign countries and in China hoped China to shoulder up the great banner of socialism.

In the 24-character principle, Deng stressed "never claim leadership". He said China will never claim the leadership, never seek hegemony, never seek sphere of influence, never practice group politics, and never interfere with internal affairs of other countries even if it becomes a strong nation one day. Understanding the sentence completely, one will see "never claim leadership" is the core of China's strategy for development. Based on the strategy, the Chinese leaders of new generation set forth the concept to build a harmonious world.








































































Monday, June 6, 2016

MAN MANAGEMENT::Reducing Flab in Armed Forces

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/reducing-flab-in-armed-forces/247339.html




 Related :

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/06/blog-post.html




            Reducing Flab in Armed Forces

                                     By

                 Gen V P MALIK( retd)





                     MODERNISATION
                                      &
    EXPANSION CAN'T GO TOGETHER



Jun 6, 2016.



The Indian army today is the third largest in the world with over 38,000 officers and 11.38 lakh soldiers

Jun 6, 2016



Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has set up a 12-member committee headed by Lieut-Gen DB Shekatkar (retd) to suggest structural changes in the Army, the IAF and the Navy on cutting down flab and reducing revenue (maintenance) expenditure. Its recommendations will entail doing away with posts that may have become redundant due to technology, and to ensure that addition of new equipment (modernisation) does not mean a corresponding rise in the personnel strength of the forces.

Parrikar has two important reasons for ordering this study. One is the ever-increasing revenue expenditure on manpower which leaves less than 20 per cent of the defence budget for weapons and equipment modernisation. The other is the advice from Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In his address at the Combined Commanders' Conference in December 2015, Modi had said, “At a time when major powers are reducing their forces and rely more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces. Modernisation and expansion of forces at the same time is a difficult and unnecessary goal.” Articulating global, regional and national strategic environment and politico-military concerns, the Prime Minister exhorted the Defence Minister and the military commanders to promote "jointness" across every level, shorten the tooth-to-tail ratio, and re-examine assumptions that keep massive funds locked up in inventories. 

There is no doubt that budgetary constraint is the primary reason for this decision. As a percentage of the GDP, the defence budget has been decreasing over the last decade. This year there was an increase of 1.16 per cent on the basis of the budget estimate of FY 2015-16. Calculated against the revised estimates (Rs 18,295 crore was surrendered by the Ministry of Defence), it works to an increase of 9 per cent.



This allocation does not cover the rate of inflation, fall in the value of the rupee against the dollar, and the sharply increasing cost of weapons and equipment all over the world. 

Due to the “One Rank, One Pension” scheme, the pension bill will increase substantially. With implementation of the Seventh Pay Commission recommendations, salaries, allowances and establishment charges of all civil and military personnel, paid from the defence budget, will shoot up. Recently, Defence Secretary G. Mohan Kumar admitted to the Standing Committee on Defence that “India’s military spending for FY 2016-17 is not as per the requirements of the services.” Unless the government hikes the defence budget, which is very unlikely, the Ministry of Defence would face a serious resource crunch to make up huge deficiencies of weapons, equipment and ammunition. Any force modernisation will remain a dream. 

We faced a similar situation in the late 1990s. As Army Chief, I decided to suppress 50,000 manpower (mostly from non-field force) over a period of three years, provided the money saved would be given to the army for capital purchases. D B Shekatkar, then a Major-General, heading Perspective Planning Directorate, worked on details in consultation with the heads of arms and services, principal staff officers and army commanders. There was considerable opposition within the army and outside. After obtaining approval and a written commitment on the savings from the Cabinet Committee on Security, we implemented the scheme for two years.

 The Kargil war put an end to that scheme in its third year. 

The Indian army today is the third largest in the world with over 38,000 officers (sanctioned strength is 49,631 officers) and 11.38 lakh soldiers. Cadre reviews and implementation of the Ajai Vikram Singh report has made it top-heavy with bloated headquarters. This is definitely not in line with modern defence management to win short and swift wars.

Incidentally, India is not alone in its attempt to trim its armed forces and improve the teeth-to-tail ratio. In the last decade, all major armed forces of the world have attempted such exercises and made deep cuts in manpower — the most important and costliest military resource. In 2012, the UK announced a 20 per cent cut, reducing the strength of its army to 82,000 combatants by the end of this decade. The Russian army has done away with large size divisional headquarters to make itself a quick-strike, lean force. The US army has announced a reduction of strength by a whopping 80,000 by 2017 to “reduce the overall number of headquarters, while sustaining as much combat capabilities as possible.” China’s recently announced military reforms envisage a cut of 300,000 personnel in its 2.3 million PLA forces by 2020. The idea is to “remake the PLA from a manpower intensive force to a smaller, technologically able and mobile force capable of combat beyond its geographical borders.”

Over the last decade, India's armed forces have absorbed a fair amount of technological developments, including communications and digitisation. Manpower intake is better educated, savvy on computers and smart phones. Most of them have driving licences. But the resultant organisational changes, shedding of redundant establishments and manpower savings have seldom been attempted by the army. On many of these issues, there is a lot to be learnt from the best practices of the private sector. 

In the past, many units were raised to meet special operational circumstances of that period e.g. Rashtriya Rifles for Punjab. A review to examine the need or quantum of such forces is overdue.  

Meanwhile, there is considerable scope for downsizing forces in areas which are not of operational importance, and to reduce the flab. Some suggestions which require further study are:


  • By further improving jointness amongst the forces, there is scope to cut down duplication (sometime triplication) of logistic (medical, supplies, station duties) and security resources.
  • Reducing size of headquarters, particularly of field formations, training establishments and shedding redundant establishments.
  • Merger and pruning of logistic units and training facilities of the army like the EME, Ordnance, Army Service Corps, Army Education Corps, and so on. 
  • Clubbing of non-essential unit functions such as Military Farms and Army Postal Service, or outsourcing their functions.
  • A review of all peace establishments.  
  • Multiple use of lands/facilities wherever units and formations are in close proximity to each other.
With the development of the automobile sector and availability of civilian repair and maintenance infrastructure in forward areas, this requirement of the armed forces fleet can be outsourced, or even better, contracted with vehicle manufacturers.

The flab is not only within the military. Civilian organisations like the ordnance factories, defence PSUs, DRDO, the MES, the Defence Estate, and the Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Services, paid from the defence budget, also need to be trimmed. With the Indian private sector coming of age and contributing more for the defence, and greater opportunity to outsource services, these organisations should be included in the flab reduction exercise.




















 

Tuesday, May 26, 2015

India’s Military Modernization : Plans and Strategic Underpinnings









         India’s Military Modernization:





     Plans and Strategic  Underpinnings


                                     By
                   GURMEET KANWAL


(Sep 2012 Produced by The National Bureau ofAsian  Research for the Senate India Caucus )
 
 
As a key player in Asia and a large democracy with which the United States shares common interests, India is emerging as an important U.S. strategic partner. There is a broad national consensus in India on the contours of this emerging relationship with Washington, particularly with respect to enhanced defense and civil nuclear energy cooperation.

 

 


During his visit to New Delhi in June 2012, U.S. defense secretary Leon Panetta identified India as a “linchpin” in Washington’s emerging “rebalancing” strategy in the Asia-
Pacific region. While there was no reaction from the Indian
government, it is clear that these two large democracies need
to work together militarily in order to maintain freedom of
the seas in the Indian Ocean region and to ensure peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific more generally. Should China
experience political instability or behave irresponsibly in
asserting its territorial rights—as it has shown a tendency to
do in the South China Sea—both India and the United States
will need strong strategic partners to face worst-case
scenarios effectively.




In order to meet future threats and challenges and achieve
interoperability with U.S. and other friendly armed forces
for joint operations in India’s area of strategic interest, the
Indian military needs to modernize and create force
structures that are capable of undertaking network-centric
warfare on land, at sea, and in the air. Gradually, but
perceptibly, the Indian armed forces are upgrading their
capabilities, enhancing their kinetic effectiveness and
command and control, and improving interoperability. This
brief analyzes the threats and challenges that India must
address, the measures being adopted to modernize the
country’s armed forces, and the strategic underpinnings
behind this slow but steady modernization effort.



 
 

Preparing For a Two-Front War
 

South Asia is among the world’s most unstable regions due to the ongoing war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In
addition, growing fundamentalist terrorism; creeping
“Talibanization” in Pakistan; political instability in
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; unrest in Tibet
and Xinjiang; narcotics trafficking; and the proliferation of
small arms and light weapons are also destabilizing factors.
Unresolved territorial and boundary disputes with China
and Pakistan, over which India has fought four wars;
internal security challenges in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)
and the northeastern states; and the rising tide of the Maoist
insurgency in the heartland further vitiate India’s strategic
environment. Further, many Indian security analysts worry

that China is engaged in the strategic encirclement of India
through its nuclear and missile nexus with Pakistan; the
sale of military hardware to Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar,
and Sri Lanka; and a “string of pearls” strategy to surround
India with naval bases in the northern Indian Ocean region.


 

 

India-China relations are stable at the strategic level.
Resolution of the territorial dispute is being discussed by
India’s national security adviser and China’s vice foreign minister, military confidence-building measures are holding
up, bilateral trade has increased to $60 billion, and both
countries are cooperating in international forums like the
World Trade Organization and the UN Climate Change
Conference. However, the relationship is more contentious
at the tactical level. For example, China refuses to issue
proper visas to Indian citizens of Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing
denied the commander-in-chief of India’s Northern
Command a visa for an official visit because it believes that
J&K is a disputed territory, and the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) has been making frequent forays across the Line of
Actual Control into Indian territory simply to push Chinese
territorial claims. China has also rapidly developed military
infrastructure in Tibet to allow for quicker induction of
troops and their sustenance over a longer period of time.
Another destabilizing factor is the large Chinese presence
in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
These developments do not augur well for long-term peace
and stability.


 

 
The prevailing strategic environment has forced India’s
armed forces to prepare for the possibility of a “two front”
war, while the army and other security forces are engaged in
fighting an ongoing “half front” internal security war. Even
though the probability of conventional conflict remains low
due to steadily improving relations and military confidence building measures with China and Pakistan, this possibility
cannot be completely ruled out. Nuclear deterrence also plays
a positive role in conflict avoidance, but the prevailing
wisdom in India is that there is space for conventional conflict
below the nuclear threshold.

The pace of modernizationhas been slow due to
 
 
the lack of adequate funding, delayed decision-
 
 
 making, and a low tech  defense industrial base.



 
 
 
There is now increasing realization that unless India takes immediate measures to accelerate the pace of its military modernization, the gap with China, which is only a quantitative gap at present, will soon become a qualitative gap, given the rapid rate of PLA modernization. Likewise, the slender edge that the Indian armed forces now enjoy over the Pakistani armed forces in conventional conflict is being eroded as Pakistan is spendinconsiderable sums of money on its military modernization under the garb of fighting radical extremism.1
 
 

 
Although the Indian armed forces have drawn up elaborate plans for modernizing and qualitatively upgrading their capabilities for future combat, including the ability to secure the sea lanes of communication and project power in India’s area of strategic interest, the pace of modernization has been slow due to the lack of adequate funding, delayed decision-making, and a low-tech defense industrial base. India’s defense budget is pegged at less than 2% of its GDP at present, and the bulk of the expenditure is on the revenue
account—that is, pay and allowances, rations, fuel, oil and
lubricants, ammunition, and vehicles.2 Very little remains
in the capital account to be spent on modernization. In the
case of the army, spending on modernization is as little as
20% to 25% of total capital expenditure in 2012–13.3
According to the Indian defense minister A.K. Antony,
“New procurements have commenced…but we are still
lagging by 15 years.” 4 Nonetheless, an inadequate defense
industrial base—imports constitute 70% of defense
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------ 

 
 1. The India-Pakistan combat ratio is assessed by this author as 1.2 to 1.0 in India's favor
 
2.  Laxman K. Behera, “India’s Defence Budget 2012–13,” Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), IDSA Comment, March 20,2012,







LaxmanBehera_200312.
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2012-13_


 




3.  Ibid.

4. Gurmeet Kanwal, “Indian Army’s Modernisation,”
India Strategic
January 2012.
 
------------------------------------------------------------
acquisitions—and bureaucratic inefficiency, rather than lack
of funds, are the main causes of the slow pace of modernization. India is expected to procure defense equipment worth $100 billion, most of it imported, over the next two five-year plans. Simultaneously, however, efforts are being stepped up to enhance indigenous capabilities and thereby reduce India’s dependence on imports by an order of magnitude. The following three sections will survey India’s modernization of its army, navy, and air force.
 
Army Modernization: Enhancing Capabilities Without Reducing Manpower
 
 
With personnel strength of 1.1 million soldiers (6 regional commands, a training command, 13 corps, and 38
divisions), the Indian Army has kept the nation together through various crises, including four wars since
independence, Pakistan’s “proxy war” in J&K since 1989–90,
and insurgencies in many of the northeastern states.5 Given


its large-scale operational commitments on border
management and counterinsurgency, the army cannot afford
to reduce its manpower numbers until these challenges are
overcome. Many of its weapons and equipment are
bordering on obsolescence and need to be replaced. The
next step would be to move gradually toward acquiring
network-centric capabilities for effects-based operations so
as to optimize the army’s full combat potential for defensive
and offensive operations. The army is also preparing to join
the navy and the air force in launching intervention
operations in India’s area of strategic interest when called
on to do so in the future.

-------------------------------------------------------------

Policy Brief




Given its large-scale operational commitments
on border management and counterinsurgency, the army cannot afford to reduce its manpower numbers until these challenges are overcome
 

------------------------------------------------------------

Lieutenant General J.P. Singh (retired), former deputy
chief of the army staff (planning and systems), stated in an
interview with the CLAWS Journal that
 
  “the critical  capabilities that are being enhanced to meet challenge sacross the spectrum include battlefield transparency,
battlefield management systems, night-fighting capability,
enhanced firepower, including terminally guided munitions,
integrated maneuver capability to include self-propelled artillery, quick reaction surface-to-air missiles, the latest
assault engineer equipment, tactical control systems,
integral combat aviation support and network centricity.”
6 The army’s mechanized forces are still mostly “night blind.”
Its artillery lacks towed and self-propelled 155-mm  howitzers for the plains and the mountains and has little capability by way of multi-barrel rocket launchers and surface-to-surface missiles. Infantry battalions urgently need to acquire modern weapons and equipment for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations to increase operational effectiveness and lower casualties.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

     
Main battle tanks (MBT) and Infantry Combat Vehicles(ICV) are the driving forces of India’s conventional deterrence in the plains. This fleet is being modernized gradually by inducting two regiments of the indigenously developed Arjun MBT and importing 310 T-90S MBTs from Russia. A contract has also been signed for 347 additional T-90S tanks to be assembled in India. The BMP-1 and BMP- 2 Russian ICVs, which have long been the mainstay of the mechanized infantry battalions, need to be replaced as well.The new ICVs must be capable of performing internal security duties and counterinsurgency operations in addition to their primary role in conventional conflicts.

 
 
Artillery modernization plans include the acquisition of towed, wheeled, and self-propelled 155-mm guns and howitzers for the plains and the mountains through import as well as indigenous development. The Corps of Army Air Defence is also faced with problems of obsolescence. The vintage L-70 40-mm air defense (AD) gun system, the four barreled ZSU-23-4 Schilka (SP) AD gun system, the SAM-6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5   
This section draws from the author’s analysis in “Indian Army Modernisation Needs a Major Push,” India Strategic, February 2010,
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories482.htm.

 
 “Modernisation Thrusts of Indian Army: Interview with Deputy Chief of Army Staff,” CLAWS Journal (Winter 2010):

1, http://www.claws.in/
 
CJ-winter-2010.pdf.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
(Kvadrat), and the SAM-8 OSA-AK, among others, need to be replaced by more responsive modern AD systems that are capable of defeating current and future threats.

The modernization of India’s infantry battalions is moving forward but at a similarly slow pace. This initiative is aimed at enhancing the battalions’ capability for surveillance and target acquisition at night and boosting their firepower for precise retaliation against infiltrating columns and terrorists hiding in built-up areas. These plans include the acquisition of shoulder-fired missiles, hand-held battlefield surveillance radars, and hand-held thermal imaging devices for observation at night. A system called F-INSAS (future infantry soldier as a system) is also under development. One infantry division has been designated as a rapid reaction force for employment on land or inintervention operations and will have one amphibious brigade and two air assault brigades.

Similarly, the Indian Army proposes to substantially enhance the operational capabilities of army aviation, engineers, signal communications, reconnaissance,surveillance, and target acquisition branches in order to improve the army’s overall combat potential by an order of magnitude. Modern strategic and tactical level command and control systems need to be acquired on priority for better synergies during conventional and sub-conventional conflict. Plans for the acquisition of a mobile corps-to  battalion
tactical communications system and a battalion-
level battlefield management system likewise need to be
hastened. Despite being the largest user of space, the army
does not yet have a dedicated military satellite for its space
surveillance needs. Cyber warfare capabilities are also at a
nascent stage. The emphasis thus far has been on developing
protective capabilities to safeguard Indian networks and
C4I2SR (command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance)
from cyber attack. Offensive capabilities have yet to be
adequately developed. All these capabilities will make it
easier for the army to undertake joint operations with
multinational forces when the need arises and the government approves such a policy option.
 ---------------------------------------------------------
 
The Indian Army proposes to substantially enhance the operational capabilities of army aviation, engineers, signal communications, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition branches in order to improve the army’s overall combat potential by an order of magnitude.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
  


Naval Modernization: Major Fleet Expansion

The Indian Navy’s ambitious Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan seeks to dominate the Indian Ocean region
by acquiring blue water operational capability while
effectively countering current and emerging threats closer
to the coastline. There is a perceptible shift in emphasis from
an increase in the number of platforms to the enhancement
of capabilities. According to a report tabled in the Indian
Parliament in the last week of April 2012 by the Standing
Committee on Defence, the navy’s modernization plan seeks
to achieve the following objectives:
Augment airborne maritime surveillance, strike, anti-submarine warfare [ASW] and air defence capability through induction of shore-based aircraft, integral helos, carrier based aircraft, space based [assets] and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], along with suitable  weapons and sensors.
Develop ASW capability through induction of suitable platforms, weapons and sensors.
Build adequate stand off capability for sea lift and expeditionary operations to achieve desired power  projection force levels, influence events ashore and  undertake military operations other than war.
Induct assets and develop suitable infrastructure to   augment forces available for low intensity maritime operations (LIMO), protection of off-shore assets and[for] coastal security.

 • Induct force multipliers like satellite based global communications, reconnaissance and network enabled  platforms to achieve battle-space dominance capability  and perform network centric operations.
Induct state-of-the-art equipment and specialized platforms for special forces to enhance niche  capabilities to conduct maritime intervention operations and other envisaged roles.
Develop support infrastructure in island territories
to support the planned force levels as well as support infrastructure for ships/submarines/aircrafts at ports and airbases.7
 
 
 According to Admiral Arun Prakash (retired), former chief of naval staff, India’s naval modernization plans are designed to meet the following aims:8  

 
Acquiring a capability for maritime domain awarenes
in the area of responsibility, including space-based surveillance, maritime reconnaissance, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), and UAVs
Developing the capability for expeditionary and joint
warfare, supported by special operations
Acquiring reach and sustainability through long
endurance, tankers, turnaround facilities in friendly foreign ports, and longer intervals between maintenance cycles
Acquiring modern capabilities in fields of tactical
aviation, ASW, anti-air/anti-missile, land-attack,
mine countermeasures, and electronic warfare
Networking ships, submarines, and airborne
platforms via satellite
Committing to self-reliance and indigenization, with
the objective of harnessing national strengths in
shipbuilding, engineering, electronics, and IT
The Indian Navy has two operational fleets—the Eastern
Naval Command and Western Naval Command—and has
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
7
 
Standing Committee on Defence, Indian Ministry of Defence,
“Demands for Grants (2012–2013),” April 30, 2012, 70–71,

http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/FINAL%20DFG%20%20


REPORT%20-2012-13.pdf.


8
 
Author’s email interview with Admiral Arun Prakash (retired),
July 27, 2012.
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Policy Brief


The Indian Navy is on the cusp of acquiring the capabilities necessary to join key strategic partners such as the U.S. Navy in  afeguarding the sea lanes of communication in the northern Indian Ocean and ensuring unfettered freedomof the seas for trade and commerce.
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proposed to center both fleets around an aircraft carrier.
Eventually the navy plans to graduate to three carrier battle
 
groups. The INS Chakra, a nuclear-powered submarine
leased from Russia, will join the fleet later in 2012, while
the INS Arihant, the first of three to four indigenously
designed and developed nuclear-armed submarines, is expected to become fully operational by late 2014. India has
also begun to induct Russian Nerpa-class submarines, which
will give the navy a much needed fillip to the submarine
fleet and considerably enhance sea-denial capabilities. Three
stealth frigates have only recently been added to the fleet.
 

The Indian Navy’s modernization plans, though much
delayed, have thus finally begun to pick up steam. Pointing
out the navy’s role as a key facilitator in promoting peace
and stability in the Indian Ocean region, Defence Minister
Antony observed while commissioning a stealth frigate in
July 2012 that the present operating environment of the
Indian Navy “dictates that we balance our resources with
a strategy that is responsive across the full range of blue and
brown water operations….The maintenance of a strong and
credible navy and strengthening cooperation and friendship
with other countries to promote regional and global stability is the need of the hour.” 9

 


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
9
Vinay Kumar, “Credible Navy Need of the Hour: Antony,” Hindu,
July 21, 2012.
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The navy plans to expand to a fleet of 150 ships in the next ten to fifteen years, with 50 warships now under construction and 100 new vessels in the acquisition pipeline.


The navy is also engaged in setting up operational turnaround bases, forward-operating bases, and naval air enclaves with a view to enhancing India’s surveillance efforts in the Indian Ocean region. Plans for accretions to the naval aviation fleet are likewise progressing smoothly: Boeing 737 P-8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft have begun to be inducted, and 5 additional Kamov Ka-31 AEW helicopters will be added to the existing fleet of 11 helicopters. Further, the navy’s amphibious landing capability has been enhanced

considerably by the acquisition of the INS Jalashwa (ex–USS
Trenton) and other landing ships, and additional capabilities
for amphibious warfare are being rapidly developed. As a
result of these efforts, the Indian Navy is on the cusp of
acquiring the capabilities necessary to join key strategic
partners such as the U.S. Navy in safeguarding the sea lanes
of communication in the northern Indian Ocean and
ensuring unfettered freedom of the seas for trade and commerce.

Air Force Modernization:

Air Dominance and Force Projection


Until recently, India’s traditional strategic sphere lay

between the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca; but
with India’s global footprint expanding, the Indian Air Force should be ready to serve wherever the country’s future
strategic interests lie. The air force is gearing up to provide
the strategic outreach that India needs as a growing regional

-----------------------------------------------------------

Policy Brief

 The air force is gearing up to provide the strategic outreach that India needs as a growing

regional power and to project power where necessary in order to defend vital national  interests   

 -------------------------------------------------------------

power and to project power where necessary in order to defend vital national interests. According to Kapil Kak, a retired air vice marshal and senior defense analyst, although there is a gap between vision and capability with regard to shaping India’s strategic neighborhood, forward movement is now visible. In his view, the modernization plans of the air force are aimed at achieving the following objectives:10

 

 
Air dominance and control of the air
Deterrence, by both denial and punishment
Long-range offensive reach—penetration, precision,
persistence, and parallelity—in simultaneous operations
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels
 
Strategic air-lift capability for power projection
through both hard and soft power, such as
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations and diaspora evacuation
 
Build-up of capability for coercion
Acquisition of force enablers and multipliers and
related combat-support systems, including
networking for tri-service command and control
 
Capability of conducting cyberspace and information
operations
 
Indigenization of future capabilities for design and
development


From a sanctioned strength of 39 squadrons, the Indian
Air Force is down to 34 squadrons at present, due to decades
of neglect, but hopes to enhance its strength to 42 squadrons
by 2022. Yet plans to acquire 126 multi-mission, medium range
combat aircraft—in order to maintain an edge over the regional air forces—are stuck in the procurement quagmire. Tejas, the indigenously designed light combat aircraft, which is expected to replace the obsolescent Mig-21, is still a few years away from becoming fully operational. India is also developing a fifth-generation fighter jointly with Russia and aims to fly it in 2015. New fighter bombers include a fleet of 272 Sukhoi-30 MKIs, half of which have
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10 Author’s email interview with Kapil Kak, July 27, 2012.


 ------------------------------------------------------------


already been built. AEW aircraft are being acquired from
Israel as well as being developed indigenously. India has also acquired 6 C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for its special forces and will likely order 6 more from the United States. C-17 Globemaster heavy-lift aircraft are also likely to be acquired shortly, which will take India’s defense cooperation with the United States to a new level. Although a contract has been signed with a Swiss firm for 75 Pilatus PC-7 basic trainer aircraft, India’s fleet of jet trainers continues to be deficient. In the rotary-wing category, the indigenously manufactured Dhruv utility helicopter has entered service.


The air force is also in the process of acquiring medium-lift
transport helicopters and attack helicopter In keeping with developments in the region, India’s strategic forces are also modernizing at a steady pace. The Agni-I and Agni-II missiles are now fully operational. Immediate requirements include the Agni-V intermediate range ballistic missile, which has a 5,000-km range, and nuclear-powered submarines with suitable ballistic missiles
to provide genuine second-strike capability. As noted above,

the INS Arihant, India’s first indigenously built nuclear
submarine, will likely become fully operational by late 2014.



 

While India’s emphasis is on mobile missile launchers, a

small number of hardened silos are also being constructed.
The armed forces do not currently have a truly integrated
tri-service C4I2SR system suitable for network-centric
warfare, which would allow them to optimize their
individual capabilities; however, plans have been made to
develop such a system in the next five to ten years. In fact,
all new weapons and equipment acquisitions are now being
planned on a tri-service basis to ensure interoperability.


 

 

 

India’s Quest For Strategic Outreach

 
Given its growing power and responsibilities, India has been steadily enhancing its expeditionary and military intervention capabilities, which have been amply demonstrated in recent times. During the 1991 Gulf War, India airlifted 150,000 civilian workers, who had been forced to leave Iraq, from the airfield at Amman, Jordan, over a period of 30 days. This was the largest airlift since the Berlin airlift at the end of World War II. During the 2004 tsunami, the Indian armed forces were at the forefront of rescue and relief operations. Over 70 Indian Navy ships transported  rescue teams and relief material to disaster zones in less

 
 
It is evident that India is preparing to join the world’s major powers in terms of theability to undertake out-of are contingency operations



 
 
than 72 hours, even though the country’s eastern seaboard had itself suffered considerable casualties and damage. Likewise, Indian Navy ships on a goodwill visit to European countries during the Lebanon war in 2006 lifted and brought back 5,000 Indian civilian refugees. From the ongoing modernization plans described above, it is evident that India is preparing to join the world’s major powers in terms of the ability to undertake out-of-area contingency operations. Further, the acquisition of SU-30 MKI long-range fighter bombers with air-to-air refueling
capability, C-130J Hercules transport aircraft, and airbornewarning-and-control-system and maritime-surveillance capabilities over the next five to ten years will give India considerable strategic outreach. New Delhi has consistently favored military intervention only under a UN umbrella.Though that position is unlikely to change in the near term,India is likely to join future coalitions of the willing even
without UN approval when vital national interests are
threatened and need to be defended. Shiv Shankar Menon,
India’s national security adviser, stated in a speech in August
2011: “As a nation state India has consistently shown tactical
caution and strategic initiative, sometimes simultaneously.
But equally, initiative and risk-taking must be strategic, not
tactical, if we are to avoid the fate of becoming a rentier state.”11 He went on to mention that India was cooperating
extensively with other militaries to fight piracy off the Horn
of Africa. Such cooperation will increase in the future as India adds to its intervention capabilities.
 
 
Given that India faces complex strategic scenarios and is located in an increasingly unstable neighborhood, it is in New Delhi’s interest to encourage a cooperative model of
 
 
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11
 Shiv Shankar Menon, “India and the Global Scene” (16th
 Prem   Bhatia Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, August 11, 2011),
 
 
 
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 regional security and work with all friendly countries
toward that end. At the same time, New Delhi finds it
pragmatic to hedge just in case worst-case scenarios—such
as the collapse of China or China’s use of military force for
territorial gains—begin to unfold and threaten India’s
economic development or territorial integrity. The
increasing emphasis on maritime cooperation, particularly
with the United States, is part of India’s continuing efforts
to fulfill growing obligations and responsibilities as a
regional power. New Delhi is now working to cooperate
with all the major Asian powers in order to maintain peace
and stability in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific more
generally, though without aligning militarily with any one
power. Toward this end, the armed forces are working
together to achieve joint warfare capabilities for intervention
operations in India’s area of strategic interest. In sum, a
rising India will soon become a net contributor to security
in the Indian Ocean region, together with strategic partners
such as the United States.

 

 Nonetheless, India’s modernization plans are moving
ahead at a very slow pace. Policy paralysis in New Delhi due
to the vagaries of coalition politics in a parliamentary
democracy, along with the reduction in the defense budget
as a share of India’s GDP due to sluggish growth in the
economy, has further exacerbated the difficulties in
increasing the pace of modernization. However, the process
is certainly underway, and there is hope that it will receive
bipartisan support across the political spectrum because of
the realization that no alternative exists for addressing
emerging threats and challenges but for India to quickly
modernize its armed forces.
 
 
 
 

India’s military modernization, however slow it might be,
will lead to a qualitative increase in defense cooperation
with the United States and other strategic partners by
enhancing the capabilities of the Indian armed forces for
joint coalition operations, if they are in India’s national
interest. Overall, India will gradually acquire the capability
to act as a net provider of security in South Asia and the
Indian Ocean region. This positive development will allow
strategic partners like the United States to reduce their
military commitments to the region to a limited extent.
Hence, India’s modernization efforts will enhance and
further cement U.S.-India relations. •



 







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