ERBIL, Iraq —THE Islamic State continues to control a huge section of Syria. But in Iraq, its advance has stalled. While Shiite militias and their Iranian allies fight the Islamic State ferociously, the Kurds have held a 640-mile front against the Islamic State’s advance. Their steadfastness should prompt America to rethink its alliances and interests in the region and to deepen its relationship with the Kurds — who are sometimes described as the world’s largest stateless nation.
Last week, the Sunni town of Tikrit (Saddam Hussein’s hometown)fell to largely Shiite forces from Iraq, backed by Iran. An offensive to retake Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and the heart of Arab Sunni nationalism, is now within reach. The Kurds plan to enter eastern Mosul, where many Kurds lived before the Islamic Stateseized the city in June, but they say that moderate Arab Sunnis must lead the effort to retake the rest of the city — not Baghdad’s predominantly Shiite forces or the Iranian-backed Shiite militias. The Kurds point out that it was grievances against Shiite rule that helped drive Sunni support for the Islamic State in the first place.
Together with Lydia Wilson and Hoshang Waziri, our colleagues at Artis, a nonprofit group that uses social science research to resolve intergroup violence, we found that the Kurds demonstrate a will to fight that matches the Islamic State’s. The United States needs to help them win.
In Kirkuk last week, where only a narrow canal separates Kurdish and Islamic State forces, we talked to three captured Islamic State fighters, and to their captors: Gen. Sarhad Qadir, the city’s Kurdish police chief, and his deputy, Col. Gazi Ali Rashid.
General Qadir, who lost a brother in earlier fighting, has been wounded 14 times in battles with Sunni militants, most recently in a suicide attack on Tuesday. The Islamic State recently paraded Colonel Rashid’s brother in a cage, along with other Kurds captured in a large-scale offensive that stalled in late January. Arab Sunni tribes have been trying to negotiate a prisoner exchange to signal to the Kurds that they are not all aligned with the Islamic State, but Colonel Rashid has no hope. “I know my brother will die,” he told us shortly before he was severely wounded on Tuesday.
The Islamic State prisoners most likely will be executed for having committed assassinations and deadly car bombings. The three are in their early 20s; two have wives and young children. None finished elementary school. They recounted growing up in the failed Iraqi state during the last decade : a hellish world of guerrilla war, disrupted families, constant fear and utter lack of hope. They see Iran and the Shiites as their greatest enemy but they also believe that America allowed them to oppress the Arab Sunni minority for the sake of majority rule.
When we asked the prisoners “What is Islam?” they answered “my life.” Yet it was clear that they knew little about the Quran, or Islamic history, other than what they’d heard from Al Qaeda and Islamic State propaganda. For them, the cause of religion is fused with the vision of a caliphate — a joining of political and religious rule — that kills or subjugates any nonbeliever.
The Kurds’ commitment to Islam is matched by their commitment to national identity; theirs is a more open-minded version of Islam. They have defended Yazidis and Christians, as well as Arab Sunnis, who make up the bulk of the more than one million displaced persons in Iraqi Kurdistan.
But perhaps what most reveals commitment by the Kurds is how they hold the line with so little material assistance.
On the night of Jan. 30, the Islamic State used the cover of fog to attack a Kurdish battalion near the town of Mahmour. Seven Kurds were killed immediately. Their colleagues said that if they had had night-vision goggles — or better yet, thermal-imaging scopes to also detect vehicles — all would most likely be alive. When we gave them a gift of our small, store-bought binoculars with which we had been watching Islamic State movements less than one mile away, they expressed deep gratitude. As we left, a mine went off as they moved earth to make a defensive wall, for there is no demining equipment.
To be sure, coalition airstrikes have prevented Islamic State forces from deploying heavy artillery to break Kurdish lines, although Gen. Sirwan Barzani, who commands the main front between Erbil and Mosul, told us that a Pentagon lawyer must approve every strike (a policy intended to minimize chances of civilian casualties from drone attacks). Sometimes, that approval comes too late.
With its big guns vulnerable to air attack, the Islamic State adapts its tactics, piercing Kurdish lines with suicide attacks in primitively armored vehicles. One Kurdish commando near the Mosul Dam showed us, on his smartphone, a video of the approach of a steel-hardened vehicle. No amount of rifle fire or rocket-propelled grenades could stop the attack, which killed 23 and wounded 40.
Yet the United States insists that the Kurds obtain permission, grudging and often denied, from the central government in Baghdad for essential equipment to counter these and better weapons that the Islamic State seized from the Syrian and Iraqi Armies.
Meanwhile, the Islamic State won’t quit. Their wounded fighters often booby trap their bodies rather than be captured, and face down fire to recover dead comrades’ bodies. The leaders they call emirs, who are chosen because of their religious devotion and fearless effectiveness, and their foreign fighters, are especially fierce. The Westerners often die in suicide attacks; seasoned fighters from North Africa and the Middle East, and particularly from former parts of the Soviet Union (like Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Dagestan), are prominent as operational leaders and snipers. Foreign fighters return to their countries only if they escape or are sent home, because the punishment for defection is death.
Local Syrians and Iraqis conscripted to fight for the Islamic State, in contrast, are not totally committed. In one conversation picked up by a Kurdish walkie-talkie, a fighter with a local accent asked for help: “My brother has been killed. I am surrounded. Help me take his body away.” The reply: “Perfect, you will join him soon in Paradise.” The fighter retorted: “Come for me. This Paradise, I don’t want.”
The Islamic State will say to a local sheikh: “Give us 20 young men or we loot your village.” To a father with three sons, they will say : “Give us one or we take your daughter as a bride for our men.” One girl of 15 told how she was “married” and “divorced” 15 times in a single night to a troop of Islamic State fighters (under some readings of Shariah law, “divorce” is as easy as repeating “I divorce you” three times, which makes it easy to cast rape as marriage). In the face of such brutality, wavering supporters of the Islamic State could well rally to an Arab Sunni force allied with the Kurds. That is a prospect the United States, which fears leaving the fight mainly to Iran and its allies, should welcome.
As we said goodbye at the front, a young Kurdish sniper promised us she would never abandon her comrades or their cause. Will the United States deny her people the means to counter the Islamic State — for the sake of upholding the costly illusion of an Iraqi nation-state, devised from three Ottoman provinces to fit British imperial desires but now hopelessly fragmented?
Kurdish leaders say they would accept a federated Iraqi state if they were given autonomy in political, economic and security matters. The United States should have agreed to do this long ago; it’s not too late to do so now. If America does not, Iraqi Kurdistan will most likely declare itself an independent state, which Turkey, Iran and Syria will move forcefully to stop, for fear that their own Kurdish populations will try to join it.
The United States must help the Kurds translate their bravery into a true ability to defeat the Islamic State. They are America’s most reliable friends on the ground, and should be treated as such.
Vice Admiral Rustom Khushro Shapoorjee Ghandhi The Admired Admiral..!!!!
The only naval officer to have commanded ships in all the marine wars fought by India,
Above right: Rustom Ghandhi
The only naval officer to have commanded ships in all the marine wars fought by India,Vice Admiral Rustom Khushro Shapoorjee Ghandhi, nicknamed RKS or simply called Rusi, wished to return to the sea which had given him so much. He jested: "I enjoyed fish all my life; now let the fish enjoy me.” Four days after his passing away on December 23, 2014 at age 90 his immediate family and a few friends sailed from Lion Gate on INS Vipul, 40 miles into the Arabian Sea. With synchronized precision the naval pall bearers carried the coffin, his three children Sandy (named Phiroze), professor emeritus of law at Reading University, Dr Yasmine Hilton, chairman, Shell companies in India, and medical practitioner Dr Delna Ghandhi jointly said some Zoroastrian prayers and placed his kusti beside him with an item each one treasured. The nailed coffin was then slid into the sea.
His coffin being lowered into the sea
Characteristically unconventional, Ghandhi was the first naval officer to return to the ocean and the Navy had to do research as a precedent was created. The Navy acknowledged him with three rounds of gunfire when white uniformed officers stood at attention, the Last Post played and Ghandhi went into the waters forever.
The previous day, on December 26, a steady stream of friends and visitors paid him their last respects at INHS Asvini, when Commander in Chief of the Western Naval Command, Vice Admiral Anil Chopra arrived with naval punctuality at the appointed time of 11.30 a.m. for the last rites. Ghandhi’s former Flag Lieutenant, Chopra, termed his senior as "one of the most natural and outstanding leaders in my 40 years in the Navy.” As other officers, friends and family members paid their tributes, officers and cadets stood motionless. A guard of honor for three-and-a-half hours caused a cadet to pass out in the scorching sun. In addition to Zoroastrian prayers recited by Ervad Khushroo Madon, the navy band played for the gathering. Not given to rituals or formal religion, Ghandhi believed in secularism.
"He had 87 glorious years and three heroic ones,” stated Dhun of his brother who suffered a stroke, borne stoically for three years before his demise. He was recipient of the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (1977) for distinguished service and gallantry in times of peace and the Vir Chakra too for conspicuous bravery in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 for steering INS Mysore.
The Indian naval officer began his career during World War II in the Royal Indian Navy in 1942 and Adrian Holloway who had then served with Ghandhi on HMS Suffolk said, "He was a great man and I was privileged to know him.”
During the swearing-in ceremony of the first cabinet of independent India on August 15, 1947 Ghandhi was present as aide-de-camp (ADC) to Lord Louis Mountbatten of Burma. In fact he was the only Indian to have been Mountbatten’s ADC and the royal had prevailed on him to be the bearer of his prized decoration — the Star of Burma — at his funeral whenever it occurred. Ultimately, there was no funeral, as the Irish Republican Army assassinated Mountbatten along with some members of his family.
Left: Ghandhi (marked) at the swearing-in of the first cabinet of independent India and (below)
introducing young Rajiv Gandhi to Lord Mountbatten
Patricia Mountbatten, who inherited her father’s title as Countess Mountbatten of Burma acknowledged Ghandhi’s passing away saying, "We know what a great support he had been to our father during his time in India, which he (Mountbatten) valued very much, and we all grew fond of him.”
As commander of INS Betwa, built in the UK, he sailed the ship to Indian waters via Monaco where he enjoyed the royal hospitality of Prince Rainier and Princess Grace. Similarly, the Vice Admiral’s role in Operation Vijay was a decisive factor in the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese in 1961 after 451 years of occupation. As commander of INS Betwa, he helped capture the Portuguese frigate Albuquerque with Capt da Cunha Aragao in command. This maneuver was tellingly termed Operation Chutney. Ghandhi is recorded to have taken pains to inform the family of the surrendered Portuguese chief of his well-being, through his personal contacts.
To Vice Admiral Rusi Contractor, Ghandhi was "a lion with a big heart of gold, always compassionate and forgiving.” Contractor also alluded to his "towering personality and inimitable style.” "They don’t make ’em like you any more Rusi...but you will live on in the hearts of so many you touched with your generosity and your personality extraordinaire,” remarked friend Lolly Ramdas.
With his love for the waters, he passionately supported the Sea Cadet Corps believing the future and wellbeing of the navy depended on it. After his retirement from the Navy he took on the mantle of chairman and managing director (CMD) of the Shipping Corporation of India (SCI). At a condolence meeting convened by SCI he was extolled for his integrity and his ability to say no to the government. The current CMD Arun Kumar Gupta and past CMD Prabhat Kumar Srivastava spoke as did his erstwhile executive assistant Kamal Kothari who recalled how the shipping ministry pressurized the chairman to buy ships amounting to US $ 850 million.After 18 months they ultimately bought 37 ships totaling $ 230 million from three different shipyards. When one shipyard subsequently offered him a "compensation” of $100,000 for each ship, he hurriedly ordered Kothari to send off a note to Delhi, stating that the total cost of the 15 ships was further reduced by $ 1.5 million.
Clockwise from top left: Khorshed Ghandhi; prior to naval burial;
Zoroastrian prayers at INHS Asvini; family bidding farewell
On another occasion when Ghandhi had to clear a file for a senior officer of the SCI attending a course at Cambridge University, UK, he bluntly wrote, "XYZ is an old dog. You can’t teach an old dog, new tricks.” On Kothari cautioning Ghandhi that this could have repercussions and was politically incorrect, RKS recalled the file and added, "XYZ is an old dog, like me. You can’t…”
An unusual project for a Services man was being technical advisor on the sets of Ewan Lloyd’s film The Sea Wolves shot in Goa. The actor to play the governor being indisposed, Lloyd zeroed in on Ghandhi who looked "suitably gubernatorial” and could fit into the clothes, reveals Sandy.
He could be mistaken for a Royal Navy officer in demeanor and dress for he was always "perfectly turned out, perfect in diction and master of the kind of dripping in sarcasm which often achieved more results than any other form of admonishment,” reminisced Ranjit Rai in the India Defence Forum Analysis. Taking pride in his well-appointed table, Ghandhi who belonged to the "old guard,” had come down heavily when Rai and some colleagues invited to the Ghandhi home in Juhu for a five-course meal admitted they had eaten some chaat at the beach just prior to the visit!
Ghandhi’s flamboyance was recognized in red pyjamas — which were his style statement — as were his predictable red socks, which prompted Rear-Admiral Chotu Das to write in his condolence message to the children: "It is an end of an era, and of a style, end of a way of life. How many of us tried to emulate his charisma? How many of us tried to sport red socks and red hanky? Colorless is all we could achieve. A fighter till the end, we salute the inspiration he enthused in all of us.”
The United States, its allies, and its partners face an intertwined series of challenges in the South China Sea. This nested series of issues is most clearly manifest in China’s recent (and continuing) island-creation and expansion in the South China Sea. China’s island-dredging is itself only a symptom of the real problem: a significant power vacuum in the South China Sea. The United States has largely reduced its presence in those waters over the past 20 years. While the overall capabilities of the U.S. Navy are increasing with each new ship, the newer, more versatile platforms are more expensive. In DoD terminology, the Navy has prioritized capability over capacity, with the result being the reduction by more than 20 percent in total Navy ships since 1995. Combined with demands on the U.S. Navy to be present in the waters around the Middle East, and the United States is left with fewer “presence days” elsewhere in the world. In terms of hard power, Southeast Asia’s littoral states’ maritime—navy and coast guard—capabilities are extremely limited. In addition, they are reluctant to take actions that would put them in direct opposition to China. The reluctance may be due, at least in part, to the fact that China is thetop trading partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Even considering countries’ willingness to pursue their interests according to international law, the Philippines’ much-noted arbitration case (which was initially highly controversial among ASEAN countries) is only to determine what maritime features are contestable in court—not who owns them, but “can they be owned?” Together, these factors leave a significant power gap in the South China Sea. While Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are all increasing their spending on maritime assets, their efforts will need to be sustained for at least another decade to provide the countries with both the assets and the crews capable of sustaining presence in their claimed waters of the South China Sea. Mira Rapp-Hooper is right to highlight the need to expedite U.S. capacity-building efforts formaritime domain awareness. That said, China’s 35 years of economic growth, and 20 years of 10 percent or more annual growth in military spending allows it to fill the gap. If current trends continue, the future strategic landscape in the South China Sea will be considerably different, and unlike today, it will no longer be open to interpretation. Recent events certainly suggest that the Chinese are consolidating their claims in a de facto, if not a de jure way. But is it really so bad for the United States if China controls the fisheries and resources of the South China Sea? After all, China asserts it does not seek to impede the free flow of commerce in the South China Sea. Despite China’s stated commitment to uphold open commerce, it has demonstrated both its capability and willingness to utilize economic tools punitively to further national objectives. For example, China halted exports of rare earth elements, necessary for batteries and other high-end electronics, to Japan during a 2010 dispute over the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain. At the time, China controlled 93 percent of the global supply of rare earths. China has a legitimate interest in preserving the continued flow of commerce through the South China Sea, with a large share of its imports flowing through those waters. However, Japan and South Korea have the same interest in the free-flow of commerce, and are even more import-dependent for many resources than China. Approximately50 percent of annual global merchant shippingtraverses the South China Sea. Should China have control of the waters of the South China Sea, there is no certainty it would not utilize the same economic strong-arm tactics used against Japan to secure its objectives. Promoting the rule of law and equal access by all countries to the maritime commons will require a far more comprehensive set of activities from the United States. The first need, as noted byseveral contributors at War on the Rocks, is that the United States will need to pursue policies that demonstrate to China that its actions in the South China Sea risk escalation. As long as China sees little risk of escalation in its actions, it will have little reason to refrain from provocation. Second, my colleague Zack Cooper is right that the United States needs “gray hulls for gray zones.” To be truly effective, the United States (and countries in Southeast Asia) will also need more hulls so that they are present more often for more time. Doing so will require the United States to carefully consider what the rules of engagement are, and the latitude given to ship commanders.
Third the United States must demonstrate progress on the economic front. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) needs to be signed this year. For the United States to be seen as a viable economic partner (and not just a guarantor of security), TPP is the minimal credible step. In addition, the United States should identify targeted ways to promote U.S. investment in the developing economies throughout Southeast and South Asia, and should work with countries in these regions to bolster rule of law and contract enforcement so that businesses have greater clarity about the market environment. Fourth, the United States should commission legal scholars from across the region and a broader community of interest to develop a proposal for the legal status (elevation, rock, orisland) of each feature in the South China Sea. Countries would be free to debate differing viewpoints, but this would be a useful mechanism for countries to reduce tensions without directly confronting one another’s claims. Lastly, the United States must present a vision for what a vibrant and open South China Sea could look like. Currently, zero-sum national interests combine with resource and political constraints to impede countries bordering the South China Sea from working together to achieve positive outcomes. The United States must partner with littoral states to build the case that countries in the region have more to gain working together than they have to lose. If the United States is unwilling to commit to these actions—or a comparably ambitious slate—then we should all begin to adjust to a South China Sea that is controlled according to Chinese, rather than international, law. John Schaus is a Fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS where he focuses on defense and security issues in the Asia-Pacific. From 2011 to 2014 he worked in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense. Photo credit: Official U.S. Navy Imagery
With his Indian Ocean tour, the PM aims to counter Chinese influence among small island nations.
for The Diplomat
March 11, 2015
As China continues to draw attention to the South China Sea with its land reclamation and creation of artificial islands, it is also important to look at Chinese activities in the not-so-contentious but strategically important Indian Ocean Region. Beijing, with the help of economic and commercial initiatives, is mapping out a web of influence by increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean. As I argued in a previous articlepublished by The Diplomat, access to and control of the islands in the Indian Ocean is crucial for Beijing to secure its strategic interests in the region. There are two reasons for China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. First, some of these islands — such as Kyaukpyu — can prove to be China’s answer to its Malacca Dilemma, strengthening its energy security by reducing its dependence on the Strait of Malacca. Second, an increasing presence in the Indian Ocean is crucial in strengthening Beijing’s role as a key actor in the emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. There is no doubt that China aspires to be a Maritime Power. Beijing realizes that to be considered as a great power, it must have a role and stake beyond its region — beyond the Western Pacific and throughout the Indo-Pacific. Having attained a favorable status quo in the Western Pacific, China is now engaging with the island nations of the Indian Ocean through its investments and commercial initiatives. It is through its relationship and investments with these nations that Beijing aims to project itself as a resident power of the Indian Ocean, leading to a greater security role throughout the Indo-Pacific. However, unlike in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean is already home to many resident middle powers, wary of China’s unilateral and hostile maritime policies. As a result, the possibility of increased Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is leading to competition for geostrategic space,especially between India and China.
This article looks at the island nations of Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles, against the backdrop of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Indian Ocean tour.
Maldives
The Republic of Maldives is strategically located in the Indian Ocean, close to some of the critical trading routes passing through the region. Though a small island nation, its strategic importance can be relayed from the fact that instability in the waters of Maldives can essentially affect critical global trading routes. While Male is far from flexing any military muscle in the region, access to and influence over this island can help another nation project power through the region. This is perhaps the reason why Male is comfortably sitting in the middle of a geostrategic tussle between India and China unfolding in the Indian Ocean.
Though geographically closer to India and historically within its sphere of strategic influence, Maldives is increasingly strengthening its relationship with Beijing. Chinese investments in the Maldives have increased over the years, ranging from housing projects to infrastructure projects such as building roads and airports. The China-Maldives economic cooperation has experienced a boost ever since the Abdulla Yameen government came into power in November 2013. The Chinese ambassador to the Maldives, Wang Fukang, mentioned three critical areas where Beijing and Male should increase their cooperation, indicating an expansion of their economic and strategic ties. The three areas mentioned by Wang are tourism, infrastructure projects, and, finally, closer maritime cooperation between the two nations.
Noting the Chinese impact on the Maldivian tourism sector, the Ambassadorstated,“Since 2010, China has remained the largest source of tourist arrivals in the Maldives. In 2013 alone, more than 330,000 Chinese tourists visited Maldives. In the future, both sides could encourage more Chinese tourists to visit Maldives. Maldives could attract potential Chinese companies to invest in the tourism sector of the country.” Investing in infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean appears to be Beijing’s preferred approach for obtaining a strong foothold in the region. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative (which still lacks clear details or a clear intent) further boosts this policy. Maldives is an important player in China’s Indian Ocean game and hence infrastructure projects on this island nation are critical. When President Xi Jinping traveled to the Maldives in September 2014, agreement on infrastructure projects in the country was a key outcome. It is equally important to note that this was the first ever visit by a Chinese leader to the Maldives. Along with housing and road projects, the two leaders also agreed to upgrade the main airport and to build a bridge connecting Male to Hulhule — the island where the Male International Airport is located. While initially the agreement was to upgrade the existing airport, reports now suggest the building of a whole new airport with a second runway. The Chinese presence in Maldives is very prominent through its housing and development projects, so much so that their Ministry of Foreign Affairs building was designed and constructed by Beijing. Increase in Chinese investments in Maldives will provide Beijing with a legitimate platform to increase its military presence in the area. China will have every right to protect its commercial interests in the region both during war and peace times. These infrastructure investments also carry the possibility of being turned into military installations. There is palpable fear, especially in India, of China dominating the foreign investment sector in Maldives.
While the previous government tilted toward Indian influence in the Indian Ocean, the current government seems to favor China. With the arrest of former President Mohamed Nasheed, Maldives is descending into political turmoil. While countries such as India and the U.S. have expressed concerns over the arrest and political dissent in the country, Beijing refused to comment on the issue stating that “We are committed to non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs.” China’s stance has been well appreciated by the Yameen government, while pro Nasheed supporters have expressed their concerns about anti democratic trends. Speaking at a conference hosted by the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, Ahmed Naseem (former foreign minister of Maldives) stated,“For Maldives it is imperative to stand together with India to balance Indian Ocean security and protect the interests of the Maldives in a growing gamble for power in the Indian Ocean.” The Maldivian delegation led by the Naseem was in India to urge New Delhi to play its role in stabilizing Maldives and in balancing Beijing’s presence in the country. Thanks to growing investments joined with its “non-interference in domestic affairs” policy, Beijing appears to be a favorite for the current government in the Maldives. Male’s reliance on China for an economic boost under the current government is dangerous for both Maldives and India. China increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean through the Maldives is no longer a distant possibility and New Delhi must wake up to the strategic changes taking place so close to home. However, the Narendra Modi government is taking note of these developments and seem to be willing to shoulder its responsibility as a security actor in the Indo-Pacific. Maldives was one of the countries that Modi was supposed to visit during his travels beginning March 11, in an attempt to revive India-Maldives ties and balance increasing Chinese presence in its Indian Ocean neighborhood. Unfortunately due to the ongoing political turmoil, Maldives has been dropped from Modi’s itinerary. Modi will still tour Sri Lanka, Seychelles and Mauritius.
Seychelles The republic of Seychelles is another player in the emerging geostrategic competition in the Indian Ocean. The 115-island nation located in the Indian Ocean constantly fights to keep its EEZ secure and safe from pirates. Seychelles’ location and proximity to the coast of Africa make it a lucrative option for Beijing to establish a naval base in the country. China is already participating in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and has growing economic interests in Africa. In 2011, it was widely reported that Seychelles offered China maritime bases for refueling purposes while conducting its anti piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Thereports created a significant amount of unease in New Delhi; such a move would give Beijing the opportunity to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean, facilitating Chinese naval operations far beyond its shores. While China was quick to dismiss any possibility of a military base overseas, the possibility of such a development is higher today.
It is not news that Beijing aspires to extend its influence to the Indian Ocean. What is alarming is the use of commercial and economic initiatives to create a reason to maintain a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean Region. China is quick to dismiss any plans of creating military bases overseas, but Chinese maritime strategists such as Shen Dingli advocate the need for China to set up overseas military bases. In an article titled “Don’t shun the idea of setting up overseas bases,” Shen asserts that “[s]etting up overseas military bases is not an idea we have to shun; on the contrary, it is our right.” Encapsulating the reason behind China’s need to expand into the Indian Ocean, Shen further argues, “The real threat to us is not posed by the pirates but by the countries which block our trade route.” Shen continues:
“The threats also include secessionism outside the Chinese mainland. The situation requires us be able to hit the vulnerable points of our potential opponents by restricting their international waterway. So we need to set up our own blue-water navy and to rely on the overseas military bases to cut the supply costs.”
China is gearing up to protect its energy imports that pass through the Indian Ocean. Evidently, Beijing is not comfortable with Washington and New Delhi being the security providers in the region. Inability to sustain troops in the region would mean that China’s energy imports will be highly vulnerable in the event of a military standoff with either the United States or India. Currently, India and Seychelles share close military ties as New Delhi helps the island nation secure its EEZ by presenting surveillance aircrafts and patrolling ships. By increasing its economic investments in the Indian Ocean Region, Beijing is creating a legitimate reason to maintain a military presence in the Indian Ocean. While New Delhi cannot stop China from making inroads into the Indian Ocean, it must step up its game and increase cooperation with these island nations in order to balance the situation. This is why New Delhi is looking to increase its security cooperation with Seychelles and hopes to balance the situation through Narendra Modi’s ongoing Indian Ocean tour. Sri Lanka India’s ties with Sri Lanka date back to historical and cultural linkages in ancient times. Geographically located at the tip of India, the island nation is considered to be within New Delhi’s sphere of strategic influence. However, strengthening ties with Beijing through infrastructure projects are creating tension in the Indian Ocean politics between China and India. An area of great discomfort for India has been the frequent docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo. The previous government of Mahinda Rajapaksa appeared fairly China-friendly, awarding many infrastructure development projects to Beijing. The Maithripala Sirisena government is now reviewing all Chinese investments in the country, especially the $1.5 billion port city project. Explaining the reason for the re-assessment, Sri Lanka’s investment promotion minister, Kabir Hashim,noted that “The port city project has to be completely looked at… You cannot have land given on freehold basis to another country in a high security zone.” According to reports, the project would give China around 100 hectares of land “an outright basis and the rest on a 99-year lease.” The issue of Chinese submarines docking at Colombo is a perfect example of Beijing using its commercial initiatives to gradually increase and maintain its military presence in the Indian Ocean. It is interesting to note that the submarine docked at the Colombo International Container Terminals Ltd., (CICT), a terminal constructed by China Merchants Holdings (International) Co., Ltd. (CMHI), much to India’s surprise and concern. CMHI holds 85 percent ownership of the terminal. The Sirisena government is nowreassuring India that such “incidents, from whatever quarter, do not take place under our tenure.” In this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to Sri Lanka from March 13-14 is of great significance to reassert India’s ties with Colombo. Prime Minister Modi will also be addressing the Sri Lankan Parliament along with a visit to Jaffna. While the new government in Colombo reviews its relationship with Beijing, New Delhi must be available to assert its support and strengthen its ties with the tear drop nation of the Indian Ocean. Modi will also be traveling to Mauritius, another small but significant country in the Indian Ocean. As the island nation looks to attract investments from China, India is stepping up its game by providing a 1,300-tonne Indian-built patrol vessel, the Barracuda, to Mauritius to help the island nation protect its coastline. Modi will also address the National Assembly and will attend the Mauritius National Day on March 12. Narendra Modi’s Indian Ocean tour comes at a much needed time to re-assure the Indian Ocean islands that New Delhi is present and willing to shoulder its responsibility in maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean.
It is quite clear that China is engaging with the island nations in the Indian Ocean Region through small but significant projects, leveraging its strategic interests. What Beijing essentially aims to do is create an atmosphere where Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean becomes inevitable. While India may not indulge in any China containment policy, there is a dire need for New Delhi to reengage with these islands and secure its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. Darshana M. Baruah is a Junior Fellow at the New Delhi based think, the Observer Research Foundation.
Concrete Steps
for the U.S. in the South China Sea
By
The United States, its allies, and its partners face an intertwined series of challenges in the South China Sea. This nested series of issues is most clearly manifest in China’s recent (and continuing) island-creation and expansion in the South China Sea.
China’s island-dredging is itself only a symptom of the real problem: a significant power vacuum in the South China Sea.
The United States has largely reduced its presence in those waters over the past 20 years. While the overall capabilities of the U.S. Navy are increasing with each new ship, the newer, more versatile platforms are more expensive. In DoD terminology, the Navy has prioritized capability over capacity, with the result being the reduction by more than 20 percent in total Navy ships since 1995. Combined with demands on the U.S. Navy to be present in the waters around the Middle East, and the United States is left with fewer “presence days” elsewhere in the world.
In terms of hard power, Southeast Asia’s littoral states’ maritime—navy and coast guard—capabilities are extremely limited. In addition, they are reluctant to take actions that would put them in direct opposition to China. The reluctance may be due, at least in part, to the fact that China is the top trading partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Even considering countries’ willingness to pursue their interests according to international law, the Philippines’ much-noted arbitration case (which was initially highly controversial among ASEAN countries) is only to determine what maritime features are contestable in court—not who owns them, but “can they be owned?”
Together, these factors leave a significant power gap in the South China Sea. While Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are all increasing their spending on maritime assets, their efforts will need to be sustained for at least another decade to provide the countries with both the assets and the crews capable of sustaining presence in their claimed waters of the South China Sea. Mira Rapp-Hooper is right to highlight the need to expedite U.S. capacity-building efforts for maritime domain awareness. That said, China’s 35 years of economic growth, and 20 years of 10 percent or more annual growth in military spending allows it to fill the gap. If current trends continue, the future strategic landscape in the South China Sea will be considerably different, and unlike today, it will no longer be open to interpretation.
Recent events certainly suggest that the Chinese are consolidating their claims in a de facto, if not a de jure way. But is it really so bad for the United States if China controls the fisheries and resources of the South China Sea? After all, China asserts it does not seek to impede the free flow of commerce in the South China Sea.
Despite China’s stated commitment to uphold open commerce, it has demonstrated both its capability and willingness to utilize economic tools punitively to further national objectives. For example, China halted exports of rare earth elements, necessary for batteries and other high-end electronics, to Japan during a 2010 dispute over the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain. At the time, China controlled 93 percent of the global supply of rare earths.
China has a legitimate interest in preserving the continued flow of commerce through the South China Sea, with a large share of its imports flowing through those waters. However, Japan and South Korea have the same interest in the free-flow of commerce, and are even more import-dependent for many resources than China. Approximately 50 percent of annual global merchant shipping traverses the South China Sea. Should China have control of the waters of the South China Sea, there is no certainty it would not utilize the same economic strong-arm tactics used against Japan to secure its objectives.
Promoting the rule of law and equal access by all countries to the maritime commons will require a far more comprehensive set of activities from the United States.
The first need, as noted by several contributors at War on the Rocks, is that the United States will need to pursue policies that demonstrate to China that its actions in the South China Sea risk escalation. As long as China sees little risk of escalation in its actions, it will have little reason to refrain from provocation.
Second, my colleague Zack Cooper is right that the United States needs “gray hulls for gray zones.” To be truly effective, the United States (and countries in Southeast Asia) will also need more hulls so that they are present more often for more time.
Doing so will require the United States to carefully consider what the rules of engagement are, and the latitude given to ship commanders.
Fourth, the United States should commission legal scholars from across the region and a broader community of interest to develop a proposal for the legal status (elevation, rock, or island) of each feature in the South China Sea. Countries would be free to debate differing viewpoints, but this would be a useful mechanism for countries to reduce tensions without directly confronting one another’s claims.
Lastly, the United States must present a vision for what a vibrant and open South China Sea could look like. Currently, zero-sum national interests combine with resource and political constraints to impede countries bordering the South China Sea from working together to achieve positive outcomes. The United States must partner with littoral states to build the case that countries in the region have more to gain working together than they have to lose.
If the United States is unwilling to commit to these actions—or a comparably ambitious slate—then we should all begin to adjust to a South China Sea that is controlled according to Chinese, rather than international, law.
John Schaus is a Fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS where he focuses on defense and security issues in the Asia-Pacific. From 2011 to 2014 he worked in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense.
Photo credit: Official U.S. Navy Imagery