When Americans think about the world, they divide it into discrete regions: Europe, spanning from Norway to Greece; the Middle East, stretching from Morocco to Iran; and the Asia-Pacific, covering Japan through Indonesia, or sometimes even to India. This mental map of the world is profoundly powerful and entirely imaginaryBlack Sea. Source: Wikipedia Commons. . Powerful, because where we place countries affects how we treat them. Imaginary, because our mental geographies are not the only way of seeing the world. Often, they are not even the best way.
No region of the world is more divided in Americans’ mental map than the Black Sea. We place the countries that surround the Black Sea coast into three different categories. Romania and Bulgaria are in Europe, members of NATO and the European Union. Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia are the former Soviet Union; for better or for worse, they are still defined by the historical legacy of Soviet rule. And Turkey, embroiled by Kurdish insurgency and at war in Syria and Iraq, is increasingly seen as one of the main powers of the Middle East.
Batumi, Georgia
There is much sense, of course, in this tripartite division of the region, since it accurately describes at least some of these countries’ current domestic politics and international orientation. But thinking only in terms of Europe, the Middle East, and the former USSR misses many, perhaps most, of the dynamics that unite the region. Only several hundred miles separate Turkey’s great Black Sea port of Trabzon from Tiraspol, the border city serving as capital of Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region. Burgas, Bulgaria’s biggest port and an oil-refining hub, is a one-day sail from Georgia’s Batumi, formerly the greatest oil port of Tsarist Russia. Sochi, the host of Russia’s 2014 winter Olympics, is located due north of Rize, the home province of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
The geography of the Black Sea matters not only because the region is increasingly at the center of the United States’ foreign policy, but we continue to wrongly see the region as divided into unconnected chunks. Beyond geographic proximity and historical connections, however, there are three main reasons to look at the Black Sea as a coherent region, rather than merely as a medium-sized body of water: security, energy, and European and Eurasian integration. Each of these themes is shared across the Black Sea region. Unless we recognize the interconnections—and treat the Black Sea as a whole—we cannot fully understand the region. Why the Black Sea? We may see it as a body of water that separates Europe from Asia, or that divides the Middle East from the former USSR. But all sides of the Black Sea’s shores share many of the factors driving political and economic change in the region.
Black Sea Security
Take security. A ring of smoldering conflicts surrounds the Black Sea. In Moldova, a 25-year-old frozen conflict divides the country into two pieces. Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula was annexed by Russia, and the Donbass region remains occupied by Russian-backed separatist forces. Russia’s main supply route to its forces in Syria runs through the Black Sea via the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to the Eastern Mediterranean. In the Caucasus, ongoing conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and between Georgia and the breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia continue to attract the interest of outside powers, Russia chief among them.
All of these conflicts—frozen to various degrees—are usually seen as the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, remnants of the retreating Russian Empire. This is true, but it misses their Black Sea context. It is not a coincidence that all the ongoing post-Soviet conflicts (including, it is worth noting, Russia’s ongoing struggle to pacify and integrate its own North Caucasus) occur around the Black Sea.
Sevastopol
Why is this case? Primarily because the Black Sea area is where Russia and the West failed to agree on post-Cold War “rules of the game.”In Central Asia,the West never seriously expected to wield dominant influence or to transform local governance. The civil war in Tajikistan, therefore, was resolved in the 1990s along Russian lines, with relatively little Western input. Similarly, Moscow has recognized the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—as part of the European system, and disagreements between these countries’ ethnic majorities and Russian-speaking minorities have been managed along the West’s preferred methods.
Russia and the West never agreed about the Black Sea. Are Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in Russia’s sphere of control, or are they on track to join Western institutions? Such disagreement exists, largely because in the 1990s, neither the West nor Russia seriously imagined that these countries would want or could be prepared to join Western institutions. (In the 1990s, the debate was whether Poland would join NATO.) At the same time, Turkey had long sought to join the European Union, but was held at bay by Western European voters who feared a wave of Turkish immigrants. This confusion added an additional level of geopolitical complication. Lacking a clear set of rules, the Black Sea region’s existing conflicts continued to smolder. The wars in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 were sparked by local disputes, but they only occurred because of this larger disagreement about how the Black Sea region should be governed.
Today, the situation is as confused as a decade ago, but far more tense. Both Russia and Ukraine are building up their military power in the Black Sea. NATO has stationed additional forces in Romania and has considered adding to its naval presence. Over the past year, Turkey and Russia have swung between tentative friendship and near-open conflict. Ankara relies on NATO defense commitments even as it seeks to maintain its privileged position in the Black Sea itself. And Russia’s expansion of its military role in Syria adds to the importance the Kremlin attaches to Black Sea naval supply routes. The Black Sea is more militarized and less stable than at any point since the Cold War’s end—and perhaps since the late 1940s.
Black Sea Energy
The question of security and insecurity in the Black Sea overlaps with other areas of conflict and cooperation. One key and contested theme is energy. A significant share of Russia’s gas exports run via the Black Sea region, primarily through Ukraine. Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, says it wants to cut off gas transit through Ukraine, a move in part designed to place pressure on Kyiv’s Western-oriented government.To make such a switch possible, Russia is looking to build new gas pipelines: some further north, but some also located in the Black Sea region. For years, Russia promoted the South Stream pipeline, which would have shipped gas via an underwater pipeline intersecting the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria, and then on to other European countries. Despite some support for the project in Bulgaria and elsewhere, it was scrapped in 2014 under pressure from Western leaders who wanted to punish Russia for annexing Crimea.
Since the cancellation of South Stream, the Kremlin has turned its attention to a new pipeline, Turk Stream. This pipeline would also bypass Ukraine via an underwater, trans-Black Sea link, distributing gas from Russia via Turkey and onward to European customers. This pipeline, too, is partly a geopolitical game. Russia froze the project after tensions with Turkey spiked in late 2015, only to restart it when ties improved in 2016. Many experts, however, consider the project economically unjustified given low energy prices and ample existing pipeline capacity. It remains unclear if the pipeline will be built.
Burgas, Bulgaria
Other countries also view the Black Sea as a strategic energy corridor. Just as the Kremlin seeks to bypass Ukraine by using other Black Sea routes, so too do Western governments look to the Black Sea as a route for transporting energy from the gas-rich Caspian Sea region to Western markets. Already, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline transports oil from Azerbaijani oil fields to global markets, bypassing Russia.
Potentially more significant are efforts to construct gas pipelines originating in Azerbaijan or even Turkmenistan, transiting through Turkey and supplying gas to Western consumers. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), for example, is intended to give Azerbaijan a means of breaking Russia’s monopoly on gas exports from the former USSR to the West. If Iranian gas ever reaches Europe, it too will transit the Black Sea.
So long as Europe relies on natural gas for
energy, the Black Sea will remain a crucial
energy transit corridor.
European and Eurasian Integration in the Black Sea
Energy is not Europe’s only interest in the Black Sea. The region is one of three areas of instability positioned along Europe’s southern border. Coupled with the Eastern Mediterranean (Syria, Lebanon, Israel) and the countries of North Africa, political and economic chaos in the Black Sea risks spilling into the European Union. The threat of instability along its border is a major reason why the European Union involves itself so much in the Black Sea region. Indeed, except for the Balkans, all potential members of the European Union ring the Black Sea, including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and (for true optimists) Turkey.
The European Union has already signed Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. These agreements do not guarantee these countries future membership in the European Union, but they do provide wide access to European markets as well as aid and technical assistance. Moldovan and Georgian citizens have received the right to travel to the European Union without needing to apply for a visa, a right that Ukrainians may receive in 2017.
Major political groups in each of these countries describe accession to the European Union as a long-term goal. Amid Brexit and a continent-wide populist backlash, further EU expansion looks unlikely in the short term. But it is worth remembering that in 1989, as communist regimes crumbled across Central and Eastern Europe, the idea that Poland or Romania would join the European Union also seemed like a long-term prospect at best. As it happened, the long term came sooner than many expected.
Turkey has been a candidate for EU accession since before the Cold War ended, yet its membership, while still in theory under negotiation, looks unlikely. Unlike tiny Moldova and Georgia, Turkey’s population is the size of Germany’s, so its accession would drastically shift the balance of power within Europe. It would also likely lead to a flood of unwelcome economic migrants to wealthier European countries. That means full EU membership is unlikely, even if current political disagreements between Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other European leaders are overcome. Nonetheless, geographic and economic realities mean that ties between Turkey and Europe are likely to persist. The migration deal struck earlier this year by Erdoğan and German Chancellor Angela Merkel is a good example for why cooperation between Turkey and the European Union will continue.
For this reason, Europe’s foreign policy is likely to remain focused on the Black Sea for some time to come. Yet, the Black Sea is also one of two regions that Russia hopes will participate in its own Eurasian Union. Armenia has already signed up, and Russia is pushing hard for Moldova to join. Moscow would also like Ukraine to join its Eurasian project, though this looks unlikely given how strongly Ukrainian public opinion turned against Moscow thanks to the war in the Donbass.
Even if Europe and Russia manage to agree on Ukraine—a prospect that does not look likely—the broader question of Europe’s relations with the other countries of the Black Sea is unlikely to go away. The door to European Union membership formally remains open, particularly for Moldova, a small country on the EU’s border. And the EU has no model for stabilizing European countries on its border that does not involve expanding its own institutions. The Association Agreement that Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia signed with the European Union is unlikely to be the final step of their integration with Europe.
Why the Black Sea Matters
Rarely has a region figured so prominently in American foreign policy without our even realizing it. We treat Turkey as separate from Ukraine, Romania as wholly distinct from Georgia, and Russia as an aggressive “lone wolf” in the region. These are different countries, of course, with diverse historical traditions and political structures. But from security to energy to the future of Europe, the Black Sea operates as a united region far more than Americans usually realize. We underestimate regional connections and fail to understand the linkages that drive regional politics.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Black Sea Initiative, launching this month, will cover these issues in depth. Each month, we will publish an essay on a key Black Sea region issue, looking both at how specific Black Sea countries view the region and examining themes that cut across national borders. These essays will be written by top American and European analysts and by leading experts from the Black Sea region. Our aim is to show that from energy to economics, from security to geopolitics, the region’s relevance is far broader than most people realize. The future of Europe and Eurasia is being contested in the Black Sea.
About the author: *Chris Miller is Research Director of the FPRI Eurasia Program where he serves as the editor of the Baltic Bulletin and our Black Sea Initiative publications. He is also the Associate Director of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University.
Lock and Load! The T-90 tanks will now inherit Armata Tank's Deadly Cannon - WATCH
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7O7XCt8K5tc]
The latest modernization of Russia's main battle tank, the T-90, will embrace the firepower capabilities of the advanced T-14 Armata. The Uralvagonzavod machine building company recently published the tank's photo for the first time.
"The T-90M will receive a modernized smoothbore 125mm 2A82-1M cannon, the one used in the Armata, and a new fire control system characterized by a higher precision and a higher rate of fire, and its barrel durability will be increased up to 900 shots," Russian military expert Alexei Leonkov told Zvezda TV.
The gun is 20 percent more precise and has 17 percent more muzzle energy (a firearm's destructive potential is directly proportional to this factor) than the rival model on Germany's Leopard 2 battle tank. The automatic loading mechanism allows for the use of projectiles up to one meter long, such as the armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding-sabot (APFSDS) called Vacuum-1, which is used in the Armata.
The T-90M's ammunition load totals 45 projectiles. In addition to shells, the modernized tank is capable of firing Invar and Invar-M tandem-charge guided missiles, which are said to be able to effectively penetrate the protective shielding of all existing and prospective armor vehicles used by foreign armies.
The tank is now protected from enemy fire with the Malakhit reactive armor and the Afghanit active protection system, which were designed for the Armata family of vehicles. Reactive armor is in essence an extra layer of metal "bricks" covering a vehicle's parts, which bear the main weight of a shell's hit and cushion its destructive effect. In its turn, the active protection system can "blind", deflect and strike down an enemy missile or other anti-tank weapon. The lower part of the turret is now additionally protected by slat armor, shielding it from anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades. The surveillance means of the tank's commander and the gun sighter allow for an equally efficient search for targets day and night, in motion or in a stationary position.
According to Leonkov, Russia is going to upgrade 400 T-90 battle tanks to the T-90M level.
Thanks to the Armata "refresh pack", the Russian main battle tank will be able to conduct even more effective combat operations in different weather conditions and strike targets despite stiff enemy resistance.
The family of Armata platform-based military vehicles is the latest achievement of Russian armor engineers. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SnFq54ELpmM]
SOURCE: JANTAR MANTAR 22 Jan 2017 6:09 p.m. Dear Sh Narender Modi Ji
Greetings
Our 02 veterans and 01 Veer Nari are on Fast Unto Death for last eight days at Jantar Mantar.
Condition of Mrs Sudesh Goyat has deteriorated and veterans have taken her to ARMY RR Hospital and admitted in emergency. Doctors are now taking care of her.
In brief about Veer Nari Mrs Sudesh Goyat wife of Major Goyat
This fearless and selfless lady is a true example of bravery. She or her husband would not be benefited by OROP as her husband has taken premature retirement from Army Medical Corps. She was requested by so many veterans to break the fast but she clearly said,
"either PM Narender Modi ji would break my fast or God would call me"
The OROP, in"Letter and Spirit" is yet to be delivered.
SOURCE https://www.thequint.com/world/2017/01/16/can-china-army-reach-new-delhi-in-2-days-cold-start-doctrine-chinese-state-tv-war-with-india DELHI PAKRO : IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN DO WHY NOT CHINKS
This is not the first time China has tried to use rhetoric as a deterrence strategy against India, but it comes as probably the first one which is as specific. (Photo: iStock)
DELHI PAKRO DO NOT LAUGH IT OFF. YES IT CAN BE DONE - VASUNDHRA [ THE ANSWER LIES IN THE CONCEPT OF CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF BATTLE FIELD.[COG] FIELD MARSHAL ROMEL HAS DISCUSSED & TOUCHED UPON IT DURING NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN & SO HAVE THE NUMEROUS MILITARY THINKERS. NOW CHINESE ARE ON IT. YES DELHI CAN BE CAPTURED IN 48 Hrs, BUT AFTER CAPTURE HOW WILL THEY WITHDRAW or WILL THEY WITHDRAW ? ] IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN get DELHI CAPTURED WITH A COY GROUP of ARMY, WHY CHINKS CANNOT DO WITH THE THIRD LARGEST ARMY!!!!!!!!
Can China’s Army Really Reach Delhi in 2 Days? Nope, Say Experts
Sameeksha Khare
YEP, SAYS VASUNDHRA
“It would take China's motorised troops 48 hours and its paratroops 10 hours to reach India's capital if war broke out,” a Chinese State television channel boldly proclaimed.
This is not the first time China has tried to use rhetoric as a deterrence strategy but it comes as probably the first one that is so specific.
Interestingly, this also comes on the back of Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat’s pointed comment on honing India’s Cold Start strategy for Pakistan.
Does the Chinese state TV’s statement come as nothing more than a deterrence tool, or are the claims viable?
‘A Ridiculous Remark Made Without Any Practicality’
Experts and retired army officers were quick to rubbish this as illogical rhetoric, and questioned the logistics of the provocative claim. The ill-thought-out remark shows the level of understanding of the people who’ve made it, said retired colonel Rohit Agarwal. Speaking to The Quint, he broke the comment down and analysed its impracticality.
For motorised troops to infiltrate the mountainous terrain of the north-eastern border of India and advance further inside is not possible, he said.
Soldiers of Indian Army and Chinese Army undertaking endurance exercises during Indo-China Joint Military exercise in November 2016. (Photo Courtesy: Twitter/@adgpi)
If you’re talking about motorised troops, you need to first look at the terrain. Where will those troops come from? All of our north-eastern border is mountainous, so, even if they plan on using that route for their troops, how far can they advance?
Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army
As far as the paratroops are concerned, anyone can drop paratroops anywhere, said a former Indian army commander to The Quint. Putting the situation in perspective, he said:
If it takes their paratroops 10 hours to reach Delhi then theoretically it will take even our paratroops the same time to reach Beijing.
Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army
Agarwal explained that depending on the flying time and the time taken to prepare, why just 10 hours? One can drop paratroopers anywhere anytime, but what thereafter? What possibilities will they have after landing in foreign territory? Will it be a clandestine operation? If so, what will it lead to? It would then be a full-scale escalation, he added.
You can drop paratroopers in Delhi as and when you like, but what will they do once they reach the ground? So, I think it’s just rhetoric.
Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army
Agarwal says it’s difficult to discern what might have prompted the state channel to issue the remark. But China is always looking to send messages and threats to India or even United States, said Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret’d).
This claim is beyond ridiculous. It’s saying their motorised troops will reach Delhi in 48 hours – how will they cross the Himalayas?
Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret’d)
Further, a former Army commander explained that notwithstanding all the disputes India has with China and Pakistan, the chances of a war are extremely low.
This is nothing but a figment of imagination of the television channel and a matter of who they’re quoting and how. It’s just imaginations running wild and typical punchline reporting by the state channel.
Former Army Commander
The Chinese state TV’s comment was issued without context and, seeing the experts’ views, is being interpreted as mere rhetoric – thus negating any deterrence effect it may have sought to achieve.
PS CHINKS WOULD OPEN A OPERATION MAINTENANCE AXIS FROM SHILPA PASS TO SIMLA TO CHANDIGARH TO DELHI IN 48 HRS & WILL DO SO ON OTHER MAIN & SUBSIDARY AXIS AS PER THEIR OPERATION PLANS
DELHI PAKRO Do not laugh it off. Yes it can be done The answer lies in the concept of Centre Of Gravity of Battle Field (COG) Field Marshal Rommel has discussed and touched upon it during North African campaign & so have the numerous military thinkers.. Now the chinese are on it(COG). Yes Delhi can be captured in in H plus 48 Hrs but after capture how will they withdraw or will they withdraw at all ? IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN get DELHI CAPTURED WITH A COY GROUP of ARMY, WHY CHINKS CANNOT DO WITH THE THIRD LARGEST ARMY!!!!!!!! Coming to hard facts. After Sumdrung chu incident Chinese have developed the capability to induct one air borne division in 24 hrs, one Airborne corps in 72 hours & they have practically demonstrated by launching a para division within two to four hours in the earth quake zone of 2009( ?year). With the advent of Railway line they can induct 25 to 30 divisons to Lhasa in thirty days with micro induction management. Their road communication in Tibet is almost first class. Chinese have a full fledged Airfield/port with SIX KILOMETER runway Sixty kilometers as the crow flies off CHUSUL south of NGARI in tibet, including at Shigaste & Lhasa. From Ngari flying of heavy weight crafts time to Chandigarh is one hour & to Delhi 2 minus hours (minus). Chinese do have a capability till 2009 to airlift a division & para drop. Which they must have improved probably to a Corps. It is fact that they can capture Arunachal & Aksai chin in 48 hours & Indians response time is estimated to be 7 days. In Ladhak they will link with PAKIS at Siachen for which they do have a large sand model at pass HAJI ALI What ever I say here is all available on the net and much more. Cutting it short Chinese have the capability to capture Chandigarh & Palam in H pls 8 hrs and link up with motorised divisons combo with airlift in D plus 48hrs . It is possible.& be assured Indians will not know what has hit them . THIS IS A FACT. I AM NOT JOKING - Vasundhra
