Friday, April 14, 2017

BOMBS, BOMBS AND BOMBS. I LOVE BOMBS

SOURCE:

PART ONE

BOMBS, BOMBS AND BOMBS.
I LOVE BOMBS
&
PREFER
"IEDs"

Brutal Floating Behemoth
RBE	2,884 in BTD4 3,164 in BTD5 8,500 in BSM2 17,500 in BSM2 (as a Boss in 2-5)
Parent of	4 M.O.A.B.s
Child of	Z.O.M.G. (BTD5) Bloonarius the Inflator (Bloons Monkey City)

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How many nuclear weapons are there in India?

How many nuclear weapons are there in the world?

COUNTRY	SIZE OF ARSENAL
China	260 warheads
India	110–120 warheads
Pakistan	120–130 warheads
Israel	80 warheads

6 more rows

Nuclear arsenals - International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

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What round do lead Bloons come?

Bloons TD 5 Rounds Edit

Round	RBE	[Hide] Description
59	5844	28 Lead Camo, 50 Ceramic
60	3164	1 B.F.B.
61	6530	150 Zebra Regrowth, 5 M.O.A.B
62	5901	300 Pink Camo, 15 Rainbow Camo Regrowth, 6 M.O.A.B

84 more rows

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How big was the fat man?

Fat Man
Weight	10,300 pounds (4,670 kg)
Length	128 inches (3.3 m)
Diameter	60 inches (1.5 m)
Filling	Plutonium

11 more rows

Nuclear arsenals - International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

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What is the meaning of BFB?

BFB

Acronym	Definition
BFB	Bike Freaking Bike (polite form; slang for any large displacement motorcycle)
BFB	Brutal Floating Behemoth (video game character; Bloons Tower Defense)
BFB	Big Fat Bummer (Internet slang)
BFB	Best Friend's Brother

14 more rows

BFB - What does BFB stand for? The Free Dictionary

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What round do lead Bloons come?

Bloons TD 5 Rounds Edit

Round	RBE	[Hide] Description
59	5844	28 Lead Camo, 50 Ceramic
60	3164	1 B.F.B.
61	6530	150 Zebra Regrowth, 5 M.O.A.B
62	5901	300 Pink Camo, 15 Rainbow Camo Regrowth, 6 M.O.A.B

84 more rows

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How big was the fat man?

Fat Man
Weight	10,300 pounds (4,670 kg)
Length	128 inches (3.3 m)
Diameter	60 inches (1.5 m)
Filling	Plutonium

11 more rows

Rank	Country	Active Military
1	China	2,333,000
2	United States	1,492,200
3	India	1,325,000
4	North Korea	1,190,000

29 Largest Armies In The World - WorldAtlas.com

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How big was the fat man?

Fat Man
Weight	10,300 pounds (4,670 kg)
Length	128 inches (3.3 m)
Diameter	60 inches (1.5 m)
Filling	Plutonium

11 more rows

Priority	Composition of explosive decomposition	Products of decomposition
1	A metal and chlorine	Metallic chloride
2	Hydrogen and chlorine	HCl
3	A metal and oxygen	Metallic oxide
4	Carbon and oxygen	CO

Chemical explosive - Wikipedia

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What round do lead Bloons come?

Bloons TD 5 Rounds Edit

Round	RBE	[Hide] Description
59	5844	28 Lead Camo, 50 Ceramic
60	3164	1 B.F.B.
61	6530	150 Zebra Regrowth, 5 M.O.A.B
62	5901	300 Pink Camo, 15 Rainbow Camo Regrowth, 6 M.O.A.B

84 more rows

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What monkeys can see Camo Bloons?

Camo detection of towers and agents Edit

Tower	Upgrade needed	Notes
Dart Monkey	Enhanced Eyesight (path 1, upgrade 2)	Also increases range
Sniper Monkey	Night Vision Goggles (path 2, upgrade 2)
Boomerang Thrower	Glaive Lord (path 1, upgrade 4)	Also allows to pop lead bloons
Ninja Monkey	No upgrade needed

18 more rows

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How big was the fat man?

Fat Man
Weight	10,300 pounds (4,670 kg)
Length	128 inches (3.3 m)
Diameter	60 inches (1.5 m)
Filling	Plutonium

11 more rows

Tomahawk
Used by	United States Navy Royal Navy
Production history
Manufacturer	General Dynamics (initially) Raytheon/McDonnell Douglas
Unit cost	US$1.59m(FY2014) (Block IV)

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INDIAN SECURITY OVERSEAS COMMAND - INDIA MUST DEPLOY TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN [[R]

SOURCE:
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/605240/india-must-deploy-troops.html

IT IS TIME TO BALKANIZE PAKISTAN

BALUCHISTAN IS AN INDEPENDANT COUNTRY

CLICK/GOOGLE TO WATCH

https://www.periscope.tv/NewsX/1nAJEVpoOOoxL

INDIA MUST DEPLOY TROOPS

IN

AFGHANISTAN

Gurmeet Kanwal,

April 8, 2017

PEACE, STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

The situation in Afghanistan can be described as a

stalemate at both the strategic and tactical levels. The

security environment is precarious, socio-economic

development is stagnating and the reconciliation

process has reached an impasse.

The NATO–ISAF (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation–International Security Assistance Force) strategy to clear-hold-build-transfer-exit has succeeded only partially as the Taliban and the Al Qaeda have not been eliminated and terrorists owing allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) are growing in number.

The fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are not yet capable of managing security after the premature withdrawal of the US-led NATO-ISAF intervention force. The Afghanistan National Security Forces’ (ANSF, ANA plus ANP) numbers are small (3,52,000). The ANA lacks heavy weapons, artillery, air support and helicopters for logistics support.

The standards of junior leadership are low and the troops are inadequately trained and equipped. They do not have the level of motivation necessary to undertake complex counter-insurgency operations on a sustained basis. Cases of fratricide and desertions with weapons are commonplace.

While the ANSF and the remnants of the Nato-ISAF forces control most of the large towns and the airports, the Taliban — together with the al-Qaeda — control large swathes of the countryside. Governance is virtually non-existent outside Kabul. The approximately 13,000 Nato-ISAF troops now remaining in Afghanistan are on a train-advise-assist mission.

Unless Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, the Central Asian

Republics (CARs), China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia

join hands with the international community to supplement

the ANSF’s efforts to eliminate the insurgents, the security

environment is likely to deteriorate further and may

degenerate into a civil war.

Kabul and New Delhi have had a historically friendly relationship. Afghanistan’s location at the strategic cross-roads between South Asia and Central Asia and South Asia and West Asia makes it an important geo-political partner. Afghanistan has vast mineral deposits. When the Chabahar port in Iran becomes operational, India will gain access to the CARs through Afghanistan. Hence, peace and stability in Afghanistan are vital national interests for India.

India supports the installation of a broad-based and stable representative government in consonance with Afghan customs and traditions. The imposition of the Western model of democracy will not be appropriate. India would prefer a government that adopts a stance of neutrality between India and Pakistan, but should be willing to work closely with any government that is truly representative of the Afghan people.

India’s efforts to provide greater assistance are being hampered by the lack of geographical contiguity. India has only limited access to Afghanistan as Pakistan has not given India transit rights. India’s attempts to allay Pakistan’s misapprehensions about New Delhi’s intentions have not been successful as Pakistan has steadfastly refused to discuss this issue. Afghanistan’s problems can’t be resolved unless the trans-Durand Line challenges that it faces from Pakistan and the Haqqani network are addressed simultaneously.

The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership agreement was signed in October 2011. It calls for close political cooperation with a mechanism for regular consultations and joint initiatives on regional and international issues. It stipulates a strategic dialogue to provide a framework for cooperation in the field of national security. Security cooperation is intended to enhance mutual efforts against international terrorism, organised crime, illegal trafficking in narcotics and money laundering.

The agreement specifies that India will assist in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes of the ANSF. It commits the two sides to “strengthening trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as cooperation between other bodies of business and industry representatives…” India has committed itself to continue to provide assistance for Afghan-istan’s reconstruction and development programmes and capacity building.

Policy objectives

India’s policy objectives in Afghanistan are in consonance with the strategic partnership agreement. Besides a stable and preferably neutral government, India’s political objectives include the following: ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a base and safe haven for terrorists and radical extremists; counter Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth, acquire access to Afghanistan and through it to the CARs; establish broad-based engagement with all political groups; support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts, as visualised by the Afghan High Peace Council; assist Afghanistan to train its administrative and judicial staff to improve governance and delivery of justice; and, further enhance people-to-people contacts.

India’s national security objectives comprise: supporting the capacity building efforts of ANSF by ensuring implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement, including the supply of war-like stores; ensuring the safety and protection of Indian assets and infrastructure in Afghanistan; and, cooperating to share intelligence.

India’s economic policy objectives are to increase trade with Afghanistan and through it with the CARs; enhance Indian business investment in Afghanistan; assist Afghanistan to develop its natural resources; further increase India’s reconstruction and capacity building programme; enhance India’s energy security; for example, through the commissioning of the TAPI (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India) pipeline; assist Afghanistan to replace narcotics-based agriculture with regular agriculture; and, work towards the implementation of Safta (South Asian Free Trade Area).

Finally, unless the security environment improves substantially, governance and development will continue to take a back seat. The P-5 (UN permanent members: China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States) need to be persuaded to supplement the ANSF with a United Nations or a regional peacekeeping force to eliminate the Taliban.

Though there is no support in India for sending troops to Afghanistan, there is realisation that the fight against the Taliban and the al Qaeda has long-term security implications for the country as peace and stability in Afghanistan are vital national interests. Along with other neighbours, New Delhi should be willing to deploy up to one division (15,000 troops) to join such a force provided Pakistan’s sensibilities about Indian military presence in Afghanistan can be assuaged.

(The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi)

Wednesday, April 12, 2017

OROP & THE GREAT BETRAYAL OF FAUJI FOR ITS VOTE BANK & FAILED PROMISES

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/of-fauji-vote-bank-and-failed-promises/391091.html

'Pakistan must focus on ending poverty instead of breeding terror'   - Narendra Modi speech in Rewari

ना टेरर रुका |
ना  टेरर से  ख़ून रूका
ना  फ़ौज को आधुनिक  हत्यार मिला |
ना फौजी को ओरोप  मीला |
ना फौज का 7 CPC लागू हुआ |
ना रेड्डी वन  मैन कमीशन रिपोर्ट आउट हुआ |
मिला तो हतियार का मेमोरंडम OF अंडरस्टैंडिंग मीला
डिलीवरी का DATE मिला जुलाई 2019 SATBIR BOLA मिला ONE  टाइम RAISE मिला
वह भी भिखारी के KATMANDAL में
KHOTA ओरोप  का MEAN वैल्यू KA देन मिला
मोदी BOLA फौजी को आरोप MILA
मोदी का वायदा पूरा हुआ

   NA HATHIAR NA OROP
   NA CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
NA RAKSHA MANTRI
MANTRALLAYA BABU KE RAM BHAROSE
JAI JAWAN JAI KISSAN
MERA BHARAT MAHAN
- Vasundhra

OROP & THE GREAT BETRAYAL

Of Fauji Vote Bank and Failed Promises

By

Col Dabby S De Mello (RETD)

On September 15, 2013, in an election rally at Rewari the BJP had promised to implement the One Rank One Pension scheme. Almost three years later, the promise has still not been fulfilled. The issue is far from being resolved. The nurturing of the armed forces en bloc has created a new vote bank.
Apr 13, 2017.

Veteran ex-servicemen protest against the non-implementation of the One Rank One Pension scheme outside Finance Minister Arun Jaitley’s residence in New Delhi. PTI

IN present-day India, come elections, the political parties throng to the various vote banks. On September 15, 2013, one more vote bank was added to the existing list; the “Armed Forces Vote Bank”.

OROP & THE GREAT BETRAYAL

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5EYZAespU3o ]

'Pakistan must focus on ending poverty instead of breeding terror' - Narendra Modi speech in Rewari

Persons from the armed forces, especially retired soldiers, are a fairly close-knit community.The mollycoddling of the military had thus far not been openly attempted by any political party even though politicisation had been going on for long. The collective mindset of the veterans it seems altered on September 15, 2013. On this day they (rightly or wrongly) allowed themselves to be considered a vote bank, perhaps due to the feeling that they have been taken for granted.

In the run-up to 2014 General Election, a poll strategist of the BJP apparently came up with a bright idea: “Why not tap the neutral armed forces, serving as well as retired, and use them as a vote bank”. The idea, appreciated by one and all as one whose time had come, was considered a master stroke.

A survey was conducted to ascertain the numerical strength of this vote bank. The strength of the three services —the Army, Navy and the Air Force regulars is already well known. The district and state sainik boards have the data regarding the ex-servicemen, military widows and the reservists.

The combined strength of the three services as per the Indian Defence Year Book is around 14 lakh, ex-servicemen constitute nearly 26.5 lakh, military widows and war widows 6.5 lakh and 45.5 thousand, respectively, (a testimony to the huge, but unrecognised, national sacrifice of our soldiers and the most unjustly neglected lot), the reservists are 1.7 lakh. The sum total is 49.1 lakh. Multiply it by a modest figure of 10 (family members and close friends) and the simple arithmetic gives you a whopping and magic number of 4.91 crore. A pan-India electorate which could influence 110 parliamentary seats, if evenly dispersed constituency wise. If the demographic spread is slightly uneven, the influence pattern may get marginally reduced but would still be formidable. Sometime during the middle of 2013, the BJP started a primary membership drive for ex-servicemen. The veterans were excited about being part of the electoral process, something denied to them since Independence. They even got a (misplaced) feeling of empowerment. Within a couple of months, the membership grew unexpectedly. Senior veterans organised motivational workshops at the block and district level and the middle-level ones motivated those at the village and mohalla level.

The agenda was to project the BJP as a jawan-friendly party, worth giving a chance to. The disciplined and obedient vote bank was shaping well. For the game plan to work, the BJP needed a believable electoral promise, a bait attractive enough for the faujis to bite, and an organisation with a strong leadership to spread the promise to the jawans throughout the country. The bait already existed for the ex-servicemen — the promise to implement One Rank One Pension (OROP) for defence pensioners. Prior to this, to press home the longstanding demand of OROP, in 2008 the entire ex-servicemen community came under one umbrella, with the formation of the United Front of Ex-Service Men (UFESM), headed by a retired General officer. Since then the UFESM made its presence felt all over India in support of the highly emotive issue of OROP. Poll strategists of the BJP were monitoring the influence and expanse of this front of disciplined and obedient ex-servicemen who would obey their seniors, including voting en masse for a particular political party in the polls. The aim as well as the mechanism to spread it among the 4.91 crore-strong armed forces vote bank were readily available. The only thing the BJP needed was a master stroke to showcase a supposedly charismatic figure and kick-start the campaign. It was a win-win strategy. The BJP had one in Narendra Modi.

Now that the statistics had been worked out, the BJP and the veterans devised a plan to collect the ex-servicemen and tell them that the BJP was truly a jawan-friendly party, committed to safeguarding their interests. Accordingly, Rewari a small town in southern Haryana was chosen as the venue for the All-India Ex- Servicemen Rally on September 15, 2013, to be addressed by Narendra Modi, the projected prime ministerial candidate. Captain Abhimanyu, a veteran and a BJP heavyweight in Haryana, was tasked to organise the rally. Handouts with tri-services colours and the lotus logo were distributed far and wide.

been declared the prime ministerial candidate on September 13, 2013 but it was on September 15, when he addressed his maiden election rally at Rewari that this was publicly announced.

The rally was attended by 31 retired generals, many more brigadiers and colonels ( I was one of them ), majors and captains running into hundreds, and an estimated seven lakh JCOs and jawans — all flashing their shining miniature or full medals on their chests. A photographer's delight indeed. Narendra Modi mounted the stage, bowed five times in front of the ex-servicemen and there was a thunderous roar by the upbeat veterans: "Dekho, dekho kaun aaya! Bharat Ma ka sher aaya". Yes the lion, the would-be king had arrived. The lion mesmerised the audience with his one hour and five minutes’ flawless oratory. He mentioned that some political parties were indulging in vote-bank politics with the military and they should not fall prey to them.

What he said in the 47th minute of his speech was what the entire defence fraternity was waiting for. “Hamare fauji bhaiyon ki wazib maang sweekar honi chahiye”. He continued, “Your longstanding and just demand of One Rank One Pension has been pending since so many years. Why?”He further added, "Had our government come to power in 2004, fauji bhaiyo, maanniye Vajpeyi ji would have ensured that your wazib demand of One Rank One Pension was met and the honour and dignity of the serving and retired is restored”. It had an instant connect with the jubilant audience. Another roar by the now totally mesmerised, or should we say brainwashed innocent faujis, “Dekho dekho kaun bol raha. Bharat ma ka sher bol raha”. After the massive response by the ex-servicemen in Modi's maiden election rally at Rewari, for the NDA (read the BJP) the wind of approval seemed favourable, the sea seemed calm and the Ark (vote bank of the ex-servicemen) seemed ready too. All it needed was a call from the General to all veterans to vote for the BJP to ensure the BJP's Ark, sails through. At the appropriate time, the General gave a call to the entire fraternity of ex-servicemen throughout India: “Vote for the BJP. Modiji has promised to fulfil our demand of One Rank One Pension”. The entire defence fraternity of 4.91 crore responded to the General's rallying cry and en masse as a vote bank cast their ballot for the BJP.

As a result, over one-fifth of the NDA's thumping majority in the 2014 General Election was courtesy the soldiers in and out of uniform. On September 15, 2013, a new vote bank, the “Armed Forces Vote Bank” was rightly or wrongly formed.

The defence pensioners have been given just a one-time raise in their pension and the government has maliciously termed this raise as One Rank One Pension. The Prime Minister has the utmost affection for the jawans but his colleagues and his subordinates (bureaucrats) seem to have misinformed him, resulting in him repeatedly telling a lie to the nation about granting of the One Rank One pension to the faujis.

The veterans feel let down at this sellout. Surely they are not foolish enough to continue to agitate if the OROP had been granted. The number of veterans sitting at the Jantar Mantar for the past one year and nine months, without break, asking for their promised One Rank One Pension is increasing day by day.

It is not merely the unkept promise by the Prime Minister to the faujis. Modi, a world-class statesman and the head of the government is repeatedly misinforming the country at the cost of serving and retired soldiers just to convince the larger electorate — the civilians— about his good governance.

In 2014, the General gave a call to the serving and the retired soldiers and all responded. They always do. Come 2019, and the General will again give a call but that time the narrative may not be the same as it was in 2014.

Tuesday, April 11, 2017

INDIAN NAVY : Making the Problem & Case for India’s Naval Build-Up (R)

SOURCE:

[ a ] http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/itCxLclcVmVqEu3rbEMaSO/The-problem-with-Indias-naval-buildup.html

[ b ] http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/ASEBsxXh9kcNmv9MZMQWIL/Making-the-case-for-Indias-naval-buildup.html?li_source=LI&li_medium=news_rec

INDIAN NAVY : Making the Problem & Case for India’s Naval Build-Up

PART ONE of TWO

The Problem with India’s Naval Build-Up

By

Abhijit Iyer-Mitra

Naval build-ups, because of their capital-intensive nature, are frequently more fatal to the originator than they are to the opposition

Mar 15 2017.

The whole rationale of aircraft carriers for middle-power navies like India needs to be re-examined in the interests of fiscal prudence and the creation of a navy that realistically serves India’s interests. Photo: Abhijit Bhatlekar/Mint

Much of the focus of Aero India 2017 was on the navy’s fighter requirement following the abject failure of the MiG-29K and the abandonment of Tejas. However, given that India’s capital acquisition budget will remain plateaued for the foreseeable future, the whole rationale of aircraft carriers for middle-power navies like India needs to be re-examined in the interests of fiscal prudence and the creation of a navy that realistically serves India’s interests, rather than ending up subsidizing dangerous delusions of grandeur.

Naval build-ups, because of their capital-intensive nature, are frequently more fatal to the originator than they are to the opposition. Admiral Tirpitz’s build-up of the Imperial German Navy, for example, contributed to the German defeat in World War I, with no significant returns on the massive investment. Similarly, Admiral Gorshkov’s expansion of the Soviet navy directly contributed to the fall of the USSR.

Both Tirpitz and Gorshkov were tactical geniuses who were unmitigated strategic disasters because they were economic ignoramuses, ignoring the military dictum of economy of effort where every action must extract a disproportionate cost from the opponent. Ominously, the INS Vikramaditya once bore the ill-fated name: Admiral Gorshkov.

The navy forwards three reasons for its carrier craze. First, the Chinese naval build-up and forays into the Indian Ocean; second, to dominate the littoral and project power; third, to protect the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) and, as a corollary, deny China energy supplies in the event of war. Not one of these reasons holds up to scrutiny.

The vast difference in the economies of China and India means that the former can counter our naval aviation assets many times over. Operationally, China’s naval fighter, the Su-33, outclasses India’s failed MiG-29K. While Western naval fighters like the Rafale or F-18 are undeniably superior electronically, a cost difference of almost 10:1 in the Sukhoi’s favour presents an insurmountable quantitative challenge. To quote Stalin, “Quantity has a quality all of its own.” This, in fact, is similar both to World War II, where Russian bulk overcame the Luftwaffe’s vast qualitative superiority, and the Falklands war where Harriers bested superior Argentine Mirages because Argentina failed to mobilize sufficient numbers or absorb high losses against the Harrier. Clearly, the quality-quantity matrix favours Chinese quantity over Indian quality.

Dominating the littoral with carriers is also a problematic proposition. A cursory glance at the Indian Ocean reveals two kinds of states here—very powerful ones and very weak ones. Sending all three carriers against powerful countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Pakistan, Singapore and Australia would be suicidal, with each of these countries possessing the ability to tackle India’s naval fighters effectively. On the other hand, even one aircraft carrier is a farcical overkill against countries like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Somalia, Mauritius, Mozambique et al. This means the Indian carrier build-up answers a question nobody asked.

Protecting SLOCs, and in wartime destroying China’s energy access, is best achieved by other assets. During peacetime, the best way to police the Indian Ocean is a fleet of cheap offshore patrol vessels. During wartime, the lack of littoral aircraft carriers means frigates with an excellent anti-submarine (ASW) component and air defence missiles are more than qualified to do the job. Yet, curiously, the critical ASW helicopter shortage is something the Indian Navy has dangerously subjugated to its quixotic quest for inutile carriers.

Denying the Indian Ocean to the Chinese navy in the event of war will mean countering two main threats—their nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. Chinese nuclear submarines will, in such a situation, challenge the Indian surface fleet and are best countered by a strong anti-submarine helicopter force for the fleet. Chinese aircraft carriers, on the other hand, are best countered by Indian submarines.

Submarines and anti-submarine components are also an area where India enjoys an advantage. Chinese submarines are noisy and relatively crude, whereas the Western submarines and helicopters that India has access to have superb stealth and electronic capabilities. In war games, conventional Western submarines have routinely sunk US aircraft carriers while avoiding detection. The latest generation of French sonars on British submarines is able to acoustically detect every single ship leaving New York harbour thousands of kilometres away.

While submarines are not cheap, they are much cheaper than aircraft carriers, play to India’s strength and meet our requirement set in a much more affordable, versatile and sustainable way.

In the final analysis, if India wants to change the current situation where it punches far below its weight, a shift to air-centrism is the only answer. However, an ill-planned, operationally inadequate and economically catastrophic air-centrism of the Indian Navy variety will do far more damage to Indian interests, with gains being illusory at best.

Being a serious player requires the ruthless culling of deadweight. And the bellwether for Indian seriousness will be decisions that the country’s strategic managers take on the future of aircraft carriers in lieu of realistic and affordable goals (read frigates, submarines and helicopters) that yield true “bang for the buck” in the short to medium term.
Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is senior fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.Comments are welcome at views@livemint.comAbhijit Iyer-Mitra

TOPICS:
INS VIKRAMADITYA AIRCRAFT CARRIER INDIAN NAVY SUBMARINES MIG29K

PART TWO of TWO

Making the Case for India’s Naval Build-Up

By

Abhijit Singh

Critics of the aircraft carrier fail to appreciate the political objectives that maritime power is meant to further

Navies regard aircraft carriers—not battleships— as the core of their war-fighting plans. Photo: Abhijit Bhatlekar/Mint

India’s naval establishment has been het up after Abhijit Iyer-Mitra wrote a scathing piece for this newspaper last week, criticizing the Indian Navy for its maritime modernization strategy (“The problem with India’s naval build-up”). Iyer-Mitra disapproved of the decision to induct aircraft carriers as being fiscally imprudent, serving to subsidize a certain “delusion of grandeur” in the Indian navy, and impeding efforts to modernize the army and air force.

Though seemingly well argued, Iyer-Mitra’s piece reveals a misjudgement of the essence of naval operations, as well as a lack of appreciation of the political objectives maritime power is meant to further. In over half a century of naval development, maritime forces have based their combat strategy and modernization on two principal concepts of operations: “sea control” and “sea denial”. A maritime power either dominates the adversary by controlling the littoral seas or denies their use to the adversary. Sea control is the strategy of choice for an ascendant force but entails a higher operational commitment in dictating the tempo of operations in littoral spaces over prolonged durations. In contrast, a weaker force focuses all its combat efforts in denying the adversary the use of the near-seas—a strategy called “sea denial”.

In peace and in war, there is no platform that provides access to littoral spaces as thoroughly and emphatically as the aircraft carrier. Not only does it allow a superior maritime force to establish effective sea command, it ensures a continuous and visible presence that influences the cost-benefit calculus of the enemy commander and his political masters. The importance of flat-top operations cannot be overstated, because apart from the ability to surveil and strike littoral targets, aircraft carriers enable crucial tactical air-cover, an operational imperative in littoral conflict. Powerful navies the world over, thus, regard aircraft carriers—and not battleships (or submarines)—as the core of their war-fighting plans and power-projection strategies.

But the flat-top is also an article of faith with India’s naval elite because of its ability to alter the psychological balance in the Indian Ocean littorals. A potent symbol of a nation’s pride and power, an aircraft carrier projects strength. It could be replaced by lesser platforms that might do the job, but none can replicate its demonstrative impact. For naval commanders, therefore, the aircraft-carrier debate is more than a question of “utilitarian” value, because the flat-top is the “beating heart” that provides all naval combat effort with its essential vigour.

This is not to say all criticism of the navy’s modernization plans is invalid. The move to induct modern air carriers and other costly platforms has indeed imposed a huge financial burden on the state, slowing investment in other key areas of military development. Yet, the suggestion that air power must substitute naval aviation is patently misplaced, as the air force has shown itself to be an unreliable source of tactical action at sea. It does provide a measure of fleet support but is incapable of crisis response in the far littorals.

As Iyer-Mitra sees it, India might be repeating the “mistakes” of sea-power proponents Alfred Tirpitz and Sergei Gorshkov, who in his opinion contributed significantly to the fall of Wilhelmine Germany (1890-1914) and post-Cold War Soviet Union by ignoring the economics of naval modernization. That assessment is again wide off the mark. Admiral Gorshkov’s singular achievement was that he resisted the temptation to play the near-game with the US navy. By patiently working towards long-term strategic objectives in the post-Khrushchev era, he transformed the Soviet navy from a submarine-dominated force with a coastal and defensive orientation into a blue water fleet that had strategic strike, power projection, and global presence. Gorshkov’s impact on the Russian naval establishment was enduring and continues to this day.

Similarly, German admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s folly in the years leading up to World War I wasn’t thoughtless profligacy, but his attempts to build a navy on the cheap—a tactic that lowered the operational efficiency of Germany’s maritime combat power (and one Iyer-Mitra incorrectly recommends for India).

The real dilemma for India’s maritime planners is that their mission set of raising fighting efficiency and interdiction potential in the near-littorals is constantly in competition with the broader strategic objective of expanding regional political influence. The navy’s deployment plans must deter adversaries, but also establish a visible footprint in the far seas to project ambition and influence through presence operations. If particular aspects of the maritime blueprint are found to be lacking—as indeed is the case with the limited success of the MiG-29K aircraft—the navy cannot discard its broader strategy in favour of an ad-hoc plan built around particular assets of relative operational superiority. Indian naval power in the Indian Ocean region would be robbed of its vitality if the aircraft carrier is replaced with a few more destroyers, corvettes and shore-based air power—regardless of the latter’s perceived tactical advantages in battle.

As Gorshkov noted in his thought-provoking and intellectually stimulating treatise The Sea Power Of The State, ideas on the deployment of maritime power need to be grounded in the logic of geopolitics and long-term state interests, and not on any contingent assessments of imminent needs.

Abhijit Singh heads the maritime policy initiative at the Observer Research Foundation and is a former naval officer.

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Abhijit Singh

TOPICS: INDIAN NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS INS VIKRAMADITYA ADMIRAL GORSHKOV MILITARY