GEO STRATEGY : Dynamics Of Strategic Stability In South Asia

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30042017-dynamics-of-strategic-stability-in-south-asia-oped/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

            Dynamics Of Strategic Stability

                                     In

                              South Asia

                                     By

                               Asma Khalid*

 

April 30, 2017 

Strategic stability in South Asia is complex phenomena due to adversarial relationship between two traditional rivals India and Pakistan. Existence of an Action-Reaction Spiral between both nuclear rivals is increasing the fragility of the South Asian strategic stability.

Though, the both states have successfully achieved the principal requirements of strategic stability by enhancing their nuclear capabilities and maintaining the deterrence. But different postures of military strategies have negatively affected nuclear equation of the region. Balance of power in South Asia revolves around the competition over nuclear and conventional military build-up between India-Pakistan and powers politic among United States, China and Russia.

The territorial dispute over Jammu and Kashmir is an actual bone of contention and previous events of the war of Kargil, the Mumbai attack, and the most recent attacks of Pathankot and Urri, has severely shattered the stability paradigm and these events have brought both countries on the brink of war. Most significantly the Indian claim of surgical attacks in Pakistan held Kashmir has seriously disturbed the existing strategic stability paradigm in South Asia.

Though the introduction of nuclear weapon has brought the fundamental change in regional security calculus but Stability-Instability paradox is operational in south Asia.

The dilemma of the South Asian region is that with the passage of time, strategic stability is becoming more fragile instead of becoming strong. Deterrence stability and Crisis stability in the region is not yet stabilize due to various internal and external factors Historical events, social, economic, political aspects and external powers especially United States (US) has played crucial role in disturbing the strategic force balance and strategic stability in the region. Internal challenges such as territorial disputes (Sir Creek, Kashmir, and Siachen), increased border tension on LOC, defence production gap and Indian military modernization, Indian ballistic missile program, and absence of arms control regime are the main source of tension in the region. In such a strategic landscape three possible threats to regional strategic stability are: crisis instability, arms race, security dilemma and escalatory danger have worsened the situation.

Power politics among super powers has also played a crucial role in disturbing the regional equilibrium as the sub-continent has remained under the influence of great powers. During the cold war period USSR and U.S exercise their power struggle over South Asia; where as in china emerged as third competitor during the Post-Cold war era.

At the end of Cold-War, India-US bilateral ties were strengthened by economic and defence co-operation. In post 9/11 indo-US stronger ties were the biggest threat to regional stability. Growing Indo-US strategic partnership, Indo-US nuclear deal, recent defence co-operation and U.S support to Indian candidacy for NSG has drastically halted the process of stability. Defence bond between U.S and India is biggest threat to regional stability as well as to the global non-proliferation efforts.

At the broader aspect the Indo-U.S strategic partnership has put the question mark on the aspiration of both states and it may force the other regional states to take the measure to ensure their safety and security.

In response to Indo-U.S strategic co-operation, China and Pakistan are making a strong partnership in economic, military and nuclear fields. China can play the crucial role to maintain the balance of power in the region by providing assistance to Pakistan in military and nuclear fields. At the same time, Pakistan and China are pursuing the strategies to counter the threats and challenges to regional strategic stability but not by violating the international laws or norms as US did to support India’s membership for NSG. Subsequently, Pakistan’s vision is to promote the idea of regional cooperative development; CPEC is the most significant example of that.

Two categories of strategic partnerships: the Indo-U.S strategic partnership and China-Pakistan Strategic co-operation has evolved the unique kind of equilibrium in the South Asia. However, India’s military modernization plane, missile program, Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal and discriminatory approach of U.S towards Pakistan have directly challenged the regional strategic balance.

In this regard, the absence of crisis stability and deterrence stability mechanism is increasing the fragility of South Asian strategic stability. So it is imperative to develop a framework comprised of conventional force balance, arms control regime and conflict resolution. Unfortunately, India has always rejected such proposals regarding nuclear restrains. In order to ensure the regional stability it is necessary to take the establishment of restraint regimes seriously for durable peace in the South Asian region.

*Asma Khalid, Writer is Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) Islamabad. Asmaakhalid_90@hotmail.com

INDIAN SECURITY OVERSEAS COMMAND - INDIA MUST DEPLOY TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN [[R]

SOURCE:
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/605240/india-must-deploy-troops.html


      IT IS TIME TO BALKANIZE PAKISTAN

        BALUCHISTAN IS AN  INDEPENDANT COUNTRY


                                     
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         INDIA MUST DEPLOY TROOPS 

                                  IN 

                      AFGHANISTAN     

                                 By

                    Gurmeet Kanwal, 

April 8, 2017 

                      PEACE, STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

The situation in Afghanistan can be described as a 

stalemate at both the strategic and tactical levels. The 

security environment is precarious, socio-economic 

development is stagnating and the reconciliation 

process has reached an impasse.

The NATO–ISAF (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation–International Security Assistance Force) strategy to clear-hold-build-transfer-exit has succeeded only partially as the Taliban and the Al Qaeda have not been eliminated and terrorists owing allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) are growing in number. 

The fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are not yet capable of managing security after the premature withdrawal of the US-led NATO-ISAF intervention force. The Afghanistan National Security Forces’ (ANSF, ANA plus ANP) numbers are small (3,52,000). The ANA lacks heavy weapons, artillery, air support and helicopters for logistics support. 

The standards of junior leadership are low and the troops are inadequately trained and equipped. They do not have the level of motivation necessary to undertake complex counter-insurgency operations on a sustained basis. Cases of fratricide and desertions with weapons are commonplace. 

While the ANSF and the remnants of the Nato-ISAF forces control most of the large towns and the airports, the Taliban — together with the al-Qaeda — control large swathes of the countryside. Governance is virtually non-existent outside Kabul. The approximately 13,000 Nato-ISAF troops now remaining in Afghan­istan are on a train-advise-assist mission. 

Unless Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, the Central Asian

 Republics (CARs), China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia

 join hands with the international community to supplement

 the ANSF’s efforts to eliminate the insurgents, the security

 environment is likely to deteriorate further and may

 degenerate into a civil war. 

Kabul and New Delhi have had a historically friendly relationship. Afghan­istan’s location at the strategic cross-roads between South Asia and Central Asia and South Asia and West Asia makes it an important geo-political partner. Afghanistan has vast mineral deposits. When the Chabahar port in Iran becomes operational, India will gain access to the CARs through Afghanistan. Hence, peace and stability in Afghanis­tan are vital national interests for India.

India supports the installation of a broad-based and stable representative government in consonance with Afghan customs and traditions. The imposition of the Western model of democracy will not be appropriate. India would prefer a government that adopts a stance of neutrality between India and Pakistan, but should be willing to work closely with any government that is truly representative of the Afghan people. 

India’s efforts to provide greater assistance are being hampered by the lack of geographical contiguity. India has only limited access to Afghanistan as Pakistan has not given India transit rights. India’s attempts to allay Pakistan’s misapprehensions about New Delhi’s intentions have not been successful as Pakistan has steadfastly refused to discuss this issue. Afghan­istan’s problems can’t be resolved unless the trans-Durand Line challenges that it faces from Pakistan and the Haqqani network are addressed simultaneously. 

The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership agreement was signed in October 2011. It calls for close political cooperation with a mechanism for regular consultations and joint initiatives on regional and international issues. It stipulates a strategic dialogue to provide a framework for cooperation in the field of national security. Security cooperation is intended to enhance mutual efforts against international terrorism, organised crime, illegal trafficking in narcotics and money laundering. 

The agreement specifies that India will assist in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes of the ANSF. It commits the two sides to “strengthening trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as cooperation between other bodies of business and industry representatives…” India has committed itself to continue to provide assistance for Afghan-istan’s reconstruction and development programmes and capacity building.


Policy objectives

India’s policy objectives in Afghanistan are in consonance with the strategic partnership agreement. Besides a stable and preferably neutral government, India’s political objectives include the following: ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a base and safe haven for terro­rists and radical extremists; counter Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth, acquire access to Afghanistan and through it to the CARs; establish broad-based engagement with all political groups; support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts, as vis­ualised by the Afghan High Peace Council; assist Afghanistan to train its administrative and judicial staff to improve governance and delivery of justice; and, further enhance people-to-people contacts. 

India’s national security objectives comprise: supporting the capacity building efforts of ANSF by ensuring implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement, including the supply of war-like stores; ensuring the safety and protection of Indian assets and infrastructure in Afghanistan; and, cooperating to share intelligence. 

India’s economic policy objectives are to increase trade with Afghanistan and through it with the CARs; enhance Indian business investment in Afghanistan; assist Afghanistan to develop its natural resources; further increase India’s reconstruction and capacity building programme; enhance India’s energy security; for example, through the commissioning of the TAPI (Turkmenistan–Afg­hanistan–Pakistan–India) pipeline; assist Afghanistan to replace narcotics-based agriculture with regular agriculture; and, work towards the implementation of Safta (South Asian Free Trade Area).

Finally, unless the security environment improves substantially, governance and development will continue to take a back seat. The P-5 (UN permanent members: China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States) need to be persuaded to supplement the ANSF with a United Nations or a regional peacekeeping force to eliminate the Taliban. 

Though there is no support in India for sending troops to Afghanistan, there is realisation that the fight against the Taliban and the al Qaeda has long-term security implications for the country as peace and stability in Afghanistan are vital national interests. Along with other neighbours, New Delhi should be willing to deploy up to one division (15,000 troops) to join such a force provided Pakistan’s sensibilities about Indian military presence in Afghanistan can be assuaged. 

(The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi)

From String Of Pearls To Head Vice: Is China Squeezing A Strategic Advantage Over India? (R)

SOURCE: https://swarajyamag.com/world/from-string-of-pearls-to-head-vice-is-china-squeezing-a-strategic-advantage-over-india

From String Of Pearls To Head Vice: Is China Squeezing A Strategic Advantage Over India?

                    BY

     Syed Ata Hasnain

- 

SNAPSHOT

The Chinese Defence Minsiter General Chang Wanquan recently visited Sri Lanka and Nepal even as the state-owned media in China issued veiled warnings to India.

Is China’s wariness of India’s relationship with the US forcing it to move beyond the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.

Asia Pacific is quiet at present awaiting President Donald Trump’s true strategic emergence; uncertainty about rebalancing and pivot reinforce the belief that the US is yet unprepared to seriously address the issues concerning China. West Asia still steals the march in terms of glamour news such as the ongoing battle for Mosul and discussions on the future strategy of Islamic State (IS or Daesh).

However, a reading of 2017 thus far gives indicators of a bolder China, preparing itself for all options that the US strategy may adopt to address the future needs of its interests in the Asia Pacific. Although South Asia classically remains a peripheral zone for the Asia Pacific it is an important area of the Indo-Pacific region. For China, the Pacific Rim and waters are within reach with potential for greater control due to direct accessibility from the mainland. It is the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) of South Asia where China’s access is not from the mainland but through belts and corridors. That zone is crucial because through it are aligned the sea lines of communication (SLsOC), China’s commercial and economic lifeline.

It is not usual to commence analyses with deductions but here it may be necessary. A flurry of reportage and commentary in Chinese media, especially the print, considered virtual official mouthpieces, appears to indicate that Beijing perceives an emboldened New Delhi due to the emerging US-India strategic partnership. The coming of Trump doesn’t appear to have diluted that even as details are being resolved. China’s original strategy the ‘String of Pearls’, hotly denied by it, was obviously a form of psychological encirclement of India through more active diplomatic outreach to the smaller states of South Asia. That, in the new dispensation, is being progressed to the next level which is obviously less benign and taking the shape of a ‘Head Vice’. Here is why such a deduction seems more plausible; with activities from Myanmar to Gwadar under the scanner.

Fourteenth November 2016 is an important date; on that day the operationalisation of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) appears to have commenced with movement of ships from Gwadar to other ports. The deepening of Pakistan’s strategic relationship with China goes up several notches and as the $50 billion project progresses the notches will convert to rungs. This will be notwithstanding the supposedly blood sucking 11 per cent interest on Chinese loans amounting to $35 billion. It may see transfer of land and assets of choice from Pakistan to China in a later timeframe. Gwadar also allows China to monitor US and Indian naval activity in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and Pakistan to dominate the energy routes to which it is a gateway. CPEC has done more for Pakistan’s strategic confidence than any other arrangement in 50 years. The same if not already evident in Pakistan’s diplomatic and military stance will manifest very noticeably as we proceed to the future.

Even more than the Sino-Pakistani strategic relationship it is China’s surge towards Sri Lanka that should draw attention. It had already established a hold during the later stages of the Eelam wars through supply of weapons worth almost $1 billion to the Sri Lankan armed forces. China had also won favour by securing the project for construction of a modern port at Hambantota and an ultra-modern international airport at Mattala in 2006. It was a project initially offered to India but not taken up by us due to questionable commercial viability. China grabbed it and after completion realises its commercial non-viability but immense strategic value for its own maritime presence in the Indian Ocean to oversee the security of its SLsOC.

Sri Lanka, beholden to Chinese support during the final stages of the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and financially in no position to pay for the project has apparently bartered 80 per cent holding in the project and the nearby modern airport at Mattala. Till the time Mahinda Rajapaksa was in power the Chinese confidence was evident but with the arrival of President Maithripala Srisena the urgency that Sri Lanka felt towards making up with the West increased; this was primarily due to the human rights investigations that were being sought in relation to the final stages of the war against the LTTE. To regain some strategic space China has sent its defence minister on a recent visit with offers on renegotiating Hambantota, supply of military hardware to give Sri Lanka a more proactive role in patrolling the oceans and self-confidence to preserve its integrity. Details of the visit are yet emerging.

Switch to Bangladesh and we have the Chevron gas fields under sale with China’s Zhenhua Oil bidding for these. Zhenhua raises no eyebrows until it is revealed that it is a subsidiary of Norinco, the Chinese defence manufacturing company. The brow would raise even more once it was known that the gas fields in question are not in Southern Bangladesh but in the North Eastern part bordering Meghalaya, lower Assam and Tripura. India is not paranoid but surely land based presence of an adversary’s assets bordering your rear areas is not a position of comfort. Strategic literature emanating from Dhaka expresses deep interest in the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor which has not received a very enthusiastic response from India. China’s involvement in development of port infrastructure in Bangladesh is but a matter of time as the latter cannot afford to drag its feet on this due to its own economic compulsions.

Maldives is more complex in complete contrast to the size of its geography. A Chinese firm has acquired "Feydhoo Finolhu" island on a 50 year lease for $4 million for developing a resort near capital city Male. This has now been supplemented by a Saudi Arabian initiative of investing $10 billion for wholesale acquisition of Faafu, 19 low-lying islands 120km south of Male. It would involve building seaports, airports, high-end housing and resorts and the creation of special economic zones. No doubt Chinese-Saudi Arabian cooperation is not something which has been contemplated as a security threat.

Yet, when viewed in the context of the increasing footprint of radical Islam in the islands, increasing visibility of Chinese Saudi defence cooperation becomes worrying for India’s strategic watchers. As per an interesting paper written by James Dorsey of the RSIS – “Riyadh sees its soft power in the Maldives as a way of convincing China it is Saudi Arabia – and not its regional rival, Iran – that is the key link in Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative to link Eurasia to the Middle East kingdom through Chinese-funded infrastructure”. That explains the concern for India.

Nepal’s relationship with India has been tentative for some time and even the goodwill re-established by the relief work after the disastrous earthquake of 2015 has not translated into any major strategic advantage. At the same time the deterioration of Indo-Nepalese relations over the new constitution and the rights of people of Indian origin has also not been fully exploited by China. There are pin-prick events such as a low-level military training exercise and continuing negotiations on project feasibility of a trans-national (Tibet to Nepal) railway project and power lines. The Belt-Road concept of President Xi Jing Ping has yet to emerge here but interest in the same has been expressed by Nepal; its future inclusion is a given.

Prime Minister Prachanda is likely to visit Beijing in the near future but China’s Defence Minister Chang Wanquan is already visiting Kathmandu after his visit to Sri Lanka. Prachanda’s visit may set the stage for the Chinese President’s visit to Kathmandu which was postponed last year following some unconfirmed reports of Beijing’s unhappiness over a lack of seriousness to push bilateral projects. That moment seems to have passed. China has recently pledged $8.3 billion in investment to Nepal – equivalent to nearly 40 per cent of its entire GDP. That staggering commitment dwarfed India's offer of $317 million.

China’s Global Times wrote on 26 December 2016 – “It is neither realistic nor possible for India to always regard Nepal as its backyard and put pressure on Sino-Nepalese cooperation.” The deepening of Sino-Nepalese ties can therefore be taken for granted although the speed of the same may be a little slower.

On Bhutan the Global Times recently stated – “New Delhi is one of the crucial reasons why China and Bhutan, which is controlled by India economically and diplomatically, have not yet established diplomatic relations”. Summing up the discomfort of India it said – “If such tendencies in India continue, China will have to fight back, because its core interests will have been violated. This is not what we hope for, but the ball is in India’s court”.

It is obvious that China is concerned about India’s efforts to secure its neighbourhood and keep it within its realm of influence. There is an element of realpolitik in this. Its ambitious designs to achieve its interests mainly extend to securing SLsOC and the Belt and Road linkages and facilities. It has invested just too much time, energy and money into this and its sensitivity to all this will increase progressively. That is the reason why it is trying to send aggressive messages and enhancing the psychological squeeze on India. India’s stance has been correct and balanced. It has objected to issues such as the construction of the CPEC through the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan over which India lays claim. Norms of international conduct do not permit this but just as in the case of the South China Sea dispute China is beyond adherence to legal procedures.

The cold war between India and China with respect to influence in the South Asian region is already taking the shape of a New Great Game. This is likely to intensify. Maturity demands that rhetoric be reduced and engagement increased so that economic and diplomatic activities continue which perhaps will bring some compulsion to view each other’s interests with sensitivity. India cannot be pressurised regarding its partnerships with other countries which are based upon mutual and shared strategic interests. The New Great Game in the IOR of South Asia is likely to continue with increasing attempts at securing spheres of influence. There is a set of old military tactics which states that when surrounded hit at the enemy from outside the area of encirclement.

India must develop Chahbahar at the earliest and convince the US to support the India-Afghanistan-Iran initiative as it makes ample sense. In Sri Lanka, it must seek ways of enhancing its presence and supporting the Sri Lankan government with more economic initiatives. Handling Maldives has been a challenge but control over its strategic decisions must be exercised with consultation. Our relationship with Bangladesh is strong and progressing; Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is visiting India in April 2017. Her visit is one of the most strategically important visits in recent months and must help in developing long-term trust and faith between countries which are considered natural partners. With Nepal an exercise of a degree of strategic independence by it is inevitable. The question is how that can be managed to advantage. Lastly, the BCIM Economic Corridor needs to be analysed more deeply for hidden agenda. The overall benefit to the North East may assist in stabilising the region through the economics route.

What India has to fully ensure is that the String of Pearls do not convert to a Head Vice which will squeeze it out of options.

Tags

• Sri Lanka
 
• Chinese String of Pearls
 
• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
 
• China Defence Spending

Syed Ata Hasnain

The writer is a former GOC of India’s Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.

Geo-Strategic Imperatives For India (R)

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/14102016-geo-strategic-imperatives-for-india-oped/#at_pco=smlwn-1.0&at_si=58ac78d8e6f1fb30&at_ab=per-2&at_pos=0&at_tot=1

Geo-Strategic Imperatives For India – OpEd

                                  BY 

             AMITABH HOSKOTE 

                                AND 

        VISHAKHA AMITABH HOSKOTE

 OCTOBER 14, 2016




The term ‘Known Unknowns’, hitherto fore unheard of in India, and definitely not in the Indian strategic context, is a clarion call for Indian strategists to wake up to the reality of a post modern scenario where the severity of multifarious situations poses new and inexplicable dangers to the very sovereignty of the nation; if unheeded, it threatens to annihilate the very concept of united India as we know it. An initial look did surprise us of the extent to which the Indian establishment chose to ignore or conveniently overlook such very real possibilities. We try and put down some thoughts garnered from perspective; the factual information has been gleaned from very public sources of information and nothing written in succeeding paragraphs purports to be classified at all. In fact such is the free flow of information in contemporary times that it is shocking at times how “frog-in-the-well” our entire attitude has been; though equally encouraging is the role being played by an ever increasingly aware media and the growth of strong, democratic and independent thought which has an increasing influence on public thought and policy & decision making.

Another imperative for prompting such thought is that the world today is no longer a place where entire countries can choose to exist in seeming isolation. Severally connected and hinged economies often give rise to the term ‘shrinking world’, and not without reason. Such has the interdependence of trade and commerce become that it is no longer possible to survive singly. The other facet to this rule is the fact that policies, not only foreign but domestic as well, need to be shaped and re-shaped with each shift in the global tide. Often clarity of thought and purpose is lost in the intertwining of so many factors contributing towards fashioning the strategic and national aims of a country; this especially true when the focus is on new concepts and fresh ideas. As in the post-crisis business world, innovation seems to be the key word

.

Concept of Known Unknowns and relevance in the Indian context

The concept of Known Unknowns has been studied and written about by Nathan Freier for the US Army War College. It is essentially unconventional strategic shocks in defence. Such shocks that by their sheer strategic impact, surprise and the potential for disruption and violence, they would demand the focused attention of defence leadership, as well as the decisive employment of defence capabilities in response. The US found 9/11 and the events after that catastrophe challenging for its defence establishment, but according to Lt Col Freier, a strategically dislocating surprise would be next, and just around the corner. And sure enough, we have a global war against the Islamic State, which is now threatening to turn into a new cold war between the US and Russia owing its dimensional shift in Syria. What with so many imponderables as Iran, North Korea, and even its failure in Afghanistan and its inability to deal with the Taliban in frontier districts of Pakistan, could the ‘strategically dislocating surprise’ come from this part of Asia? Could the stand off between India and Pakistan, both nuclear states be the catalyst to reorient strategy, investment and missions in so far as the US is concerned? Given that unconventional challenges lie definitely outside the realm of traditional war fighting, does not necessarily mean that it is non-violent, non-state, or unorganized.

Risks to national security which may not be fully anticipated or predicted would thus constitute Known Unknowns; that they exist can be conceived but yet they are not being imagined or expected. 

Defence strategy usually faces the critical flaws of being reactive in nature and lacking imagination. This is attributed to the otherwise strict hierarchical controls owing to the nature of the job; it however leaves strategy planning and decisions susceptible and vulnerable to surprise. Aversion to institutional change is another key factor. Yet the Known Unknowns stretch conventional wisdom to such an extent that it becomes difficult to ferret out a likely and suitable response, whereas their broad and fundamental implications rise and mature fast leaving little room for the system to adjust itself to the strategic and inherent changes. Concepts face the challenge of change and existing paradigms are questioned; prevailing strategy and assumptions are undermined leaving strategists little choice but to venture into uncharted territory.

What does this concept mean for India? The relevance of such disruptive and strategic shocks would find its roots in the very nature of India’s sub continental environment and the rapidly changing global economic scenario, which forces India to look into newer and unexpected areas of likely conflict. Given the history of animosity that engulfs the country historically, it becomes that much more a lucrative target for various sections of neighbouring establishments. Also with the rapid economic growth of modern India and its increasing clout in global affairs, it needs to forge new and meaningful relationships to further strengthen and consolidate its own position on the world stage. In drawing a parallel to the US, India has had its share of challenges like 26/11 and every new day announces new stories of insurgent and naxalite violence. China and Pakistan continue to be painful thorns in the side, and with both neighbours taking a hostile stand, the security establishment has its work cut out for it. Central Asia has always been strategically important and in the last three decades has faced intense turmoil with it being the new arena for wars, conflicts, socio-political changes and mushrooming religious fundamentalists. Its proximity to India and the vulnerability associated with it, should give a new focus to our policies, both domestic and foreign. New avenues for meaningful dialogue need to be explored and all available means of ensuring territorial integrity and the security of Indian citizens will have to be undertaken. Above all, conceptual framework should be reinforced with a strong military establishment, and a proactive doctrine. Indian strategists will do well to always be on their toes, since most state and non state antagonists are unlikely to change or just disappear; instead they may find new and innovative means to bleed the Indian behemoth.

Points to ponder for the Indian political and defence establishments

What is India’s geo-strategy? What are its regional and global objectives? Is there focus on forming a coherent long term strategy or are we just blundering our way about international diplomacy? All these questions and more need to be answered by the Indian polity and thereafter the defence hierarchy. Endemic to the Indian system where the military functions as an arm of and under a civilian government, is the greater role played by the polity and the bureaucracy, in formulating policies. The defence establishment which implements these policies also needs to be given greater autonomy as also an implicit faith imposed in their ability to function apolitically, yet at the same instance provide valuable inputs to further governmental policies. Such a move has historically has been viewed with apprehension by the civilian establishment (and indeed, the sub-continent is rife with enough examples, both Pakistan and Bangladesh being cases in point). However this would also pave the way for flexibility and innovation in the functioning of the defence forces and thereby reduce the chances of getting shocked strategically!

In the regional context of the sub-continent, we continue to face relentless attack by subversive forces under various garbs.

Does the fact that a country which is not only one eighth of the Indian landmass, but has been carved out of it, continues to implement strategy with impunity with the sole aim of bleeding India, tell us something? 

Are we indeed unable to deal with this imbalance for almost 70 years? Where dialogue and diplomacy may not work due to the inherent nature of the Pakistani mindset (it has always found itself threatened by India), can we switch tracks and look at such an infusion of economics, that it will becomes impossible for Pakistan to ignore the impact and therefore be forced to change its policies, or at least reign in those non state players who work towards subversion in Indian territory?

Where China has had the liberty of implementing various policies to bring it to the point of being an economic giant, India has been progressing too, albeit ponderously. On the one hand is the vibrancy of the Indian democracy and on the other is the lack of political will to implement measures for growth. These have in fact worked to further China’s subversive strategies, giving it a perfect platform to fuel naxalism inside Indian territory. Indeed, the growth story in India sometimes seems to be despite the government, not because of it! With its economic status well cemented, China also harbours ambitions of being a global power militarily. To that end, it has made rapid strides in bringing in technology and upgrading the fighting capabilities of its forces. It postures more frequently in a threatening manner, based on its historic border disputes with India. The recent spate of military/ naval posturing in the Indian Ocean region, the South China Sea, and the upcoming China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or the new Silk Route, are all signs of muscles being flexed by the Chinese dragon. However there seems to be little or no response and definitely a complete lack of coherent and well thought out strategy on our part. This is further taken as a sign of weakness and exploited increasingly. Alarming reports suggest that China has managed to slowly extend its hold over disputed border territory. Its increasing military clout is evident from its growing presence in the Indian Ocean which is essential to China’s projection of its power, but also a potential threat to Indian interests. What are we doing about these issues? At the end of the day, we do not have any cogent long term strategy in place and only now and very slowly waking up and gearing ourselves for a potential conflict with China. In its quest for energy and petroleum globally, China seems to succeed much more than does India. The infusion of Chinese funds into African economies and the number of successful bids in Central Asia and Africa for oilfields, is surely putting China in a more secure position by the day. Even the conduct of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 was meant to announce its arrival on the global stage. Surely these issues need to be examined.

Traditionally India held its non aligned status (but with a dash of convenience thrown in) through the Cold War years. With the break up of the USSR and the US emerging as the single and uncontested global hegemon, India found itself drawn into a closer relationship with the US. On its part the US also cannot ignore the rapid growth of Indian economy and has shown all signs of positive engagement with us. Yet, as they say in diplomat-speak, ‘There are no permanent friends, only permanent interests’. Contradictory to its engagement with India, the US continues to indirectly fuel conflict in the sub-continent through its policies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To be fair to the US, it is unable to deal with its own creation (yet again!) and therefore cannot afford the collapse of the Pakistani establishment (and the nuclear dimension to boot!) and the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It then becomes incumbent on India to initiate positive relations by whatever means possible. Ultimately, Indian interests must be supreme for India and going by the analogy of permanent interests, it too should re-examine all avenues for its growth, security and consolidation of status. Post the economic meltdown in 2008 the US found itself more and more dependent on economies with strong growth. And what better candidate than a democracy (surrounded by all other forms of governance) with tremendous prospects in the foreseeable future. The question therefore is where are we headed in our relations with the US?Can all these positives not be leveraged to bring abo ut a change in our regional equations? Policies may not change overnight, but concerted efforts would at least pave the way for a brighter future.

Indian capabilities both overt and covert face the prospect of erosion due to the lack of coherent long term strategies and egoist polity and bureaucracy, which resists the very idea of fresh infusion in thought processes. A paradigm shift in our outlook based on where our national interests lie is essential to the continued economic success and to obviate any possibility of attacks on our security and territorial integrity. It is therefore of paramount importance that a proactive and consistently innovative approach be adopted to geo-strategic concerns. Such a move would invariably herald the renaissance of India.

*Amitabh Hoskote, PHD (Development & Conflict Studies) & Vishakha Amitabh Hoskote, MA, MPHIL (International Relations, Political Science & Development Communication)

TOPICS:Foreign PolicyIndiaPoliticsSouth Asia

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Amitabh Hoskote

Amitabh Hoskote is a Strategic and Defense Professional and Scholar with varied experience in Combat, Defense Management, research in Security & Defense oriented issues, crises management, strategy planning & execution. With a Masters and PHD in Development and Conflict Studies, Finance and Economics, he has been an Honorary Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a leading Strategy Think Tank in India and writes regularly for the Eurasia Review on issues of geopolitical importance.