Sunday, May 7, 2017

L O C JAMMU & KASHMIR : BATTALION ACTION TEAM [BAT]

SOURCE:
http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in/2013/10/loc-downside-of-bat-actions.html?m=1







      

     BATTALION ACTION TEAM [BAT]
                                    OF
       PAK INFANTRY BATTALIONS 




LOC: The Downside of BAT Actions        



October 5, 2013 
Updated 05 May,2017.



The recent ongoing Pakistani intrusions on the Line of Control must be understood in the larger perspective of the Pakistan’s philosophy of keeping the LC alive by Border Action Teams(BAT). Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain explains the nuances to clear misconceptions about the LC dynamics.

During the 06 Aug 2013 flare up on the LC (LoC) in the Poonch Sector and the beheading incident in Jan 2013 the common string of information was that the targeted killing of Indian Jawans on the LC was executed by BATs. Even in the Army, not many would boast of knowing what BATs are, how do they function (modus operandi), what effects they have and how the Indian Army handles the threat. In the typical lackadaisical way that the public treats matters military not many sought more information on BATs, preferring to leave them to our professional Army to handle.

In a way that is a positive because the world of the LC is the domain of just a few who have had the honour and the ‘sugar high’ of serving in the razor sharp environment that presents itself daily in the ‘border areas’ of Jammu & Kashmir. It may be appropriate to clarify some of the basic ingredients of this high drama environment.

What is the LC?

The LC is different to the LAC (Line of Actual Control), different to the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) and much different to the Working Boundary (a term used only by Pakistan). The LAC alludes to the land boundary between the areas currently held by China and India along the Northern borders and the AGPL refers to the un-demarcated area north east of NJ 9842. To detail these aspects would be to digress from the main issue the LC, which is quite often called LoC by the media but the Army prefers to shorten it to the more colloquial LC.

The LC is an imaginary line running along the current frontier between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Although the Instrument of Accession of 26 Aug 1947 and Joint Resolution of the two Houses of Parliament of Jul 1994 place the whole of Jammu and Kashmir with India, the actual ground position has emerged over the last 65 years commencing with Pakistan’s invasion in 1947 the conflicts of 1965, 1971 and 1999 (Kargil), as also the proxy war launched by Pakistan since 1989. The LC runs well east of the actual International Boundary (IB) and is the alignment along which the operations of 1947-48 came to a halt thus creating Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK-often referred as Azad Kashmir, or AK, by Pakistan). Unlike the IB there are no boundary pillars (BPs) delineating the LC, however, there are a series of mostly unrecognizable landmarks such as boulders, trees and nullahs which have undergone change over years. The Indian and Pakistan Armies are in eyeball contact in their various pillboxes and picquets all along the alignment but at places terrain constraints may separate the two by two or more km.

It is an environment little known to the outside world, where the notion of ‘Grabbers, Keepers’ exists. Translating this into reality it means that any side grabbing a piece of ground for a tactical advantage gets to keep it unless forcibly evicted (recall Kargil 1999).

Events Leading to Current Status

All was well on the LC till 1989 or so except the sporadic shootouts of lower intensity which took place for the sake of ‘moral ascendancy’. A much misunderstood term, ‘moral ascendancy’ remains even today a task for the wily infantrymen and encompasses a range of sub tasks primary being the sanctity of the LC, (no loss of ground) and prevention of rogue actions by Pakistan.

In 1989 things started to change drastically with the belief among the Kashmiri populace that ‘Azadi’ or merger with Pakistan was becoming a reality. The proxy war within the Valley had to be sustained by Pakistan through induction of terrorists, explosives, military hardware and finances. The LC became the obvious conduit through which all this happened. Much against the common belief that the LC is manned metre to metre the ground reality is that there are large gaps dictated by terrain factors, logistics and climatic constraints. It is these gaps which were exploited and converted to ‘highways’ (a terrorist term) for movement of terrorists, potential terrorists(recruits), hardware, explosives and finances.

The Army was forced to redeploy and selectively reinforce at the cost of its counter terrorist operational grid in the Valley floor. This left many of its LC picquets weaker as a new dimension was added to the task of ‘sanctity of the LC’ this was Counter Infiltration. Sensing a great opportunity the Pakistan Army commenced selectively targeting Indian picquets with a mix of regular troops and well trained terrorists (those who had undergone Daura-e-Khas training). The purpose force back Indian Army counter infiltration ambushes, located between picquets and thus create the gaps needed for infiltration. Unprovoked firing by Pakistani posts further forced the creation of gaps. All this occurred in the Nineties and progressive lessons learnt by the Pakistan Army refined the BAT concept.

Characteristics of BATs

Border Action Teams comprise a mix of Pakistan Army regulars, Pakistan Special Forces elements and high profile terrorists (Jihadis) who are trained to cross the LC to execute raids on Indian picquets, ambushes and patrol parties or logistics elements. Strength has mostly been experienced to be 15 to 20. Beheading has been one of the modus operandi adopted by these teams to cause scare and impose immense caution on their targets. The immediate effect of information about concentration of a BAT opposite a particular segment of the LC is an inevitable strengthening of the defensive stance; stronger patrols, more protection for logistics elements such as mule trains which carry advance winter stocking stores; all this at the cost of the counter infiltration grid. The situation can then be exploited for strong infiltration bids through gaps. Quite obviously BAT actions are in the mold of terrorist acts launched with the intent of imposing caution and creating the tactical conditions for terrorist infiltration.

The Coming of the LC Fence

The inevitable question does the Indian Army sit on its haunches waiting to be attacked; far from it. Indian infantry units are known to have wreaked revenge and delivered telling blows on the Pakistan Army and terrorists. In years before the Cease Fire came into place on 26 Nov 2003 exchange of Arty Fire and direct firing heavy weapons was common place. Many an ingenius Indian gunner and infantry commander innovated and caused much destruction on the Pakistan Army. Among others the name of Brigadier Jasbir Lidder (later Lt Gen), Commander of the high profile 12 Infantry Brigade (Uri) is well known for his famous quip “When Uri rumbles, Chakhoti (PoK town opposite Uri) crumbles”. The ingenius LC fence constructed along the 16 & 15 Corps frontages under the outstanding leadership of then COAS Gen Nirmal Vij greatly altered the odds of infiltration. This needs to be understood in the right perspective as the annual reconstruction of the Fence (an expensive exercise in men and material) is very often questioned within the Army and the less informed bureaucratic circles. 

The LC Fence

The LC Fence changed much more than just the awe inspiring landscape of the Pir Panjal and Shamshabari ranges. It altered what we call the ‘mathematics of terror’ in Jammu & Kashmir. Prior to 01 Jul 2004 (the date the Fence officially came in existence) Pakistan successfully infiltrated 2000-3000 terrorists across the LC each year. On an average 1400-1500 were killed in engagements with the Indian Army on the LC or in the hinterland. The residual figures were always in favour of Pakistan. Then came General Nirmal Vij who led the construction of the Fence from the plains to the obscene heights of the Shamshabari, flaying the ‘nay sayers’. It altered everything. The Indian Army now had an obstacle to concentrate upon and converted it from a mere line of barbed wire to a system comprising steel, lead, electronics, ether and human beings.

By 2006 the Indian Army had acquired the knowledge and experience of exploiting the LC Fence which was leaking just a few hundred terrorists annually while the Army eliminated double the number in its CI/CT operations. The mathematics were now reversed leading to the situation in 2011-12 when less than 300 terrorists roamed the Valley and 19 top terrorists leaders were eliminated with focused CT operations. The transformational ‘Heart Doctrine’ combined with this approach almost brought Kashmir to the doorstep of conflict stabilization awaiting conflict resolution.

The media and the public have often questioned how BATs can enter 400 500 meters into our side and conduct an operation. There is a simple answer to this. In 2003-4 when the LC Fence was constructed there was no ceasefire for most of the period; hence the Fence had to be constructed well away from the LC at most places. Where ever we were/are in domination the construction was well forward, hugging the LC. The Fence gives natural protection against rogue actions but where it is aligned well inside we per force have picquets/posts/detachments ahead but not necessarily on the LC as long as the area ahead can be dominated by fire. Small patrols are used to dominate this space and these are the patrols which are vulnerable to BAT actions. BATs can therefore enter minefields with considerable risk but no other obstacle prevents them from accessing the Indian Army’s patrol bases or routes of patrolling near (400-500 metres) the LC.

To expect Pakistan Army to use BATs more extensively after the Indian Army’s successful handling of the situation in J&K in 2011-12, is to state the obvious. We often hear of the phrase ‘keeping the pot boiling’ in Kashmir while Pakistan handles the Afghan border and its internal security threats. To execute this concept Pakistan requires its terrorist foot soldiers (boots on the ground) in J&K; to allow the fast dwindling strength to reduce even further would be a catastrophe for the ISI’s post 2014 strategy in J&K. Hence the necessity to once again force creation of gaps on the LC to facilitate infiltration.

Many veterans of the Army would recall some of the well known BAT actions which were launched against Indian Army units and the counter actions taken by the same units. The Indian Army has foiled many more BAT actions than the ones which have succeeded. Only a year ago 16 PUNJAB foiled a major action in the Tangdhar Sector. 

Handling BATs at Different Levels

In my long years handling the LC from unit to a Corps Commander I always found the threats from BATs as the most challenging and relished countering these. In 2008 a Pakistan Army unit decided to send a 15 man officer led team across the LC to dislodge a small detachment of my brave Rajputs who had temporarily occupied a patrol base to dominate an area of the LC not usually visited or patrolled. In the ensuing clash between four young Rajput soldiers without a senior leader and the 15 Pakistanis the Rajputs lost one soldier and killed 7 Pakistanis. All hell broke loose on the LC in a frontage of about 3 to 4 Km. My orders to the CO were crystal clear “’the night is yours, I do not want the Pakistani bases, from where the soldiers had emerged, to remain standing”. The Rajputs shocked me next morning when they reported the destruction caused to the Pakistan Army posts. The last hurrah was when a Pakistan Army helicopter emerged late the next afternoon and took away the Pakistani Brigade Commander; it was later learnt that he was removed from command; so much for the moral ascendancy achieved by the Rajputs. As the General Officer of the division I asked no one and no one advised me. It was my calling and the risk was also mine.

The above example displays just how Pakistan Army’s proactive and provocative stance on the LC needs to be handled. The offensive response by Indian Army units has to be reflected in their attitude from the moment they step into their area of responsibility. Most BAT actions take place during handing/taking over between units when command and control is supposedly loose. Infantry units do not realize that each action of theirs even before they arrive in their AOR is under surveillance. Many units having fearsome reputation will never be tested; others with lesser credentials and poor body language of their troops would get tested early. The first engagement if handled with professional aggression will allow a unit a tenure with little turbulence. Destiny has brought many units of both Armies from the Kargil war once again face to face on the LC. 

The reader must not go away with the impression that the Pakistan Army and terrorists rule the roost on the LC, far from it. Yet, it is imperative that our commanders be bold, trust their instinct, train their troops hard and wargame contingencies regularly. This is 24 x 7 soldiering where every movement has to be controlled and reactions kept ready; most important of all — time is the worst enemy of effectiveness on the LC. As a sector cools down so does the vigil and then one fine day it happens; there is only one solution to this constant reminders to all at the oddest time of the day or night. There is no rest on the LC; those who rest seldom live to tell the tales.

About the Author

Besides the optimum combination of ground soldiering, staff work and academics, Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain, the scholar warrior, is best known for his path breaking tenure as Corps Commander of the high profile 15 Corps in the Kashmir Valley, where he employed the most unique methods to stabilise the turbulence that the Valley had experienced giving it the best chance for a return to peace. He remains the only officer of the Army to be decorated six times by the President of India and was recently honoured by the Vice President with the Capital Foundation Society’s award for excellence in the field of military leadership. This article first appeared in South Asia Defence and Strategic Review defstrat.com.





Friday, May 5, 2017

India may use BrahMos for cross-LoC strikes

SOURCE:

India may use BrahMos for cross-LoC strikes





India may use BrahMos for cross-LoC strikes






                                    [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l53gYzqqBB4 ]









The Army has begun weighing its options to retaliate against Pakistani forces on the Line of Control, after their troops, employing jihadi extremists, killed and beheaded two Indian soldiers near Poonch on Monday, top generals said.

It is learnt that the incident took place when an Indian patrol of 8-10 soldiers was checking the border fence, a perilous task involving physically moving along the fence, very close to the LoC, to check that it has not been cut or its electronic sensors damaged.

According to the modus operandi of Pakistani troops on forward LoC posts, the exposed patrol first came under intense fire from automatic weapons, which Pakistani soldiers had stealthily deployed in temporary positions, just across the LoC.

With two Indian jawans injured in the firing, a ‘border action team’, comprising jihadi fighters, darted across the LoC to the border fence. Covered by the Pakistan army’s firing, the jihadis killed the two jawans, beheaded them, and returned to their side of the LoC, bearing the heads as trophies.

The employment of a BAT is a well-rehearsed Pakistani tactic that creates deniability by using jihadis to cross into the Indian side.


The employment of a BAT is a well-rehearsed Pakistani tactic that creates deniability by using jihadis to cross into the Indian side. If any jihadis are killed or captured, the Pakistan army disowns it as an infiltration attempt.

Regular soldiers remain on their side of the LoC, firing on Indian posts and patrols to cover the BAT’s move.

A range of retaliatory measures are being weighed by India’s generals, including attacks by ground forces on Pakistani posts, or strikes by aircraft, missiles or massed artillery guns.

Army Vice-Chief Lieutenant General Sarath Chand, on Tuesday, said, "Humko kya karna hai woh hum yahaan bataana nahin chahte hain. Apni karyavahi hum apne aap karenge, at a time and place of our choice (I don’t want to give out here what we intend to do. We will take action at a time and place of our choice)."

On Monday, the Army's Director General of Military Operations, Lieutenant General A K Bhatt, warned of retaliation during a phone call to his Pakistani counterpart. A defence ministry release stated: ‘The DGMO of the Indian Army conveyed that such a dastardly and inhuman act is beyond any norms of civility and merits unequivocal condemnation and response.'

Defence Minister Arun Jaitley also sounded a warning on Monday, "The country has full confidence and faith in our armed forces, which will react appropriately to this inhuman act. The sacrifice of these soldiers will not go in vain."

However, army sources emphatically rejected Indian media claims -- by India Today TV and Dainik Jagran newspaper -- that the Indian Army had already visited retribution, killing 10 Pakistani soldiers in an attack.

Last September, the Indian Army had retaliated to a jihadi strike on an army post near Uri with multiple cross-LoC ‘surgical strikes’ that are believed to have killed several jihadi fighters and a handful of Pakistani soldiers.

After another attack in November, the Indian Army secretly moved 155 millimetre Bofors guns into forward firing positions, destroying two Pakistani posts in a massed fire assault.

Even so, senior generals admit there are limitations on how much, and how often, Pakistani posts on the LoC can be punished, even in retaliating to an inhuman violation that involved mutilating Indian soldiers.

Inadequate punishment fails to deter Pakistani violations, while an excess could set off a cycle of escalation that could spiral out of control.

Moreover, the Indian military does not have a tri-service plan for immediate retaliation to such incidents.

This would involve pre-selecting Pakistan army or jihadi targets, earmarking the aircraft, missiles, guns or Special Forces to hit them and devising defensive measures for the inevitable Pakistani retaliation.

In what might be an unlinked development, the Army on Tuesday test-fired a BrahMos land-to-land missile, demonstrating what an official release described as ‘the weapon’s unmatched lethality of hitting the centre of a designated target with ‘bull’s eye’ precision’.

The BrahMos would be an important component of any concerted Indian cross-LoC strike capability

Sunday, April 30, 2017

GEO STRATEGY : Dynamics Of Strategic Stability In South Asia

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30042017-dynamics-of-strategic-stability-in-south-asia-oped/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29



            Dynamics Of Strategic Stability

                                     In

                              South Asia

                                     By










Strategic stability in South Asia is complex phenomena due to adversarial relationship between two traditional rivals India and Pakistan. Existence of an Action-Reaction Spiral between both nuclear rivals is increasing the fragility of the South Asian strategic stability.

Though, the both states have successfully achieved the principal requirements of strategic stability by enhancing their nuclear capabilities and maintaining the deterrence. But different postures of military strategies have negatively affected nuclear equation of the region. Balance of power in South Asia revolves around the competition over nuclear and conventional military build-up between India-Pakistan and powers politic among United States, China and Russia.

The territorial dispute over Jammu and Kashmir is an actual bone of contention and previous events of the war of Kargil, the Mumbai attack, and the most recent attacks of Pathankot and Urri, has severely shattered the stability paradigm and these events have brought both countries on the brink of war. Most significantly the Indian claim of surgical attacks in Pakistan held Kashmir has seriously disturbed the existing strategic stability paradigm in South Asia.

Though the introduction of nuclear weapon has brought the fundamental change in regional security calculus but Stability-Instability paradox is operational in south Asia.

The dilemma of the South Asian region is that with the passage of time, strategic stability is becoming more fragile instead of becoming strong. Deterrence stability and Crisis stability in the region is not yet stabilize due to various internal and external factors Historical events, social, economic, political aspects and external powers especially United States (US) has played crucial role in disturbing the strategic force balance and strategic stability in the region. Internal challenges such as territorial disputes (Sir Creek, Kashmir, and Siachen), increased border tension on LOC, defence production gap and Indian military modernization, Indian ballistic missile program, and absence of arms control regime are the main source of tension in the region. In such a strategic landscape three possible threats to regional strategic stability are: crisis instability, arms race, security dilemma and escalatory danger have worsened the situation.

Power politics among super powers has also played a crucial role in disturbing the regional equilibrium as the sub-continent has remained under the influence of great powers. During the cold war period USSR and U.S exercise their power struggle over South Asia; where as in china emerged as third competitor during the Post-Cold war era.

At the end of Cold-War, India-US bilateral ties were strengthened by economic and defence co-operation. In post 9/11 indo-US stronger ties were the biggest threat to regional stability. Growing Indo-US strategic partnership, Indo-US nuclear deal, recent defence co-operation and U.S support to Indian candidacy for NSG has drastically halted the process of stability. Defence bond between U.S and India is biggest threat to regional stability as well as to the global non-proliferation efforts.

At the broader aspect the Indo-U.S strategic partnership has put the question mark on the aspiration of both states and it may force the other regional states to take the measure to ensure their safety and security.

In response to Indo-U.S strategic co-operation, China and Pakistan are making a strong partnership in economic, military and nuclear fields. China can play the crucial role to maintain the balance of power in the region by providing assistance to Pakistan in military and nuclear fields. At the same time, Pakistan and China are pursuing the strategies to counter the threats and challenges to regional strategic stability but not by violating the international laws or norms as US did to support India’s membership for NSG. Subsequently, Pakistan’s vision is to promote the idea of regional cooperative development; CPEC is the most significant example of that.

Two categories of strategic partnerships: the Indo-U.S strategic partnership and China-Pakistan Strategic co-operation has evolved the unique kind of equilibrium in the South Asia. However, India’s military modernization plane, missile program, Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal and discriminatory approach of U.S towards Pakistan have directly challenged the regional strategic balance.

In this regard, the absence of crisis stability and deterrence stability mechanism is increasing the fragility of South Asian strategic stability. So it is imperative to develop a framework comprised of conventional force balance, arms control regime and conflict resolution. Unfortunately, India has always rejected such proposals regarding nuclear restrains. In order to ensure the regional stability it is necessary to take the establishment of restraint regimes seriously for durable peace in the South Asian region.
*Asma Khalid, Writer is Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) Islamabad. Asmaakhalid_90@hotmail.com

Saturday, April 29, 2017

DEPORT HER TO INDIA! INDIA NEEDS HER !!



      DEPORT HER TO INDIA !  INDIA NEEDS HER  !!

                           Way to go Granny!!!




            The Rambo Granny of Melbourne, Australia




Gun-toting granny Ava Estelle, 81, was so ticked-off when two thugs raped her 18-year-old granddaughter that she tracked the unsuspecting ex-cons down and shot off their testicles.

The old lady spent a week hunting those men down and, when she found them, she took revenge on them in her own special way,

said Melbourne police investigator Evan Delp.


Then she took a taxi to the nearest police station, laid the gun on the sergeant's desk and told him as calm as could be:  "Those bastards will never rape anybody again, by God."

Cops say convicted rapist and robber Davis Furth, 33, lost both his penis and his testicles when outraged Ava opened fire with a 9-mm pistol in the hotel room where he and former prison cell mate Stanley Thomas, 29, were holed up.


The wrinkled avenger also blew Thomas' testicles to kingdom come, but doctors managed to save his mangled penis, police said.

"The one guy, Thomas, didn't lose his manhood, but the doctor I talked to said he won't be using it the way he used to," Detective Delp told reporters. "Both men are still in pretty bad shape, but I think they're just happy to be alive after what they've been through."


The Rambo Granny swung into action August 21 after her grand-daughter Debbie was carjacked and raped in broad daylight by two knife-wielding creeps in a section of town bordering on skid row. "When I saw the look on my Debbie's face that night in the hospital,I decided I was going to go out and get those bastards myself because I figured the Law would go easy on them," recalled the retired library worker. "And I wasn't scared of them, either because I've got me a gun and I've been shooting all my life. And I wasn't dumb enough to turn it in when the law changed about owning one."

So, using a police artist's sketch of the suspects and Debbie's description of the sickos, tough-as-nails Ava spent seven days prowling the wino-infested neighborhood where the crime took place 'till she spotted the ill-fated rapists entering their flophouse hotel. "I knew it was them the minute I saw 'em, but I shot a picture of 'em anyway, and took it back to Debbie and she said sure as hell, it was them," the oldster recalled.

"So I went back to that hotel and found their room and knocked on the door, and the minute the big one opened the door, I shot 'em right square between the legs, right where it would really hurt 'em most, you know."
"Then I went in and shot the other one, as he backed up pleading to me to spare him. Then I went down to the police station and turned myself in."

Now, baffled lawmen are trying to figure out exactly how to deal with the vigilante granny.

"What she did was wrong, and she broke the law, but it is difficult to throw an 81-year-old woman in prison," Det. Delp said, "especially when 3 million people in the city want to nominate her for Mayor.


         Granny you are welcome in India 
                                
                                   &     

     if possible get a couple  of more like you. 

   This country is in dire need of  like your ilk



                                                                        AND

          BE ASSURED YOUR STATUE  WILL BE                              INCARNATED 
                                     AS
              AN AVTAR OF MAA KALI





















Friday, April 28, 2017

NUKES : South Asia is not the Most Dangerous place on Earth

SOURCE:
http://thebulletin.org/south-asia-not-most-dangerous-place-earth10720






                South Asia is Not 

  the Most Dangerous place on Earth

                              By

          Ramamurti Rajaraman




Nuclear weapons are arguably among the most dangerous inventions of man. The scale and rapidity of the destruction they can cause is unparalleled, as evidenced by the two occasions that they were used on civilian populations and by the numerous tests conducted on testing ranges. It follows that any country choosing to possess nuclear weapons is creating an existential threat, not only for its adversaries but also for itself and for its general neighborhood. Such places are all very dangerous to be in.

Given the immensity and gravity of this danger, it might seem silly and ghoulish to quibble over which nuclear weapon country is a greater danger than the others. Nevertheless, in the 70-year history of nuclear weapons such comparisons have often been made by diplomats, national leaders, scholars, and the media. Motivations have varied. Mostly they come from genuine concern for the safety of that region and of the world in general. But sometimes it is part of the thrust and parry of diplomatic engagement, or a strategic step to name and shame a country. It can also be a strategy for individuals and nongovernmental organizations specializing in that region to enhance the importance of their scholarly niche and ensure the next tranche of grant money.

In this genre, the flavor of the decade has been the notion that “South Asia is the most dangerous place on Earth.” This view was launched after a remark by President Bill Clinton, about two years after the nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in May 1998. Shortly before he was to make his first state visit to India, Clinton said: “The most dangerous place in the world today, I think you could argue, is the Indian subcontinent and the line of control in Kashmir.” The statement quickly gained wide currency.
Since then it has become customary for analysts in think tanks and Western media to routinely and casually use this phrase or something equivalent.
This perception, however, is not widely shared in the Indian sub-continent. In fact, soon after Clinton made his statement and during a formal banquet in India honoring Clinton’s visit, Indian President K.R.Narayanan cautioned:
“It has been suggested that the Indian sub-continent is the most dangerous place in the world to-day and Kashmir is a nuclear flash-point. These alarmist descriptions will only encourage those who want to break the peace and indulge in terrorism and violence.” 
A similarly sober assessment continues to be provided by experts in India. These include not just politicians and civilian officials who could conceivably be expected to paint a reassuring picture, but also senior military officers who would seem to be inclined to be hawkish and belligerent.
.
For example, Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoi, former Vice Chief of Army Staff, has written:

 “Keeping rhetoric, verbal statements, and saber rattling aside, both India and Pakistan know that even a single use of a nuclear weapon—whether in [its] own or [on the] adversary’s side of the border, would invite massive retaliation and destruction, not only for both countries or substantial parts of both countries, but also have severe adverse impact for the region and many parts of the world. Consequently, it is illogical to conclude that the escalatory ladder will climb to the nuclear level as a matter of course.”

Such sober views are not limited only to Indian analysts who, one might say, are compelled by regional pride to be biased in favor of thinking highly of their ability to handle nuclear responsibility in a crisis. Some analysts in the Western media have taken a similar stance, such as the BBC’s Defence Correspondent Jonathan Marcus
: “In going nuclear, and in a sense in getting away with it, they [India and Pakistan] have provided a dangerous precedent. That is certainly the way western analysts would view it. Though local experts in the region would probably echo their own governments in insisting that if nuclear deterrence is okay for Britain, France, Russia, and the United states—not to mention China—then it should be fine for India and Pakistan as well.”
Meanwhile, other Westerners took a very different view. In 2007, four very distinguished elder statesmen of the US establishment—George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn—published a very influential article in the Wall Street Journal calling for a world free of nuclear weapons. Such a call for total disarmament by veterans of the Cold War was widely welcomed around the world. But one of the arguments they used to advocate this goal was less than universally welcome

: “New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?”

Although the distinguished authors used very diplomatic language in attributing the prevention of nuclear disasters to good fortune, the undertone was that the “new nuclear states” may not have the same technical capability or the nuclear maturity that the two Cold Warriors had to safely maintain their nuclear arsenals. That is a bit rich, given that the time when we came closest to a nuclear exchange was during the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, which lasted for 13 days as the world waited with bated breath to see who would blink first, the United States or the Soviet Union. No threat of remotely similar proportions has emerged from South Asia in the 19 years since Pakistan announced that it had conducted nuclear warhead tests and the region can be said to be nuclearized by both parties.
Our weapons are not on a ready-to-launch state of alert. In India, and as far as I know also in Pakistan, the warheads are kept de-mated from the missiles.

Despite this, outbreaks of alarmist comments about South Asia recur from time to time from think tanks and scholars in the West. One recent example was reportedly a talk at the prestigious Carnegie Conference held at Washington in March 2017, which in turn led to a flurry of articles in major US newspapers. The talk and a subsequent New York Times article about it drew their conclusions from some re-interpretations of our No First Use doctrine by some retired Indian officials to permit a first strike in some circumstances. True, these officials are highly respected people who had held apex positions in the government‘s strategic establishment. But there is no evidence that their post–retirement views represent in any way the policies of the government currently—or for that matter, even when they held office.
In fact, one can cite several examples of restrained behavior in the subcontinent in support of India's claim that nuclear weapons, while very dangerous anywhere, are no more so in the hands of the Indians and Pakistanis. Situations that could have escalated from the conventional level to a nuclear exchange did not do so. The first example, the Kargil “war” of 1999, happened just a year after the two countries had turned nuclear. It began with the Indian discovery that Pakistani soldiers had occupied some strategic mountain peaks on the Indian side and had to be evicted. 

Although it was limited to a narrow 100-mile long strip of uninhibited mountain ridges abutting the Line of Control, or de facto border, in Kashmir, it went on for three months, involving not only ground troops but also the Indian Air force. If there ever was a time to seriously worry about a nuclear war, it was then. The two countries, after conducting their respective nuclear tests in May 1998, were presumably in possession of a few warheads each. One could have legitimately worried that with little prior experience in possessing nuclear arsenals, one or the other side might have erred on the side of excessive military action or aggressive bluster, and take them both down the treacherous slope towards nuclear exchange.
But that did not happen.
The war was not allowed to escalate. The Indian government had given firm orders to its Air Force that beyond evicting the intruders, its airplanes should not cross the border in hot pursuit. The Pakistanis in turn, with reportedly some counseling by the Americans, withdrew from the remaining occupied areas. Cease fire followed.
The next few years witnessed what could be viewed as far more serious challenges to nuclear stability in the subcontinent. First came the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, by the Pakistan-supported terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Fortunately, it was repelled by the Indian security detail, but even if a single terrorist had managed to enter the building, there were a hundred unarmed members of the parliament inside, ready for picking. Despite the massive uproar this caused in India, with calls for immediate revenge, the Indian government kept its cool and took no military action. For purposes of comparison, imagine the dilemma President Trump would face if some armed outfit from Mexico snuck across the newly renovated border wall and attacked the Capitol building while the US Congress was in session.
What the Parliament attack in New Delhi did result in was a show of strength by India through a military mobilization (“Operation Parakram”) at the border the following summer, leading to a similar response by Pakistan. The troops were lined up on their respective sides of the border in a face-to-face confrontation which lasted for months. From time to time sporadic incidents on the border or a burst of overheated rhetoric from either side would generate rumors in the foreign media that war between the two nuclear armed neighbors was imminent.
I recall being on a brief visit to the United States in that summer of 2002. My American friends expressed concern over the situation back in India and were equally concerned over my nonchalance on the matter, given that my family was living in New Delhi. So, mostly to reassure my friends, I called my wife that evening and was informed that there was no feeling of imminent danger, let alone panic on the streets of Delhi. The poor were as usual worried about their next meal, while the middle classes was pre-occupied with upward mobility in a growing economy!
It must be acknowledged that during this face-to-face standoff, leaders of other nations, especially the United States, contacted their counterparts in India and Pakistan, expressing their concern and urging them not to let the situation go out of control. While their concern and advice did contribute to the resolution of that crisis, it does not follow that without their input the two protagonists would have not have, on their own, avoided stepping into the abyss.
Terrorist attacks continued to be launched even after that, not only within Kashmir but also on the Indian mainland. The worst of them was the attack in Mumbai in 2008 in which over 160 people were killed. This attack also received more attention than usual in the West, because several foreigners from the United States and Israel were among the casualties. The Indian public reaction to this attack was stronger than ever before and, as credible evidence of the involvement of Pakistan-based outfits grew, so did calls for reprisal. Yet once again the Indian government resisted pressures to retaliate. Instead, it was content to register its outrage through diplomatic channels, by providing evidence on how and by whom the attacks were planned.
It is not as though India has been the only one to exercise restraint. The other side has, in its own way, done that too. Once it became clear, after Mumbai, that the Indian government might be forced by public opinion to launch a punitive strike the next time there was a major act of terror on India, there have in fact been no more attacks of that magnitude for several years since. Whoever organizes and funds these attacks from Pakistani soil has been told to refrain from doing so. How much of this is because of pressure from the world community and how much due to the wisdom of Pakistani strategists, we do not know. But the fact is that nothing close to the Mumbai or Parliament attack in size or significance has happened since then.
Another instance which effectively became an act of Pakistani restraint was their response to the Indian surgical strikeson Pakistani infiltration camps last November. Although terrorism on the scale of Mumbai has not happened since then, there has been a resurgence of attacks on Indian military bases near the border, first at the Pathankot airbase on January 2016 and then at Uri on September 18, 2016. Seven Indian soldiers were killed at the former and 18 at the latter. The Indian government decided that this time a calibrated punitive measure was finally called for and launched a set of coordinated strikes across the border on the launch pads of the infiltrators. The scale of that counterattack was not much higher than standard cross-border attacks that have been taking place for years in Kashmir. The difference this time was that the Indians publicly announced these counter strikes. In Asia, where saving face is as important a criterion as any other in deciding foreign policy, the announcement of the Indian counterattack was also a public reprimand to Pakistan. Such an “insult” could easily have generated an uncontainable public demand in Pakistan for a tit-for tat response and the whole situation could easily have escalated to something bigger. But the Pakistani government chose not to retaliate, either with military action or even threatening rhetoric. Instead they chose to ridicule the Indian claims of a major “surgical strike” and declared that no such things had happened. Now, I do not know what exactly motivated the Pakistani army to take such a position of denial. But the net result, once again, was that matters were prevented from escalating.
No one is arguing that the nuclearization of South Asia has not been a very dangerous development. It certainly has. There is also no doubt that all the nuclear weapon nations of the world, including those in South Asia, should relentlessly strive to get rid of these weapons. Specifically, making South Asia a nuclear weapons-free region is primarily the responsibility of us Indians and the Pakistanis. In support of this ongoing effort by right-thinking people here, advice, counsel, and analysis coming from other nations are of course very welcome. But such inputs will be counter-productive if they are condescending and simplistic. That will only put the backs up of conservatives and ultra-nationalists in South Asia, and make the prospects of arms reduction even more distant.