NUCLEAR WARFARE : What Would Happen If An 800-Kiloton Nuclear Warhead Detonated above Midtown Manhattan?

Source:
http://thebulletin.org/what-would-happen-if-800-kiloton-nuclear-warhead-detonated-above-midtown-manhattan8023



                                NUCLEAR  WARFARE




                                    [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WCme_K6MYLY ]

Washington, D.C. gets NUKED! (DAY AFTER DISASTER)  

Uploaded on Jul 10, 2011

In the current climate of widespread national security concerns in the U.S., many people worry that the threat of a nuclear attack on American soil is more plausible than ever. In this chilling program, get a firsthand look at what would happen if a nuclear bomb exploded in the heart of Washington, D.C.

With shockingly realistic dramatizations, DAY AFTER DISASTER puts you in the line of fire to experience the consequences of nuclear fallout — from the moment of detonation to 24 hours afterward. Focusing on the administration's controversial Continuity of Government program (COG) History Channel™ offers a rare inside look at how the government plans to save American lives while also ensuring that the country does not descend into anarchy should the President and those next in line be among the estimated 300,000 dead.

Featuring extraordinary interviews with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials and terrifying images of the expected nuclear aftermath in the nation's capital, this feature-length special explores the incisive question: Is America prepared for the DAY AFTER DISASTER?

                                NUCLEAR  WARFARE


What Would Happen If An 800-Kiloton Nuclear Warhead Detonated above Midtown Manhattan?
                                   BY
    Steven StarrLynn EdenTheodore A. Postol

 

 

 Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles are believed to carry a total of approximately 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads that can hit the US less than 30 minutes after being launched. Of this total, about 700 warheads are rated at 800 kilotons; that is, each has the explosive power of 800,000 tons of TNT.


What follows is a description of the consequences of the detonation of a single such warhead over midtown Manhattan, in the heart of New York City


THE INITIAL FIRE BALL .

The warhead would probably be detonated slightly more than a mile above the city, to maximize the damage created by its blast wave. Within a few tenths of millionths of a second after detonation, the center of the warhead would reach a temperature of roughly 200 million degrees Fahrenheit (about 100 million degrees Celsius), or about four to five times the temperature at the center of the sun. 



A ball of superheated air would form, initiallly expanding outward at millions of miles per hour. It would act like a fast-moving piston on the surrounding air, compressing it at the edge of the fireball and creating a shockwave of vast size and power.



                 AFTER  "ONE" SECOND

After one second, the fireball would be roughly a mile in diameter. It would have cooled from its initial temperature of many millions of degrees to about 16,000 degrees Fahrenheit, roughly 4,000 degrees hotter than the surface of the sun. 




                 HURRICANE OF FIRE

On a clear day with average weather conditions, the enormous heat and light from the fireball would almost instantly ignite fires over a total area of about 100 square miles.  



Hurricane of fire. Within seconds after the detonation, fires set within a few miles of the fireball would burn violently. These fires would force gigantic masses of heated air to rise, drawing cooler air from surrounding areas toward the center of the fire zone from all directions.




                       MASSIVE  WINDS



As the massive winds drove flames into areas where fires had not yet fully developed,the fires set by the detonation would begin to merge. Within tens of minutes of the detonation, fires from near and far would join to form a single, gigantic fire.


The energy released by this mass fire would be 15 to 50 times greater than the energy produced by the nuclear detonation.



The mass fire, or firestorm, would quickly increase in intensity, heating enormous volumes of air that would rise at speeds approaching 300 miles per hour. This chimney effect would pull cool air from outside the fire zone towards the center of the fire at speeds of hundreds of miles per hour. These superheated ground winds of more than hurricane force would further intensify the fire.

At the edge of the fire zone, the winds would be powerful enough to uproot trees three feet in diameter and suck people from outside the fire into it.



The inrushing winds would drive the flames from burning buildings horizontally along the ground, filling city streets with flames and firebrands, breaking in doors and windows, and causing the fire to jump, sometimes hundreds of feet, swallowing anything not already violently combusting.


These above-hurricane-force ground winds would have average air temperatures well above the boiling point of water. The targeted area would be transformed into a huge hurricane of fire, producing a lethal environment throughout the entire fire zone.





                                     GROUND  ZERO


Ground zero: Midtown Manhattan.

The fireball would vaporize the structures directly below it and produce an immense blast wave and high-speed winds, crushing even heavily built concrete structures within a couple miles of ground zero. The blast would tear apart high-rise buildings and expose their contents to the solar temperatures; it would spread fires by exposing ignitable surfaces, releasing flammable materials, and dispersing burning materials.



WITHIN A HALF SECOND OF THE DETONATION 

At the Empire State Building, Grand Central Station, the Chrysler Building, and St. Patrick's Cathedral, about one half to three quarters of a mile from ground zero, light from the fireball would melt asphalt in the streets, burn paint off walls, and melt metal surfaces within a half second of the detonation.


ROUGHLY ONE SECOND LATER

 [ WITHIN A HALF SECOND OF THE DETONATION ]

Roughly one second later, the blast wave and 750-mile-per-hour winds would arrive, flattening buildings and tossing burning cars into the air like leaves in a windstorm. Throughout Midtown, the interiors of vehicles and buildings in line of sight of the fireball would explode into flames. 


A MILE FROM GROUND ZERO


Slightly more than a mile from ground zero are the neighborhoods of Chelsea, Midtown East, and Lenox Hill, as well as the United Nations; at this distance, for a split second the fireball would shine 10,000 times brighter than a desert sun at noon.  All combustible materials illuminated by the fireball would spew fire and black smoke.


Grass, vegetation, and leaves on trees would explode into flames; the surface of the ground would explode into superheated dust. Any flammable material inside buildings (paper, curtains, upholstery) that was directly exposed to the fireball would burst into flame. The surfaces of the bronze statues in front of the UN would melt; marble surfaces exposed to the fireball would crack, pop, and possibly evaporate.


  "4" SECONDS : ARRIVAL OF BLAST WAVE


At this distance from the fireball, it would take about four seconds for the blast wave to arrive. As it passed over, the blast wave would engulf all structures and crush them; it would generate ferocious winds of 400 to 500 miles per hour that would persist for a few seconds


The high winds would tear structural elements from buildings and cause them to disintegrate explosively into smaller pieces. Some of these pieces would become destructive projectiles, causing further damage. The superheated, dust-laden winds would be strong enough to overturn trucks and buses.



"TWO MILES"  FROM GROUND ZERO


Two miles from ground zero, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, with all its magnificent historical treasures, would be obliterated. Two and half miles from ground zero, in Lower Manhattan, the East Village, and Stuyvesant Town, the fireball would appear 2,700 times brighter than a desert sun at noon. There, thermal radiation would melt and warp aluminum surfaces, ignite the tires of autos, and turn exposed skin to charcoal, before the blast wave arrived and ripped apart the buildings.

"THREE MILES TO "NINE  MILES "FROM GROUND ZERO

Three to nine miles from ground zero.

Midtown is bordered by the relatively wide Hudson and East rivers, and fires would start simultaneously in large areas on both sides of these waterways (that is, in Queens and Brooklyn as well as Jersey City and West New York).  Although the direction of the fiery winds in regions near the river would be modified by the water, the overall wind pattern from these huge neighboring fire zones would be similar to that of a single mass fire, with its center at Midtown, Manhattan.


Three miles from ground zero, in Union City, New Jersey, and Astoria, Queens, the fireball would be as bright as 1,900 suns and deliver more than five times the thermal energy deposited at the perimeter of the mass fire at Hiroshima. In Greenpoint, Brooklyn, and in the Civic Center of Lower Manhattan, clothes worn by people in the direct line of sight of the fireball would burst into flames or melt, and uncovered skin would be charred, causing third-degree and fourth-degree burns.


It would take 12 to 14 seconds for the blast wave to travel three miles after the fireball's initial flash of light.  At this distance, the blast wave would last for about three seconds and be accompanied by winds of 200 to 300 miles per hour. Residential structures would be destroyed; high-rises would be at least heavily damaged.


Fires would rage everywhere within five miles of ground zero. At a distance of 5.35 miles from the detonation, the light flash from the fireball would deliver twice the thermal energy experienced at the edge of the mass fire at Hiroshima. In Jersey City and Cliffside Park, and in Woodside in Queens, on Governors Island and in Harlem, the light and heat to surfaces would approximate that created by 600 desert suns at noon.
Wind speed at this distance would be 70 to 100 miles per hour. Buildings of heavy construction would suffer little structural damage, but all exterior windows would be shattered, and non-supporting interior walls and doors would be severely damaged or blown down. Black smoke would effuse from wood houses as paint burned off surfaces and furnishings ignited.



Six to seven miles from ground zero, from Moonachie, New Jersey, to Crown Heights, Brooklyn, from Yankee Stadium to Corona, Queens and Crown Heights, Brooklyn, the fireball would appear 300 times brighter than the desert sun at noon. Anyone in the direct light of the fireball would suffer third degree burns to their exposed skin. The firestorm could engulf neighborhoods as far as seven miles away from ground zero, since these outlying areas would receive the same amount of heat as did the areas at the edge of the mass fire at Hiroshima. 


Nine miles from ground zero, in Hackensack, Bayonne, and Englewood, New Jersey, as well as in Richmond Hill, Queens, and Flatlands, Brooklyn, the fireball would be about 100 times brighter than the sun, bright enough to cause first- and second-degree burns to those in line of sight.


 About 36 seconds after the fireball, the shockwave would arrive and knock out all the windows, along with many interior building walls and some doors.



No survivors. Within tens of minutes, everything within approximately five to seven miles of Midtown Manhattan would be engulfed by a gigantic firestorm. The fire zone would cover a total area of 90 to 152 square miles (230 to 389 square kilometers). The firestorm would rage for three to six hours. Air temperatures in the fire zone would likely average 400 to 500 degrees Fahrenheit (200 to 260 Celsius). 



After the fire burned out, the street pavement would be so hot that even tracked vehicles could not pass over it for days.


Buried, unburned material from collapsed buildings throughout the fire zone could burst into flames when exposed to air—months after the firestorm had ended.  



Those who tried to escape through the streets would have been incinerated by the hurricane-force winds filled with firebrands and flames. Even those able to find shelter in the lower-level sub-basements of massive buildings would likely suffocate from fire-generated gases or be cooked alive as their shelters heated to oven-like conditions.


The fire would extinguish all life and destroy almost everything else. Tens of miles downwind of the area of immediate destruction, radioactive fallout would begin to arrive within a few hours of the detonation.




 NEXT


But that is another story.


Editor's note: This article is adapted from “City on Fire” by Lynn Eden, originally published in the January 2004 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

 



































 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Governance in India: Corruption

Source:
http://www.cfr.org/corruption-and-bribery/governance-india-corruption/p31823?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief--link18-20150311&sp_mid=48201607&sp_rid=YmN2YXN1bmRocmFAaG90bWFpbC5jb20S1




                                                         

                                                                   

 

             Governance in India: Corruption

                         Author: Beina Xu
                   Updated: September 4, 2014

Introduction

With a booming economy throughout the 2000s, India was touted as one of the most promising major emerging markets. But that breakneck growth sputtered to a decade low in 2012, with many observers pointing to the corrosive effect of endemic corruption—including a spate of scandals under former prime minister Manmohan Singh—as a culprit. Perhaps more than India's weak currency and rising inflation, the graft problem has undermined institutions and thwarted efforts to reduce poverty and catalyze sustainable growth in the world's largest democracy. Public revelations of corruption, including major scandals in the telecommunications and coal industry, have galvanized a rising middle class with increased demands for better governance. The tide has spurred new political movements, and forced the government to address transparency and marshal reforms.

The Roots of Corruption

Corruption in India can be traced back to the country's colonial past, analysts say. The British Raj period, beginning in 1858, excluded Indian citizens from political participation by dividing the country into districts with provincial governments controlled by a commissioner. The 1923 Official Secrets Act made it an offense for officials to reveal state information to citizens, ostensibly to protect military and government intelligence.


After India gained independence in 1947, the new regime implemented heavy economic regulations intended to develop domestic markets; the 1951 Industries Act, for instance, required all new industrial operations to obtain a license from the central government. The policy limited foreign investment and stifled competition, and bribery became part and parcel of doing business. The period up to 1991 was dubbed the "License Raj" as a result of the government's excessive oversight of the economy. The poor often suffered most from the widespread corruption, which diverted large amounts of public revenue intended for public works, aid, and social welfare programs.


"Historically, the roots of India's corruption came from the proliferation of licenses," said former CFR Senior Fellow for International Economics Jagdish Bhagwati. "The idea was to ensure economical use of resources, so you would not waste foreign exchanges. To this day, this is what Indians have been very aware of: that the institution of licenses and permits was responsible for creating corruption on a massive scale."


The first major law to combat government malfeasance was the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) of 1947, enacted to prevent officials from cashing in on postwar reconstruction funding. Parliament also established the Anticorruption Bureau in 1961 to investigate violations of the PCA, which has since been amended twice (most recently in 1988). The latest revision was a direct response to the late-1980s Bofors scandal, in which then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and other politicians were accused of receiving large kickbacks in a weapons bid from Swedish arms company Bofors. Many observers considered the scandal to be a main reason the Gandhi-led Congress Party was voted out of power in 1989.


Under the PCA, bribery is punishable by a fine and up to five years imprisonment. But many analysts believe India's sprawling bureaucracy and weak institutions—the police and judiciary were ranked as the second and third most corrupt institutions in India, respectively, after political parties—have thwarted convictions, and arguably increased incentives for bribery. In recent years, graft pervaded society from small-scale "harassment bribes" (payments for essential social services) to scandals on a national level. At least 42 percent of young Indians have paid a bribe, according to a 2012 Hindustan survey.


"There's been corruption in India for thousands of years—it's endemic—but what you see is the kind of corruption changing," says Milan Vaishnav, a South Asia associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "In the past two decades, there's been a shift toward grand corruption: the recent scandals are just qualitatively and quantitatively bigger than anything we've seen. And a big reason for that is India's rapid growth. Growth has expanded the possibilities for rent-seeking."


A 2011 report from KPMG stated that 68 percent [PDF] of India's total illicit capital loss happened after the country's economic liberalization in 1991, indicating that the reform and rise of India's economy has contributed to the transfer of "black money" abroad.

 

A Spiraling Problem

In 2013, India ranked ninety-fourth out of 176 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, alongside Mongolia and Colombia and below neighbors like China and Sri Lanka. The country has steadily slipped since ranking seventy-second of 179 in 2007, when the report debuted. Several recent high-profile scandals have underscored the extent of the problem. In 2010, allegations emerged surrounding the gross misallocation of funds at the Commonwealth Games, which cost almost eighteen times its budget estimate. Reports surfaced of shoddy infrastructure and financial irregularities regarding contracts, and the scandal led to the resignation of two senior Congress Party members and other government officials. The Central Vigilance Commission cited the total misappropriation of funds to be around $1.8 billion.

"There's been corruption in India for thousands of years—it's endemic—but what you see is the kind of corruption changing." —Milan Vaishnav, Carnegie Endowment

Soon after, controversy mired the government again when an auditor's report uncovered a massive telecom scam estimated to have cost the government some $39 billion, making it one of the largest cases of state corruption in Indian history. Telecom minister Andimuthu Raja, accused of orchestrating the sale of licenses below market value, resigned in 2010. (He was arrested in 2011, and was out on bail as of late 2013.) During the affair, outraged opposition parties shut down parliament for three weeks and prompted massive protests in Delhi.


Public anger escalated when the 2012 "Coalgate" scandal, in which an estimated $34 billion was lost, implicated the prime minister himself. The breadth of corruption has even touched the U.S. government, as cables released in 2011 by Wikileaks revealed that a Congress Party aide allegedly showed a U.S. diplomat chests of cash intended as a bribe to secure Parliament's endorsement of a controversial 2008 U.S.-India nuclear deal.

The Fallout From Corruption

Public outrage peaked by the spring of 2011. A social activist named Anna Hazare emerged as a prominent organizer of the anticorruption movement, vowing a "fast unto death" unless the government established a new anticorruption agency (Lokpal) to review complaints at the highest level. Thousands of citizens took to his cause, and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)–led government announced in August that it would form a committee to draft the law. After stalling for months in Parliament, India's lower house finally passed the bill in mid-December 2013 with both Congress and BJP's support, ending Hazare's nine-day hunger strike in a rare show of unity.

"In the end, the corruption in India is of a form that undermines growth in our institutions. It's a very expensive way to be corrupt." —Jagdish Bhagwati, Council on Foreign Relations

Mounting graft has stirred not only domestic worries, but has also tarnished the country's image among international investors. Since 1947, India has lost hundreds of billions of dollars in illegal capital flows (tax evasion, corruption, bribery, kickbacks, etc.), and was ranked 134th of 189 countries in the World Bank's 2014 Doing Business Report. At Davos in 2013, NGOs warned that the hefty investment needed for India's infrastructure development could breed more corruption.


Some experts note that while there isn't necessarily a direct correlation between corruption levels and India's economic health, the nature of the graft has been corrosive to its growth. "The way corruption has been practiced in India has been particularly harmful," says Bhagwati, who contrasts India's rent-creating corruption, which carves out monopolies for cronies, with China's profit-sharing system, which takes an interest in growth. "In the end, the corruption in India is of a form that undermines growth in our institutions. It's a very expensive way to be corrupt."

 

Campaigning for Reform

As India's economy slowed, successive revelations of graft exacerbated public outrage at the inability of the former Congress-led government to mitigate corruption. In turn, the country saw an uptick of anticorruption rhetoric ahead of state elections in November and December 2013. The Aam Aadmi Party, led by activist Arvin Kejriwal, emerged as a new political party that got its start on an anticorruption platform, while the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) also emphasized good governance. Meanwhile, Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, who leads one of India's poorest states, Bihar, also won accolades for his success in emphasizing good governance.


"What is new and politically relevant has been, in response to citizen outrage, the rise of parties explicitly focusing on governance," says CFR's Alyssa Ayres. "And most importantly, the transformation of campaigning from a mode that focused on a language of empowerment with an appeal to caste, to one focusing on good governance and delivering services to citizens."


The BJP championed the clean track record of its leader Narendra Modi, whose reform efforts as chief minister of Gujarat, made his home state a key driver of national economic growth, and who went on to win the 2014 national election. Yet corruption remains rife in India's political landscape. In 2012, criminal cases were pending against 31 percent of members of parliament and the legislative assembly. Campaign spending limits are low, driving expenditure underground and fostering reliance on "black money." Many experts also point to Indian voters' complex relationship with corruption; research from a wide range of states finds that political candidates often promote their criminality as an indication of their ability to defend the interests of their communities.



 

Prospects for Progress

India's government has made a few attempts at the federal level to combat corruption. The 2005 Right to Information Act allows citizens to request access to any public record and, if approved, receive it within thirty days. The law, which can penalize noncompliance and requires authorities to digitize records, has been hailed as a pivotal achievement in the fight against corruption. The government is also considering moves to strengthen the national antigraft law [PDF], potentially introducing changes that would punish corporate failure to prevent bribery.

"What is new and politically relevant has been, in response to citizen outrage, the rise of parties explicitly focusing on governance." —Alyssa Ayres, Council on Foreign Relations

An increasingly activist judiciary has also taken a stronger stance against corruption; in early 2011, the Supreme Court asked all trial courts in the country to fast-track corruption cases. The next year, it limited the amount of time the government had to decide whether or not to prosecute a public official for corruption. And in July 2013, the top court ruled that it was illegal for politicians convicted of crimes to continue holding office, although, in a highly controversial move, Singh's cabinet withdrew the decree in October. Modi announced in an August 2014 speech that his government will initiate tough initiatives to battle corruption, likening the problem to a "disease."


Technology has also helped. Some states like Gujarat have implemented online systems for state contract bids, allowing for greater transparency. Others have also put land records and death certificates online, while websites like IPaidaBribe.com expose graft associated with common public services. The government is also devising an electronic ID system, which would allow poor citizens to avoid intermediaries and receive aid directly through a bank account.



But technology can only do so much, says Jennifer Bussell, assistant professor of public policy at the University of California, Berkeley. Bussell notes that technology's most important contribution has been granting citizens greater access to information. "Some combination of administrative reforms and local-level technology initiatives to help bring corruption to light—in addition to efforts by organizations like the Comptroller and Auditor General, which is exposing corruption at the highest levels of government—would help. You need all of these things."

Additional Resources

Transparency International India offers statistics and reports about the current state of corruption in India.

Accountability Initiative offers reports and policy briefs using publicly-available data collected from the Right to Information Act.

This CMS India Corruption Study [PDF] breaks down corruption statistics by state and public service.

 

This U4 Anticorruption Resource Center report gives an overview of India's corruption problem and efforts to address reform.

This Fair Observer article asks whether computerization of public service transactions could help curb petty corruption in India.

More on this topic from CFR

• India's Fight Against Corruption
  Author: Jayshree Bajoria

• Corruption Threatens India's Growth
  Author: Jayshree Bajoria

• Getting Corruption Right
  Author: Jagdish N. Bhagwati

View more from Corruption and Bribery, India

 

Source:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/11032015-saudi-arabia-turkey-egypt-and-changing-political-groupings-in-mideast-analysis/

Middle East

1, Analysis, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt And Changing Political Groupings In Mideast – Analysis

                                     By 

                     Hassan Ahmadian*

                                                          (By Iran Review )

 

March 11, 2015

 

 

 

 

Since Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became the new Saudi king, domestic developments in Saudi Arabia have taken a rapid pace, as a result of which questions have arisen as to the foreign policy approach of the new Saudi monarch. King Salman is apparently attaching high importance to foreign policy of Saudi Arabia because the current versatility in the Middle East’s political sphere and the resultant security challenges have had no precedent since the end of the World War II. Under these conditions, even a small change in the policies of regional powers can have a profound effect on security and political trends in the region and may even lead to emergence and rise of new trends. As a result, following the ascension to the throne of King Salman and due to subsequent changes in the power structure of Saudi Arabia, active players in the Middle East as well as observers elsewhere expected changes in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and, at the same time, posed various questions in this regard.




Changes first started inside Saudi Arabia. Within a week after he came to power, King Salman issued 34 royal decrees. The extent of changes brought about by those decrees was unprecedented in contemporary history of Saudi Arabia in terms of speed and scope. Of course, it was habitual with Saudi kings to appoint those closest to them to key posts and power positions in a gradual manner. However, despite usual expectations, King Salman did not follow that gradual pattern. As a result of changes introduced by him, those close to Salman rapidly fortified their positions within the power structure of Saudi Arabia. These vast and speedy developments, gave rise to speculations about possible parallel changes in the country’s foreign policy. Assuming that the foreign policy is just an extension of domestic policies of a country, it would follow that expecting change in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy would be quite logical.


The most important change, whose signs have already appeared on the horizon, is an effort by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman to get his country rid of foreign policy approaches that had caused serious problems for Saudi Arabia during recent years. Those approaches had practically caused Saudi Arabia to lose needed dynamism in reacting to developments under versatile conditions that prevailed in the region. In other words, one of the priorities of King Salman’s foreign policy was to do away with self-imposed limitations in the area of foreign relations. As a result, changing the type of Saudi Arabia’s interaction with the regional affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood was put on the agenda. The conflict between the interests of Riyadh and the Muslim Brotherhood started right after the beginning of the Arab Spring and was mostly the result of Riyadh’s concern about increasing power of the Muslim Brotherhood both within and in the surroundings of Saudi Arabia. Extended support lent by Saudi Arabia to the Egyptian army following the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Mohamed Morsi; intensification of differences between Riyadh and Ankara, Tunisia and the Palestinian resistance movement of Hamas; and near-complete severance of ties with al-Islah party in Yemen were major highlights of Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Muslim Brotherhood following the outbreak of the Arab Spring. On the whole, Riyadh was at odds with all organizational branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region and decided to support those regional regimes that opposed the Muslim Brotherhood.


However, as compared to his predecessor, King Abdullah, Salman is more religious, more traditional and, on the whole, closer to the social realities of Saudi Arabia. In addition, it seems that previous rumors and speculations about his close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood have come true. The fact that he has let Tunisia’s Rashid al-Ghannushi to visit Saudi Arabia is a positive sign in this regard because the former Saudi king had twice rejected Ghannushi’s demand. Another signs was related to Saud al-Shuraim, one of the Imams of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, who had been banned from preaching because of his close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, under the new king, he was allowed to restart preaching. The third sign proving a détente between Riyadh and the Muslim Brotherhood was restoration of the passport of the Saudi cleric, Salman al-Ouda, who had been previously stripped of his passport. Above all, a recent visit to Saudi Arabia by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the type of welcome given to him and private talks with him as compared to his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was the most important sign of this change in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy orientation.


Simultaneity of Saudi visits by Erdogan and Sisi gave rise to some questions because given the fastidiousness of Riyadh in arranging such diplomatic exchanges, this development could not be taken as haphazard. In fact, by planning these simultaneous visits, Riyadh was sending out the message that it will no longer limit its diplomatic and security priorities to Egypt and will engage in serious interactions with Turkey as well. In other words, Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Turkey is changing, but this change does not necessarily mean that Riyadh is changing its approach to Egypt. Nonetheless, Saudi officials are well aware that such interactions with Turkey cannot be desirable to Cairo. Of course, this is not actually a source of concern for Saudi Arabia because they know that Cairo under the rule of Sisi needs Riyadh more than any time before. Saudi officials are well aware that Egypt has currently no choice, but to maintain special relations with Saudi Arabia and this situation will continue, at least, in medium term. Now, it is turn for Egypt to be bound by security and diplomatic priorities of Saudi Arabia.


It is evident that Riyadh has changed its approach to Ankara. Saudis have apparently reached the conclusion that the optimal way for rivalry with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its influence in the Middle East is to get close to Erdogan’s Turkey. The positive attitude of King Salman toward the Muslim Brotherhood has been the key to restoration of relations between the two countries. Both countries have been losers of the Syrian war. In Iraq, they have been watching the rising power of the Islamic Republic and the war launched by the United States against the ISIS terrorist group. Moreover, when it comes to Hamas, Yemen and even Lebanon, they see themselves faced with the increasing power of Iran. In this way, short-term priorities of the two countries with regard to issues of the Middle East have made it easy to forecast a possible détente between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The only obstacle to such a détente was Riyadh’s animosity toward the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been largely removed following the enthronement of King Salman.


The warm welcome given to Erdogan and private talks between Salman and Erdogan as opposed to the unceremonious return of Sisi to Cairo were all telltale signs which proved that Turkey and Saudi Arabia are working toward convergence on certain regional issues. According to available information, the two countries have emphasized continuation of support for the Syrian opposition. On the other hand, a plan is already in gear to train the Syrian opposition in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It was due to these developments and positons that the Syrian opposition groups announced following the meeting between Erdogan and Salman that they have turned down a truce plan offered by the United Nations’ special envoy so Syria, Staffan de Mistura. In other words, the Syrian opposition has been inspired with new hope as it sees a new prospect for Syria’s developments in the light of the assistance that it is receiving from Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Of course, Syria has been recently more of interest to Turkey than Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we should expect some sort of exchange of cooperation between the two countries in this regard.

Yemen is the most important place where Turkey and Saudi Arabia can exchange reciprocal cooperation. Of course, no accurate reports have been published in this regard yet, but Saudi Arabia has been apparently resuming its support for al-Islah party. This development, considering Turkey’s special relations with this party, can form a connecting link to bolster cooperation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in various fields.



On the whole, protecting Sisi’s Egypt is not on the top of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy priorities anymore. Getting closer to Turkey in a bid to deal with the new developments in Yemen as well as increasing support for the Syrian opposition are now the main components of new and emerging regional policy of Riyadh. The previous interaction between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Syria lacked a farsighted and strategic approach to regional developments as a result of which the ISIS was born, which is now posing a major threat to the entire Middle East region.

The same story is being repeated in Yemen as Saudi Arabia is lending its support to certain currents in this country. It should be noted that the different and sometimes conflicting approaches taken by Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the past has so far wreaked havoc on both Syria and Iraq. We must wait and see what developments will take shape in the Middle East region as a result of the new round of the two countries’ cooperation on regional issues. A look to the past will tell us that one cannot expect establishment of more stability and security in the region.
 Sisi’s Egypt cannot join the new alliance formed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the near future, but certainly, it will not oppose that alliance either.












*Hassan Ahmadian
PhD, Senior Researcher; IRI Expediency Council’s Center for Strategic Research (CSR)

Iran Review

Iran Review is a Tehran-based site that claims to be independent, non-governmental and non-partisan and representing scientific and professional approaches towards Iran’s political, economic, social, religious, and cultural affairs, its foreign policy, and regional and international issues within the framework of analysis and articles.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Army Officer's Benevolent Fund --Platinium Grant at 75 yrs age

Army Officer's Benevolent Fund

      -Platinium Grant at 75 yrs age

This info is a periodic repeat. Subject: Army Officer's Benevolent Fund-Platinium Grant at 75 yrs age Retired army officers, who have completed 75 years of age, are entitled to a grant of Rs 50,000.00 from the Army Officers Benevolent Fund. Kindly share this information among the retired Army Officers in your city. (In case of demise of an officer, during service or later before completing 75 years, this amount is payable to the next of kin immediately after the demise of the officer. It is also applicable to officers settled abroad.) No formal application is required for claiming the platinum grant. However the retired officers are required to intimate their postal addresses and Bank Account Numbers as and when they enter their 75th year at following address for updating the records :- Director Accounts Ceremonial & Welfare Directorate Adjutant General's Branch Army Headquarters South Block, Room No 279 DHQ PO New Delhi - 110011 Tele No - 011-26196217 Best wishes. Note - This info is also available on website signals-parivaar.blogspot.in for future ref . Brig Narinder Dhand (Veteran)

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy IRIN

 

           Islamic Republic of Iran Navy IRIN

https://www.google.com/search?q=Damavand+destroyer&rlz=1T4GUEA_enIN629IN629&tbm=isch&imgil=ONTdyXbX_C5u5M%253A%253Bcb152_yo-RcM2M%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.islamicinvitationturkey.com%25252F2014%25252F04%25252F28%25252Firan-to-unveil-damavand-destroyer%25252F&source=iu&pf=m&fir=ONTdyXbX_C5u5M%253A%252Ccb152_yo-RcM2M%252C_&usg=__sUTeADiHbn0IQ0aVw1Sklqdxet8%3D









Damavand (frigate) :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damavand_(frigate)

 

 

 

 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2015/iran-150309-presstv02.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1362%2eka0ao00b2h%2e190m

 

Home-Made Damavand Destroyer Joins Iran Fleet

In-Depth Coverage

 

Mon Mar 9, 2015


Iran's domestically-made destroyer, Damavand, has officially joined the Navy's fleet in the Caspian Sea north of the country.


The country's state-of-the-art training destroyer, equipped with modern radar, electronic and reconnaissance systems, was delivered to the Iranian naval forces stationed in the northern port city of Anzali in a ceremony on Monday.

High-ranking Iranian officials, including Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Shamkhani, Defense Minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan and Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari attended the ceremony.

Speaking at the event, Shamkhani described the Caspian Sea as a sea of peace and friendship, saying the Islamic Republic has played a unique role in providing security, particularly energy security in the sea.

The Caspian Sea is bounded by Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan Republic, Iran, and Turkmenistan
Also Sayyari said Damavand is a Jamaran-class destroyer which is more sophisticated than Jamaran.
Earlier in May 204, Sayyari said the Damavand destroyer is equipped with advanced sea-launched drones as well as cruise missiles.

The Iranian commander said that efforts have been made to employ cutting-edge technology in building the destroyer, stressing that Damavand would also be equipped with more advanced cruise missiles than those of domestically designed and built Jamaran destroyer.

The Iranian Navy launched its first domestically-built destroyer, Jamaran, in the waters of the Persian Gulf in February 2010.

The 1,420-ton destroyer is equipped with modern radar systems and other electronic warfare capabilities and has a top speed of up to 30 knots and a helipad.

The vessel, equipped with torpedoes and modern naval cannons, also features highly advanced anti-aircraft, anti-surface and anti-subsurface missile systems.

Damavand, however, is longer but lighter than Jamaran destroyer and is capable of tracking and targeting aerial, surface and sub-surface targets simultaneously.

It is equipped with a cruise missile system, torpedo launchers, 40-mm and 76-mm cannons, radar processing systems as well as tactical surface and aerial radars.

The Islamic Republic has repeatedly assured other states that its military might poses no threat to other countries since the Islamic Republic's defense doctrine is based entirely on deterrence.

 

 

Source:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/navy.htm

 

Further Reading

Iranian Navy Iranian Navy - Equipment Iranian Navy - Doctrine Iranian Navy - Bases Iranian Navy - Modernization Iranian Navy - Reorganization Iranian Navy - History Iranian Naval Infantry Strait of Hormuz Iran Shipping Lines Resources XERXES' LASH Iran's Navy in the Persian Gulf Iran's Two Navies Iran Naval

 

 

 

 

 

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy IRIN
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy

Iran has two naval forces: the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, or IRIN, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, or IRGCN. The IRIN is the naval branch of Iran's Artesh, the traditional military force that existed prior to the 1979 revolution. In addition to the original ground forces element, the IRGC also formalized an emerging naval component in the mid-1980s, following successful amphibious operations in the southern marshlands of Iraq. Over the intervening decades, the IRGCN was politically favored over the IRIN and has capitalized on this status to acquire advanced weaponry and better platforms to develop additional capabilities.


By 2013 there were 18,000 IRIN naval personnel, and 25,000 IRGCN naval personnel, and nearly 8,000 naval infantry. The Iranian navy had always been the smallest of its three principal services, having about 14,500 personnel in 1986, down from 30,000 in 1979. Throughout the 1970s, the role of the navy had expanded as Iran recognized the need to defend the region's vital sea-lanes.


The navy is perhaps Iran's most important military service. The Persian Gulf must remain open for Iranian commerce since the Gulf is the primary route for all of Iran's oil exports and most of its trade. However, Iran's current navy structure is outdated and in need of substantial modernization, an effort that Iran is gradually attempting to accomplish. For the present, Iran's naval capacity remains limited and barely supports its status as essentially a coastal defense force. Iran's economic dependence on the free and uninterrupted use of the Persian Gulf for its commercial shipping combined with its past lessons in confrontations with the United States Navy in the 1987-88 time frame have reinforced Iran's determination to rebuild its naval forces.


In 2007 the IRIN and IRGCN underwent a reorganization that included new base openings and a re-division of duties between the navies. Although the two navies had traditionally shared operations in the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Gulf of Oman, the reorganization split the IRIN and IRGCN areas of responsibility. The IRIN was assigned to the Gulf of Oman and Caspian Sea, while the IRGCN was given full responsibility for operations in the Persian Gulf. This reorganization and the establishment of new bases are in keeping with Iranian naval strategy in the event of a conflict. Because Iran's naval doctrine is based upon access denial, the realignment of IRIN assets further into the Gulf of Oman and the costly for the perceived benefit. It does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy's political will. The geographic split of the two services not only streamlines command and control by reducing the need to coordinate and deconfhct between different naval services operating in the same water space, but should also reduce confusion or miscommunication that an enemy could exploit in wartime.


Iran's navy personnel as of 2014 were young and inexperienced, and many of them were riflemen and marines based on Persian Gulf islands. At higher levels, there had been a fierce rivalry between the IRGC and regular navies for scarce resources. Due to these shortcomings, Iran's three Kilo-class submarines would be vulnerable, and they were limited to laying mines in undefended waters. Mines, however, are one area in which Iran had made advances. It can produce non-magnetic, free-floating, and remote-controlled mines. It may have taken delivery of pressure, acoustic, and magnetic mines from Russia. Also, Iran was negotiating with China for rocket-propelled rising mines.


The Navy's airborne component, including an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and minesweeping helicopter squadron and a transport battalion, continued to operate despite wartime losses. Of six P-3F Orion antisubmarine aircraft, perhaps two remained operational, and of twenty SH-3D ASW helicopters, possibly only ten were airworthy. Despite overall losses, the navy increased the number of its marine battalions from two to three between 1979 and 1986.


Iranian naval forces held several exercises in early 2001 to improve their capabilities and also have had exchange visits with Pakistan and India. As a result, defense officials called for the consolidation of Iran's commercial and military fleets to increase their strengths, overcome any weaknesses, take advantage of opportunities, and address future threats. Iranian naval forces held the three-day Fath-9 exercises in the northern end of the Persian Gulf in Mahshahr during the first week of March 2001. These exercises involved 6,000 people from the regular navy and air force, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps navy and air corps, the Basij Resistance Forces, and the Law Enforcement Forces.


Iran's navy held more than a week of war games in the Persian Gulf in early 2007 using tactical submarines and small vessels carrying missile launchers. The March 2007 exercises were the latest in a series of maneuvers staged by Iran's military in the Persian Gulf, where the United States had deployed two aircraft carriers in recent months, a move widely seen as a warning to Tehran over its nuclear ambitions. Though Iran cannot come close to matching US forces, it could cause trouble for shipping in the Persian Gulf and disrupt the flow of oil in the waterway through which 40% of the world's traded oil flows.


The Iranian navy has developed its presence in international waters since 2010, regularly launching vessels in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden to protect Iranian ships from Somali pirates operating in the area.


Iranian Navy Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari announced at a press conference 25 February 2013 the presence of the Navy’s 24th flotilla in the Pacific… Sayyari emphasized, “This is the first time that we have passed the Strait of Malacca and entered the Pacific Ocean,” and added that the warships would pay a port call at Zhangjiagang, China. An Iranian warship’s passage through the Suez Canal and into the Mediterranean on 22 February 2011 and Iranian warships paying port calls in the Sudan a year later reinforced the fact that the Iranian Navy has expanded its operational reach. The push into the Pacific came less than three months after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared that the Iranian Navy’s new emphasis should be expanding its reach beyond the Persian Gulf.


In January 2014, Iranian navy announced that its deployed naval group, consisting of a frigate and a replenishment ship, were making a voyage to the Atlantic, with a port visit to South Africa, to demonstrate the country's ability to project power beyond the Middle East. Iranian warships were ordered to approach US maritime borders as a response to Washington’s stationing of US vessels in the Persian Gulf. Admiral Afshin Rezayee Haddad said “Iran’s military fleet is approaching the United States maritime borders, and this move has a message”. Haddad, commander of the Iranian navy’s northern fleet, said the vessels had started their voyage toward the Atlantic Ocean via “waters near South Africa”. In Washington, a US defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, cast doubt on any claims that Iranian ships are approaching US maritime borders. But the official added that “ships are free to operate in international waters”. The United States and its allies regularly stage naval exercises in the Gulf, saying they want to ensure freedom of navigation in the waterway through which 40 percent of the world’s seaborne oil exports pass.



Iranian Navy announced 13 April 2014 that it had called off plan to deploy warships near U.S. territorial waters in the Atlantic Ocean. IRIN Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari said in Tehran such changes in naval plans are routine, “considering the situation in the region.” Adm. Sayyari, however, did not provide specific reasons for the change, but hinted that the “rise in piracy in the Gulf of Aden” might have prompted the decision to cancel deployment to the Atlantic.