SOURCE:

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2020/11/mil-201108-globaltimes03.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e2919%2epm0ao0egkh%2e2p4s

Indo-China War of 1962

Indo-China Conflict of 2020

Arunachal Pradesh

India - China Relations

Combatants

• India - XVII Corps Mountain Strike Corps
• China - Western Theater Command
• China - Chengdu Military Region

Resources

• Here's Why All's Not Well for India on the Ladakh Front
• Despite disengagement talks, India, China mobilise further in Ladakh, only winter holds hope
• Why the �Old Normal� Along the Sino-Indian Border Can No Longer Stand by Ankit Panda

China-India Border Talks may Drag on      During Winter

                                 By

                        Deng Xiaoci 

Source: Global Times

Published: 2020/11/8 

China and India have cemented agreements achieved in previous rounds of talks in the latest commander level meeting on Friday, with both sides vowing to ensure their frontline troops "exercise restraint and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation." Future talks will be arranged soon, indicating the two sides are prepared to prolong the row through the coming winter and even longer, according to an official media release by China's Ministry of National Defense on Sunday.

Both sides agreed to earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, maintain dialogues and communications through military and diplomatic channels, and push for the settlement of other outstanding issues, so as to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas, said the release.

The wording in the eighth round of talks - "China and India also agreed to have another round of meetings soon" - seems to be keeping the door to a peaceful solution open.

"The agreement of maintaining dialogues and communications itself shows that neither India nor China desires an escalation of the issue, and that both are trying to prevent disagreements from developing into conflicts," Qian Feng, director of the research department at the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University, told the Global Times.

The recent enhancement of India-US ties have definitely weighed on the China-India talks, said Qian, adding that the signing of Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation during the recent 2+2 India-US ministerial dialogue, which promoted the quasi military alliance between India and the US and the building of QUAD, an informal security grouping of the US, Japan, Australia and India, would surely encourage the Indian side to act tougher during talks.

However, similar to the seventh round of such talks between senior commanders in mid-October, the latest round conducted in early November failed to bring about concrete progress in forming a disengagement plan, which Chinese observers called the "main point" of this series of military channel communications.

Since their sixth round of talks in late September, China and India had announced a slew of decisions including not sending more troops to the frontline, refraining from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground and avoiding any actions that may further complicate matters, Times of India reported.

Chinese analysts pointed out that the outcomes of the seventh and eighth rounds of talks indicated the two sides have entered a stalemate over the disengagement solution, despite other agreements being reached in a generally positive atmosphere, adding that it was the Indian side to blame for this situation.

Indian's reluctance to retreat from the Chinese side of the LAC and to end their aggression near the south bank of the Pangong Tso Lake, which they dared to regard as a "trophy of war" in the border friction, led to the failure in addressing the row, Song Zhongping, a military expert and TV commentator, told the Global Times on Sunday.

Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, also expressed disappointment over the latest round of talks, saying that an insincere India had misused the military talks as a setting for shameless bargaining.

According to the Times of India, India maintained that the disengagement process has to start simultaneously at all the flash points, while nearly 50,000 Indian Army troops are currently deployed in a high state of combat readiness in various mountainous locations.

China deployed an equal number of troops, the report claims, citing official sources.

With winter already setting in, the region has now been hit by extreme cold. The China and India border stand-off will become a war of patience and a test of both sides' logistical support capabilities. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has an overwhelming superiority over the Indian army if there is ever a winter war, observers said.

Chinese soldiers on border patrol have been given new equipment and suits, including glare-reducing lenses, multifunctional kettles and cold protective suits, to protect them from the extreme weather, the PLA Daily reported.

According to the report, a total of 15 kinds of equipment and suits were supplied to meet the requirements of patrolling in temperatures ranging from - 40 C to -30 C.

And compared with China's indigenous and sufficient supply of winter gear, India has to rely on foreign suppliers, acquiring extreme cold gear sets from the US.

Whether such imported gear would meet the challenge of the harsh cold of the region remains a question, Song noted, suggesting that the PLA is better prepared and more capable when it comes to winter supplies.

The PLA's weapons also beat the Indian army's in terms of extreme cold resistance capability, Song added.

Considering this gap in capabilities, it would be not surprising if the Indian army choose to disengage in the winter time and return when the cold abates, as it is increasingly clear that the border issue with China has become a routine card to play whenever domestic tensions emerge in India, observers said.

  PLA(CHINA) PROPASAL FOR DIS ENGAGEMENT ON 9TH CORPs CDRs MEETING

https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/lac-standoff-india-stands-firm-on-its-position-china-makes-unusual-proposal-for-de-escalation/665906

As a first step, the armoured vehicles including the tanks, armoured personnel carriers are to be moved back to a significant distance from the LAC by both sides. In the second step to be carried out near the northern bank of the Pangong Tso lake, both sides are to withdraw around 30 per cent of the troops every day for three days. 11:12 PM, 11 NOV No time period has been agreed upon within which to implement the plan; neither is the extent to which it will happen decided between the two sides. 11:12 PM, 11 NOV Both the countries have readied a three-phase plan for disengagement in eastern Ladakh where the two sides have been in a stand-off since May this year. 11:10 PM, 11 NOV India and China may be on the verge of a breakthrough in resolving the over six-month-long tense border standoff in eastern Ladakh with both sides broadly agreeing on disengagement of troops and withdrawal of weaponry from all major friction points in a time-bound manner. 7:31 PM, 11 NOV Senior defence officials of China and the US held telephone talks amid deepening military tensions between the two countries and agreed to properly manage their differences. 7:30 PM, 11 NOV Chinese and the US militaries on Wednesday started an online seminar to share experiences on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, China's Ministry of National Defence said, amid rising tensions between the two countries over the disputed South China China and Taiwan. 5:19 PM, 11 NOV However, there is no signature or agreement on the plan's implementation as yet, the sources said. No time period has been agreed upon within which to implement the plan; neither is the extent to which it will happen decided between the two sides. 4:20 PM, 11 NOV India and China have readied a three-phase plan for disengagement in eastern Ladakh where the two sides have been in a stand-off since May this year, senior government sources have said. 3:08 PM, 11 NOV India and China have agreed to disengagement from the friction points along the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh. 2:02 PM, 11 NOV While China has been aggressively pushing for the Indian troops to vacate the multiple strategic heights, India feels that no hasty step should be taken which could result in our troops being left in a disadvantageous position.

Read more at: https://www.oneindia.com/india/india-china-standoff-live-modi-xi-to-meet-first-time-today-since-border-face-off-3141848.html

INDIAN ARMY REFORMS: Reforms Must Go Beyond Pay, Pensions (R)

 SOURCE:

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/reforms-must-go-beyond-pay-pensions-168907

VIDEO: CLICK/GOOGLE TO WATCH VIDEO

            

जवानों की पेंशन कटौती पर CDS को खूब धोया COL ने –प्रधानमंत्री, रक्षामंत्री, & तीनों सेना प्रमुखों 

                     [ https://youtu.be/55fNUkk59nQ ]

  ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

CLICK/GOOGLE URL BELOW TO OPEN

http://welfarenews.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Letter-to-CDS.pdf

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

On the wrong track: The highest military leadership is looking at options that dilute the terms of service in terms of financial compensation.

Reforms Must Go Beyond Pay, Pensions

The military is an integrated body of highly motivated and dedicated men and women who pride themselves on belonging to an honourable profession. Ensuring that there is no misuse of benefits, and that the military values are upheld is primarily the responsibility of the organisation.

Lt Gen DS Hooda (Retd)

Nov 11, 2020 

IN his Mann ki Baat address on the occasion of Kargil Vijay Diwas, Prime Minister Modi addressed the nation with these words, “Whatever we say, our behaviour, our speeches, our aim should be to boost the morale and respect of our soldiers.” These are the words that any soldier would be glad to hear from his highest national leader. He would also wish that the Prime Minister’s words are translated into action by those who implement policy. Unfortunately, what we are witnessing is a steady onslaught on the terms and conditions of service personnel, mostly to dilute provisions that have existed for decades.

Cutting down rations for officers, stopping hotel stay during temporary duty, removing income tax exemption on disability pension, and now the proposal to reduce pension for officers who take premature retirement, are examples of steps that have been taken in the past few years. Some of these were reversed after the government faced sharp criticism, but they created misgivings about the political and military leadership.

It is well understood that military reforms, particularly in times of stressed budgets, are absolutely essential. However, some of the personnel policies being recommended appear ill-considered and could have long-term implications on the character of the military. Without getting into the pros and cons of each proposal, the trends that we are witnessing raise three substantive issues. 

The first concerns the responsibility of the military as an organisation towards its members. It would be stating the obvious that the organisation should empower its officers and men and strive to meet their genuine needs. Instead, the approach seemingly being adopted by the military hierarchy is one of collective disempowerment. Income tax relief on disability pension is sought to be stopped for everyone because some ‘unscrupulous personnel’ were misusing disability benefits. Hotel stay for all officers was banned because some of them could indulge in corrupt practices such as ‘exchanging briefcases with contractors’ in the hotel room. A similar logic is being applied in the latest proposal for reducing pension of officers who take premature retirement. Several specialists/super-specialists leave the service to work in other sectors; in order to discourage them, the pensionary benefits of all officers must be cut down.

The military is an integrated body of highly motivated and dedicated men and women who pride themselves on belonging to an honourable profession. Ensuring that there is no misuse of benefits, and that the military values are upheld is primarily the responsibility of the organisation. This is implemented through a system of policies that reward good behaviour, incentives for members, and where required, disciplinary action. Wielding only the blunt instrument that apparently seeks to punish the whole military community for the faults of a few is both an injustice to those who serve with honour and an abdication of organisational responsibility.

The second issue is the impact of the recent proposals on the attitudes of the officer corps. It could well be asked as to why I am specifically talking about the officers and not about all the rank and file who form the larger part of the military. The simple explanation is that officers occupy a special position in the organisation.

In the military system, there is an ‘otherness’ to the officer corps. General John Hackett, in his classic The Profession of Arms, writes, “There is in armies a tendency to set up an officer group with an otherness as a step towards or in some degree a replacement of, the betterness you require.” Officers are commissioned through a document signed by the President who reposes special trust in them. Officers are largely responsible for shaping the military’s ethos and their standards of conduct are pegged at a higher level.

It is the officers who provide the leadership in the military and who are tasked to ensure the care of the men they command. An officer who passes out of the Indian Military Academy takes the Chetwode pledge that he will place the ‘honour, welfare and comfort of his men’ before his ‘own ease, comfort and safety’. This pledge is redeemed daily by thousands of young officers who lead the soldiers from the front and ensure their welfare in the most challenging of conditions.

Some of the recent proposals have caused a sense of disquiet among the officers. I am not going into the merits or demerits of each proposal, but it would be better if policies are implemented after greater deliberation within the officer cadre of the military. Any loss of trust between the junior and senior leadership is a tear that will not be easily repaired.

The third issue is that an obsessive focus on pay and pensions is skewing our thinking on military reform. It is well understood that salaries account for a large section of the total budget, but this is not because the salaries are huge, but because the allocation to defence services is insufficient to support our military ambitions. There is a crying need for reform in the military, but rather than taking the harder step of restructuring to reduce its size, the highest military leadership is looking at options that dilute the terms of service in terms of financial compensation.

The most valued asset of the military is the quality of its human resource capital — the men and women who serve. Thousands of soldiers are currently locked in a standoff with the Chinese army in the freezing conditions of eastern Ladakh. Others are losing their lives battling infiltrators from Pakistan. In times like this, the military leadership needs to display greater sensitivity in pushing policies that could impact the morale of officers and men.

There is an unwritten covenant between the soldier and the state. The soldier pledges to sacrifice his life for the security of the nation, and the state promises to treat the soldier with respect and dignity and provide adequate compensation to him and his family. If this covenant is broken by either side, either the nation will weaken its security, or the military will lose its professionalism. Neither scenario is desirable.

MODERNIZATION : Don’t Tinker with Indian Military’s way of life to fix Your Out-of-Control Fiscal Deficit

SOURCE:

https://theprint.in/opinion/dont-tinker-with-indian-militarys-way-of-life-to-fix-your-out-of-control-fiscal-deficit/539018/

 

Don’t Tinker with Indian          Military’s way of life to fix Your Out-of-Control                Fiscal Deficit 

Some half-baked economist came up with the 

specious argument to reform military life to save 

money — and CDS Bipin Rawat-led DMA 

swallowed the bait hook line and sinker.

MANVENDRA SINGH 

 9 November 2020.

hse Narendra Modi government flew a kite,

 its string handled by the Department of 

Military Affairs, to test conditions among the 

soldier community on the ground. 

The message displayed by the kite caused such severe turbulence in the fraternity of the fearless that it is unlikely to be a smooth ride for it from now on. Soldiers, those in service and veterans, have seen a slow erosion of their way of life. Perquisites have been chiseled away, one slice at a time. Chinese  WAY  of  Salami slicing of the border has been copied, aimed at service privileges. Pension and service reforms are the latest target, and anger is palpable among soldiers.

Military institutions in India have taken generations to mould and develop. Beginning from humble origins, much like their recruitment base, the military has successfully created its ethos and culture that is uniquely Indian. It is in fact a society that reflects the best of India, from inculcating a sense of belonging to this vast land to echoing its civilisational vision in a masterly way. Military life in India is deeply spiritual, completely professional, and uncompromisingly inclusive. Soldiers are drawn from Kupwara to Kanyakumari, Kutch to Kohima, and everywhere in between.

Each soldier is driven by a pride in the uniform, embodying a work culture that doesn’t accept laxity. Unlike any other Indian institution, the military doesn’t make concessions with prejudice or non-performance. The soldiers live, train, fight, and even die, for their pride, battalion and mother India. Living largely isolated from the vagaries of civilian India, they have developed systems and practices that sustain their unique way of life — an existence that is increasingly seen as peculiar and in need of tweaking. This episodic tinkering has suddenly got the soldier community ablaze because of an outlandish proposal to increase service age and pare down pensions.

Reform? Call it by its name

“[Chief of Defence Staff] General (Bipin) Rawat had made it very clear that the increase in retirement age would come through by 2021 as it was the need of the hour. Both the measures would lead to substantial financial savings as the increase in retirement age will also lead to lesser intake of officers at cadet level,” The Indian Express reported, citing a military source. A draft Government Sanction Letter (GSL) follows on the heels of earlier proposals that recommended a strange cadre review, some reversal of canteen entitlements, even changes in the much-valued Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme, functioning of military messes, bands, and regimental institutions including the hallowed quarter-guard.

The driver of all this tinkering is a ballooning pension bill that was estimated at 28 per cent of the last defence budget. Some half-baked economist came up with the specious argument to reform military life, so as to save precious money. The Department of Military Affairs (DMA) swallowed the bait hook line and sinker, without a thought to how it impacts the functioning life of a combat unit. By all estimations, the military is one institution that delivers on every task it is called upon. It is indeed the best value for money spent by the government. And yet it is the singular establishment that is expected to clip its perquisites so that an out-of-control fiscal deficit can be better managed. Under the guise of pension reform, this is yet another raid on a way of life that is celebrated nationwide.

Military reforms are always welcome if war-fighting capabilities improve. But such improvements can never succeed when they piggyback on financial setbacks to soldiers. They cannot help battle efficiency when a time-tested system is tinkered. They can only succeed when structures are created that extract the best from an effective institution and existing ethos. Neither of these two fundamentals can be raised overnight. But they can certainly be damaged even before the ink has dried on an order. If the Modi government wants to save money, it should begin with the vast leaky reservoir of rural development schemes. Every bureaucrat and politician in India knows the extent of the leakage, but they know nothing about military life, ethos, and morale.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The author is a Editor-in-Chief of Defence & Security Alert. Views are personal.

Why America Must Lead Again:Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump (R)

SOURCE:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again

                                   Click/Google to Open the VIDEO      [ https://youtu.be/lVwSmc6K5x4 ]

                Joe Biden’s foreign policy vision                                                from his own writings 

                                             & 

                what it means for India & Modi

                        

HISTORY INDIA : INDIA 326 BC NAND EMPIRE: What is the story between Chanakya and Dhananda?

 SOURCE:

https://www.quora.com/q/history-of-india?__ni__=0&__nsrc__=4&__snid3__=13657784564&__tiids__=14199905

https://www.quora.com/q/history-of-india/questions

                                                       INDIA  326 BC 

NAND EMPIRE: What is the story between                          Chanakya and Dhananda?

                                      BY 

                  Ninad Kshirsagar ( Quora)

·

The story of Chanakya and Dhanananda lead to the foundation of Akhand Bharat and Mighty Maurya empire.

Magadha was biggest and strongest Janpada in India which was ruled by Dhanananda of Nanda dynasty. He had the biggest army in entire India. At this time India was facing the threat of Macedonian attack of Alexander. India was a divided house with 16 janapadas.

  

Add caption

Acharya Vishnugupta Chanakya was a renowned acharya of Takshashila (RAWALPINDI now PAKISTAN) University which was the biggest and most reputed university at that time in Entire Bharatvarsha (  present SOUTH ASIA INDIAN SUB CONTINENT). In was located in Takshashila which was capital of Kingdom of Gandhar ruled by king Ambhi. As expected Alexander was standing at gates of India near hindukush. Now the situation was that King of Ambhi of Gandhar and King Puru of Panchnad or modern day Punjab were swore enemies and Ambhi had previously suffered defeat at hands of Puru. So to avenge it Ambhi joined hands with Alexander and opened the gates of Bharat for him by helping him cross hindukush and enter India. ( THIS IS WHAT present day PAKISTAN is doing since 1947 ) He struck a deal that Ambhi will help Alexander with army and after defeat of Puru his kingdom will be given to Ambhi ( Corelate today's PAKISTAN cohabitating with CHINA against INDIA. TWO FRONT WAR  ). Alexander and his army entered India. Now their next stop was against Puru( CONSIDER as todays NEW DELHI ). They sent letter to kingdoms to surrender including Puru and Puru the man he was refused and challenged Alexander to meet him in battlefield.

So what happened was that Chanakya knew that India which was divided in small janapada's can't take on the might of Alexander individually. As soons as Chanakya received news of Ambhi joining hands with Alexander Chanakya set out to warn everyone and urge them to unite. Puru was all set for fight anyway. But chanakya still knew that for completely defeating Macedonian force they need support of strong King. Magadha was birth place of Chanakya and Dhanananda was most powerful ruler with a formidable army. Chanakya reached Magadha and wanted to meet and convince dhanananda to march towards north and secure indian borders from Alexander. But Dhanananda was a power hungry , corrupt and incompetent king. Yes he had a mighty force but he was running out and out corrupt administration ( BOTH BJP & prior to BJP CONGRESS  since 1947 are playing the game of  political chess  seething with corruption which is supported  & protected by the most corrupt political system in the recorded history of INDIAN SUB CONTINENT )

So when Chanakya went and tried to convince dhanananda to help the northern kingdoms and secure Bharatvarsh from Invaders dhanananda in his arrogance not only abused Chanakya but he ordered his guards to catch chanakya by his hair knot ( BODI  aka PONY TAIL  )or shikha which Brahmins keep and throw him out of palace which they did. It was an extreme level insult to a famous teacher of famous University. See such an arrogance of power and insult chanakya took a vow then and there which we call “Chanakya Pratigya” that he will not tie his hair or shikha till he dethrones Dhanananda and destroy his entire clan before Magadha and install a king in his place who will unite Janapadas and form Akhand Bharat.

And rest we know is history how chanakya took young Chandragupta under his fold trained him and Dethrones Dhanananda and instated Chandragupta as Emperor and established the GREAT MAURYAN EMPIRE

DOCTRINE : Orthodox Doctrine - Indian Army’s Orthodox Doctrine Distorts Military Strategy in Ladakh-type Conflicts: Study (r)

           National Security Strategy.

India is alone among major powers in 

not regularly producing such a 

deliberate planning document.

                                                                            Curtsey :

DEFENCE SECRETARY OF INDIA WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFNCE OF INDIA

SOURCE:

( A )   https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/fighting-spirit-other-intangibles-count-in-warfare-156498

( B )   LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE – 2018 

http://www.ssri-j.com/MediaReport/Document/IndianArmyLandWarfareDoctrine2018.pdf

( C ) MINISTRY OF DEFENCE   ANNUAL REPORT 2018-19  

https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MoDAR2018.pdf

              

• • 
    
• • 
    
  • 
    
  Opinion

Indian Army’s Orthodox Doctrine Distorts Military Strategy in Ladakh-type Conflicts: Study

ARZAN TARAPORE 

Stanford researcher writes why New Delhi in recent times has been left with an invidious all-or-nothing choice in the use of military force—either start a major war or abstain from action.

31 August, 2020 

Ground forces dominate Indian military strategy. Since its independence, India has fought five wars along its unsettled northern land borders, and its most vexing security threats today—as illustrated by the ongoing Chinese incursions in the northern region of Ladakh—still loom across those same borders. The Indian Army commands a clear and growing majority of military budget allocations and an even larger share of military personnel. But how does India use its ground forces, and how well do they serve Indian security interests?

The Indian Army—and by extension, Indian defence policy—is dominated by an orthodox offensive doctrine. This is an approach to the use of force that centres on large army formations, operating relatively autonomously from political direction. The doctrine’s theory of victory relies on the logic of deterrence by punishment––that India’s threat of a prohibitively costly retaliation will convince its enemy to refrain from aggression. The punitive cost often takes the form of capturing enemy territory as a bargaining chip, even though India usually pursues strategically defensive war aims to maintain the territorial status quo. 

This orthodox offensive doctrine was practiced through several successive conflicts, institutionalised through organisational reforms and professional military education, and codified in official publications, including the latest Land Warfare Doctrine, released in 2018. Since the army is by far the largest and best-resourced service, at the forefront of every war and current-day plans, this doctrine has taken on even larger proportions as the de facto national military strategy of India.

The stubborn dominance of the orthodox offensive doctrine, even in the face of drastic changes in India’s strategic environment, renders the military a less useful tool of national policy. In the two decades since India fought its last war in and around the district of Kargil in 1999, three major strategic trends have fundamentally changed India’s security environment:          (a)Nuclear deterrence has made major conventional war unlikely;  (b)China’s military power and assertiveness now pose an unprecedented threat;and (c)radical new technologies have redefined the military state of the art.

• India’s security policy has not kept pace. Given the balance of military power on India’s northern borders, India cannot decisively defeat either Pakistan or China on the battlefield. Without the ability to impose such unacceptable costs, India’s doctrine will not deter its rivals, which both have significant resolve to bear the costs of conflict. The continued pursuit of large, offensive military options also raises the risk that its enemies will rely on escalatory—even nuclear—responses. And because the doctrine demands a force structure of large ground-holding formations, it pulls scarce resources away from modernisation and regional force projection—a problem made especially acute as the Indian government makes tough economic choices amid the coronavirus pandemic.

• A more Challenging Strategic Environment

Since India fought its last conventional war in 1999, its strategic environment has changed considerably. As India’s inchoate responses to crises since then reveal, its military doctrine and force structure still have not adapted. The scholarship on military innovation presents a broad consensus that military strategies are most likely to change in response to changes in the state’s external environment.

In India’s case, three major strategic changes of the 21st century provide sufficient external motivation for change. First, the open declaration by India and Pakistan that they had nuclear weapons, which introduced a new, confounding element into India’s security policy. Second, the extraordinarily rapid modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which poses a new, more comprehensive threat from China. Third, the step change in the complexity and effectiveness of military technology.

A Failure to Adapt

Despite the abundance of incentives, India’s military strategy has not adapted quickly to the evolving strategic environment. While the motivations for change are apparent, the mechanisms for change are problematic.

Adapting to external changes requires accurate strategic assessments and a rational deliberation of policy options. Such tasks are best performed in a periodic strategic planning process. The US government is mandated to produce a written National Security Strategy. All major powers—including China, France, Japan, Russia, and the UK—produce defence policy white papers. 

India is alone among major powers in 

not regularly producing such a 

deliberate planning document.

The services’ organisational cultures are another powerful impediment to doctrinal change. Left to its own devices, the Indian Army has persisted with deep-rooted practices favouring the orthodox offensive doctrine. Meanwhile, the generally non-expert civilian bureaucracy is unable to drive change or arbitrate between intra-military disputes. Even occasional episodes of reassessment have reinforced the army’s existing patterns in strategy and doctrine rather than challenging them.

Given that the military is unlikely to overhaul its strategic approach independently, the final major impediment to doctrinal change has been the traditional absence of authoritative civilian direction to change. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, empowered by two decisive electoral mandates, has provided the political muscle to enact some of the long-overdue reforms. The transformative change was the establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) position — although there is no evidence yet that this reform will also change the doctrine.

A less useful Force

Given the absence of major reforms, the Indian military will become decreasingly useful as an instrument of national power. The army remains, by far, the largest and best-resourced of the Indian military services, accounting for 57 per cent of the defence budget (compared to 23 per cent for the air force and 14 per cent for the navy) and for 85 per cent of military personnel (compared to 9 per cent for the air force and 4 per cent for the navy).

Within the army, the bias favouring conventional offensive operations is perpetuated through an officer promotion system that uses quotas to greatly favour officers from the combat arms, especially infantry and artillery. The army’s general staff reflects this combat-arms privilege and perpetuates it through its control of doctrine and organisation of the force.

However, it lacks the key enablers to deter or defeat a modern, information-era adversary—especially the C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities that knit together sensors and shooters and the long-range precision weapons that can target the enemy’s vital rear areas and lines of communication.

It lacks the organisation for joint deterrence and war-fighting, in which the military services are integrated with each other from the highest levels of command down to tactical units, both to defend the Indian homeland and to project expeditionary power into the region.

Perhaps most fundamentally,                                               it lacks a theory of victory that would use Indian forces to coerce, deter coercion, and, if necessary, fight, all in ways that are responsive to national political direction

Recommendations for the Indian Army

The recommendations are designed to require relatively modest additional resources and generate minimal resistance among other services or the civilian bureaucracy.

• Consider new theories of victory. To deter and defeat coercion, the Indian Army should consider rebalancing its doctrine with greater use of denial strategies. It should more frequently seek to make coercion and territorial revisionism prohibitively costly or unfeasible for the enemy rather than relying on ex post facto punishment.
• Consider how to be the supporting element of a joint force. Indian forces will increasingly be compelled to deter and fight in multiple domains and different theatres, and the army should therefore consider how to play a productive role in new missions where it supports a main effort elsewhere.
• Consider new niche capabilities. The army can make sizable and qualitatively different contributions to joint combat by developing more robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and by increasing its capacity for long-range precision strike.

Conclusion

India and its army cannot ignore the prospect of a major war, or indeed of a simultaneous collusive threat on both fronts. It must therefore retain the capacity for major conventional operations. Given the length of India’s borders and the size of Pakistan’s and China’s armies, this would require maintaining a sizeable conventional force. However, India should prepare not only for the most dangerous scenario but also for more likely enemy courses of action.

As the Indian Army’s own Land Warfare Doctrine recognises, grey zone and hybrid threats are a central feature of the contemporary and future strategic environments. Meeting those threats does not require a major resource investment; rather, most fundamentally, it requires rethinking India’s traditional orthodox offensive doctrine.

Indian planners and strategists have begun the necessary discussions. However, reform efforts continue to be thwarted by the lack of formal planning processes, the organisational interests of the military, and haphazard civilian-directed change. Top-down change will remain patchy as long as political leaders focus on short-term tokens of bravado at the expense of long-term investments in modernisation.

Modernisation is more than only new equipment and organisation; it also involves new theories of victory, and doctrinal change that allows responses along the full spectrum of conflict. Punitive incursions into enemy territory, using mass and firepower, are rarely effective in wartime, and even less useful as coercive options in peacetime or crisis. If the Indian Army remains focused on conventional offensive operations, it will become increasingly irrelevant as a tool of national security policy.

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Arzan Tarapore is a research scholar on South Asia at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.Views are personal.

This is an edited excerpt from the author’s paper The Army in Indian Military Strategy: Rethink Doctrine or Risk Irrelevance first published by Carnegie India. Read the full paper here.

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