SOURCE:

WHY HAS THE ARMY CHIEF NOT BEEN APPOINTED YET  

December 08, 2016 

According to convention, Lieutenant 

General Praveen Bakshi should be 

named as General Dalbir Singh 

Suhag's successor as army chief, says 

Ajai Shukla/Business Standard.

If the government had followed tradition, Lieutenant General Praveen Bakshi, currently commanding the Eastern Army from Fort William in Kolkata, would have been named two months ago to succeed the present army chief, General Dalbir Singh Suhag, who is scheduled to retire on December 31.

General Bakshi is the senior-most amongst the qualified generals; and the government has traditionally named its incoming army, navy and air force three months ahead of time, to facilitate a smooth handover.

But with just 23 days to go for General Suhag's retirement, and no successor named, the New Delhi grapevine is abuzz with speculation that the government is finalising the appointment of a tri-service chief, along with the next army chief.

The four-star or five-star tri-service commander would be over and above existing army, navy and air force chiefs of four-star rank --- general, admiral and air chief marshal respectively.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar have both earlier pledged to create a tri-service chief.

There would be both political and functional benefit from such an appointment, with the Bharatiya Janata Party reinforcing its claim to being strong on national security.

However, the degree to which creating a tri-service chief would transform the military's functioning would depend on the structures around the appointment.

There are three ways this could be done.

The least disruptive measure, and therefore the least transformative, would be creating a four-star 'permanent chairman chiefs of staff' (PCCOS), as proposed in 2013 by the Naresh Chandra Committee.

This would leave the operational command of field forces with the army, navy and air force chiefs, as at present, while the tri-service chief would handle strategic and perspective planning, long-term equipment and manpower structuring; while also rendering military advice to the political leadership.

In effect, the new PCCOS would only be an upgraded version of the three-star officer who currently heads the Integrated Defence Staff --- set up in 2001 as a gesture to jointmanship.

While the PCCOS is spoken of as 'the first amongst equals,' the untrammelled power of the three service chiefs over their respective fiefdoms would render the PCCOS a nominal tri-service chief.

The government's second option is to appoint a five-star rank commander termed the 'chief of defence staff' (CDS), who would be the direct boss of all three service chiefs and the single point military advisor to the political leadership.

In 2001, a Group of Ministers had recommended a five-star CDS, echoing the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, which had criticised the lack of tri-service coordination during the 1999 Kargil conflict.

The CDS appointment could be rotated between the army, navy and air force; or handpicked by the political leadership from any of the three services.

Smaller services like the air force and the navy worry that the army, being the largest service, would predominate in CDS appointments, which in turn might bring it disproportionate funding and equipment allocations.

The IAF has publicly opposed having a five-star CDS exercising control over the air force chief.

The bureaucracy, especially the Indian Administrative Service, also opposes a five-state CDS, apprehending that he would be senior to the top bureaucrat --- the Cabinet secretary.

The third option, which would be the most transformative, is a root-and-branch restructuring of the entire military command structure, to impose tri-service jointmanship not just at the apex of the hierarchy, but also on the combat force --- the so-called theatre commands.

The US military enforced this in 1986 through the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which placed American combat forces from all four services (including the Marine Corps) under geographic theatre commanders -- Pacific Command, Central Command, etc.

A similar exercise would merge our 17 single-service commands, into 5 or 6 tri-service commands, organised geographically, each under a commander with full authority over all the army, navy and air force assets in his theatre.

Every theatre commander would report to the defence minister, including for combat operations in his theatre.

Meanwhile, the five-star CDS, without the burden of operational command responsibility, would be an advisor to the political leadership on military affairs.

Meanwhile, the army, navy and air force chiefs, also relieved of operational command, would focus on manpower, training and equipment of their respective services, ensuring that the soldiers, sailors and airmen they send into the field are suitably selected, kitted and trained for combat.

This is the trend globally. In February, China's People's Liberation Army transformed from a single-service to a tri-service structure, with its 7 'military regions' reorganised into 5 tri-service theatre commands.

Each of these so-called 'battle zones' incorporates units from the PLA navy and PLA air force.

It remains unclear who would be the first tri-service commander.

In the options being spoken of, the first involves elevating General Suhag to that job, while promoting General Bakshi to army chief.

The second option is appointing General Bakshi to one of the jobs, while promoting the army's current vice-chief, Lieutenant General Bipin Rawat, to the other.

Last December, addressing the military's top commanders, the prime minister declared: 'Jointness at the top is a need that is long overdue. We also need reforms in senior defence management... This is an area of priority for me.'

Now, the government has just three weeks to decide whether to deliver.

The three service chiefs at the Amar Jawan Jyoti on Navy Day. Photograph: Press Information Bureau

INDO- PAK NUKES : A Global Nuclear Winter: Avoiding The Unthinkable In India And Pakistan

SOURCE
http://www.eurasiareview.com/10122016-a-global-nuclear-winter-avoiding-the-unthinkable-in-india-and-pakistan-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

A Global Nuclear Winter: Avoiding The Unthinkable In India And Pakistan – Analysis

                                 By

                    Conn Hallinan*

Border personnel from India and Pakistan during the Wagah Border ceremony. Photo by Therealhiddenace, Wikipedia Commons.

DECEMBER 10, 2016

US President-elect Donald Trump’s off the cuff, chaotic approach to foreign policy had at least one thing going for it, even though it was more the feel of a blind pig rooting for acorns than a thought-out international initiative. In speaking with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the New York Timesreported, Trump said he wanted “to address and find solutions” to Pakistan’s problems.

And what big problems they are.

Whether Trump understands exactly how dangerous the current tensions between Pakistan and India are, or if anything will come from the November 30 exchange between the two leaders, is anyone’s guess. But it’s more than the Obama administration has done over the past eight years, in spite of the outgoing president’s 2008 election promise to address the on-going crisis in Kashmir.

Right now that troubled land is the single most dangerous spot on the globe.

War, Famine, and Radiation

India and Pakistan have fought three wars over the disputed province in the past six decades and came within a hair’s breadth of a nuclear exchange in 1999. Both countries are on a crash program to produce nuclear weapons, and between them they have enough explosive power to not only kill more than 20 million of their own people, but also to devastate the world’s ozone layer and throw the Northern Hemisphere into a nuclear winter — with a catastrophic impact on agriculture worldwide.

According to studies done at Rutgers, the University of Colorado-Boulder, and the University of California-Los Angeles, if both countries detonated 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs, it would generate between 1 and 5 million tons of smoke. Within 10 days, that would drive temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere down to levels too cold for wheat production in much of Canada and Russia. The resulting 10 percent drop in rainfall — especially in Asian locales that rely monsoons — would exhaust worldwide food supplies, leading to the starvation of up to 100 million or more people.

Aside from the food crisis, a nuclear war in South Asia would destroy between 25 to 70 percent of the Northern Hemisphere’s ozone layer, resulting in a massive increase in dangerous ultraviolent radiation.

Cold Start, Hot War

Lest anyone think that the chances of such a war are slight, consider two recent developments.

One, a decision by Pakistan to deploy low-yield tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons and to give permission for local commanders to decide when to use them.

In an interview with the German newspaper  Deutsche Welle, Gregory Koblentz of the Council on Foreign Relations warned that if a “commander of a forward-deployed nuclear armed unit finds himself in a ‘use it or lose it’ situation and about to be overrun, he might decided to launch his weapons.”

Pakistan’s current defense minister, Muhammad Asif, told Geo TV, “If anyone steps on our soil and if anyone’s designs are a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those [nuclear] weapons for our defense.”

Every few years the Pentagon “war games” a clash between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. Every game ends in a nuclear war.

The second dangerous development is the “Cold Start” strategy by India that would send Indian troops across the border to a depth of 30 kilometers in the advent of a terrorist attack like the 1999 Kargill incident in Kashmir, the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, or the 2008 attack on Mumbai that killed 166 people.

Since the Indian army is more than twice the size of Pakistan’s, there would be little that Pakistanis could do to stop such an invasion other than using battlefield nukes. India would then be faced with either accepting defeat or responding.

India doesn’t currently have any tactical nukes, only high yield strategic weapons — many aimed at China — whose primary value is to destroy cities. Hence a decision by a Pakistani commander to use a tactical warhead would almost surely lead to a strategic response by India, setting off a full-scale nuclear exchange and the nightmare that would follow in its wake.

A Regional Arms Race

With so much at stake, why is no one but a Twitter-addicted foreign policy apprentice saying anything? What happened to President Obama’s follow through to his 2008 statement that the tensions over Kashmir “won’t be easy” to solve, but that doing so “is important”?

A strategy of pulling India into an alliance against China was dreamed up during the administration of George W. Bush, but it was Obama’s “Asia Pivot” that signed and sealed the deal. With it went a quid pro quo: If India would abandon its traditional neutrality, the Americans would turn a blind eye to Kashmir.

As a sweetener, the U.S. agreed to bypass the global nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow India to buy uranium on the world market, something New Delhi had been banned from doing since it detonated a nuclear bomb in 1974 using fuel it had cribbed from U.S.-supplied nuclear reactors. In any case, because neither India nor Pakistan is a party to the treaty, both should be barred from buying uranium. In India’s case, the U.S. has waived that restriction.

The so-called 1-2-3 Agreement requires India to use any nuclear fuel it purchases in its civilian reactors, but frees it up to use its meager domestic supplies on its nuclear weapons program. India has since built two enormous nuclear production sites at Challakere and near Mysore, where, rumor has it, it is producing a hydrogen bomb. Both sites are off limits to international inspectors.

In 2008, when the Obama administration indicated it was interested in pursuing the 1-2-3 Agreement, then Pakistani Foreign minister Khurshid Kusuni warned that the deal would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty and lead to a nuclear arms race in Asia. That is exactly what has come to pass. The only countries currently adding to their nuclear arsenals are Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea.

While Pakistan is still frozen out of buying uranium on the world market, it has sufficient domestic supplies to fuel an accelerated program to raise its warhead production. Pakistan is estimated to have between 110 and 130 warheads already, and it’s projected to have developed 200 by 2020, surpassing the United Kingdom.

India has between 110 and 120 nuclear weapons. Both countries have short, medium, and long-range missiles, submarine ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, plus nuclear-capable aircraft that can target each other’s major urban areas.

A New Uprising in Kashmir

One problem in the current crisis is that both countries are essentially talking past one another.

Pakistan does have legitimate security concerns. It has fought and lost three wars with India over Kashmir since 1947, and it’s deeply paranoid about the size of the Indian army.

But India has been the victim of several major terrorist attacks that have Pakistan’s fingerprints all over them. The 1999 Kargill invasion lasted a month and killed hundreds of soldiers on both sides. Reportedly the Pakistanis were considering arming their missiles with nuclear warheads until the Clinton administration convinced them to stand down.++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+

Pakistan’s military has long denied that it has any control over terrorist organizations based in Pakistan, but virtually all intelligence agencies agree that, with the exception of the country’s home-grown Taliban, that is not the case. The Pakistani army certainly knew about a recent attack on an Indian army base in Kashmir that killed 19 soldiers.

In the past, India responded to such attacks with quiet counterattacks of its own, but this time around the right-wing nationalist government of Narendra Modi announced that the Indian military had crossed the border and killed more than 30 militants. It was the first time that India publicly acknowledged a cross-border assault.

Meanwhile the Indian press has whipped up a nationalist fervor that has seen sports events between the two countries cancelled and a ban on using Pakistani actors in Indian films. The Pakistani press has been no less jingoistic.

In the meantime, the situation in Kashmir has gone from bad to worse. Early in the summer Indian security forces killed Burhan Wani, a popular leader of the Kashmir independence movement. Since then the province has essentially been paralyzed, with schools closed and massive demonstrations. Thousands of residents have been arrested, close to 100 killed, and hundreds of demonstrators wounded and blinded by the widespread use of birdshot by Indian security forces.

Indian rule in Kashmir has been singularly brutal. Between 50,000 and 80,000 people have died over the past six decades, and thousands of others have been “disappeared” by security forces. While in the past the Pakistani army aided the infiltration of terrorist groups to attack the Indian army, this time around the uprising is homegrown. Kashmiris are simply tired of military rule and a law which gives Indian security forces essentially carte blanche to terrorize the population.

Called the Special Powers Act — modeled after a British provision to suppress of Catholics in Northern Ireland and mirroring practices widely used by the Israelis in the Occupied Territories — the law allows Indian authorities to arrest and imprison people without charge and gives immunity to Indian security forces.

Avenues to Peace

As complex as the situation in Kashmir is, there are avenues to resolve it. A good start would be to suspend the Special Powers Act and send the Indian Army back to the barracks.

The crisis in Kashmir began when the Hindu ruler of the mostly Muslim region opted to join India when the countries were divided in 1947. At the time, the residents were promised that a UN-sponsored referendum would allow residents to choose India, Pakistan, or independence. That referendum has never been held.

Certainly the current situation cannot continue. Kashmir has almost 12 million people, and no army or security force — even one as large as India’s — can maintain a permanent occupation if the residents don’t want it. Instead of resorting to force, India should ratchet down its security forces and negotiate with Kashmiris for an interim increase in local autonomy.

But in the long run, the Kashmiris should have their referendum — and both India and Pakistan will have to accept the results.

What the world cannot afford is for the current tensions to spiral down into a military confrontation that could easily get out of hand. The U.S., through its aid to Pakistan — $860 million this year — has some leverage, but it cannot play a role if its ultimate goal is an alliance to contain China, a close ally of Pakistan.

Neither country would survive a nuclear war, and neither country should be spending its money on an arms race. Almost 30 percent of Indians live below the poverty line, as do 22 percent of Pakistanis. The $51 billion Indian defense budget and the $7 billion Pakistan spends could be put to far better use.

*Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Conn Hallinan can be read at dispatchesfromtheedge.wordpress.com and middleempireseries.wordpress.com.

TOPICS:
Foreign PolicyIndiaKashmirMilitaryNuclearPakistanSouth AsiaUnited States

Loose Cannons, Generals And US Foreign Policy In The Trump Era

SOURCE:
http://swarajyamag.com/world/loose-cannons-generals-and-us-foreign-policy-in-the-trump-era

SNAPSHOT

President-elect Trump seems to be hiring US Army and Marine Corps generals in key advisory roles.

While its impact on US policy is debatable, what’s common to Trump’s picks is that they all disagree with President Obama on his policies.

Under Obama, India-US relations reached new heights. India shouldn’t take that for granted, and must instead stay prepared for any eventuality.

Loose Cannons, Generals                      And

   US Foreign Policy In 

      The Trump Era

                                  BY
                     Syed Ata Hasnain 




December 11, 2016,                                                       
   President-elect Donald Trump has a few more weeks to remain in the ‘loose cannon’ mode before he is fully accountable for what he utters. For over a year, he has been trumpeting his wares, his mind and his ideas, on a nation which is in a state of regression. The entire Trump phenomenon arose from a sense of insecurity brought on by the failure of post-Cold War international configurations that the United States (US) sought to create. The so-called restructuring of the new world order at a time of fundamental change in the way the world exists and does business could not succeed. The Information Revolution and the resultant globalisation hasn’t given the dividends that were sought by a superpower like the US.

In fact, in an era when the US is still counted as the only superpower, there is an internal weakening in its fabric, leading to a loss of confidence among its people in the American Dream. The economic meltdown of 2008 added to its woes, and the military deployments in Afghanistan-Pakistan and Iraq, the former a strategic compulsion and the latter a strategic blunder, only weighted the sinking ship. The social fabric of the US, formerly its strength, suddenly has become a weakness.

The arrival of Trump at such a crucial juncture in US and world history, when the world is seeking a mature approach towards the persisting problems of communal confrontation and phenomena such as terror and radicalism, could not have been more tragic.

In India, we may gloat about our success and the fact that an Indian American hand also facilitated Trump’s success; the emergence of Indian American personalities in the soon-to-be-created power centre of the Republicans seems to also overawe us. The impact on India-US relations may well have a telling effect – Indian American political personalities are not known to display any loyalty to their former homeland. In fact, in the case of personalities such as Bobby Jindal, the opposite is known to be true.

Trump’s utterances continue to project the extent of his ignorance in matters strategic, especially if they concern the military domain. Out-of-the-box ideas and introduction of volatility in the leadership style are fine if the strategic leader has a firm hold over history and an understanding of the nuances. Trump, probably on advice, is obviously following a strategy of gamesmanship, needling opponents, forcing them to respond to reveal their core concerns and display their limits of tolerance. His telephonic conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, the first recorded conversation between an American President and a Taiwan head of state since 1979, has irked China. Ever since the US decided to improve its relationship with China following the pathbreaking diplomatic efforts of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the principle of One China has been adhered to – with no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, the US has maintained a special relationship with the island state and treaded a careful path, something that is only now coming into focus.

On Iran, Trump’s views are well known and supported by his advisors; the 15 July 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement does not meet approval among any of them. The future of Iraq and Syria, as well as the situation in West Asia, will be dependent on US’ attitude towards the Iran nuclear deal.

The President-elect is known to have been guided to some extent during the campaign by a set of US Army and Marine Corps generals who are emerging from the shadows. Among the ones likely to be advising him as part of his core team are General Michael Flynn as Trump’s pick for National Security Advisor and General James Mattis for Defense Secretary. More uniformed officials from the four American armed forces, including General Stanley McChrystal, could find plum, influential jobs running intelligence agencies or offering advice. The New York Times observed that the single thread tying them all together is that they all had issues with President Barack Obama.

Trump seems to perceive the idea of a political opposition as one with a literal 180-degree opposition. Expectations always remain that a presidential candidate once elected would quickly adjust himself to the ways of the establishment and proceed cautiously in terms of pursuing change. But one example from history of single-minded pursuance of change as a policy was Nixon with his approach to China; ping-pong diplomacy took just five months to commence after his inauguration.

Observers are terming the entry of US Generals into advisory and strategic decision-making roles as dangerous because that would inevitably lead to a more robust policy of the use of hard power. However, the New York Times, quoting Stephen K Bannon, the President-elect’s chief strategist, says “the 

incoming administration was looking at 

potential cabinet officials with combat 

experience so that people who had fought in 

wars would be making decisions about whether 

to commit the country to more of them.” Military leaders of the Marshall, Eisenhower and Powell variety drew much respect when saddled with political responsibilities. Yet today, even military analysts are being critical. Retired Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, who authored two books on military strategy, speaks about the feasibility of too many military instruments in every consideration of international security.  Somehow, the perception of military leaders seeking conflict resolution through the employment of only hard power appears to have permeated the thinking of most academic and security related analysts. This is also the opinion of the political class and civil society in most nations.

To establish the truth or otherwise of this perception would need a separate essay. Currently suffice to say that military leaders are acutely conscious of the economic and social implications of the unrestrained use of hard power. Military institutions the world over, which teach and discuss strategy, usually emphasise on all instruments of conflict resolution. The United Kingdom’s Royal College of Defence Studies and India’s National Defence College hardly carry much content about the military in their curriculum. Yet, somehow this perception prevails to the detriment of exploiting the strategic might and experience of military leaderships.

For Indian foreign policy specialists, analysts and those specifically focused on the development of the India-US strategic relationship, this would be a time for concern. If 

there has to be a marked influence of the US 

military on strategic policy formulation, then it 

is worth knowing that the US military has no 

particular affection for India. The slight disdain that exists, and many would take this writer up on it, is symbolically displayed in many a US training institution where both Indian and Pakistan Army personnel train. In all strategic seminars around the world, it is the Pakistan Army which finds favour with the US armed forces. India’s Soviet/Russia connect from the Cold War era and the US-Pakistan connect of CENTO and, also, the 1979-89 period of Soviet presence in Afghanistan inspires less confidence in India and more in Pakistan, at least within the US uniformed and intelligence community.

Former US President George Bush’s push for a stronger US-India equation received energetic support from President Obama in the second half of his presidency. Just when things seem to be looking upwards comes the new presidency of Trump. Continuity is usually the responsibility of non-partisan bureaucracies, but when the President-elect is veering towards hiring advisors who have had major disagreements with President Obama, the potential of continuity becomes questionable.

This is what Indian policy planners must be prepared for. They must work to prevent awkward perceptions from developing. The time to work on that is now, even before the inauguration. We may be sceptical about the alleged Trump-Nawaz Sharif telephonic chat and promises of a visit to Pakistan, but Pakistan’s strategic position in world polity must not be scoffed at. Indian efforts at isolating Pakistan on the issue of terrorism have been insufficiently supported internationally, and the US continues to play games in this regard. The strategic importance of Pakistan’s territorial space for all kinds of international players makes it a nation everyone wishes to befriend.

Trump may yet turn out to be an outstanding President, independent in thought and not tied to old-world equations. Yet, the uniformed intellectual community is definitely going to be a major player in deciding US security policy. If that is the case, India will have to redouble its efforts to stay where it has reached with President Obama and potentially engage in different dimensions beyond just the political and diplomatic contacts.

Calling upon the Indian military and 

intelligence community to play a greater role in 

diplomacy may well be in order.

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Donald Trump

America

India-US relations

US Foreign Policy

Indian foreign policy

Michael Flynn