BANISHED FROM HIS OWN LAND (R)

SOURCE:
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/spectrum/banished-from-his-own-land/818375.html

VIDEO: Kashmir The Story | Full Documentary On The History & Timelines Of Kashmir Valley

           https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SuNPI6Y6K8&t=302s

  BANISHED FROM HIS OWN LAND 

 

Maharaja Hari Singh acceded J&K to India but was expelled two years after the accession. He breathed his last in exile                                                                     BY                     Shakti S. Chandel

                                 Maharaja Hari Singh                                          took over the reins of J&K on September 23, 1925

         Maharaja Hari Singh and Vallabhbhai Patel
                       in Delhi on April 20, 1948

          Nehru and Maharaja Hari Singh in May, 1948.

Pt Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah

                                The Royal couple             : Maharani Tara Devi and Maharaja Hari Singh

June 20, 1949. It was the day when the government of independent India chose to exile the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir, who had acceded his state to India on October 26, 1947. The Jawaharlal Nehru-led government in Delhi, under the influence of Governor General Lord Mountbatten, did not accept the accession in full measure — it was accepted on the condition that the final accession would be decided by the people of Jammu & Kashmir by plebiscite. Maharaja Hari Singh had merged the state with India without any condition — none could have been attached as conditional accession was not warranted by the 1947 Act of Independence passed by the British Parliament. However, the strings of plebiscite attached by the Indian government now came in the hands of Sheikh Abdullah, who got himself appointed as the Prime Minister of J&K. He wanted to be the absolute head of the state if the Indian government wanted his favour for winning the plebiscite. So he bargained with Nehru and sought the exile of Maharaja Hari Singh from J&K. Both Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel succumbed to this man's design, according to Looking Back, an autobiography of Mehr Chand Mahajan, the Prime Minister of Maharaja Hari Singh and the third Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India.

In 1857, the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, was exiled to Rangoon for resisting a foreign power. In that case, a native was exiled by a foreign, occupying force — the Britishers. In the case of Maharaja Hari Singh, it was done by his own country's rulers in Delhi for no fault of his. Patel assured him that his stay outside the state would be a 'temporary phase' and he would return after a settlement with regard to the plebiscite was finalised. After signing a proclamation appointing his 18-year-old son, Yuvraj Karan Singh, as the Regent of Jammu and Kashmir, the Maharaja took a train to Bombay on June 20, 1949, and started living there. As events unfolded, the plebiscite never took place and only the ashes of the exiled ruler returned to Jammu in 1961.

April 26, 1961. The news of Maharaja Hari Singh's passing away was broken by the All India Radio on April 26, 1961, plunging the region and the Dogras into a state of shock and confusion. Shock, because he was loved across caste lines in the region; and confusion since they did not know where they should go for mourning. There was no one in the palace. Yuvraj Karan Singh and his wife were on a trip to Europe, and the Maharani was in Kasauli. The mourners marched to the residence of Pandit Prem Nath Dogra of Praja Parishad, hoping he would be able to guide them. No one knows how the decision was taken, but the mourners ended up forming a surreal funeral procession, which had neither the dead, nor the family of the deceased. The procession proceeded to the funeral grounds by the banks of Tawi, where the funeral rites were performed. No smoke came out of any hearth that evening as a sign of love and respect for the departed soul. However, the state government refused to share the grief of the Dogras. The radio station played songs and the state flag continued to flutter. This was provocative, and the demonstrating youth reacted. They marched to the civil secretariat and attempted to bring down the flag to half-mast, but the police responded by firing at them. 

Maharaja and the Great Game

The Dogra rulers had survived the intrigues of the Lahore Durbar, and theirs was the only dynasty to emerge out of the decay and destruction of the local kingdoms. Eventually, the Dogras succeeded in extending the boundaries of their state deep into northern areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, Ladakh, Trans-Karakoram Tract and Aksai Chin. By the time Maharaja Hari Singh took over the reins of the state on September 23, 1925, much had changed and much remained mired in the political games of the nineteenth century that came to be known as the ‘Great Game’. Most of his life was spent battling those forces, in addition to the newly emerging threat of communalism in the subcontinent.

In hindsight, the history of the post-1947 subcontinent can’t be fully appreciated without critically examining the Maharaja’s role. So far it has never been adequately narrated. Even those who have made such attempts have judged him rather harshly through the eyes of other prominent forces of the time, without applying the test of objectivity and credibility to the sources from where they drew their arguments. Apart from not being fair to the Maharaja, historians have also been guilty of unfairly condemning the state forces for their role in the 1947-48 war with Pakistan. “Setting the record straight on both these counts was my stated purpose of writing the book Maharaja Hari Singh: The Troubled Years,” says author Prof. Harbans Singh.

The beginning of the Maharaja’s rule coincided with the rise of Mahatma Gandhi as a mass leader in India and the beginning of the awakening among the rural masses. Maharaja Hari Singh introduced many administrative and judicial reforms. At the very first durbar of 1925, he had declared: “Justice is my religion.” He stuck to this secular vision in letter and spirit all his life. He selected the ablest and experienced luminaries from British India as his prime ministers. He set up a responsible government with full provincial autonomy, and a Board of Judicial Advisors with the ruler as the constitutional head. The finances of the State were governed on modern principles. He promoted diverse cultural activities of the state and patronised performing artistes.

Secular outlook

Maharaja Hari Singh had worked hard for improving the lot of the Kashmiri Muslims. He made primary education compulsory for all subjects. Liberal stipends and scholarships were offered to Muslim students as an incentive for higher education. Sadly, the state had not taken sufficient measures to create a vibrant economic scene where jobs were created and these educated young men could have found opportunities. Therefore, if Sheikh Abdullah was a disgruntled schoolteacher after receiving a post-graduate degree in science, there was some reason for his resentment. The disgruntled thus found other channels to express their frustration. In a society that is largely uneducated and religious, the parables and words of saints come in handy to inspire as well as rouse. Since Sheikh Abdullah was adept at scriptures, he quickly succeeded in building a large following.

Then the developments of 1947 and the question of accession appeared.  The position of Jammu and Kashmir was quite difficult, situated as it was in contiguity to India and Pakistan as also to Afghanistan, Tibet and Russia. The state had several ethnic groups. The situation, therefore, required to be dealt with tact and foresight. The Maharaja waited in vain for the turmoil of the communal frenzy in neighbouring Punjab to settle down. And before that happened, Pakistan invaded Kashmir—resulting in hurried accession of the state to India.

Sidelined

After taking over as the Prime Minister, Sheikh Abdullah started usurping all powers, ignoring the existence of the Maharaja. He started issuing a series of statements intended to humiliate and malign the Maharaja, and painted him as unpatriotic. In order to avoid embarrassment, the Maharaja wrote to Patel on May 6, 1949, and proposed that the Government of India find a suitable position in Delhi where his services could be utilised in a befitting manner, but there was no response. Under pressure from Sheikh Abdullah, the Maharaja was called to Delhi and was asked to desist from returning to the state, and was finally exiled. Thus, the Maharaja was banished from his own land, which had neither the sanction of law nor of political morality. 

On June 20, 1949, the three members of the Dogra dynasty embarked upon their lonely journeys: the Maharaja took a train to Bombay; the Maharani took the road to Kasauli, and the newly appointed Regent, Yuvraj Karan Singh, flew to Srinagar to work with Sheikh Abdullah! This caused a strain on the relationship of the father and the son; 

the Maharaja mollified only after Yuvraj Karan Singh dismissed Sheikh Abdullah from the office in 1953 and put him in jail, where he was to spend 11 years.

In the last phase of his life, the Maharaja lived a forlorn life, with no complaint or grudge against anyone. Only his passion for horses and the turf of Mumbai kept him going!

— The writer is a former IAS officer

SOURCE:
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/ruptures-in-the-yemen-coalition/?utm_source=A+Short+History+of+Modern+Russia&utm_campaign=e7680dc709-190804_sunday+reads_COPY_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_daf8214408-e7680dc709-264164417

   RUPTURES IN THE YEMEN COALITION  

 
                               By 

                    Xander Snyder

Clashes between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may indicate a deeper strategic divide between the two

 August 14, 2019

Infighting among the Arab coalition in Yemen is starting to resemble a civil war within a civil war. Disagreements between Saudi Arabia, the coalition leader, and junior partner the United Arab Emirates in Yemen is nothing new, and in some ways last weekend’s events looked like only the latest in the tussle between them: Two UAE-backed entities, the Southern Transitional Council and its military wing, the Security Belt, attacked Yemeni government forces, which are supported by Saudi Arabia and led from afar by exiled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, in the southern port city of Aden. The militias seized the presidential palace and several military bases

What’s different about this round of infighting is the context. In May, the United Nations brokered a cease-fire that required rebel Houthi troops to withdraw from the key port city of Hodeida, though airstrikes by the Arab coalition on Houthi targets there in June called into question the U.N.’s assertion that the withdrawal had been completed. Four days before these strikes, a Yemeni official claimed that the UAE was plotting a military coup against Hadi. It was a credible claim even at the time, given the STC’s threat to overthrow Hadi last October, and one that was further validated by the STC’s seizure of the presidential palace in Aden last weekend.

(click to enlarge)

Then, beginning in June, the UAE started to slowly leave the country. Emirati forces made what the UAE described as a “strategic” withdrawal from Hodeida – ostensibly as part of the U.N.-led peace process that prompted the Houthis’ partial exit – and “tactical” retreats from other cities, including Aden. By July 2, some sources were reporting as much as an 80 percent drawdown in UAE forces from in and around Hodeida, a full withdrawal from Marib, and an ongoing tactical withdrawal from Aden. Emirati sources also reported that the UAE had scaled back its presence in Assab, Eritrea, by 75 percent. (Assab is where the UAE trains soldiers and launches airstrikes on Yemen.) Around July 6, control over the Emirati forces’ headquarters in Mocha had been transferred to Saudi Arabia.

(click to enlarge)

Throughout these withdrawals, Emirati officials repeatedly issued statements insisting that the military would continue to participate in the Arab coalition and would honor its commitment to countering Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula. Three Western diplomats, speaking to Reuters, said the UAE’s withdrawals were in fact related to escalating tensions between the U.S. and Iran that began when four tankers were attacked in an Emirati port in May. That the UAE would want to bring troops home to protect its coasts seemed credible.

But in early July reports surfaced that Emirati forces were redeploying to Yemen. In early August, the Emirati foreign affairs minister confirmed as much. If the UAE is indeed redeploying, it might suggest that the earlier withdrawals were, in fact, tactical. But details on any such redeployment are scant, and other reports suggest the withdrawal is continuing – painting a rather muddled picture of the UAE’s position in Yemen.

A Narrowing Strategy

What is certain, however, is that the UAE’s perception of the war in Yemen – and of its winnability – has changed. The UAE is no longer comfortable expending all the resources it’s contributed to the war, especially as tensions in the Strait of Hormuz threaten the country’s maritime trade. This makes the UAE’s interest in controlling Yemen’s southern coast all the more pressing.

The recent infighting in Aden thus takes on greater significance. The UAE appears willing to scale back its presence across much of the country, including in combating the Houthis, even as it doubles down on its control over southern Yemen.

Hence the meeting, purportedly on maritime issues, between Emirati and Iranian officials in July. Officially, the two countries discussed fishermen’s rights to cross into each other’s waters for commercial purposes. But the timing of the meeting – on the heels of the reports that UAE forces were redeploying and just a week and a half before the STC attack on the Saudi-backed Yemeni government – makes the official version highly suspect.

It’s possible that the UAE and Iran reached a tacit agreement to leave each other alone in Yemen. Their territorial interests are complementary; Iran-backed Houthis are now concentrated north of Hodeida, with their seat of power in Sanaa, while the UAE is interested in securing possessions in the south. If the UAE is to redirect its forces away from hotly contested arenas like Hodeida to the south, it wouldn’t threaten the Houthis; in fact, there would be fewer Emirati forces available to fight them.

The UAE has other reasons to reconsider its commitment to the war in Yemen. Following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the American public became much more interested in Saudi Arabia’s behavior on the world stage, particularly in Riyadh’s role in the Yemen civil war. Both chambers of the U.S. Congress have passed legislation to curtail U.S. support for Saudi Arabia in the war. President Donald Trump has vetoed some of these bills, but the dissension is there. The U.S. is less willing to turn a blind eye to the conflict, making a difficult war much harder for the Saudi-led Arab coalition to fight.

That leaves Saudi Arabia with Houthi forces at its southern doorstep, threatening its airports with Iranian-supplied missiles, and with less Emirati ground support. Throughout the war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has relied on the UAE’s ground forces, which it supports from the air – a strategy that limits Saudi casualties and, therefore, the Saudi public’s opposition to the war. If the UAE pulls back to the south, Saudi Arabia will be forced to either commit more ground forces to a quagmire of a war or to reach some kind of accommodation with the Houthis. Iran’s goal in supporting the Houthis all along has been to tie Saudi Arabia down; forcing the Saudis into this position would benefit Tehran, too.

(click to enlarge)

The obvious problem with this theory is that the STC is no friend of Iran. Even after taking Aden, its leader even said the STC was committed to Saudi Arabia. Still, it would be easier for the UAE and its allies to make these kinds of commitments from a position of power – namely, consolidated control of the south. The UAE needs to be playing on its own terms, which at this point probably includes pushing for a political settlement that will relieve the demands on its manpower and resources to a war that seems, at best, to be a stalemate. And what better time to push for a settlement than now, since the UAE has control over Yemen’s southern coast and the surrounding maritime routes.

What Happens Next?

The UAE’s withdrawals and redeployments, its meeting with Tehran, and the infighting in Aden make it more likely that a political resolution to the war in Yemen will divide the country in two. To manage discontent with the war on the home front, it’s more likely Saudi Arabia will need to reach an agreement with the Houthis. But even if they reach a political settlement, Saudi Arabia will not be able to divert its attention from its southern border, constraining what it can do in the rest of the Middle East to counter Iran’s influence. An enduring Houthi presence in northern Yemen is not the most powerful stick in the world, but it’s one that Riyadh knows that Tehran could use to poke it in the eye at inopportune moments. (It also makes it less likely that half of one of our 2019 forecasts – that Iran’s position in Syria and Yemen will weaken – will come true.)

Last, this would portend a deepened rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Going its own way in Yemen is a sign that, where its interests diverge with Saudi Arabia, the UAE will be willing to pursue them regardless of what Riyadh wants. The two are still aligned on some issues – not least their shared fear of Iran – but this will represent another point of tension, and possible division, between the Gulf’s two monarchies.

Another ‘Arab Revolt’? History Never Repeats.

SOURCE:
https://www.newsclick.in/Arab-Revolt-US-Iran-Tension-Donald-Trump




             

             Another ‘Arab Revolt’?

                         History 

                   Never Repeats.

                            BY

          M. K. BHADRAKUMAR

 

The Arab Revolt (1916-1918). File photo.

AUGUST 02, 2019    

The Arab sheikhs who instigated the US-Iran standoff have heard the African proverb, ‘When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers’. But they chose to ignore it. The assumption in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi was that President Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ strategy would frighten Tehran and life would be back to normal very soon with a weakened Iran bludgeoned into submission. 

On the contrary, the gyre of the US-Iran standoff is only widening by the day. What was thought to be a localised affair is acquiring international dimensions. America’s Arab allies no longer have a say in the mutation of the US-Iran standoff. 

The Saudi and Emirati role narrows down to bankrolling the Anglo-American project on Iran and to allow the western bases on their territories to be used as launching pads for belligerent acts aimed at provoking the leadership in Tehran into retaliatory moves. In sum, there is growing danger that they  might get sucked into a conflict situation in a near future. 

The Gulf states lack “strategic depth” vis-a-vis Iran and are sure to find themselves on the frontline of any military conflagration. Conceivably, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE bargained for such an eventuality. 

. It is possible to discern amidst the welter of interpretations given to the “partial” pullout of the UAE forces from Yemen, Abu Dhabi’s calculation that safeguarding homeland security comes first, way above any imperial agenda. That sobering thought may also have prompted the UAE to make some overtures most recently toward Tehran

The UAE has taken a nuanced stance that no country could be held responsible for the attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf in June. Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan said “clear and convincing evidence” is needed regarding the attacks that targeted four vessels off the UAE coast, including two Saudi oil tankers. In essence he distanced the UAE from the US National Security Adviser John Bolton’s finding that the attacks on oil tankers were the work of “naval mines almost certainly from Iran”. 

Significantly, Al-Nahyan made the remark at a joint press conference with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during a visit to Moscow in late June, which from all indications focused on the efforts to bring the war in Yemen to an end and on a possible Russian initiative to moderate UAE’s tensions with Iran. (Interestingly, within the week after Al-Nahyan’s visit in late June, Moscow also hosted the Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the UN special envoy on Yemen.) 

It is entirely conceivable that Russia is doing what it can behind the scenes to lower the tensions between Iran and the UAE and in the Persian Gulf region as a whole. Moscow has lately rebooted its proposal for a collective security system for the Persian Gulf. In fact, on July 29, the Russian concept of collective security in the Persian Gulf has been distributed as an official document approved by the UN. 

The Russian document envisages an initiative group to prepare an international conference on security and cooperation in the Persian Gulf, which would later lead to establishing an organisation on security and cooperation in this region. China has welcomed the Russian initiative and offered to contribute to its success — “We would also like to boost cooperation, coordination and communication with all the corresponding parties.” 

Clearly, the Russian proposal flies in the face of the Anglo-American project to create a western naval armada led by the US to take control of the 19000 nautical miles in and around the Strait of Hormuz that will put the West effectively as the moderator of the world oil market — with all the implications that go with it for international politics — and literally reduce the oil-rich Persian Gulf countries to de facto pumping stations. For that reason, the Russian initiative will not fly. Simply put, the US and Britain will resent Russia butting in. 

However, there are other straws in the wind. The Iran-UAE joint meeting to address littoral security cooperation in Tehran on July 30 is a tell-tale sign that the Persian Gulf states may have begun to realise that the endemic insecurities of the region ultimately require a regional solution. Iran has welcomed the Emirati overture and sees in it a “slight shift” in policy. 

The big question is how far the UAE can get away with an independent foreign policy toward Iran. The West traditionally dictates the bottom line and that cannot change fundamentally unless the Arab regimes in the region give way to representative rule. 

This is where the real tragedy lies. The big powers — be it the US or Russia — are largely guided by their own mercantilist interests and are stakeholders in the autocratic regimes in the region, which they find easily amenable to manipulation. A century ago, when an Arab Revolt appeared in the region, Britain had engineered it to roll back the Ottoman Empire. Today, there is no such possibility. The dismal ending of the Arab Spring in Egypt was to the advantage and utter delight of both the US and Russia. 

Having said that, the situation is not altogether bleak. The western powers and Russia fiercely competing to secure lucrative arms sales running into tens of billions of dollars annually. This can be turned into opportunity.

The Russia-Saudi axis calibrating the world oil market shows the potential to incrementally shift the locus of Middle East politics. 

Similarly, China’s appearance on the scene opens seamless possibilities for the Gulf states. The recent visit by the UAE Crown Prince to China underscores the Arab ingenuity to test the frontiers of strategic autonomy even in such difficult conditions. The fact of the matter is that the UAE has openly defied American pressure and is positioning itself as a hub of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and, furthermore, has become the first country in the Persian Gulf to introduce the 5G technology from China. (See my blog Belt and Road takes a leap forward to the Gulf.)

THE KRA CANAL

SOURCE:
https://takshashila.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/TDS-The-Kra-Canal-MK-AK-KK-2019-02-1.pdf


             THE KRA CANAL

: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR INDIA? 

Why is China attempting to build a canal through the Isthmus of Kra?

 How does this impact regional dynamics? 

What are India’s interests in the project? 
                       BY
Manoj Kewalramani , Anirudh Kanisetti & Kunaal Kini 

March 2019

Executive Summary

A canal along the Isthmus of Kra could alter the strategic calculus for states across Southeast Asia, with China expected to benefit the most. In light of recent discussions around building the canal with the help of Chinese investors, this study examines the potential impact and pitfalls of this project from an Indian interests perspective. The following are the key conclusions of this assessment:

1. The Kra Canal is not going to materialise immediately and has several challenges.

Thailand has many misgivings about the project, with divided elite and public opinions. It is a diplomatically, politically and economically risky undertaking. In addition, China is working on less controversial alternatives to address the Malacca Dilemma.

2. The Kra Canal is not necessarily “aimed” at India, and can serve Indian interests. 

The Kra Canal is not an economic risk to India and will likely boost trade with East Asia. The potential security threats it poses can be managed through contingency planning.

3. For India to benefit from the canal, it needs to take action immediately. 

India must avoid direct involvement in the project. But if it materialises, India should deepen bilateral ties with key ASEAN members, pursue a “sea denial” strategy to address security concerns and invest in port and transshipment capacity.


What is the Kra Canal? 

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that could route shipping from the Andaman Sea directly to the Gulf of Thailand. It’s in the news thanks to reports of a 2015 MoU between two private entities and the Thai leadership commissioning a feasibility study

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that aims to directly connect the Gulf of Thailand to the Andaman Sea through the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand, providing an alternative route for shipping that is now concentrated on the Straits of Malacca. If built, the canal would cut travel time from South Asia to East Asia by at least 3 days and 1200 kilometres.

 In 2015, a Chinese company reportedly signed an MoU to construct the canal. Since then, there have been concerns about the canal’s impact on India. This Slidedoc discusses Thai and Chinese interests in pursuing the canal, the project’s feasibility and prospects, and proposes actions for India to maximise its interests.

How far along has the project come?

The Kra Canal is a project often discussed at times of geopolitical competition. Despite the support of Chinese academics and elements within the Thai military, it has not yet secured a green light. A feasibility study has recently been commissioned, but it is not the first and may not be the last.

The idea of a canal through the Isthmus of Kra is more than 300 years old, and has been periodically revived in times of geopolitical competition. The late 19th century, for example, saw competition between France and Britain, the former in support while the latter opposed. The late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen more systematic and technology-backed proposals, with multiple feasibility studies being carried out.

In 2015, an MoU was inked between the China-Thailand Kra Infrastructure Investment and Development company and Asia Union Group, to build the canal. Both the Chinese and Thai governments have since officially distanced themselves from the deal. But many Chinese academics and influential Thai businessmen - who also happen to be retired military officers - have spoken in favour of it.

Most recently, Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Board and the National Security Council have been tasked to conduct a feasibility study (Pakkawan 2018). So far, neither the ruling military junta nor the democratic opposition have taken a clear, decisive stance supporting the canal, or outlining how it would be constructed.

What does Thailand stand to gain or lose?

 There are compelling arguments for and against the Canal. It is potentially a very lucrative project, but comes with immense risks for Thailand


Economics
Gains
The canal could aid Thailand’s rise as a shipping and financial hub, create employment, incentivise business and boost growth.
Losses
  To benefit from the canal, transhipment facilities and an SEZ must be built, bringing the total cost anywhere between $30-$80bn. The debt incurred may be difficult to repay – especially given that Singapore would remain a competitor and the canal could adversely impact the environment, hurting tourism.

 National Security 
Gains
Economic development and employment generation may well lead to increased social and political stability.
 Losses
The Canal would physically divide the South of Thailand from the North. This impinges on Thailand’s territorial integrity. It could also fuel the existing insurgency by Malays in the south. Unsustainable debt burden owing to the canal could also comprise Thai sovereignty. All of this could lead to greater political and social instability.
Geopolitics 
Gains
The Kra Canal would significantly buttress Thailand’s position as a swing power in Southeast Asia
Losses
A shift in trade away from the Straits of Malacca could lead to frictions among ASEAN states. Debt owed to China could increase Thailand’s dependence on it and risk embroiling it in the growing Sino-US competition (Bloomberg 2018).
Environment
Gains
Cutting the maritime travel time by 2-3 days and 1200 km would result in less energy consumption and reduced emissions (Murdoch 2017).
Losses
There are fears that increased shipping would adversely impact marine ecology and potentially pose an existential risk to tourist sites such as Phuket.

What does China stand to gain or lose?
China has much more to gain from the construction of the Kra Canal and is also less exposed to risk. However, some concerns remain.

Economics


 Security


Geopolitics

Our PM and CMs are puppets of the IAS

SOURCE:

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/seeing-the-invisible/our-pm-and-cms-are-puppets-of-the-ias/

       Our PM and CMs 

    are puppets of the IAS 

                   By 

        Sanjeev Sabhlok

 Sanjeev Sabhlok

Sanjeev Sabhlok joined the IAS in 1982 but resigned after 18 years upon concluding that India's corrupt socialist governance system cannot be reformed from within. He concluded that the IAS itself is a major cause of India’s misery. Since then he has attempted to build a liberal party for India even as he earns his living as an economist in the Treasury in the Victorian government in Australia. In 2013 he was instrumental in forming Swarna Bharat Party (SBP) which takes inspiration from Rajaji’s Swatantra Party and stands for comprehensive political, social and economic liberty. Sanjeev holds the pen on SBP’s manifesto and believes the document now contains all the essential reforms to transform India into a First World nation. He is author of Breaking Free of Nehru (2008, Anthem Press), and manuscripts such as The Discovery of Freedom and Seeing the Invisible (economics for children). He sometimes writes about SBP and its policies in the Times of India editorial page and in other outlets.

June 1, 2019,

I’m simplifying things quite a bit when I say that our elected politicians are puppets of the bureaucracy, but as I will show presently, this is a fair comment given our institutional arrangements. Our bureaucracy – taken as a whole – is not only more powerful than any elected chief minister, it is more powerful than the Prime Minister.

This situation is a complete violation of the principles of liberal political theory. In a democracy, the executive should be checked and balanced by the judiciary and parliament. The idea that the unelected machine of government (the bureaucracy) will itself check the executive by exercising independent power was never intended by any theorist of political science.

This huge power of the bureaucracy in India – much greater than the power that even the British Indian bureaucracy wielded – came about during the haste of the 1947 partition and Constitution drafting. Sardar Patel made a strong case in the Constituent Assembly to continue with the colonial bureaucracy. There was no time to think about alternative models. He asked: “Is there any Premier in any province who is prepared to work without the services? He will immediately resign. He cannot manage.”

This panic led to not only the Constitutional inclusion of the all-India services (India is unique in having the public services form part of its Constitution) but the way Part 14 of the Constitution was drafted, enormous restrictions were imposed on the sovereignty of the executive and the People of India. In all democracies, the executive is supreme, with almost unlimited discretionary powers to hire and fire public servants. Not so in India. Article 311 massively dilutes this power and makes it virtually impossible for the executive to remove public servants.

As a result over the past 70 years, even the PMs of India haven’t been able to easily remove corrupt IAS officers, leave alone the incompetent ones. A PM’s entire tenure can go by in chasing up a single case through the courts. There are cases in the Modi government where even compulsory retirement has been insufficient to get rid of bad officers. Our bureaucracy thus sits on a pedestal well above elected representatives. Effectively, it is the IAS that is sovereign in India, not the People.

There is a widely cited but spurious argument that has enabled the IAS to hold on to their powers: that Indians trust their politicians less than they trust IAS officers. The people perceive the IAS to be incompetent, self-interested and arrogant but they trust their political leaders even less. Further, many honest IAS officers, in their genuine concern for India, want the IAS to continue so it can block corrupt politicians. But their remedy does not address the cause of the problem. Fixing the problem of corrupt politicians requires a different approach (which I’ve elaborated elsewhere) and we should not use the existence of bad politicians to justify the world’s most powerful but incompetent bureaucracy.

The main puppet-master in the IAS is the Establishment Officer (EO) in the Ministry of Personnel, about whom most people do not the slightest clue. The EO’s sole purpose is to defend (and expand – to the extent possible) the powers that Patel gave to the IAS. The EO operates behind the scenes, manipulating and controlling (mainly frustrating) the elected government. He dramatically reduces options for the elected representatives on almost all major appointments. And of course, the Cabinet Secretary plays a crucial role in defending the IAS empire directly at the Cabinet. This itself is a huge anomaly. In genuine democracies, a bureaucrat must not have a seat at the political table. In Victoria, an elected MP serves as Cabinet Secretary.

Such is the clout of the EO and Cabinet Secretary that Ministers and Chief Ministers need to send their emissary to the lowly EO to try to influence his decisions. This clearly shows where power lies in India. Our elected politicians have no real powers to deliver their election commitments. Our democracy is thus being choked from within – by the unaccountable and ultra-powerful IAS.

The IAS is unfit for the task of taking India from the Third World to the First World. From my personal experience (and I continue to have good friends within the IAS), no IAS officer comes even remotely close to the competence of middle-level managers in the Australian government. If the pool of administrative leaders in India is so poor, how can India possibly succeed? We need to urgently broaden the talent pool for each job and ensure the right incentives and systems of accountability. The function of EO might have worked for the colonial British government but it simply can’t work in a modern democracy.

This hugely powerful Indian bureaucracy (of which I was once a member) contrasts with the situation in Victoria where the Premier (Chief Minister) of Victoria is the unquestionable boss. He appoints Secretaries, who then appoint other officers down the line. No one can tell the Premier that he can appoint officials only from a “shortlist” prepared by a petty bureaucrat. And if a Secretary doesn’t perform, he is fired without notice. The Premier is fully empowered to get the job done. The link between the voter, his taxes and the performance of the government is direct and unambiguous. No EO sits behind the scenes, stymying the elected executive.

The saving grace for India is that the PM does have a few powers to shop outside the IAS. The recent lateral entry program has been one such rare instance. Some people have questioned the Constitutional power of the PM to do so, but I believe the Constitution allows such limited powers.

The State governments, on the other hand, are in really bad shape. Their freedom to appoint outside the IAS is almost completely circumscribed. In particular, all important posts in the states have been captured by the IAS through IAS cadre rules. These include senior positions in local government bodies, such as municipal corporations. While the IAS system doesn’t, of course, control precisely who is appointed, it ensures that only one of them can hold these posts. In that sense, the Chief Ministers of the States have even less flexibility than the PM.

As a result, IAS officers are able to thumb their nose at State governments. They can go to the EO and get themselves posted to another state or to the Government of India or even abroad. Everything depends on the officer’s relationship with the EO and Cabinet Secretary. That’s why the IAS is such a cosy and exclusive club.

It is high time to bring this dysfunctional and undemocratic system to an end. Within two years the BJP government will have the opportunity to amend the Constitution. IAS is the first thing that must go.