Sunday, September 22, 2019

Part 14 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA The New PLA Joint Headquarters and Internal Assessments of PLA Capabilities ( R )

SOURCE :
https://jamestown.org/program/the-new-pla-joint-headquarters-and-internal-assessments-of-pla-capabilities/

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf?ver=2017-03-21-152018-430

CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

Part 28 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-28-cds-jointness-pla-snapshot.html

Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html

Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html

Part 14 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of-n-parts-new.html

Part 13 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-jointness-pla-pla-system-of-systems.html

Part 12 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-12-cds-jointness-pla-military.html

Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part 9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part 8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html

Part 5 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-3-chief-of-defence-staff.html

Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html

Part 1 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html

The New PLA Joint Headquarters

and Internal Assessments of PLA Capabilities

By

Dennis J. Blasko

Publication: China Brief Volume: 16 Issue: 10

June 21, 2016 Age: 3 years

The creation of new multi-service (joint) headquarters organizations at the national (strategic) and theater (operational) levels is a major component of the current tranche of reforms underway in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These changes further concentrate ultimate leadership of the armed forces in the Central Military Commission (CMC), led by Communist Party General Secretary and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, supported by an expanded joint organizational structure replacing the former four General Departments. Directly beneath the CMC, five new joint Theater Command headquarters have superseded the seven former Military Region headquarters.

These new headquarters contribute to the reforms’ goals to resolve problems in military readiness and weaknesses in combat capabilities, build an integrated joint operations system, and increase the PLA’s ability to, according to Xi’s guidance, “fight and win” informationized war. Under the new structure Theater Commands are responsible for planning joint operations for a specific strategic direction and executing large-scale joint training. The four service headquarters, the newly formed Army headquarters along with the Navy, Air Force, and upgraded Rocket Force headquarters, are responsible for “construction” or “force building,” which includes organizing, equipping, and training operational units to prepare them to participate in operational deployments and large joint exercises. These changes seek to reduce levels of command, shrink the overall number of headquarters personnel, and streamline decision-making, planning, execution, and evaluation throughout the PLA (Xinhua, January 1).

The adjustments to the PLA’s headquarters structure are to be accomplished by 2020, the date announced a decade ago as the second milestone in the “Three-Step Development Strategy” to modernize China’s national defense and armed forces (Defense White Papers, 2006 and 2008). This date is underscored in the recently announced “five-year military development plan,” which has the goal of completing the mechanization and making “important progress” on “incorporating information and computer technology” in the PLA by 2020—exactly the same goal as the milestone announced by the 2008 White Paper (China Military Online, May 13). The five-year implementation period implicitly acknowledges that many details remain unsettled and must be refined to eliminate overlaps or gaps in responsibilities. Additional reforms are expected in coming decades as the PLA continues its “Three-Step Development Strategy” with the final completion date of mid-century, 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic.

These reforms come as the Chinese military has reached a critical point in its long-term modernization process. The PLA has recognized that many traditional strategic and operational concepts and practices must be revised as potential threats and economic imperatives have changed. Fundamental to this new thinking are the official statements that “China is a major maritime as well as land country” and “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned.” Therefore, “great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests…” (Defense White Papers, 2013 and 2015). Both statements are related to the goal of breaking the “big Army” concept (“大陆军”观念 or 思维) (China Military Online, February 3).

Though these new requirements have been verbalized officially only in recent years, the trends in PLA force development toward greater emphasis on missile, naval, air, and cyber/electronic warfare capabilities have been apparent for the past two decades. Employing these “new-type combat forces” in new missions demands integrated command and control of units operating at much greater distances from China’s borders than ever before. Though ground forces have not been left behind totally in the current phase of modernization, this shift in doctrine comes at the expense of the PLA’s traditional base of power and leadership, the Army and Army generals.

The following sections describe the efforts in motion to satisfy the PLA’s increased need to develop joint headquarters and officers capable of commanding joint forces. As with other aspects of modernization, these efforts begin with the realistic acknowledgement of existing shortfalls in PLA capabilities.

Internal Assessments of PLA Capabilities

Critiques of inadequacies in joint training and command capabilities in all services are perennial topics found in the domestic Chinese military literature though often buried in long texts. For example, less than a year ago, the commander and political commissar of the former Nanjing Military Region commented that the low level of joint training and poor joint training mechanisms have restricted integrated operations and are fundamental issues in the transformation of the military (Xinhua, July 3, 2015). More recently, the English-language edition of China Military Online stated that there is a “shortage of officers who have a deep knowledge of joint combat operations and advanced equipment.” Moreover, the PLA has “developed and deployed many cutting-edge weapons, including some that are the best in the world, but there are not enough soldiers to use many of those advanced weapons. In some cases, soldiers lack knowledge and expertise to make the best use of their equipment” (China Military Online, April 28). Similar criticism is common in the Chinese-language military media.

Internal critiques like those above, along with the identification of other shortcomings in organization, doctrine, training realism, and logistics, are intended to inform PLA personnel of areas that need to be improved and motivate them to work harder to improve overall capabilities. These assessments frequently follow descriptions of positive developments and often are couched in terms of “some units” or “some commanders,” but are widespread enough to indicate that the problems are serious systemic shortcomings for much of the entire force.

Generally speaking, the PLA sees itself as not having the military capabilities and capacity to be confident in accomplishing many of the tasks it may be assigned. In 2006, then-CMC chairman Hu Jintao summarized the situation in a formula known as the “Two Incompatibles” (两个不相适应), which referred directly back to his own doctrinal vision known as the “historic missions” (China Brief, May 9, 2013). The “Two Incompatibles” said the PLA’s “level of modernization does not meet the requirements of winning local war under informatized conditions and its military capability does not meet the requirements of carrying out its historic missions at the new stage of the new century.” Though appearing frequently during Hu’s tenure as CMC chairman, the formula has been used less regularly since Xi replaced Hu, but as recently as mid-April 2016 (China Military Online, April 19).

Since 2013, under Xi’s leadership, the “Two Big Gaps” (两个差距很大) and the “Two Inabilities” (两个能力不够 – translations of the Chinese terms vary) have come to prominence as general descriptions of PLA capabilities. Similar to the “Two Incompatibles,” the “Two Big Gaps” states “(1) there are big gaps between the level of our military modernization compared to the requirements for national security and the (2) level of the world’s advanced militaries” (China Air Force, April 16, 2013).

The “Two Inabilities” reinforces these points and further identifies problems specifically in officer capabilities: The PLA’s ability “(1) to fight a modern war is not sufficient, (2) our cadres at all levels ability to command modern war is insufficient” (China Air Force, July 12, 2013). These two formulas sometimes are paired together and have been associated with the “Two Incompatibles” (China Military Online, February 5, 2015 and CPC News Network, December 11, 2013).

Beginning in 2015, the “Five Incapables” (五个不会) formula began to be used which criticizes “some” leaders’ command abilities: “Some cadre cannot (1) judge the situation, (2) understand the intention of the higher up authorities, (3) make operational decisions, (4) deploy troops, and (5) deal with unexpected situations” (China Military Online, February 5, 2015). This assessment is a particularly stark acknowledgement of operational and tactical leadership shortfalls. It is an example of why the PLA prioritizes officer training over troop training as reflected in another common slogan: “in training soldiers, first train generals (or officers)” (练兵先练将 or 练兵先练官) (China Military Online, January 13 and April 12).

Though the public acknowledgement of weakness may sound strange to foreign ears, in Chinese military thinking which is based on Marxist theory, these assessments represent the “thesis” of positive developments balanced by the “antithesis” of remaining problem areas, which are to be overcome through scientific efforts leading to a “synthesis” signifying progress. The process is then repeated, especially when new technologies and weapons are issued to the force.

The judgments described above are well known to the PLA senior leadership and frequently repeated in their own writings or speeches. The reforms underway are intended to address the shortcomings in joint command organization and officer development.

The New Joint Headquarters

The new CMC staff organization consists of 15 departments, commissions, and offices (China Military Online, January 11) [ http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/11/content_6852723.htm ] . These new staff offices expand a few previously existing CMC organizations, incorporate the functions and many of the personnel from the former four General Departments, and, in the case of the National Defense Mobilization Department, take over the responsibilities of the Military Regions in commanding the provincial Military Districts, PLA reserve units, border and coastal defense units, and the militia.

The CMC staff organization primarily supports the members of the CMC, presently composed of the supreme civilian party and government leader, Xi, and 10 senior PLA officers, 6 Army generals, 1 Navy admiral, 2 Air Force generals, and a Rocket Force general. As such, the CMC itself is a joint organization with its personnel distributed among the services very close to how the 2.3 million personnel in the PLA (prior to the 300,000 man reduction) were allocated: approximately 73 percent Army/Second Artillery, 10 percent Navy, and 17 percent Air Force. The composition CMC leadership is not set by law and is subject to change.

A photograph of the CMC and the “new heads of [its] reorganized organs” revealed 69 officers, including the 10 CMC generals/admiral and another 59 CMC staff directors/officers, of which 51 were Army/Rocket Force, five Navy, and three Air Force. [1] (Xinhua, January 11). Though the CMC is a joint organization, its leaders and its primary staff officers still are mostly Army officers. The percentage of non-Army officers in lower-level CMC staff billets is not known.

Continuing the dominance of Army officers, all the new commanders and political commissars of the five Theater Commands are from the Army. [2] Each Theater is assigned responsibility for a strategic direction (战略方向) and is to develop theater strategies, directional strategies, and operational plans for deterrence, warfighting, and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Theater headquarters may command units from all services in joint operations and MOOTW tasks and are responsible for organizing and assessing joint campaign training and developing new methods of operation (China Military Online, February 1 and March 3). [ REFER ANNEXURE "A" BELOW ]

The Theater Commands are structured as joint headquarters with Army and non-Army deputy commanders and political commissars, a joint staff from all services, and service component commands. Each Theater has a subordinate Army headquarters and Air Force headquarters, while the Eastern, Southern, and Northern Theater Commands also have Navy components that retain the names East Sea Fleet, South Sea Fleet, and North Sea Fleet, respectively. These component headquarters are the key link to both the Theater Commands and national-level service headquarters. Service component headquarters have operational command of units in war and may serve as campaign headquarters (战役指挥部) under the Theater Commands. They also perform “construction” leadership and management functions under the supervision of the service headquarters in Beijing. Moreover, they may act as emergency response headquarters for MOOTW missions. [3]

Rocket Force staff officers are assigned to Theater Command headquarters, but Rocket Force units appear to remain under the direct command of the Rocket Force service headquarters in Beijing with conventional (non-nuclear) units available to support theater missions.

Training and Developing a Contingent of Joint Officers

Since their establishment, Theater Command headquarters have been engaged in functional training and evaluation to ensure their staff officers are qualified to perform their duties. For example, the Northern Theater conducted a month-long “joint operations duty personnel training camp” focused on conditions in the services and the Theater’s area of responsibility consisting of lectures, demonstrations, hands-on training, and assessments (China Youth Online, February 25).

Many Theater staff officers were selected from the best of the former Military Region officers. Within the Northern Theater headquarters staff officers were required to have spent at least two years in a headquarters at or above group army level plus have participated in or organized a large-scale joint exercise. Yet even with this background many officers express lack of confidence, known as “ability panic” (本领恐慌), in their new positions. Accordingly, the Theater has created a “Three-Year Program for Building Joint Operations Command Personnel” (《联合作战指挥人才建设3年规划》) (China Military Online, May 5).

Such programs will be necessary not only for the first batch of Theater-level staff officers, but also for new staff officers assigned at that level in the future.

Over the past decade, the Military Regions and the services experimented with a number of programs to develop joint officer capabilities. In December 2014, the Ministry of National Defense spokesman provided this update:

After a trial period, the PLA is now applying the professional training scheme for joint operation commanding officers in the whole military. This scheme aims to optimize the command posts for joint operation commanding officers, conduct differentiated training for joint operation commanders and administrative officers, and for joint operation staff officers and other staff officers, and establish a new mechanism for the selection, training, evaluation and appointment of joint operation commanding officers, so as to improve the training of joint operation commanding officers (China Military Online, December 25, 2014).

These programs will be even more important with the establishment of the Theater Commands. Likewise, the PLA educational system of universities and academies will need to adapt its curricula and student composition to prepare officers for joint assignments and the PLA’s new maritime orientation.

Conclusions

The current leadership line-up of CMC members, CMC staff, and Theater headquarters is certain to change before 2020. A measure of the PLA’s commitment to jointness will be the percentage of non-Army senior officers assigned to these billets. One of the most substantial developments, both symbolically and operationally, would be the assignment of Navy or Air Force officers to command one or more Theaters, particularly the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands where the immediate need for integrated maritime and aerospace operations is greatest.

Over the long run, the PLA must develop an education, training, and assignment scheme to prepare officers of all services for joint command and staff duties. The best practices learned from experimentation from previous years will need to be codified and applied throughout the entire force. This process will affect many aspects of the personnel system as it has been implemented for the past 60 years.

Meanwhile, doctrine and strategy must continue to evolve to support the PLA’s expanded missions, technology, and potential areas of operation. The shift in mindset from a continental Army to an integrated joint force capable of operating both inside and beyond China’s borders and three seas will probably take at least a generation to achieve. Commanders and staffs at all levels must prove themselves qualified to perform these new tasks not only in academic settings but also in real world missions. They will raise their level of confidence in their own abilities through the actual performance of missions, not just talking or reading about them. A significant level of unease among operational and tactical commanders and staff is clearly evident in the official Chinese military literature.

The military’s senior leadership understands the many challenges confronting the PLA as it continues its multi-decade, multi-faceted modernization program. In the immediate future, the disruptions caused by changes underway could result in a more cautious attitude toward the employment of force by China’s military leadership, but not necessarily its political decision-makers.

-------------------------------------------------

Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), is a former U.S. army attaché to Beijing and Hong Kong and author of The Chinese Army Today, second edition (Routledge, 2012).

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes

1. The Rocket Force does not yet have a distinctive uniform different from the Army, so it is not possible to distinguish between Army and Rocket Force officers in the photo.

2. Each Theater commander has provided at least one interview to the Chinese media.

3. China Military Online, February 2, 2016 and May 10, 2016 http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-02/01/content_6883951.htm and http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-05/10/content_144076.htm, spells out these missions for Theater Command Army headquarters. I assess the other services’ Theater Command headquarters have similar functions.

FURTHER STUDIES

CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 10

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping Drivers, Challenges, and Implications

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf?ver=2017-03-21-152018-430

Org_Chart_01-1.png

CB_16_10_1.pdf

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ANNEXURE "A"

source:

http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2016-02/25/nw.D110000zgqnb_20160225_2-11.htm

The new theater of the People's Liberation Army is moving toward unity in the running-in

Li Xianghui, Wang Qinghou, Special Reporter, Wang Jun, China Youth Daily (February 25, 2016, 11th edition)

The staff of the Northern Theater observed the operation of a certain base of the Rocket Army and discussed how to better perform duty duties. Li Xianghui / photo

The Shenyang Military Region Office in Shenyang City, Liaoning Province has been in existence for decades. Now the lights of the office building are still extinguished until late at night. The sentinels at the gate of the camp are still the soldiers of the past, but the careful people will It was discovered that the original army entering and leaving the compound every day was a uniform army. Recently, many officers and men dressed in navy and air force uniforms have been added. This is now the camp of the northern theater.

Nowadays, in this theater compound, the color of military uniforms has become colorful from a single one, including the army's pine branches and greens, as well as the navy's spray whites, as well as the air force's sky blue... these are dressed in different military uniforms from the north of the country. The soldiers, unified wearing the new armband of the "Northern Theater", are working together to push the theater into operation.

In the past, eating and drinking Lazard was all in charge, and now I’m trying to fight.

On the morning of February 18, the author walked into the Joint Staff of the Northern Theater and opened the door of a conference room. The overall staff was working hard to plan the new year. The large screen of the conference room showed the work plan for the new year.

“It is easy to set up a new department, but it is not easy to change the original inertia thinking and working methods.” A leader of the bureau told the author that some people are unconsciously immersed in inertia thinking when planning their work, and always want to organize observation activities. Great management work, etc. "We must concentrate on studying and fighting, and we are ready to lead the troops to fight." Repeatedly studying the instructions of the president, the bureau unified thoughts, actual combat, and decisively cut off six work plans that deviated from the war. Since the establishment of the theater of war, the Joint Staff and the Political Work Departments have convened a global comrade to gather ideas and focus on the planning and planning of the new year.

"In the battle of the main battlefield, all work should be focused on war, all resources tend to fight, and one mind should think about it." At the symposium held in the theater, the leadership of the theater firmly proposed to start strategic operations research, organize joint training and other key tasks. Determined and willing to fight.

At the beginning of the formation of the theater, in order to further strengthen the awareness of the main battle in the theater, and to provide guidance and grasp for the transformation of ideas and concepts as soon as possible, the Northern Party Committee decided to further clarify the functional tasks of the theater and further their respective roles. Qing, the preliminary measures were taken for preliminary research. According to reports, nearly 100 people from the Standing Committee of the Party Committee and the deputy director of the predecessor of the Party participated in the symposium. The participants put forward more than 130 constructive countermeasures and suggestions.

On February 22nd, the author came to the joint operational command center of the theater, and a strong "war zone taste" and "sniffing taste" came to the fore: the officers in the army, navy, air force, and rocket army camouflage uniforms are participating in the joint operation. Combat duty training, everyone from time to time together to judge the situation and jointly plan decisions.

"The theater is the highest command organization for joint operations of various military units in this strategic direction. The staff officers must have joint operational literacy, be proficient in the principle of command information system, and organize joint combat duty training has become a top priority." Based on this understanding, the theater party committee decided to concentrate 1 In the month of the month, the "joint combat personnel training" was launched.

In order to ensure that the participants can quickly, accurately and steadily handle all kinds of emergencies, they will get the “employment certificate” and “qualification certificate” of the independent duty as soon as possible. They will take the teaching guidance, observe the teaching, operate the training and check and accept the work. Pre-training. During the training, they arranged the leaders of the theater and the relevant comrades of the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Army, around the "Basic Situations of the Armies of the Theater, Air Force, Navy, and Rocket Army", "Basic Knowledge of Joint Operational Watches," "Operation and Operation of Command Information Systems." The surrounding military affairs are taught in 4 categories and 10 items.

During the first week of the Spring Festival, they organized more than 100 representatives of staff officers on duty to enter the theater air force, observe how the daily combat handover classes are organized, listen to the daily air defense readiness briefings, and visit the command and regional information center; At the base, the staff members of the theaters who came to observe the school to learn more about the daily combat readiness of the base command post and visit the communication and intelligence support elements.

"Through the tutoring and field visits, we have enriched our professional knowledge and arms knowledge, broadened our horizons and vision, and laid a solid foundation for the joint combat of high standards in the theater." The leaders of the theater joint staff said that as of now, the theater Hundreds of staff officers have initially mastered the basic situation of the land, sea, air and rocket forces in the theater and the relevant arms knowledge, and have mastered the ability to operate and use information equipment and systems for operational readiness.

The sense of mission is stronger, and the entrepreneur’s entrepreneurial spirit is even stronger.

On January 9 this year, the leaders of the North Sea Fleet told Li Xinan, the deputy director of the fleet logistics department, that he would be transferred to work in the northern theater. Li Xin'an did not hesitate, and immediately stated: "Resolutely obey orders!"

On the morning of January 19th, the fleet selected dozens of cadres in the northern theater to line up in the cold wind, ready to go to the theater authorities to report. Before the departure, Li Xinan reported to the head of the fleet that "when I heard the commander of the fleet issued a "departure" command from Hong Liang, I suddenly felt a bloody, but a sense of sacred mission and responsibility." Li Xinan recalled. .

"After serving in the theater, every time I attend a meeting, study, and shift, my heart is full of mission, responsibility, and pressure. I feel that the taste of the war zone is getting stronger and stronger." The current director of the Bureau of Political Work of the Northern War Zone Li Xinan told the author.

In the face of the initial work of the war zone, Li Xinan has led the overall personnel to change their concepts, change their style of work, change their working methods, seriously consider planning and implementing the work of the department, and work hard to fulfill the new mission of the theater. Make a contribution.

Like Li Xin'an, after the reform was initiated, the military commissions ordered the cadres who were selected to work in the theater to come from all over the world with their dreams and gather under the banner of the northern theater. For many cadres, it seems that the scene of joining the army in the same year has reappeared, and they will once again start another journey as a "new recruit." The difference is that when enlisted in the same year, behind the eyes of the parents staring. Today, there are still lover and child watching.

On January 15th, Zhang Wei, the political department officer of the North Sea Fleet Logistics Department, received an order to report to the theater. On the same day, his father died unfortunately. On the one hand, the military command was like a mountain, and on the other hand, his father loved the mountain. Just when he made a difficult choice, he received a notice from the superior to report to the time on January 18. He immediately took the unit for three days off, returned to his hometown to cook his father's aftermath, and rushed to the theater to report within the specified time.

In the northern theater, from the former Jinan Military Region, the former Shenyang Military Region Air Force, the former Jinan Military Region Air Force and the Rocket Army’s cadre, some family members just hoped that the stars would look forward to the reunion of the army and the two families. Some just held a wedding. They have been hurriedly separated, and some have just taken up the post of director and other positions and are now re-appointed as staff officers... but everyone has taken the initiative to overcome these difficulties and actively participate in new work.

After the "four beams and eight pillars" of the war zone have been put together, it is necessary to pay close attention to the bricks and tiles. The more the career start-up period, the shorter the running-in period will be. The more the period of ideological fluctuations, the more the morale will be united." Based on this consideration, the second day of the war zone began to be grasped. Joint combat personnel training, after the Spring Festival, at the beginning of the work, we will carry out in-depth study and implementation of the special education of President Xi’s instructions, and guide everyone to take the “first step”, do the “first”, and run the “first stick”.

Improve the ability of "joint" to achieve "hard" from "finger" to "hard fist"

"As the first staff officer of the theater, in the face of the sacred mission and the requirements of the training instructions, I deeply feel that there is still a big gap." On February 22, Meng Qinglei, deputy director of the Warfare Joint Staff Department, told the author that the Central Military Commission made an order. Next, the cadres of the theaters have overcome all kinds of difficulties and immediately rushed to Shenyang to report in all directions. Everyone is unequivocal in listening to the party’s command at a crucial moment, but this is only the turnaround after completing the big break, far from being reborn and nirvana. Rebirth.

"If we realize the synergy of the co-editing, it is the main problem to be solved at the beginning of the formation of the theater. The current state is probably that the editors are already in harmony, the mind is in harmony, and the forces are not in harmony. Many theater workers are still not thinking about their actions. Completely get rid of the shackles of the military system and the traditional system of the Continental Army."

"The next step is to urgently eliminate the gap between the military services and break the boundaries of the region." Meng Qinglei said that, as the leaders of the theater said in the tutoring class, they must step out from the previous independent planning and individual warfare modes. And to overcome the problem of "the connection between the gods and the gods", "there is no connection between the watch and the union", and the "basic skills" of the alliance, improve the "basic skills" of the association, improve the practical ability of the association, and achieve a hard from "finger" to "fist" ".

The theater is the main warfare agency and command organization, and the core is in command and the key is in unity. At present, the joint architecture has been established, and it has been compiled from the "shape". The next step is to integrate on "God". Qi Chengjun, deputy director of the Military Demand Bureau of the Joint Staff of the Theater, said that to strengthen the sense of unity, we must first have a harmonious concept. Everyone should consciously talk about the overall situation, talk about unity, talk about cooperation, break the boundaries of the military, learn from each other, complement each other, and form a game of chess. In a spur of the moment, relying on the gathering of wisdom to overcome difficulties, truly form a joint and integrated high-efficiency command organization.

At 12 o'clock on the night of February 2, the North Theater Joint Command Center officially started the trial operation. On that day, the staff officers of the theater wearing camouflage uniforms of various military services were seated in various command posts to perform their duties. Meng Qinglei said that when he sat in his own position, he seemed to be able to hear the horn of the urging war, smell the looming smoke, and feel the burden of shoulders and the ability to perform his duties and panic.

"The first time after the Spring Festival, the first division of the theater refers to the handover of the center. The "six-domain" battlefield situation of the land, sea and air network, and the "four major service types" of the land, sea and air fires are in front of us. I have really realized the same as many cadres of the theater. Lack of modern warfare, joint command, and military knowledge."

At the end of the interview, Deputy Director Meng Qinglei told the author that the theater has declared a dynamic response to joint operations and a strong response to modern warfare in a new organizational form. The word "joint" is used in the training exercises. Become a "theme" for preparations for war. However, the formation of the organization does not necessarily lead to the generation of capacity, the joint thinking needs to be deepened, the command relationship needs to be straightened, the command process needs to be optimized, and the command capability needs to be improved... This is a warning to the staff of the theater and the command responsibility of the military commission. Landing and achieving efficient command of the troops in the theater, we will have to work harder in the next step.

ON WAR : Sun Tzu’s Strategic Catechism and Contemporary Calculated Tactics

SOURCE:
IJMPAS Vol. 1, No. 2, Feb. 2015 www.ijmpas.org

In the Study of Sun Tzu’s Strategic Catechism and Contemporary Calculated Tactics: Locating the Ancient in the Modern

ᴪFrank-Collins Nnamdi Okafor
¥Okoye Belonwu Echezona
ᴥSebastine Chukwudozie Anekwe
ᴪ¥ᴥDepartment of Political Science,
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria

Abstract

Throughout history, Sun Tzu‟s The Art of War has been regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces in the history of military strategy. It is also one of the most read in Strategic Studies. Of greater interest is the fact that as it is relevant to the military, so it is to the civilians who are engaged in calculated actions in their daily activities. Although a masterpiece of the old, the book and its content remain as recurrent as they were. Imperatively, therefore, this paper takes a critical look at the arguments and strategic advice of Sun Tzu with particular reference to their relevance in contemporary military formations, politics, economy, relationships, etc. Thus, for effective analysis, Power Theory, secondary data and content analytical approach were used. The paper argues that, in as much as, The Art of War was written centuries ago, that its relevance is still very current and applicable to all facets of life.

Key words: Military, Strategy, Tactics, War, Power

Introduction

By fate or design, the history of mankind has been a profile in peace and war. In the olden days and to some extent, today, war is the ultimate option in the authoritative allocation of resources among states because, even in the most pacific and convivial situations, man is preoccupied with the mode of survivalist strategy to adopt in order to ward off impending enemies; because his desires, needs and expectations are insatiable. Obviously, the more the needs, the more the aggressive tendencies. It is stating the obvious that as it is to man in interaction, so it is to the State as an extension of the former. And with the large number of states in global politics, the world is occupied by unending struggles for scarce resources.

However, today‟s world has seen a lot of systemic changes that has, to a great extent, curtailed those animalistic tendencies that typified relations at the ancient times. The days of State of Nature, typified by frequent unbridled face-offs, have given way to coordinated arrangements that do not, anyway, mean that peace is now the permanent feature of relations among states.

The melodrama of self-assurance under trepidation still haunts nations so long as that Hercules loaded to full capacity with crude and sophisticated weapons of man and nature‟s destruction overhangs the nervous co-existence that has long become the pseudo-name of international and inter-states relations. This new threat in the form of ever present scientific weapons has continued to inspire face-offs between kingdoms, empires, regions and states.

In the face of all these threats and tribulations had been great men who were troubled by the challenges of their times as they were occupied troubled by how to either advance the course of man in the midst of threats or difficulties.

Interestingly, all the epochs had their own great men: Napoleon Bonaparte, Clausewitz, Pareto, Blutcher, Scipio Africanus, Hannibal, Fabianus, Niccollo Machiavelli, Mao Tse Tung, Shaka Zulu, etc. all aspired and were preoccupied by how best leaders and the led could be the greatest in their chosen careers and in their efforts to not only be the Masters of strategies, but dominators of their environments.

Thus, this study takes a critical look at the thoughts of Sun Tzu who was one of those known greatest strategic thinkers. It also studies how his thoughts have influenced strategic positions of his era and the current global strategic realities with view to establishing their relevance in tackling cotemporary difficulties.

Conceptual clarifications

In the light of the nature of the study, Power Theory remains the most attractive in the analysis of the strategic thoughts of Sun Tzu in contemporary analysis because Power is a recurrent decimal in international politics. Today, there is contention on the constituent of power politics taking the fact that power is regarded as a central issue in international politics, and that the propelling force in state‟s relations is the acquisition and exercise of power. It has been posited that a state can succeed in international politics if it makes the acquisition of power its central, and or immediate aim. The above suggestion tries to view power from military perspective which Sun Tzu shared.

The central proposition of the Power Theory is that at the international arena, "might is right". A powerful nation is an influential nation. This is evident when we say that country A is more powerful or stronger than country B. In history so far, the tag “Power” has been averred to states that won successful military victories and many victorious countries in the past cannot deny the fact that Sun Tzu‟s military strategies principles were not valuable to them.

Imperatively, Knorr (1973:104) sees military power “as a relation among states that permit one government to induce another to behave in a way which the later would not have chosen freely”. Traditionalists such as Machiavelli and Morgenthau regard power as both an end in itself and a means to an end. Morgenthau (1975) sees it as “man's control over the minds and actions of others” He further, stressed that power in the political sense refers to the mutual relation of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large. Therefore power covers all social relationship which serves the end, from physical violence to the most psychological ties by which one mind controls another.

To Frankel (1963), power is the “ability to get one's wishes carried out despite opposition, the ability to influence the actions of others in accordance with one's own ends”. No doubt, Giddens (1984) believes just as Sun Tzu to the effect that "power is not inherently oppressive, power is simply the ability to make a difference or the capacity to achieve outcomes and is not as such, an obstacle to freedom and emancipation but is their very medium". Thus having power, then is, the sine qua non of being able to act as a morally responsible human being. To Tzu, with power, one can conquer more powers and win more influence and this he demonstrated through his work, The Art of War.

Thus, with power at the whims and caprices of the leader, war becomes an attractive option to garner more powers while well defined tactics becomes its organizing principle. It is only he who exercises elements of power in whatever quantity that aspires to war because skills are what make a good war.

Military Strategy

The Military connotes mafias or man that handles gun in tactical way. It is to a lage extent associate with soldiers and in its conventional approach-the generals. Strategy is a phenomenon that goes beyond mere tactics or plan and began with the rise of armies. As a term, it was first used by Count Guibert in 1779, but today, it has fallen into almost universal usage in social, political, economic, environmental and military studies (Onyemaechi, 2000:13). The word 'strategy' is from the Greek word, "strategos", for "general" or "leader of troops" which was derived from the verb stratigema meaning to lead or command an army and indeed, from ancient to contemporary times, the military assumed almost the monopoly of large-scale planning for effective management (Ammer, 1989:225). Today, strategy is diverse connecting almost all aspects of humanity hence, strategic sites, strategic thought, weapons, theatre, investment, plan, legal strategy, football strategy, market strategy, campaign strategy, strategic policies, planning, etc.

Conventionally, strategy is of two dimensions: active and passive but the active is more relevant here. Active strategy, more or less, consists of crisis management. Strategy is directed toward a designed situation. It is a policy science because of its scientific applications especially in nuclear exercises. Strategic Studies therefore, is the use of policy approaches to attain set objectives within target time and at the minimum cost possible (Akpuru-aja 1999:1). Its analysis then, is the process of evaluating, examining, crossexamining, measuring and interpreting strategic policies, decisions and laws.

Military strategy is a subset of national or grand strategy. It is a scientific knowledge which studies the conditions, and the nature of future war, the preparation and conduct, the services of the armed forces and the foundations for the material and technical support and leadership of the war and the armed forces (Harriet 1981; 118). As a broad plan of action on how to wage and win war, it is equally both offensive and defensive in character and does not do away with command, control, communication, intelligence, psychological balance and force. A doyen of strategic thoughts, Carl von Clausewitz, concludes that military strategy deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy.

Sun Tzu and Military Strategy

Undoubtedly, many contemporary strategists, scholars of international relations, military generals, war-mongers, diplomats, military leaders amongst others, may not in a single sentence say who Sun Tzu was not to talk of his influence on the present day war-prone globe. The reason could be death of research.

The originality of Sun Tzu still remains controversial because of different perspectives in this direction which has resulted to many historians accepting and rejecting data with links to the nativity of Sun Tzu. Nevertheless, history is replete; Sun Tzu had originality. Hundreds of years before the birth of Christ, there was a period in China known as the Age of Warring States. This was an age of great conflict and uncertainty as states fought for survival and control of China. For those states to win, they sought for means of gaining advantage over their opponents and those with knowledge on strategy and leadership were specially sought after. It was during that time that there arose a general from the state of Ch'i known as Sun Tzu. His ability to win victories for his warlord gained him fame and power.

Historians have questioned whether or not Sun Tzu was an authentic figure. Traditional accounts place him in the Spring and Autumn Periods of China (722-481 BC) as a military General serving under King Helu of Wu, who lived C.544-496 BC. Modern Scholars accepting his historicity place the completion of The Art of War in the Warring States Period (476-221 BC), based on the descriptions of warfare in the text, and on the similarity of text's prose with other works completed in the early warring states period (Sawyer, 2007: 421-422) The oldest available sources disagree as to where Sun Tzu was born. The Spring and Autumn Annals states that Sun Tzu was born in Qi, while the Shiji states that Sun Tzu was a native of Wu (Sawyer, 2007: 151, 153). Both sources agree that Sun Tzu was born in the late Spring and Autumn Periods of China (772-481 BC) and that he was active as a General and Strategist, serving the King of Wu, King Helu, in the late sixth century BC, beginning around 512 BC.

One of the more well-known stories about Sun Tzu, taken from the Shiji, illustrates Sun Tzu's temperament as follows; before hiring him the King of Wu tested his skills by commanding him to train a harem of 180 concubines into soldier. Skillfully, he was able to finish the task to the satisfaction of the king (Bradford, 2000: 134-135). Simply put, he was an ancient Chinese military general, strategist, philosopher, mathematician, author and commander who was born C. 544 BC (traditional) and died C. 496 BC (traditional) while his famous work was The Art of War.

The Art of War and the Classical Chinese Era

The Art of War is an ancient Chinese Military Treatise that is attributed to Sun Tzu. It is acclaimed to be one of the oldest and most successful books on military strategy in the world. It has been the most famous and influential of Chinese Seven Military Classics: “for the last two thousand years it remained the most important military Treatise in Asia, where even the common people knew it by name” (Sawyer, 2007: 421-422). It has had an influence on Eastern military thinking, business tactics, and beyond. Some scholars believe that The Art War was not completed until the subsequent Warring States period. Composed of thirteen Chapters, each of which is devoted to one aspect of warfare, it is said to be the definitive work on military strategies and tactics of its time, and is still read for its military insights.

Three words in the opening of the "Art of Strategy" are very important. First, Strategy (strategy, tactics, martial art etc), second, Skill and third Study, signify that it is not an inborn quality or skill to have but a learned skill that must be studied in order to win over life's conflict, in fact, in order to survive. This is why Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of positioning in military strategy, and that the decision to position an army must be based on both objective and conditions in the physical environment and the subjective beliefs of other competitive actors in that environment. He thought that strategy was not planning in the sense of working through an established list, but rather that it requires quick and appropriate responses to changing conditions. Planning works in a controlled environment, but in a changing environment, competitive plans collide, creating unexpected situations.

Interestingly, Sun Tzu provided what he called principal elements of winning a war which he outlined, thus:

 Laying plans/the Calculations: Here, the way, season, terrain leadership and management, are the five fundamental   factors and by thinking, assessing and comparing these points, a commander (figured the other way round a country with hostile neighbours like Israel) can calculate its (her) chances of victory. Habitual deviation from these calculations is tantamount to failure via improper action. It is in this case you see deterrence and détente, nuclear parade and armament at work.

   Waging War/the Challenge: Here encourages the economy of warfare, and how success requires winning decisive engagement quickly. Sun Tzu advises that successful military campaigns require limiting the cost of competition and conflict. The World War II would have been waged had it being that some major powers encouraged the League of Nations.

 Attack by Stratagem/the Plan of Attack: Here lies the sources of strength as unity, not size, and essentially for any country or empire or kingdom to win a war, attack, strategy, alliances, army and cities ought not to be neglected.

 Tactical Disposition/Positioning: Illustrates the importance of defending existing positions until a Commander is capable of advancing from those positions in safety. No country that engages in a war prays to lose but rather, to win. Therefore, Sun Tzu opines that “opportunities ought not to be created for the enemy”.

 Energy/Directing: explains the use of creativity and timing in building an army's momentum. This is in line with the dictum, "time is of greater essence‟. Today, modern technologies have made some countries super powers and Commanders of the global village.

 Weak Points and Strong/Illusion and Reality: It explains how an army's opportunities come from the openings in the environment caused by the relative weakness of the enemy in a given area. Today, weak and weaker countries dance to the tune of stronger countries especially, the Third World economies.

 Maneuvering/Engaging the Force: Explains the dangers of direct conflict and how to win those confrontations when they are forced upon the Commander or country.

 Variation in Tactics/The Nine Variations: Focuses on the need for flexibility in an arm's responses. It explains how to respond to shifting circumstances especially, change, during the time of peace and war. Countries are well-acquainted with this philosophy.

 The Army on the March/Moving the Force: Describes the different situations in which an army find itself as it moves through new enemy territories, and how to respond to these situations.

 Terrain/Situational Positioning: It looks at the three general areas of resistance (distance, dangers, and barriers) and the six types of ground positions that arise from them.

     The Nine Situations/Nine Terrains: Describes the nine common situations or stages in a campaign (combat readiness), from scattering to deadly, and the specific focus that a Commander will need in order to successfully navigate them.

    The Attack by Fire/Fiery Attack: Here explains the general use of weapons and the specific use of the environment as a weapon.

     The Use of Spies/the Use of Intelligence: Good information sources and intelligence (tact) dominate here. Spying today is known as a crime and breach of international laws in the nation-states relations and to some extent, the diplomatic Purse which some countries usually use in carrying gadgets across their borders

Theory of Sun Tzu

Many Scholars have incorporated Sun Tzu into the world of Theorists. The Art of War is a systematic guide to strategy and tactics for rulers and commanders. The work discusses various maneuvers and the effect of terrain on the outcome of battles. It emphasizes the importance of gathering accurate information about the enemy forces, dispositions and development, and movements. One of the Sun Tzu‟s axioms says;

“know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat”.

The Sun Tzu's theory (Theory of Warfare) stresses the unpredictability of battle, the use of flexible strategies and tactics, the importance of deception and surprise, the close relationship between politics and military policy, and the high cost of war. He knows that both offensive and defensive wars are costly-natural and man-made resource. The major themes of the theory are thus: the futility of seeking hard and fast rules and the subtle paradoxes of success. The best battle according to him is “the battle that is won without being fought

The theory laid down the essential rules of guerrilla tactics in the art of war. To him therefore:

....all warfare are based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are far away; when far away, we must make him (enemy) believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him....

The Prime Principles of Sun Tzu’s Military Strategy

For Sun Tzu, there are a number of principles a Commander or a country preparing or war etc should know and act upon when the need calls for them. Some Scholars and Analysts refer to them as Sun Tzu‟s Quotes. They are as follows:

 All men can see these tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved

 All war is based on deception

 All war is deception

 “All warfare is based on deception”.

 Be extremely subtle, even to the point of formlessness. Be extremely mysterious, even to the point of soundlessness. Thereby, you can be the director of the opponent‟s fate.

 Can you imagine what I would do if I could do all I can?

 Confront them with annihilation, and they will then survive, plunge them into a deadly situation, and they will then live. When people fall into danger, they are then able to strive for victory

 For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill

 For them to perceive the advantage of defeating the enemy, they must also have their rewards

 He who is prudent and lies in wait for an enemy, who is not, will be victorious.

 Hence the General is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack

 If ignorant both your enemy and yourself, you are certain to be in peril.

 If our soldiers are not over-burdened with money, it is not because they have distaste for riches, if their lives are not unduly long; it is not because they are disinclined to longevity

 If you are not far from the enemy, make him believe you are near

 If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles

 Invincibility lies in the defence, the possibility of victory in the attacks

 In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy‟s country whole and intact, to shatter and destroy it is not so good

 It is essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you and to bribe them to serve you. Give them instructions and care for them. Thus doubled agents are recruited and used

 It is only the enlightened ruler and the wise General who will use the highest intelligence of the army for the purpose of spying, and thereby they achieve great results (http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/s/sun tzu.ht..).

By inference, if all nations, looking at the present day global village, are to apply all the above quotes (principles), one thinks that the global environment would be unsafe to live in. One may then opine without any fear of contradictions that what prompted Sun Tzu's strategies was the type of environment he found himself as well as his profession. Probably, he never knew, in the Nigerian Parlance, that "Soldier go, Soldier come, Barrack remains".

CDS & JOINTNESS INDIA ONLY A STRONG CDS WILL BE ABLE TO BREAK SHACKLES

SOURCE:
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunday-special/columns/only-a-strong-cds-will-be-able-to-break-shackles/819068.html

ONLY A STRONG CDS WILL BE ABLE TO BREAK SHACKLES

BY

Lt Gen DS Hooda (Retd)

As long as service chiefs retain complete authority over operational and administrative aspects, they will continue to compete for influence, resources. Without integration, synergised operational planning will remain a mirage.

Way Foward:

The appointment of the Chief of Defense Staff must be a part of a comprehensive plan for overhauling the higher defence management system, including the restructuring of the military into theatre commands. PTI

Following the submission of the Kargil Review Committee report, a Group of Ministers (GoM) was constituted to review the national security system of India comprehensively. The GoM report was an extremely meticulous document in which our weaknesses were honestly identified, and detailed recommendations made for strengthening the national security architecture. While looking at the higher defence management, the GoM had observed that the “COSC (Chiefs of Staff Committee) has not been effective in fulfilling its mandate”. To overcome this weakness, it was recommended that a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) be appointed to serve as the “principal military adviser” to the political leadership.

There are many reasons as to why the CDS has not been appointed till now, but it would serve little purpose to debate these reasons with the Prime Minister clearly announcing his intention to create this post. The media is abuzz with speculations on the frontrunner for the CDS, but again this is hardly a crucial aspect of the Prime Minister’s announcement. The real key lies in the role and responsibility entrusted to the CDS, and whether this is only the first step in the revamping of our higher defence management.

There are two viewpoints on the role of the CDS. The first sees him as facilitating the planning and budgeting process by prioritising the acquisitions of the three services. In times of stressed budgets, this is an essential requirement. He will also promote jointness by laying down the joint warfighting doctrine and cutting down duplicate structures and organisations that perform a similar task for different services. Logistics and training are two such areas where restructuring is possible.

In terms of direct command, the CDS will be responsible for tri-service commands like the Strategic Forces, Andaman and Nicobar Command, and the newly raised Cyber, Space and Special Forces agencies. This model is a significant improvement over the current system, where the three services pay only lip service to jointness and work to promote their own interests. The Chairman COSC is a rotational appointment with incumbents often holding the post for only a few months. The CDS will bring in the much-desired stability and authority when dealing with the three service chiefs.

However, in my view, this model does not go far enough to achieve true integration in the military. As long as the service chiefs retain complete authority over both the operational and administrative aspects of their force, they will continue to compete for influence and resources, and resist any integration that could dilute their authority. We have already seen great resistance from the Air Force on the setting up of integrated theatre commands. Without integration, synergised operational planning will remain a mirage.

The appointment of the CDS must be a part of a comprehensive plan for overhauling the higher defence management system, including the restructuring of the military into theatre commands. It is incomprehensible that India has seven Army and Air Force commands along its northern border facing a single western theatre command of China. In a warlike situation, synergising of operations will become extremely difficult.

After the raising of theatre commands, these should be placed under the CDS, who will then assume operational responsibility. It is only then that the CDS will be in a position to give well-informed advice to the political leadership. In this model, the service chiefs will only be responsible for the training and administration of their respective forces. It could be argued that this will create a very powerful post that could be viewed with suspicion by the political class. Similar views have been expressed in the past, but the Indian military has a stellar record of remaining apolitical and unfounded fears should not come in the way of essential reforms.

It is only a strong CDS that will be able to break the shackles of existing practices that have hobbled true integration and kept us tied to World War II era structures.

There is unanimous acceptance that the character of war is changing, but we are still tied to service-specific equipment like tanks, aircraft and ships as the primary weapons of war. Information, cyber, space, psychometrics and artificial intelligence, areas that transcend service boundaries, have received little attention and require urgent focus.

The Prime Minister has taken a decisive step, and it is hoped that it is the part of a larger process to transform the military into an efficient force capable of meeting all of India’s future security challenges.

— The writer is former GOC-in-C, Northern Command

Saturday, September 21, 2019

PART 13 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA :: PLA System of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations (r)

SOURCE:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/ix7cyac8dqdzkf0/System_of_Systems_Enabling_Joint_Operati.pdf?dl=0

CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

Part 28 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-28-cds-jointness-pla-snapshot.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html

Part 14 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of-n-parts-new.html

Part 13 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-jointness-pla-pla-system-of-systems.html

Part 12 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-12-cds-jointness-pla-military.html

Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part 9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part 8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html

CLICK /GOOGLE TO OPEN DIGITAL COPY

System of Systems

https://www.dropbox.com/s/ix7cyac8dqdzkf0/System_of_Systems_Enabling_Joint_Operati.pdf?dl=0

PLA System of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations

By

Kevin McCauley

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing a broad and deep transformation based on their analysis of the information technology-driven revolution in military affairs. The military reforms announced in November 2013 are intended to accelerate the long-term military modernization program that had been slowed by institutional inertia and obstruction. The current reforms specifically target operationalizing a joint operations doctrine through a joint command system, enhancing joint officer development, and improving joint training.

The theoretical development of integrated joint operations and system of systems operations represent two of the most important developments in the PLA. The foundation enabling integrated joint operations is what the PLA describes as a “system of systems” operational capability (体系作战能力). This capability will be based on an integrated C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) structure, that will link systems and forces to facilitate jointness and information sharing among the heretofore stove piped services. Successful implementation of these twin theories can significantly increase the PLA’s war fighting capabilities, and are driving many of the PLA’s modernization requirements. This report represents the most comprehensive study of the PLA’s System of Systems operations and should lay the ground work for additional research as China attempts to build a networked, joint fighting force.

A digital copy is available for free download here. .

________________________________________

CLICK /GOOGLE TO OPEN DIGITAL COPY

https://www.dropbox.com/s/ix7cyac8dqdzkf0/System_of_Systems_Enabling_Joint_Operati.pdf?dl=0
________________________________

About the Author

Kevin McCauley has spent the majority of his 30 plus year career in the U.S. Government as the Senior Intelligence Officer with the U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), VA. His work included numerous assessments supporting national decision makers, combatant commands, force and combat developers. He represented the U.S. Army at international conferences and on numerous Intelligence Community advisory boards and working groups supporting the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).

Prior to becoming SIO for China and Taiwan, Mr. McCauley was a senior analyst for the Soviet Union and then Russia. Mr. McCauley additionally headed a special analytic team during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM providing intelligence support to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT). Mr. McCauley’s new book is titled, Russian Influence Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War to Putin.