CDS PART 21 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA : The Western Theater Command (r)

CDS 

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html
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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-28-cds-jointness-pla-snapshot.html

Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html

Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html

Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part  9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part  8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html

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https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/chief-of-defence-staff.html

Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of N Parts:
  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html

Part 1  of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html

PLA THEATRE COMMANDs REFERENCES


SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-western-theater-command/


ANALYSIS
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/59413

https://imrmedia.in/current-issue.php#772

Despite continuing high-level meetings between China and India’s military, Beijing has not settled its border disputes with India, and continues aggressive military activity along the disputed border regions (China Military Online, November 22, 2016). This is despite China’s resolution of most disputed land borders including those with Russia and Vietnam. China has also continued construction of infrastructure to support military operations in a conflict. The current round of ambitious PLA reforms, including creation of peacetime joint theater commands, will significantly increase joint operations capabilities in the newly formed Western Theater Command with responsibility for the Indian strategic direction. [1]

Each of the five new theater commands will focus on combat operations and enhancing joint training of subordinate forces based on wartime missions.The new commands include the Eastern Theater Command (TC) based on the former Nanjing Military Region (MR) responsible for Taiwan operations and territorial disputes with Japan; the Southern TC based on the Guangzhou MR responsible for operations against Vietnam and the South China Sea region, as well as providing forces for operations in a Taiwan conflict; Western TC based on the former Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs; Northern TC based on Shenyang MR plus Inner Mongolia and Shandong Provinces responsible for responding to potential instability on the Korean peninsula or possibly supporting operations against Japan; and a Central TC based on Beijing and Jinan MRs with responsibility for capital defense and serving as a strategic reserve to reinforce other theaters (Global Times, February 2, 2016; Xinhua, February 1, 2016).

The Western Theater Command

The Western Theater Command (WTC) is the most expansive of the new theaters with complex internal and external operational requirements. The theater commander is Army General Zhao Zongqi, former commander of Jinan MR (2012–2016). General Zhao participated in combat against Vietnam, served as commander of the 52nd Mountain Brigade in the early 1990’s, and commander of the 14th Group Army (2005–2008) before moving to assignments in Jinan MR. These experiences demonstrate extensive operational knowledge of mountain warfare, making Zhao a good choice as WTC commander (Xinhua, February 1, 2016; The Beijing News, February 2, 2016; China Military Online, March 3, 2016).

      The Western Theater Command

The WTC is the largest theater and has complex terrain including desert and high mountains, long borders, and challenging social conditions. Theater missions include supporting the People’s Armed Police Force maintaining internal stability in the restive Tibet and Xinjiang regions. Disaster relief requiring liaison with civilian organizations is also an important theater mission. External responsibilities include responding to possible unrest in Central Asia under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO sponsored series of Peace Mission exercises since 2005 have trained SCO forces for combined operations responding to large scale unrest. However, the   WTC’s primary strategic direction is India and the contested border regions  (Xinhua, August 18, 2014; China Military Online, March 3, 2016).

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http://www.81.cn/2016xbzq/2016-03/16/content_6962518.htm

The WTC is the largest theater and has complex terrain including desert and high mountains, long borders, and challenging social conditions. Theater missions include supporting the People’s Armed Police Force maintaining internal stability in the restive Tibet and Xinjiang regions. Disaster relief requiring liaison with civilian organizations is also an important theater mission. External responsibilities include responding to possible unrest in Central Asia under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO sponsored series of Peace Mission exercises since 2005 have trained SCO forces for combined operations responding to large scale unrest. However, the WTC’s primary strategic direction is India and the contested border regions (Xinhua, August 18, 2014; China Military Online, March 3, 2016).

The Chinese press has reported that the Tibet Military Command/Military District in the WTC has been elevated by one level compared to other provincial-level military districts and placed under the PLA Army (PLAA). Most provincial-level military districts are under the National Defense Mobilization Department of the CMC with responsibility for reserves, militia and conscription. An article in The Global Times reported that the Tibet Military Command will be responsible for operations against India, at least in the Arunachal Pradesh area, training forces for specialized high-altitude mountain warfare and long-range mobility for such a contingency (Global Times, May 13, 2016). However, Army command would appear to usurp the theater’s command responsibility. The Xinjiang Military District is also under PLAA command. The current reforms and reorganization make the services responsible for force development and training their respective forces, which would appear to include the Army commands in the Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts. Since the WTC has a difficult internal mission, the Army might additionally be responsible for internal missions in Tibet and Xinjiang, acting as an intermediate command level for the theater, which would have a daunting span of control if widespread unrest occurred in both areas, compounded by an external crisis.

The WTC headquarters includes a joint operations command center also located in Chengdu. The theater Army headquarters is in Lanzhou. The new Strategic Logistics Support Force has subordinate Joint Logistics Support Centers in each theater, with one in Xining for the WTC. The WTC can deploy subordinate PLAA and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) units, and request additional forces from the CMC if required. Each theater will require time to fully transition from the Army dominated MR headquarters to establish joint commands, gain familiarity between the services, as well as train personnel in their new joint positions. For example, the WTC brought together experts to address theater construction and develop plans to promote joint operations from February 28–29, 2016. The newly formed PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) as well as the other services have assigned high quality officers to the new joint commands. The PLARF reportedly assigned approximately 100 officers to the five new theater commands to support planning and training. It is not yet clear whether PLARF conventional missile launch brigades remain directly subordinate to the CMC or are theater assets. If they remain under centralized control, the CMC would assign launch brigades to support to the theaters as required (Global Times, February 4 , 2016; Xinhua, April 6, 2016; China Military Online, April 7, 2016; Global Times, April 12, 2016; China Military Online, May 10, 2016; PLA Daily, March 2, 2016; MOD, January 11, 2016).

The theater headquarters likely includes service departments and other specialized elements. A joint command post structure could include a command and control center, intelligence center, communications center, information operations center. firepower coordination center, air defense operations center, special operations center, military affairs mobilization department, political work department, logistics and equipment support department, and other elements as required. The theater would likely include a main, alternate, rear, and possibly a forward command post to command operations in a conflict (PLA Daily, May 28, 2016). [2]

WTC Training

The theater contains the combined arms tactical training bases (CATTB) located at Xichang and Qingtongxia. These CATTB’s are highly developed training facilities for both combined arms and joint training with the PLAAF. CATTB’s typically contain direction, evaluation and simulation facilities. Exercise umpires, multiple integrated laser engagement systems (MILES), data collection systems, and Opposing forces (OPFOR) are employed to promote training realism and evaluation. Qingtongxia CATTB, established around 2000, includes an urban warfare training village, electromagnetic environment simulation, monitoring and control systems, as well as a 1:500 scale (900 meters x 700 meters) mock-up of the contested Aksai Chin border region. The PLAAF experimental training base at Dingxin, Gansu Province, is used for live fire and complex electromagnetic environment training. PLAAF units rotate through this large training area, which also contains a mock-up of Taiwan’s Ching Chuan Kang Air Force Base (清泉崗). A PLAAF training base at Korla contains an airfield mockup resembling the U.S. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. The PLARF uses the airfield mock-ups as targets for live fire training. The PLA also employs military training coordination zones for joint exercises, and the WTC contains joint training coordination zones in the Tianshan Mountains, in Gansu Province, and in the Chongqing area (PLA Daily, January 2, 2009; The Register, July 19, 2006; WantChinaTimes, December 30, 2014; PLA Daily, March 2, 2006; PLA Daily, November 3, 2010; PLA Daily, October 6, 2006).

PLA training exercises in the WTC have featured offensive and defensive mountain and cold weather warfare training and long-distance movement of units. The Stride (跨越), Joint Action (联合行动), and Firepower (火力) series of exercises have trained units, including those from the WTC, to move long distances by multiple means to reinforce another region and engage in combat. Firepower-2016 in Qingtongxia featured units from the five theaters training against a 47th GA brigade acting as a simulated enemy (China Military Online, February 28, 2016; China Military Online, July 12, 2016; China Military Online, October 12, 2015).

Potential PLA Operations in the Indian Strategic Direction

The primary border areas under dispute are the Chinese-occupied Aksai Chin in the west, and Arunachal Pradesh in the east controlled by India. China and India have conducted combined “Hand-in-Hand” (携手) counter-terrorism exercises on a small scale and have established high-level dialogue on border issues to alleviate tensions. There has also been tension between the two countries over Chinese activity in the border regions as well as the Indian Ocean. The WTC would have to coordinate operations with the responsible command for naval operations against India. The WTC focuses on relevant campaign scenarios to train troops for potential combat operations. PLA publications detail several campaigns that the WTC could conduct including Anti-terrorism Stability Maintenance operations to combat internal unrest; Joint Border Counterattack Campaigns to defend against an attack and regain lost territory; Mountain Offensive Campaigns; and Joint Fire Strike Campaigns usually supporting another campaign, but also an independent campaign (Global Times, September 5, 2012). [3]

China is rapidly improving infrastructure in the Sino-Indian border region as part of development plans for Tibet as well as to prepare for possible defensive or offensive operations. China has constructed roads to and along disputed areas, along with additional airbases, landing strips and logistics sites to support military deployments and operations. India has also improved transportation infrastructure in its controlled areas, and plans additional infrastructure construction to support its military and paramilitary forces along the border. India has also deployed additional forces to the border regions since 2012 (China Brief, September 13, 2016; Times of India, February 20, 2014; Daily Excelsior, February 11, 2016; NDTV, July 21, 2016).

The Sino-Indian disputed borders represent isolated high-altitude regions with difficult terrain and weather conditions presenting problems for troops, weapons and equipment. Ground combat will occur mainly along roads that normally follow valleys or ridges, limiting support and cooperation between forces operating on different axes. The lack of cross-terrain mobility limits the ability of ground forces to conduct penetrating or outflanking operations against enemy forces. PLA publications stress air mobile landings in the enemy rear area to overcome the restricted terrain and enemy defensive positions. Special operations forces available to the WTC would represent highly qualified units to operate in the enemy rear area to disrupt operations and attack vulnerable lines of communications. The high-altitude reduces aviation performance and lift capabilities, and increases maintenance requirements on equipment in general, although the thin air increases the range of projectiles and shrapnel. Weather conditions would mostly limit air operations to June through September. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought in October and November without air support. Cold high-plateau regions place increases requirements on engineering and support operations, and the thin air is difficult for the troops even after acclimation. This situation reduces unit combat capabilities and increases non-combat losses. Training new recruits could affect an operation depending on the timing. New recruits would likely achieve a minimal operational capability to conduct small unit combat by late spring, which should be adequate for the restricted terrain which will limit maneuver and dictate primarily small unit operations. Depending on the timing of the crisis, the PLA could decide to delay mobilization of soldiers in the WTC to retain full combat capability of units. [4]

The Aksai Chin border terrain mock-up at the Qingtongxia CATTB  [  https://international.thenewslens.com/article/59413 ]   depicts mostly Chinese occupied territory with only a small portion of Indian controlled terrain. This appears to indicate a focus on a Joint Border Counterattack Campaign in response to an Indian military incursion. However, the exact purpose of the large terrain model is unclear. The border counterattack campaign was originally considered an Army offensive campaign, although some PLA books now refer to it as a joint campaign. This campaign includes initial border defense actions with a transition to the offense to regain lost territory and restore the situation. The two mountain brigades and independent mechanized brigade are the closest ground forces to Arunachal Pradesh, although the 13th Group Army trains in mountain warfare and could deploy as needed. While no PLA forces are permanently garrisoned in the Aksai Chin area, it is likely that the mechanized infantry division in Hotan (see map) would deploy to this area. Air and missile strikes would support the ground operations to annihilate and expel invading enemy forces depending on the weather, or as in the Sino-Indian Border War operations could consist of mostly ground operations. [5]

The PLA would conduct a Mountain Offensive Campaign or possibly a Joint Fire Strike Campaign if Beijing issued orders for offensive operations. A Joint Fire Strike campaign would support the border counterattack or mountain offensive, but could also represent an independent campaign. The terrain, weather, and difficult engineering and comprehensive support conditions restraining the deployment and sustainment of forces could make a joint fire strike appear more advantageous to a mountain offensive. A mountain offensive would require a substantial advantage in the correlation of forces for the attacker operating under terrain and weather restrictions. As an independent campaign, a joint fire strike could represent punitive strikes against key Indian targets. A joint fire strike campaign is a long-range precision strike by long-range rocket, missile and air forces with the objective to destroy important enemy targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems (integrated force grouping), weaken the will to resist and destroy war potential, or create conditions for other operations. The Chinese leadership could conclude that conducting precision strikes against key Indian targets was preferable to conducting difficult offensive ground operations where the defender has an advantage. [6]

Future Prospects

The creation in peacetime of theater joint commands accelerates the PLA’s plan to develop an integrated joint operations capability, promotes theater joint training and greater familiarity between the services, and provides for a rapid transition from peacetime to wartime operations. The theater commands will train units for wartime operational missions which will decrease the need for pre-war preparations and pre-battle training. Ultimately this development will increase the combat effectiveness of forces not only in the WTC, but also in the other theaters.

It will take time for the theater commands to achieve an optimal joint operational capability as the joint commands and personnel need to establish coordination procedures and working relationships. The PLA also recognizes the requirement to improve joint professional military education for its officers, which will take time to fully implement throughout the military educational institutes, graduating a quantity of officers adept at integrated joint operations. However, PLA joint operations are constantly improving and joint exercises for more than a decade provide increased joint experience and improving capabilities.


                 -----------------------------------------------

Kevin McCauley has served as senior intelligence officer for the Soviet Union, Russia, China and Taiwan during 31 years in the U.S. Government. He has written numerous intelligence products for decision makers, combatant commands, combat and force developers, as well as contributing to the annual Report to Congress on China’s military power. Mr. McCauley’s new book is titled,

“Russian Influence Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War to Putin.”

Notes

1. This article is based on an article appearing in the Indian Military Review, Vol. 7, Issue 9, September 2016
2. Theater Joint Operations Command (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016), pp. 76–82; Military Terms (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011), p. 173; Science of Joint Tactics (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2014) pp. 130–136.
3. Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006); Military Terms (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011.
4. Science of Army Campaigns Under High-Tech Conditions, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2003), pp. 303–323.
5. Science of Army Campaigns Under High-Tech Conditions, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2003), pp. 303–323; Military Terms (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011), pp. 70–71.

Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), pp. 404–425.

http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/CHINA%20pub784.pdf

 China's Western Theater Command

 CB_17_1_1.pdf

GEO STRATEGY & POLITICS INDIA : India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia

                                  BY
               RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN

SEPTEMBER 14, 2017

SOURCE:
https://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choices-china-and-balance-of-power-in-asia-pub-73108

sacrificing security preparations for long term economic development would ensure that India has neither. For any state, security has to be the pre-eminent concern because without it no other national objectives can be pursued, including economic development. 

China’s rise poses a strategic challenge to India on multiple fronts. The best way for New Delhi to respond is to pursue a deeper partnership with the United States.

PAPER

  India’s Strategic Choices: China and                the Balance of Power in Asia 

                                     By

                RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN

Introduction

This is the central strategic problem that India faces: how to secure itself and promote its national interests in a grossly unbalanced strategic environment.

India faces critical strategic choices. In ordinary circumstances, the country’s rapid economic growth might afford it greater control over its external environment, but India’s rise is taking place in the shadow of China’s even more dramatic growth. China’s rise, even aside from the aggressive behavior it has exhibited in places like the South China Sea, would be a challenge for India because it opens up the possibility of China dominating its neighbors, including India. China’s wealth and the influence that it brings to bear on international politics is just as great a challenge, especially when India’s interests clash with those of China. Beijing’s growing assertiveness demonstrates in stark relief the consequences of an unbalanced Asia. This is the central strategic problem that India faces: how to secure itself and promote its national interests in a grossly unbalanced strategic environment. 

• 
  

Still, India is not bereft of choices in the face of China’s rise. A balance of power analysis suggests that New Delhi has a number of strategic options to consider. Over the past decade or more, as China’s power has gradually grown, Indian policymakers have been constantly debating these choices. Just as importantly, through incremental policy decisions, India also has been making its choice. But this debate and India’s policy responses to date have been less than satisfactory because they are being carried out largely in a fractured manner. The debate mostly has been taking place in op-ed columns focused on headline news. There has been perhaps only one previous attempt to consider India’s strategic choices in depth: an effort by an independent group of analysts that resulted in the much-discussed Nonalignment 2.0 report in 2012. 1

Indian strategic policy appears, at least from the outside, to be largely responding in piecemeal fashion to immediate events rather than following any deliberate plan. Though the strategic instincts of Indian decision makers have in many instances served the country well, thinking through India’s choices in the current Asian strategic environment in a comprehensive way is necessary to clarify their logic and implications and to make Indian policy  more consistent and effective. There have been few efforts to consider India’s choices from a balance of power perspective outlining the consequences of relative power dynamics for strategic policy—an approach that requires considering both India’s strengths and weaknesses.

With this in mind, Indian decision makers face at least six choices for how to deal with the strategic environment in Asia: (i) nonalignment, (ii)hedging, (iii) internal balancing (that is, building indigenous defense capabilities),(iv)  regional balancing, (v) alignment with China, and (vi) closer alignment with the United States. None of India’s potential strategic choices are easy or obvious. Every option has advantages and shortcomings. No choice by itself will give India everything it wants. The objective should be to pick the best out of this series of imperfect choices as a primary strategy and supplement with other complementary approaches as needed. But deliberating and making a decisive choice is better than being forced into one. Though India might end up lucky and circumstances might work out in such a way that New Delhi ends up with a good outcome even if it does not make a choice, such a lottery-ticket approach is inadvisable because, as with any lottery, the odds are stacked against winning. 

                                                                     

Given Asia’s current balance of power, India’s strategic interests would likely be best served by . . . a closer alignment with the United States.
________________________

After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of these respective choices, and given Asia’s current balance of power, India’s strategic interests would likely be best served by the sixth option: a closer alignment with the United States. In recent years, India has already begun to cultivate a deeper strategic relationship with the United States. This policy instinct has been a sound one, and such a partnership should be advanced even more. The goal here is to articulate why this choice offers New Delhi a higher chance of success than the others. If closer ties with the United States should prove difficult to attain, a regional balancing strategy with other powers in the Indo-Pacific offers India an alternative approach, and such regional partnerships could also be a potential supplement to an augmented U.S.-India alignment. 

As for the other potential choices, internal balancing is a necessary but insufficient means of balancing China, while the other three options—nonalignment, hedging, and alignment with China—are not feasible for India in its current strategic environment and will likely become even less so as time passes. This analysis frames these choices not in the context of specific foreign policy issues, but as broad grand strategic approaches—that is to say, the mix of military, diplomatic, and economic tools used to promote national objectives.2 Once these overarching approaches are outlined, specific policy choices can be determined accordingly. 

It is worth noting that the type of alignments or partnerships that India may pursue would not necessarily be formal military alliances, though such alliances would not be excluded outright. Rather, such relationships would be chiefly grounded in informal but deep strategic cooperation targeted against a common threat. This mind-set is intended to convey a special relationship of strategic empathy much like the ties that India has had with the Soviet Union and later Russia, those that Pakistan continues to have with China, and the type of relationship the United States and China shared between 1971 and the end of the Cold War—none of these alignments were based on formal treaties.3 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s unprompted, instinctive defense of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 is a good example of such strategic empathy.4 International alignments are generally viewed with great suspicion in India, but they should not be. Such partnerships and even military alliances tend to be temporary and focused; they are troublesome in many respects but also unavoidable, especially in situations when the balance of power is unfavorable.

Balancing, or policies and behaviors that countries adopt to counter external threats, generally can take two forms. Internal balancing involves efforts to build up domestic military muscle by raising new forces, improving existing ones, or buying weapons. By contrast, external balancing refers to building partnerships or alliances with other countries, usually as a consequence of a given country not having sufficient capacity to meet a given threat with its own resources alone. An alternative to external balancing is band wagoning, which means aligning with a threatening country to mollify it—though sometimes a country may also resort to such behavior to exploit opportunities that come with being aligned with a strong power. 

India’s China Challenge

It is clear that India faces a profound strategic challenge as a consequence of China’s rise, although this is not the only threat New Delhi must manage. China’s spectacular economic growth gives it great wealth as well as the power and influence that come with such prosperity. Yet an argument could conceivably be made that Pakistan and its asymmetric strategy of supporting terrorism against India represents a more immediate threat. Even so, China’s recent aggressive behavior—toward India (including its recent reassertion of territorial claims on Arunachal Pradesh, as well as its pressure on the India-Bhutan-China  trijunction) and toward other neighbors (in the South China Sea, for example)—makes it difficult to assume that China is any less of a short-term threat to India than Pakistan


Furthermore, Beijing poses a graver threat to New Delhi than Islamabad does. Even if it constitutes a more immediate threat, Pakistan is far weaker than India by most measures, save nuclear weapons. Its gross domestic product (GDP), for example, is approximately 13 percent of India’s.5 Pakistan’s inclination to resort to nuclear threats and asymmetric warfare is a reflection of weakness, not strength. India has sufficient military capabilities to counter  this threat—even when one accounts for China’s assistance to Pakistan—and Delhi would require little help from others to do so.6 India’s army is roughly twice as large as Pakistan’s, while India’s navy has almost three times as many major warships and its air force has nearly twice as many combat aircraft.7 India also has greater influence and support in the diplomatic arena. In short, India’s inability to deal with Pakistan up until now speaks to the failure of Indian strategy, not to inadequate material capacities. By comparison, China is a far greater strategic challenge because of the large power imbalance between it and India, which will likely continue to widen. The strategic choices that India faces with regard to China are thus far more consequential.

 _________________________
China is a far greater strategic challenge because of the large power imbalance between it and India, which will likely continue to widen. 
                                                                             


China’s growing power poses at least four challenges to India. First, it represents a direct military threat. China actually has slightly fewer ground forces (1.15 million troops) than India (1.20 million troops), but the former enjoy critical terrain advantages along the Sino-Indian border, accentuated by far superior transportation and communications infrastructure in bordering Tibet. Meanwhile, China fields almost twice as many modern combat aircraft (of the Mirage-2000 vintage or newer) as India (653 to 349) and nearly three times as many major surface combat vessels (79 to 28) and submarines (53 to 14).8 China is also building its own fifth-generation fighter jet and a new aircraft carrier that will be larger than any Indian carrier. 


China’s growing military muscle would be a concern for India even in the absence of any direct disputes. But India and China have unresolved territorial disputes that led to a war in 1962 and several subsequent skirmishes. The possibility of another war might appear remote, but the combination of China’s military power and its proclivity to use military force—as most recently illustrated in the South China Sea—represent a serious threat, as senior Indian military officials informed the Indian Parliament in the spring of 2015.9 In addition, China’s naval foray into the Indian Ocean could also represent an emerging threat.

Second, China’s power in international institutions ranging from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) has at times proved to be an obstacle to Indian foreign policy ambitions. Most recently, in 2016, China thwarted India’s efforts to join the NSG. China is likely to continue to obstruct India in this manner, and its capacity to do so will only grow as its power increases. Moreover, as its power grows, China has also started establishing international institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and has also been shaping other multilateral organizations to promote Chinese interests, such as the BRICS (a group consisting of Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 


Third, China’s willingness to play the role of an external balancer against India in South Asia is a serious challenge, and, in some cases, a military threat. China’s support has bolstered Pakistan’s military capabilities and (at the very least) accelerated the development of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. Moreover, the possibility of a two-front conflict pitting India against China and Pakistan simultaneously also worries Indian national security policymakers, a concern accelerated by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Parts of this infrastructure corridor traverse Indian-claimed territory in Pakistan-occupied portions of Kashmir. Aside from Pakistan, the enhancement of China’s relations with some other Indian neighbors—including Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka—provides an understandable temptation for these smaller states to attempt to use China to counter India’s natural domination of the region. 


Finally, China’s great economic power allows it to spread its influence around the world, which it could use to India’s detriment. Beijing has used its aid and trade policies to promote its interests, and it is not difficult to imagine that it could use these tools to pressure others, especially developing countries, to support China in a potential disagreement with India. For example, Beijing has used economic boycotts to punish countries like Norway and South Korea for actions deemed to be unfriendly to its interests. China has also used aid to advance its foreign policy objectives in its relations with countries like the Philippines.10


Why India Must Choose


When a country reassesses the critical strategic decisions it is facing as India currently is doing, the importance and potential path dependency of such decisions can often create a temptation to put off making a final determination. An additional difficulty in the case of India is the country’s lack of well defined institutional structures for deliberating and deciding on matters of grand strategy. 

Still, it would be unwise to put off making a decision for a couple of reasons. First, New Delhi has a limited window of opportunity, as India’s strategic choices may narrow over time.11 If New Delhi does not choose, it risks having the choice made for it by others. Whatever decision India makes must be deliberate, not one that is forced on it by others because New Delhi has refused to make a choice itself. A second reason for decisiveness is that 
strategic capabilities have long lead times and cannot be built up quickly. This is true for all of India’s choices. The domestic military capacity building that internal balancing entails cannot be done in a hurry, for example. After all, it takes time to determine what kind of military forces and equipment India needs, to buy or build these assets, and to deploy them. Likewise, building strategic alignments also  requires time. Expecting India to find a suitable strategic partner after a crisis has already developed would be risky
: potential partners may not be available when New Delhi needs them. And even if there were willing partners in such a situation, it might not be possible for them to deliver help quickly enough to make a difference. The longer India waits to decide, the harder these decisions become. It is even possible that some choices may no longer be available.

Indian decision makers must also resist the temptation to postpone critical short- and medium-term strategic decisions in the hope that long-term economic development will suffice to address the challenge that China poses. There is no doubt that balancing short-term and long-term needs is complicated, and these choices are never easy. An excessive focus on short-term strategic needs would hurt India’s long-term security. On the other hand, not providing for the country’s pressing short-term security needs would likely derail India’s long-term prospects too. 

New Delhi’s experience with defense budgeting in the 1950s would be a good guide: sacrificing security preparations for long term economic development would ensure that India has neither. For any state, security has to be the preeminent concern because without it no other national objectives can be pursued, including economic development. 

India is a powerful state that dominates South Asia, a condition that has given New Delhi a large margin for error and has historically encouraged Indian decision makers to take a much more relaxed attitude toward its security than is healthy. But China’s rise is significantly reducing India’s margin for error, and Indian policymakers need to recognize this changed reality. For all these reasons, India cannot afford to wait. 


India’s Foreign Policy Tools


In response to the challenges China represents, India has four types of tools at its disposal:  ( i ) military power, ( ii )potential partnerships with other countries (including China), ( iii )multilateral diplomacy, and (iv ) international economic integration. India needs to cultivate and enhance these tools as much as possible. 

The first tool is military power. States are ultimately responsible for their own security, and for most states—except especially weak ones—military power is a form of insurance that cannot be ignored. It is the most basic instrument that states have, and it is ultimately the only instrument that is entirely under the control of the state. That said, military power is often by itself is insufficient, and expending too much effort in this area can potentially have deleterious consequences. 
Building sufficient military capabilities could conceivably allow India to deter China from using force against it or, if deterrence were to fail, to defend itself. Having such military capabilities may also give India a freer hand in a potential confrontation with its long-time rival Pakistan, because greater military strength in New Delhi would likely lessen the incentive for Beijing to open a second front in such a conflict along the Indian border with Tibet. The Indian Army is now larger than China’s, but a significant portion of Indian troops are dedicated to the western front, including all three of India’s existing strike corps—though a new mountain strike corps is being formed for the Chinese border; some Indian troops are also dedicated to counterinsurgency duties in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and in insurgency-afflicted states in northeastern India. The army also suffers from equipment shortages, especially artillery.12 In addition, there are concerns about the adequacy of the army’s reserves,13 as well as a shortage of officers 14—issues that could potentially affect combat effectiveness.15                                                                               

India has four types of tools at its disposal: military power, potential partnerships with other countries. . ., multilateral diplomacy, and international economic integration.                                                      
Second, in addition to military strength, India also needs strong partners who can help balance against China and possibly help India enhance its own capabilities. This is because China is far wealthier and militarily stronger than India, and this reality is unlikely to change much over the next two decades because the gap between the two is already very wide. China’s continuing high growth rate makes it difficult for India to significantly reduce this gap, especially since India’s growth rate is not much greater than China’s. Indeed, a 2015 study by Pricewaterhouse Coopers  projected that although the Indian economy would overtake that of the United States in size (in terms of purchasing power parity) by 2050, the former’s economy would still be almost a third smaller than China’s.16

[  ( A )     https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf

    ( B )  https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-slide-pack-feb-2017.pdf   ]

This makes partnerships necessary for New Delhi, although such partners should share India’s concerns about China and be capable and willing to use their own military forces to counter China’s military power. Equally important, they should have enough clout in the international arena to be able to support India’s interests. Additionally, they should be both able and willing to help India develop its own economic, technological, and military power so that it can better balance against China. 


The third strategic tool at India’s disposal is multilateral diplomacy. India could potentially use multilateral institutions such as the United Nations to undermine the legitimacy of and constrain any aggressive Chinese behavior in the international arena. In addition, although India is not a permanent UNSC member, New Delhi could conceivably garner support on issues it deems important from other states, especially more powerful ones like the United States, and, in so doing, attempt to isolate Beijing and deter China from acting against India’s interests. Admittedly, China could opt to veto such proceedings in the UNSC, but it would likely pay a diplomatic cost for doing so, and such veto power does not extend to the UN General Assembly. Meanwhile, in some situations, New Delhi could also conceivably partner with Beijing in such venues, in order to give China an incentive to be more accommodating of India’s interests.

Finally, international economic cooperation and trade may also be useful tools for India. But Indian policymakers need to have a clear understanding of what this can and cannot achieve. Trade and economic cooperation are useful tools for growing the Indian economy, generating greater wealth, and developing India’s technological capacities. Greater wealth and technological capacities are essential building blocks of military power and greater international influence, both of which are necessary for meeting the challenge China poses. But the pacifying effects of such economic integration on international conflict are often exaggerated, and expectations that commerce will lead to cooperation in other areas are usually misplaced. So India can use trade and economic cooperation with China as one way of enhancing Indian economic growth, but New Delhi should be careful about buying into the idea that such cooperation can ameliorate potential conflict with Beijing. More broadly, greater trade and cooperation with friendlier countries and blocs, from the United States and the European Union to Japan and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, can also help expand India’s wealth and power.

India’s Strategic Choices
The first three of India’s six potential policy choices are variants of nonalignment strategies, while the latter three consider possible alignment strategies. Although India will probably employ a combination of these approaches, it is likely that even such a combination will lean consistently in the direction of one particular approach. For example, for much of the Cold War, India followed a strategy of internal balancing, although this was occasionally supplemented with an alignment with the Soviet Union. 

Admittedly, actual policies are too complicated to hew to such neat categories and, in this sense, the choices presented below are ideal types deployed to clarify the logic of each choice for heuristic purposes. Such ideal types are useful for exploring the outlines, logic, advantages, and limitations of each of these strategies. In this case, such an exercise forms a basis for judging how useful a given choice would be for India in its current strategic environment. This is, of course, a subjective judgment based on the existing balance of power. It is possible to imagine that in a decade or (more likely) two, the situation may be different, even radically so. A different balance of power context may result in very different strategic choices. But India’s current plans have to be made based on the prevailing conditions of today, not based on expectations about the distant future. Moreover, strategy has to be built, if not on the worst case scenario, at least not on the rosiest one, which unfortunately has been an Indian tradition. 

Nonalignment

Countries can pursue a strategy of nonalignment to avoid entanglement related to the balance of power in the international system, thus enhancing their own strategic autonomy while also seeking benefits from all sides of the great power equation. This was the strategy that India followed during the Cold War. It allowed New Delhi to simultaneously be the top recipient of U.S. economic aid from Indian independence in 1947 until 2012 and a significant beneficiary of Soviet military and diplomatic support during the Cold War.17 India essentially played the two sides against each other to get benefits from both. 

In the case of present-day India,(  2017...) there would be at least four benefits to adopting a nonalignment strategy. First, nonalignment arguably could offer the same benefits for India in dealing with the rise of China that India received during the Cold War. Proponents of such a strategy assert that India could adopt a modified version of this same strategy. Because India is presumed to be a sought after economic and strategic partner, it could leverage this attractiveness into deep engagement with all sides for its own needs, but also as a hedge against threatening behavior by one of the two great powers.18 India could conceivably benefit from China’s economic dynamism while leaning on the United States for security. The argument goes that this approach promises the best of both worlds: India can continue to benefit from both sides while committing to neither. 

Second, it could be argued that nonalignment would promise India a measure of strategic autonomy by avoiding the potential pitfalls of alliances. Forming any alliance represents some loss of autonomy because it requires dependence on other autonomous actors that, almost by definition, may prove to be undependable. States in alliances face well-recognized conflicting pressures between avoiding entrapment in others’ wars and abandonment by allies.19 Consequently, one of the greatest fears expressed in New Delhi about a closer relationship with the United States is that India would be dragged into the latter’s wars. In addition, most alliances raise issues related to burden sharing and buck passing by some or all partners. Nonalignment eliminates these complications. 


Third, nonalignment would likely reduce tensions with other great powers over India’s partnership choices. After all, any alignment with the United States would be viewed unkindly by Beijing and seen as part of a U.S. attempt to contain China; this would affect India’s ties with China and thus, potentially, also hurt India’s economic prospects. An alignment with the United States could also hurt India’s ties with Russia—a country with which India has a strong military relationship—especially given the increasingly tense relationship between Moscow and Washington. Similarly, pursuing a potential alignment with China could harm India’s strategic and economic ties with the United States, which is still the world’s most powerful state and largest economy.20 Nonalignment would avoid these pitfalls. 

                                                                                                                   
Nonalignment is not a feasible option for countries that face significant security threats that cannot be countered by internal balancing alone. 
                                                                     

Finally, nonalignment would help India avoid divisive internal debates about whom India should align with. There has been a general foreign policy consensus in India, but it is possible that this consensus could break down over questions of foreign alignments. Such internal divisions could weaken the country, allowing other countries to take advantage of India’s factional politics.


 Despite all of this, however, there are four reasons why nonalignment ultimately would not be a feasible strategy for India. First, nonalignment is difficult to pursue without a relatively benign security environment. Nonalignment is not a feasible option for countries that face significant security threats that cannot be countered by internal balancing alone. When internal balancing is insufficient, external balancing becomes necessary. India did face security threats from Pakistan and China during the Cold War, when it was nonaligned. However, India was far stronger than Pakistan, and the power differential between New Delhi and Beijing was not as stark during the Cold War as it is today. India built a significant military capacity to defend itself against China in the 1960s, and just in case this should have proven insufficient, it also built a close security relationship—short of a formal military alliance—with Moscow. This relationship also provided India with considerable international diplomatic support.


This is no longer the case today because of China’s rise and the large power imbalance between China and India. New Delhi could conceivably opt to be nonaligned today if it were strong enough to defend its interests with its own resources. This would require not only defensive and deterrent military capacities but also sufficient power to protect and promote India’s other global interests in multilateral venues. But India simply does not have such capabilities today. On many issues, especially on which India’s interests clash with those of China, India is just not strong enough to convince other states to support its cause. So, on issues like the NSG, India has had to depend on friends such as the United States to convince other states to support the Indian cause (although, in that case, Washington ultimately could not convince Beijing to drop its opposition to India’s membership).


Similarly, on the military front, consider the issue of defense spending disparities alone. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that Indian and Chinese defense budgets were roughly comparable in 1989 at around $20 billion each (calculated at constant 2015 prices and converted to U.S. dollars).21 By 2015, China’s defense budget had increased tenfold, to almost $215 billion annually, while the Indian budget was less than a quarter of this, at slightly more than $51 billion. Weaker powers do have strategic options, but nonalignment might not be one of them.


Second, nonalignment might actually hurt India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. States pursue alignments because a power imbalance can be a  greater threat to freedom of action. When a country is facing serious threats, alignments can actually enhance strategic autonomy. Even during the Cold War, New Delhi felt the need to drop its nonalignment stance twice when threats developed suddenly—in 1962 (when India sought U.S. assistance in its war with China) and in 1971 (when India sought Soviet assistance to balance against the U.S.-China-Pakistan axis). Recall that the Soviet Union had to cast several vetoes in the UNSC during the Bangladesh War—India’s position would have been quite precarious without this support. Moreover, India did develop a quasi alliance with the Soviet Union that was designed to deal with any residual threats from China if India’s military defenses had proven to be insufficient. As C. Raja Mohan has pointed out, “India has not had difficulty entering into alliances when its interests so demanded.”22 These historical examples suggest that even during a period when India was supposedly benefiting most from nonalignment, it found reason to change course multiple times


Third, China’s geographic proximity to India coupled with its military strength severely impinges on Indian security and constrains the possibility of New Delhi pursuing nonalignment. India was able to practice nonalignment during much of the Cold War at least in part because it was neither a neighbor nor in other ways threatened by either of the international system’s leading powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Nonalignment would require some distance between India and the key powers both in geographical and political terms. This type of distance existed during the Cold War but not now. Today, India neighbors one of the world’s two key powers, China, which makes Beijing’s military power more of a potential threat. More importantly, India has an active territorial dispute with China, which makes it difficult for New Delhi to be neutral between Beijing and Washington. What is equally concerning is that China’s rise threatens to make it the hegemonic power in Asia, which would not be in India’s interest. Given these factors, it is safe to assume that there is greater strategic sympathy between India and the United States than between India and China. 


Finally, it would be difficult for India to be nonaligned considering that China is already seeking to balance against it. Beijing’s balancing efforts are long-standing and include efforts to supply Pakistan with nuclear and missile technology. China also supplies a substantial portion of Pakistan’s military equipment, and the two countries have conducted a number of joint military exercises. China is also building a port in the Pakistani city of Gwadar, which could potentially house Chinese warships and submarines. More recently, China has stepped up its balancing efforts, not just in terms of developing military capabilities but also in terms of undercutting India in multilateral institutions, most recently in the NSG. China objected to India getting an NSG waiver in 2008 as part of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, although Beijing ultimately  dropped its objection. But by 2016, when India sought membership in the NSG, China hardened its objections and refused to budge. China also refused to accept an Indian attempt in the UN to label Masood Azhar, the leader of the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorist group, a UN-designated terrorist. Such Chinese balancing attempts require India to respond to protect its interests, making any Indian effort to be nonaligned considerably difficult because such responses require strategically sympathetic partners. Many of China’s balancing efforts are not directed at countering India’s military capacity but at constraining India in multilateral venues, where nonalignment would leave India with little support against China. 


These disadvantages are much too serious for India to consider nonalignment a viable strategy today. As far as military power goes, India can source military technology and equipment from both the United States and Russia, but being nonaligned may prevent India from acquiring the best technology from either country. Considering that the balance of power is heavily tilted in favor of China, India requires relationships that go beyond being arms suppliers. India needs strong partners who can not only coordinate with India to balance China’s military power but also counter its political and economic clout in multilateral institutions. This could change to some extent if the relative balance of power between India and China shifts sufficiently so that India becomes capable of balancing China on its own. But such a shift is likely a long way off, and until it happens, India would be ill-served by a strategy of nonalignment. 


Hedging . . . Hoping?


Hedging is a variant of nonalignment that states can pursue in the context of multiple significant security threats. In India’s case, one could hypothetically assume that either of the major powers stronger than India, the United States and China, could conceivably pose a threat to India. Hedging is the strategy of remaining neutral between two major security threats until one becomes sufficiently dangerous to require siding with the other. Indeed, some proponents of contemporary nonalignment may actually be hedgers, which would suggest that India should be prepared for the possibility that “threatening behaviour by one of the major powers could encourage or even force it [to] be closer to another.”23 Thus, while nonalignment is presumed to be a rigid ideological strategy, hedging is a pragmatic means of retaining a choice to pick sides if need be, while hoping that such a day never comes. The advantages of such a strategy are similar to the advantages already considered for nonalignment: double-wagoning (that is to say bandwagoning with and drawing benefits from both sides), avoiding tensions with either side, and skirting the troubles of alliance formation and the domestic controversies it may spark.

There are at least two additional benefits to a hedging strategy over nonalignment. First, a hedging mentality is sharply attentive to the international security environment in a manner that a nonalignment mentality is not. Because a nonalignment strategy typically is adopted in a relatively benign security environment, national decisionmakers could end up being much less careful about changes in the international security environment that might adversely affect their country. They could also be overconfident about their capacity to manage their environment. For example, the makers of India’s grand strategy during the lead-up to the 1962 Sino-Indian War assumed, with little basis, that China would be deterred from attacking India because a SinoIndian war would potentially become a world war.24 Such overconfidence can be a danger in the case of a nonalignment policy. Hedging can overcome this disadvantage. Although hedging does not guarantee strategic wisdom, such a strategy could encourage decisionmakers to be much more pragmatic and less prone to such mistakes.
 
           A second additional advantage of hedging over nonalignment is that it is a lot more flexible. Hedging involves recognizing the need to respond to a threatening environment and accepting that such a response might include aligning with one side or another. The rigidity of nonalignment can make rapid changes less likely until it is too late. Hedging could make Indian strategy somewhat more adaptable to changing circumstances than it has been traditionally.

           Set against these advantages are various disadvantages that make hedging, like nonalignment, inappropriate for India’s present circumstances. Many of the problems attributed to nonalignment are applicable to hedging too: India’s lack of equidistance from the international system’s two key powers, New Delhi’s relative weakness compared to Beijing, and China’s balancing efforts against India

          Hedging also suffers from at least four additional disadvantages. First, hedging assumes that India faces equal threats from both the United States and China. This is obviously absurd. After all, for years Indian decisionmakers have considered China to be a military threat and have sometimes said so publicly, as Defense Minister George Fernandes did in 1998 when he declared China to be India’s top potential security threat.25 By contrast, no shade of opinion in India considers the United States to be even remotely a military threat to India. Still, it is not wholly unimaginable that if China were to decline or collapse and India were to grow sufficiently strong, the natural dynamics of the balance of power in global politics could someday raise the possibility that India may begin to consider the United States a military threat. But this is not the case today, and, at this point, it appears to be highly unlikely for the foreseeable future.
            Second, although hedging sounds viable in theory, it is not clear that a pure hedging strategy between China and the United States is possible anymore. As a recent rigorous analysis of the hedging concept and its application in East Asia points out, when it comes to dealing with China, “many regional states are engaging in various forms of balancing, rather than hedging.”26 This is equally true of India. The actions of India and most of China’s neighbors indicate that they already consider China (and not the United States) a threat, even if they are careful in their public declarations. Indian military plans are already obviously directed at balancing Beijing, not the United States. India is increasing its military capability along the border, including by raising an entirely new corps in the Indian Army to face China and by building new transportation infrastructure in the border regions. India and other countries in China’s neighborhood—such as Australia, Japan, and Vietnam—are stepping up their security consultation and cooperation, a move that is clearly driven by their concerns about China. Actions speak loudly, and India’s suggest that it is already past the hedging stage.         
A third problem with hedging is that it assumes that strategic partners will be available when a country reaches a decision to stop hedging and align with one side. Refusal to take sides in time might reduce a country’s perceived credibility, heighten other countries’ suspicions of free riding, and reduce the incentives for others to cooperate. As Ashley J. Tellis has noted, to assume that the United States will be available to back India when New Delhi needs it to, irrespective of Indian policy in the interim, is highly risky.27


                                                                       
    Hedging is a risky strategy, even though it is much more pragmatic than nonalignment. 
                                                                       


A final related disadvantage with hedging is that even if strategic partners are available, they might not be able to effectively help deal with a rapidly developing threat if called upon to do so at the eleventh hour. Alignments take time to build, and building indigenous capabilities through alignments takes even more time. Time is a luxury that a hedging state might not have should a threat rise suddenly, especially since hedging takes place in an already tense security environment. As an example, in 1962, even if India had asked for assistance from the United States a few weeks or months earlier, this still might have been insufficient to develop Indian military strength to stave off defeat at the hands of China. 


These disadvantages make hedging a risky strategy, even though it is much more pragmatic than nonalignment. As with nonalignment, hedging might make it difficult for India to enhance its military power because key countries like the United States and Russia might not be as willing to cooperate militarily with a country that is hedging its bets. But just as serious of a problem (as with nonalignment) is the fact that a hedging strategy would likely reduce the willingness of key potential partners to stand with India to manage China’s clout in the diplomatic arena.



Internal Balancing

Obviously, building up India’s domestic military capabilities is necessary even if New Delhi adopts any of the other strategic choices. But internal balancing focuses primarily on building up independent military capabilities to counter external threats in a way that ideally obviates the need for external alignments. Internal balancing is a corollary to nonalignment, in that the latter presumes that a country has sufficient capacity for internal balancing.

                                                                  

India does not currently have sufficient military capability to counter China on its own.
                                                                 

States generally prefer internal balancing because it offers greater control compared to external partnerships, which require dependence on others. Thus, India’s suspicion of alliances and its desire for strategic autonomy is eminently understandable because this is what all states seek. In addition to allowing India to avoid the general problems of alliances, such as the twin fears of entrapment and abandonment, internal balancing offers at least three advantages. First, internal balancing would permit India to stick to some version of nonalignment, a policy that is deeply rooted in Indian strategic culture and with which the country’s dominant nationalist and left-of-center political culture is comfortable. Second, internal balancing would allow India to avoid contentious domestic debates about which countries India should align with. Although internal balancing is expensive, so far there have been few domestic political controversies in India about the burden of defense spending. Third, internal balancing may reduce tensions with other countries that can result from aligning too closely with one country or another. 

            But these solid advantages also need to be weighed against the potential pitfalls of an internal balancing strategy. Any such strategy must be adequate to meet all potential external threats. In India’s case, this means the capacity to militarily balance at least China and Pakistan.

There are four key shortcomings that make internal balancing an inadequate strategy for meeting India’s needs, and these apply particularly to balancing China. First, India does not currently have sufficient military capability to counter China on its own. Besides the fact that its military is being outspent by Beijing, New Delhi also has other problems. India has much worse border infrastructure, especially the roads and rail links needed to rapidly move Indian forces and supplies to the border. India’s technological edge over China is also disappearing, as China uses its larger defense budget to buy or build much more advanced military equipment than what India possesses.28 On the plus side, China has multiple threats that it must prepare for, especially emanating from the United States and Japan. Moreover, India’s military objective against China is deterrence and defense, not offense, which reduces the former’s military burden. But even so, the gross disparity in material capabilities between the two countries is so great that India simply cannot counter China’s military power by itself, making internal balancing a risky proposition.


This does not mean that India will never have the capacity to internally balance against China. India’s capacity for internal balancing is likely to get better depending on its relative growth vis-à-vis China’s. India’s GDP growth  rate now exceeds that of China, and this trend is projected to continue, giving greater support to such hopes.29 But prudent policies should be based on present conditions, not hopes about the future. Moreover, for India to close the capacity gap with China, it would have to grow at a pace substantially faster than China’s for a considerable period of time. While this may be possible, it would not be wise to make this assumption the basis for strategic planning.

Second, even if India’s growing wealth gives it a greater capacity for developing military power, New Delhi still would face at least two other challenges to converting this wealth into usable military power. One is India’s dysfunctional politics.30 Despite having a single-party majority in the lower house of the Indian Parliament after three decades, Indian party politics remains chaotic, potentially affecting defensive preparedness. To give only one example, frequent charges of corruption in Indian defense deals have slowed defense acquisition to a crawl. In addition, the Indian state’s institutional capacity to generate military power is open to question.31 This raises concern about how effectively New Delhi could improve its military capabilities chiefly by domestic means

Third, the shortfall in India’s internal balancing capacities become even more worrying in light of the possibility of a two-front war involving simultaneous hostilities with both China and Pakistan. As far back as 2009, India’s then chief of army staff, General Deepak Kapur talked about the need to plan for a two-front war.32 Although not all Indian strategic analysts agree that India faces the danger of a two-front war,33 India’s defense planners— including previous defense minister A. K. Antony—have expressed concerns about the China-Pakistan relationship and its impact on India’s war-fighting potential.34 A two-front war might appear improbable considering that neither China nor Pakistan has previously joined the other in a war against India, but Indian strategic planning cannot rule out this contingency.

Finally, an internal balancing strategy in all likelihood would seriously hamper India’s capacity for dealing with China’s power in other arenas, especially multilateral institutions. India’s national goals go beyond just defending its territory. This includes playing a more active role in multilateral institutions to generate and bolster global norms that are in India’s interest while preventing or delegitimizing norms that could constrain it. These tasks require strong and willing partners. Because a strategy based purely on internal balancing is not predicated on building strategic partnerships with other countries, India would not be able to count on help from other powerful states in multilateral bodies. New Delhi might, of course, be able to build partnerships on specific issues, as it has done on UNSC reforms. It is equally true that having strong partners might not guarantee that India will get everything it wants in multilateral engagements. Still, any assessment of the merits of a go-it-alone strategy needs to consider this a serious disadvantage.


Ultimately, India has little choice but to enhance its military capabilities to the extent that it can, irrespective of which of the six strategies it follows. But a pure internal balancing strategy would be unwise because India has inadequate military capabilities—a condition that will likely not change in the immediate future—and because India has goals that go beyond just territorial defense. A purely internal balancing strategy would not enhance India’s military power because the weakness of India’s domestic defense technology and production capacity necessitates international partnerships. And as with the previous two options, a pure internal balancing strategy would also leave India vulnerable to China’s influence in multilateral diplomatic settings.


Regional Balancing

NO

1 Sunil Khilnani et al, Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century (New Delhi: 2012), http://osf.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NonAlignment-2.0-A-foreign-and-strategic-policy-for-India-in-the-twenty-first-century.pdf.

2 This broadly follows Barry Posen’s definition, though Posen leaves out economic tools. See Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13.

3 Such special relationships also can be classified as alliances. See Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 12–13. Glenn Snyder, on the other hand, only considers formal, treaty-based defense pacts alliances. See Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4. See also Devin Hagerty, “Are We Present at the Creation?: Alliance Theory and the Indo-U.S. Strategic Convergence,” in US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More Than Words, eds. Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell (New York: Routledge, 2006), 11–37.

4 “Interview With Narendra Modi,” CNN, Fareed Zakaria GPS, September 21, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1409/21/fzgps.01.html.

5 World Bank, “[Indian and Pakistani] GDP (Current U.S.$),” 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IN-PK.

6 Sumit Ganguly points out this was true even in the 1950s. See Sumit Ganguly, “Indian Security Policy,” in The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, eds. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 280.

7 See International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2017), https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2017-b47b.

8 Ibid.

9 Sixteenth Lok Sabha, Standing Committee on Defense (2015–2016), Seventh Report, Lok Sabha Secretariat, April 23, 2015, http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/16_Defence_15.pdf.

10 Evan Feigenbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?” Macro Polo, July 25, 2017, https://macropolo.org/coercion-new-normal-chinas-economic-statecraft/.

11 Khilnani et al, Nonalignment 2.0, iii.

12 India has contracted to purchase new artillery from the United States that is better suited for mountain warfare, which should ease the situation once these assets are deployed in the next few years. “Army to Get New Artillery Guns This Weekend, First Since Bofors Scandal in the 1980s,” Hindustan Times, May 18, 2017, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/army-to-get-new-artillery-guns-this-weekend-first-since-1980s-bofors-scandal/story-gZnWH6mwIBN30Yx1agoJjJ.html.

13 Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “Indian Army’s Ammunition Stock Will Exhaust After 10 Days of War: CAG Report,” India Today, July 21, 2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-army-ammunition-war-supply-shortfall-cag-report/1/1008042.html.

14 “Shortage of Over 9,000 Officers in Indian Army, Navy: MOS Defence,” Hindustan Times, April 11, 2017, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/shortage-of-over-9-000-officers-in-indian-army-navy-mos-defence/story-mYlcDSBbh0QUcgphmo1p6N.html.

15 For a fuller analysis of some of these issues, see Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Unrealized Power,” in Strategic Asia, 2015-16: The Foundations of National Power in the Asia-Pacific, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2015), 162–89.

16 PricewaterhouseCoopers, The World in 2050: Will the Shift in Global Economic Power Continue, February 2015, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf.

17 Shyam J. Kamath, “Foreign Aid and India: Financing the Leviathan State,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 170, May 6, 1992, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/foreign-aid-india-financing-leviathan-state; Also see Chidanand Rajghatta, “India Top Recipient of US Economic Aid,” Times of India, July 16, 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/India-top-recipient-of-US-economic-aid/articleshow/48093123.cms.

18 Khilnani et al, Nonalignment 2.0, 32–33.

19 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 181–86.

20 World Bank, “GDP Ranking,” July 1, 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table.

21 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2016 http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.

22 C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July-August 2006), 29, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-and-balance-power.

23 Khilnani et al, Nonalignment 2.0, para 137.

24 Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years(New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010), 279–80.

25 John F. Burns, “India’s New Defense Chief Sees Chinese Military Threat,” New York Times, May 5, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/05/world/india-s-new-defense-chief-sees-chinese-military-threat.html?mcubz=1.

26 Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia,” Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015), 698, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2015.1103130?journalCode=fsst20.

27 Ashley J. Tellis, Nonalignment Redux: The Perils of Old Wine in New Skins (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 48, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/10/nonalignment-redux-perils-of-old-wine-in-new-skins-pub-48675.

28 Rajagopalan, “India’s Unrealized Power.”

29 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, January 2016: Spillovers Amid Weak Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016) 4.

30 Tellis, Nonalignment Redux, 49–51.

31 Rajagopalan, “India’s Unrealized Power.”

32 Rajat Pandit, “Army Reworks War Doctrine for Pakistan, China,” Times of India, December 30, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Army-reworks-war-doctrine-for-Pakistan-China/articleshow/5392683.cms.

33 Bharat Karnad, “Silly ‘Two-Front War’ Scenario and Related IAF’s Rafale Push at Expense of SU-30,” Security Wise (blog), March 24, 2016, https://bharatkarnad.com/2016/03/24/silly-two-front-war-scenario-and-related-iafs-rafale-push/.

34 Rajya Sabha, Session 225, “Discussion on Workings of the Ministry of Defence,” May 8, 2012; “NSA Ajit Doval: India Must Prepare for a Two-Front War,” Hindustan Times, November 25, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/nsa-ajit-doval-india-must-prepare-for-a-two-front-war/story-eUqDoKnVYmBRCaZUHlRauL.html.

35 Sharon Chen, “India Should Play Bigger Role in South China Sea, Says Singapore,” Livemint, March 19, 2015, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/5byvMqe44BUoCauncMigBM/India-should-play-bigger-role-in-South-China-Sea-says-Singa.html; Walter C. Ladwig, “Delhi’s Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, “Look East,” and India’s Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific,” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), 94–95.

36 Amitav Acharya, “India’s ‘Look East’ Policy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, edited by David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (New Delhi: 2015).

37 Lavina Lee, “India as a Nation of Consequence in Asia: The Potential and Limitations of India’s ‘Act East’ Policy,” Journal of East Asian Affairs 29, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2015), 67–104.

38 Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014).

39 This is a general proposition regarding great powers and their potential competitors, which is applied here to a regional context.

40 Davide Fiammenghi, “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011), 126–54, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41289682.

41 International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017.

42 PricewaterhouseCoopers, The World in 2050.

43 These figures account for purchasing power parity (in 2014 U.S. dollars).

44 Communist Party of India, “CPI Programme,” para 5.12, http://www.communistparty.in/p/party-programme.html; also see Communist Party of India (Marxist), “21st Congress: Political Resolution,” April 19, 2015, para 2.38-2.40, http://www.cpim.org/documents/21st-congress-political-resolution.

45 Walt, Origins of Alliances, 19–21; Snyder, Alliance Politics, 158–61.

46 Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), 72–107, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539149.

47 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003), 57–85, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228803321951090.

48 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 2.

49 Khilnani et al, Nonalignment 2.0, 14.

50 Andrew Small, for example, argues that China now sees Pakistan as important also in its rise as a global power, though this does not appear to have displaced the traditional logic of the relationship. Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

51 Ashley J. Tellis, “The China-Pakistan Nuclear ‘Deal’: Separating Fact from Fiction,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 16, 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/china_pak_nuke1.pdf.

52 Pranab Dhal Samanta, “China Attended Meet to Oppose UNSC Expansion,” Indian Express, October 23, 2008, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/china-attended-meet-to-oppose-unsc-expansion/376755/.

53 Indrani Bagchi, “India Must Sign NPT for NSG Membership, China Asserts,” Times of India, May 19, 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-must-sign-NPT-for-NSG-membership-China-asserts/articleshow/52350169.cms; Varghese K. George, “Hidden Vetoes Must Go, India Tells UN,” Hindu, April 16, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinas-masood-azhar-move-hidden-vetoes-must-go-india-tells-un/article8481119.ece.

54 Shyam Saran, “A Lopsided Strategic Partnership,” Business Standard, April 14, 2016, http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/shyam-saran-a-lopsided-strategic-partnership-116041400917_1.html.

55 See, for example, Dennis C. Blair, “A Strong Foundation but Weak Blueprint for National Security,” in Strategic Asia 2015-16: Foundations of National Power in the Asia-Pacific, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2015), 225–58; also see Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge will Endure,” International Security 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011–2012), 41­–78.

56 Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), 5–46.

57 “How Does China’s First Aircraft Carrier Stack Up?” Center for Strategic and International Studies ChinaPower Project, https://chinapower.csis.org/aircraft-carrier/.

58 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Anti-Access/Area-Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and the Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016), 7–48.

59 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD Economic Surveys: United States 2016, June 2016, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-united-states-2016_eco_surveys-usa-2016-en.

60 Beckley, “China’s Century?”

61 Ashley J. Tellis, “Protecting American Primacy in the Indo-Pacific: Hearings Before the Armed Services Comm.,” 115th Cong. (2017) (testimony of Ashley J. Tellis, April 25, 2017), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tellis_04-25-17.pdf.

62 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (July-August 2016),https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing, 81.

63 See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, January 25, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asia-pacific-and-indian-ocean-region; also see White House, Office of the Press Secretary, United States and India: Prosperity Through Partnership, June 26, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/26/united-states-and-india-prosperity-through-partnership.

64 Mearsheimer and Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing.”

65 Kevin Liptak, “Trump Salutes NATO With Vow of Strong Support,” CNN, February 7, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/06/politics/trump-nato-centcom/; “Tillerson Reiterates US Support for Japan and South Korea,” DW.com, March 16, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/tillerson-reiterates-us-support-for-japan-and-south-korea/a-37957324.

66 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-India Joint Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region; also see White House, Office of the Press Secretary, United States and India: Prosperity Through Partnership.

67 Steve George and Huizhong Wu, “US, India and Japan Begin Naval Exercises, as China Looks On,” CNN, July 12, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/11/asia/india-japan-us-malabar-exercises/index.html; also see Franz-Stefan Gady, “India Clears Purchase of 4 More Sub-Killer Planes,” Diplomat, July 7, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/india-clears-purchase-of-4-more-sub-killer-planes/.

68 Hagerty traces this evolution back several decades to 1979. Hagerty, “Are We Present at the Creation?,” 16–17.

69 See recent opinion polls from these two publications: Rory Medcalf, India Poll 2013, Lowy Institute for International Policy and the Australia-India Institute, 2013, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/india-poll-2013; Simon Jackman and Gordon Flake eds., The Asian Research Network: Survey on America’s Role in the Indo-Pacific, United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney and the Perth USAsia Center (Sydney: United States Studies Center, May 2017), http://perthusasia.edu.au/america-asia-pacific.

70 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “The American Hug,” Indian Express, April 2, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-american-hug-indo-us-relations-narendra-modi-barack-obama-indias-foreign-policy/.

71 Khilnani et al, Nonalignment 2.0, para. 132.

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SJ

October 08, 20179:06 pm

Dr Rajgopalan states in the article that "There has been perhaps only one previous attempt to consider India’s strategic choices in depth: an effort by an independent group of analysts that resulted in the much-discussed Nonalignment 2.0 report in 2012.1" This in my opinion is not very accurate-all the choices he has described were considered by K Subhramanyam and Bharat Karnad in their writings in the last 15 years so as such there is nothing that is new in the article that has not be discussed before. What would be useful if Prof Rajgopalan had any new ideas as to what exactly can be done to improve india's internal balancing capacity

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Rags

December 16, 20175:24 am

An excellent and educative article that is blind in one respect - which way will the Russians lean/ leap, when push comes to shove. The recent events in the Mideast which effectively downsize American intervention, has led to further fragility in India's energy supply. India could have cautiously adopted a China-friendly strategy of giving protective cover to Chinese merchantmen and tankers against Somali pirates, as also furthering the cooperation in joint venturing for the Iranian oilfields. For instance, this strategy had paid good dividends for Indian entry into Sudan through OVL. Insterad, India having short-sightedly identified Pakistan as the main enemy, went ahead with the costly Charbahar venture, and now are facing expulsion from its Iranian oilfield bid, due to non-progress on Charbahar commitments, even as the Chinese have got a few fields. In retrospect, the Chinese leases on Akyab, Gwadar, Hambantota and now the FTA with Maldives overriding Indian concerns, has given China a decisive and permanent strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean, even as India is caught up in its own Kulbhushan Jadav mess. There is now one further option that India is now forced to enter - deeper ties with Japan, even at the risk of rousing deepset Southeast Asian suspicions (of the Japanese). The absence of dynamism in Indian policy evolutions and deeply entrenched attitudes vis-a-vis Pakistan have clearly contributed to India blindsiding itself.

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Arunoday Bajpai

January 04, 20183:28 am

The author has brilliantly articulated the strategic situation confronting India, China's rise and inroads in India's neighbourhood, US strategic withdrawal from east Asia or Middle East, Pak-China closer strategic alliance and Russia's inclinations towards this alliance are some of the elements, which dot emerging strategic environment surrounding India. The author has listed six potential strategic options for India: staying unaligned, hedging, building indigenous military power, forming regional partnerships, aligning with China, or aligning with the United States. Author ha also advocated his considerate conclusion that aligning with US hould be the main policy line complemented by regional partnership and building domestic capability. Few observation need to be noted here: First, the list of six policy options are not exclusive and some may be may be combined together as author has done. Thus this option scheme needs to be reexamined. Second, gone are the days of static foreign policy postures in the face of dynamic strategic scenario. If this is the case no-policy option can be ruled out if situation demands so for the protection of India's core interests. And therefore, one has to be dynamic, proactive and improvising in the foreign policy options also. Third, in view of the above, the 'strategic autonomy', pursued by India is the best strategic posture, as it is amenable to employ any foreign policy tool (which are often presented as option) to protect and advance India's interests. However, the 'strategic autonomy' need not be an objective in itself. At best it is a tool, rather a dynamic tool rather than a static principle, as understood by diplomatic community in India.

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