Friday, June 9, 2017

THE GREAT GAME :TIBET THE BY-PRODUCT VICTIM OF THE ORIGINAL GREAT GAME





                                       111 - I N D E X - 111

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/111-index.html  ]




GREAT GAME

[1]  China is Working on the Largest Infrastructure Endeavor in Human History
      
         http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/the-great-game-china-is-working-on.html




[2] Towards a New World Order in Eurasia:The 21st Century’s Great Game (Part 1/3)

         (A)   http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/the-great-game-towards-new-world-order.html

        (B)  http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/towards-new-world-order-in-eurasia-21st.html

        (C)   http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/towards-new-world-order-in-eurasia-21st_29.html



 [3] TIBET  THE GREAT GAME :TIBET THE BY-PRODUCT VICTIM OF THE ORIGINAL GREAT GAME
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/06/the-great-game-tibet-by-product-victim.html




















 IN TIBET THERE IS NO SIGN OF THE 

END OF GREAT GAME, NEXT PHASE 

OF THE TIBET CHAPTER  OF GREAT 

GAME WILL BE THE END OF CHINK 

GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA

                                              -VASUNDHRA



                TIBET IS THE BY-PRODUCT  VICTIM 
                                       OF
 THE ORIGINAL GREAT GAME[1800-1917 ]




The original Great Game (1800-1917), the clandestine struggle between Russia and Britain for mastery of Central Asia, has long been regarded as one of the greatest geopolitical conflicts in history. The prize, control of the vast Eurasian heartland, was believed by some to be the key to world domination. Teeming with improbable drama and exaggerated tensions, the conflict featured soldiers, mystics and spies, among them some of history's most colourful and romantic characters. While the original Great Game ended with the Russian Revolution, the geopolitical wrangles for territory and power have continued into the late twentieth century - culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Karl Meyer and Shareen Brysac's magisterial one-volume survey chronicles nearly two centuries of conflict in vivid and compelling fashion.









           ONCE UPON A TIME IN TIBET

[  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XUSgzAd53c&t=2332s ]





   





This was TIBET until  1950 before the CHINKs moved in. This movie is based on   the psyche  of rural tibeteans  and on vague memories of Colonel Younghusband's expedition to LHASA in 1904 via Chumbi Valley and the  DAKOTA Air bridge created by Americans from CHABUA in ASSAM (India) during WW-II  to support the Chinese army  in China......


   Tibet was handed over to CHINESE  by INDIA  on plate.   Until 1950  INDIAN TRICOLOUR was fluttering in Lhasa,  & Chinese were no where around .There was a strong Indian Army presence in Lhasa along with Indian diplomatic mission.  One Indian infantry Battalion was positioned at Gangtok with a company in YATUNG,Chumbi valley, and two companies in LHASA. Despite prompting by AMERICANs to fight back, army & mission was ordered to withdraw backby New Delhi.

     
              INDIA  HANDED  OVER  TIBET 


                                AND  


          TIBETEANS  TO BUTCHERS 


[https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=RlZX9LO0TRc ]









           REST IS NOT YET A HISTORY 


       NEW PAGES OF THE GREAT GAME


                      ARE IN MAKING

                     000000000000000



           TIBET LOSES FREEDOM

   TIBET THE HISTORY OF TRAGEDY


   [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RlZX9LO0TRc ]











Is Tibet Part of China?


Tibet and China: History of a Complex Relationship


Is Tibet Part of China?


           [   https://www.thoughtco.com/tibet-and-china-history-195217  ] 


Updated August 09, 2016




Ganden Monastery. Diego Giannoni / Moment








For at least 1500 years, the nation of Tibet has had a complex relationship with its large and powerful neighbor to the east, China. The political history of Tibet and China reveals that the relationship has not always been as one-sided as it now appears.
Indeed, as with China’s relations with the Mongols and the Japanese, the balance of power between China and Tibet has shifted back and forth over the centuries.

EARLY INTERACTIONS


The first known interaction between the two states came in 640 A.D., when the Tibetan King Songtsan Gampo married the Princess Wencheng, a niece of the  Tang  Emperor Taizong. He also married a Nepalese princess.

Both wives were Buddhists, and this may have been the origin of Tibetan Buddhism. The faith grew when an influx of Central Asian Buddhists flooded Tibet early in the eighth century, fleeing from advancing armies of Arab and Kazakh Muslims.



During his reign, Songtsan Gampo added parts of the Yarlung River Valley to the Kingdom of Tibet; his descendants would also conquer the vast region that is now the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, and Xinjiang between 663 and 692. Control of these border regions would change hands back and forth for centuries to come.

In 692, the Chinese retook their western lands from the Tibetans after defeating them at Kashgar. The Tibetan king then allied himself with the enemies of China, the Arabs and eastern Turks.

Chinese power waxed strong in the early decades of the eighth century. Imperial forces under General Gao Xianzhi conquered much of Central Asia, until their defeat by the Arabs and Karluks at the Battle of Talas River in 751. China's power quickly waned, and Tibet resumed control of much of Central Asia.

The ascendant Tibetans pressed their advantage, conquering much of northern India  and even seizing the Tang Chinese capital city of Chang'an (now Xian) in 763.

Tibet and China signed a peace treaty in 821 or 822, which delineated the border between the two empires. The Tibetan Empire would concentrate on its Central Asian holdings for the next several decades, before splitting into several small, fractious kingdoms.

TIBET AND THE MONGOLS


Canny politicians, the Tibetans befriended Genghis Khan just as the Mongol leader was conquering the known world in the early 13th century. As a result, though the Tibetans paid tribute to the Mongols after the Hordes had conquered China, they were allowed much greater autonomy than the other Mongol-conquered lands.

Over time, Tibet came to be considered one of the thirteen provinces of the Mongolian-ruled nation of Yuan China.

During this period, the Tibetans gained a high degree of influence over the Mongols at court.

The great Tibetan spiritual leader, Sakya Pandita, became the Mongol's representative to Tibet. Sakya's nephew, Chana Dorje, married one of the Mongol Emperor Kublai Khan's daughters.

The Tibetans transmitted their Buddhist faith to the eastern Mongols; Kublai Khan himself studied Tibetan beliefs with the great teacher Drogon Chogyal Phagpa.

INDEPENDENT TIBET


When the Mongols' Yuan Empire fell in 1368 to the ethnic-Han Chinese Ming, Tibet reasserted its independence and refused to pay tribute to the new Emperor.

In 1474, the abbot of an important Tibetan Buddhist monastery, Gendun Drup, passed away. A child who born two years later was found to be a reincarnation of the abbot, and was raised to be the next leader of that sect, Gendun Gyatso.

After their lifetimes, the two men were called the First and Second Dalai Lamas. Their sect, the Gelug or "Yellow Hats," became the dominant form of Tibetan Buddhism.

The Third Dalai Lama, Sonam Gyatso (1543-1588), was the first to be so named during his life. He was responsible for converting the Mongols to Gelug Tibetan Buddhism, and it was the Mongol ruler Altan Khan who probably gave the title “Dalai Lama” to Sonam Gyatso.

While the newly-named Dalai Lama consolidated the power of his spiritual position, though, the Gtsang-pa Dynasty assumed the royal throne of Tibet in 1562. The Kings would rule the secular side of Tibetan life for the next 80 years.

The Fourth Dalai Lama, Yonten Gyatso (1589-1616), was a Mongolian prince and the grandson of Altan Khan.



During the 1630s, China was embroiled in power struggles between the Mongols, Han Chinese of the fading Ming Dynasty, and the Manchu people of north-eastern China (Manchuria). The Manchus would eventually defeat the Han in 1644, and establish China's final imperial dynasty, the Qing (1644-1912).

Tibet got drawn into this turmoil when the Mongol warlord Ligdan Khan, a Kagyu Tibetan Buddhist, decided to invade Tibet and destroy the Yellow Hats in 1634. Ligdan Khan died on the way, but his follower Tsogt Taij took up the cause.

The great general Gushi Khan, of the Oirad Mongols, fought against Tsogt Taij and defeated him in 1637. The Khan killed the Gtsang-pa Prince of Tsang, as well. With support from Gushi Khan, the Fifth Dalai Lama, Lobsang Gyatso, was able to seize both spiritual and temporal power over all of Tibet in 1642.

THE DALAI LAMA RISES TO POWER



The Potala Palace in Lhasa was constructed as a symbol of this new synthesis of power.

The Dalai Lama made a state visit to the Qing Dynasty's second Emperor, Shunzhi, in 1653.

The two leaders greeted one another

 as equals; the Dalai Lama did not

 kowtow.

Each man bestowed honors and titles upon the other, and the Dalai Lama was recognized as the spiritual authority of the Qing Empire.


According to Tibet, the "priest/patron" relationship established at this time between the Dalai Lama and Qing China continued throughout the Qing Era, but it had no bearing on Tibet's status as an independent nation. 

China, naturally, disagrees.


Lobsang Gyatso died in 1682, but his Prime Minister concealed the Dalai Lama's passing until 1696 so that the Potala Palace could be finished and the power of the Dalai Lama's office consolidated.

THE MAVERICK DALAI LAMA


In 1697, fifteen years after the death of Lobsang Gyatso, the Sixth Dalai Lama was finally enthroned.

Tsangyang Gyatso (1683-1706) was a maverick who rejected the monastic life, growing his hair long, drinking wine, and enjoying female company. He also wrote great poetry, some of which is still recited today in Tibet.


The Dalai Lama’s unconventional lifestyle prompted Lobsang Khan of the Khoshud Mongols to depose him in 1705.


Lobsang Khan seized control of Tibet, named himself King, sent Tsangyang Gyatso to Beijing (he “mysteriously” died on the way), and installed a pretender Dalai Lama.




THE DZUNGAR MONGOL INVASION


King Lobsang would rule for 12 years, until the Dzungar Mongols invaded and took power. They killed the pretender to the Dalai Lama’s throne, to the joy of the Tibetan people, but then began to loot monasteries around Lhasa.

This vandalism brought a quick response from the Qing Emperor Kangxi, who sent troops to Tibet. The Dzungars destroyed the Imperial Chinese battalion near Lhasa in 1718.

In 1720, the angry Kangxi sent another, larger force to Tibet, which crushed the Dzungars. The Qing army also brought the proper Seventh Dalai Lama, Kelzang Gyatso (1708-1757) to Lhasa.

THE BORDER BETWEEN CHINA AND 

TIBET


China took advantage of this period of instability in Tibet to seize the regions of Amdo and Kham, making them into the Chinese province of Qinghai in 1724.

Three years later, the Chinese and Tibetans signed a treaty that laid out the boundary line between the two nations. It would remain in force until 1910.

Qing China had its hands full trying to control Tibet. The Emperor sent a commissioner to Lhasa, but he was killed in 1750.

The Imperial Army then defeated the rebels, but the Emperor recognized that he would have to rule through the Dalai Lama rather than directly.

Day-to-day decisions would be made on the local level.

ERA OF TURMOIL BEGINS


In 1788, the Regent of Nepal sent Gurkha forces to invade Tibet.

The Qing Emperor responded in strength, and the Nepalese retreated.

The Gurkhas returned three years later, plundering and destroying some famous Tibetan monasteries. The Chinese sent a force of 17,000 which, along with Tibetan troops, drove the Gurkhas out of Tibet and south to within 20 miles of Kathmandu.

Despite this sort of assistance from the Chinese Empire, the people of Tibet chafed under increasingly meddlesome Qing rule.

Between 1804, when the Eighth Dalai Lama died, and 1895, when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama assumed the throne, none of the incumbent incarnations of the Dalai Lama lived to see their nineteenth birthdays.

If the Chinese found a certain incarnation too hard to control, 
they would poison him. 
If the Tibetans thought an incarnation was controlled by the Chinese, then they would poison him themselves.

TIBET AND THE GREAT GAME


Throughout this period, Russia and 

Britain were engaged in the "Great 

Game," a struggle for influence and 

control in Central Asia.


Russia pushed south of its borders, seeking access to warm-water sea ports and a buffer zone between Russia proper and the advancing British.

The British pushed northward from India, trying to expand their empire and protect the Raj, the "Crown Jewel of the British Empire," from the expansionist Russians.

Tibet was an important playing piece 

in this game.

Qing Chinese power waned throughout the eighteenth century, as evidenced by its defeat in the Opium Wars with Britain (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), as well as the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) and the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901).

The actual relationship between China and Tibet had been unclear since the early days of the Qing Dynasty, and China's losses at home made the status of Tibet even more uncertain.

The ambiguity of control over Tibet lead to problems. In 1893, the British in India concluded a trade and border treaty with Beijing concerning the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet.

However, the Tibetans flatly rejected the treaty terms.

The British invaded Tibet in 1903 with 10,000 men, and took Lhasa the following year. Thereupon, they concluded another treaty with the Tibetans, as well as Chinese, Nepalese and Bhutanese representatives, which gave the British themselves some control over Tibet’s affairs.


THUBTEN GYATSO'S BALANCING 

ACT


The 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso, fled the country in 1904 at the urging of his Russian disciple, Agvan Dorzhiev. He went first to Mongolia, then made his way to Beijing.

The Chinese declared that the Dalai Lama had been deposed as soon as he left Tibet, and claimed full sovereignty over not only Tibet but also Nepal and Bhutan. The Dalai Lama went to Beijing to discuss the situation with the Emperor Guangxu, but he flatly refused to kowtow to the Emperor.

Thubten Gyatso stayed in the Chinese capital from 1906 to 1908.

He returned to Lhasa in 1909, disappointed by Chinese policies towards Tibet. China sent a force of 6,000 troops into Tibet, and the Dalai Lama fled to Darjeeling, India later that same year.

The Chinese Revolution swept away the Qing Dynasty in 1911, and the Tibetans promptly expelled all Chinese troops from Lhasa. The Dalai Lama returned home to Tibet in 1912.


TIBETAN INDEPENDENCE


China's new revolutionary government issued a formal apology to the Dalai Lama for the Qing Dynasty's insults, and offered to reinstate him. Thubten Gyatso refused, stating that he had no interest in the Chinese offer.

He then issued a proclamation that was distributed across Tibet, rejecting Chinese control and stating that "We are a small, religious, and independent nation."

The Dalai Lama took control of Tibet's internal and external governance in 1913, negotiating directly with foreign powers, and reforming Tibet's judicial, penal, and educational systems.


THE SIMLA CONVENTION (1914)


Representatives of Great Britain, China, and Tibet met in 1914 to negotiate a treaty marking out the boundary lines between India and its northern neighbors.

The Simla Convention granted China secular control over "Inner Tibet," (also known as Qinghai Province) while recognizing the autonomy of "Outer Tibet" under the Dalai Lama's rule. Both China and Britain promised to "respect the territorial integrity of [Tibet], and abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet."

China walked out of the conference without signing the treaty after Britain laid claim to the Tawang area of southern Tibet, which is now part of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Tibet and Britain both signed the treaty.

As a result, China has never agreed to India's rights in northern Arunachal Pradesh (Tawang), and the two nations went to war over the area in 1962. The boundary dispute still has not been resolved.

China also claims sovereignty over all of Tibet, while the Tibetan government-in-exile points to the Chinese failure to sign the Simla Convention as proof that both Inner and Outer Tibet legally remain under the Dalai Lama's jurisdiction.

[ China's claim over Arunchal Pradesh 

is dubious due to its  illegitamacy of 

OCCUPATION  of  TIBET it self.  " with 

the present 14 th  DALAI LAMA in 

India the TIBET as part of  GREAT 

GAME is in the state of hibernation. 

Great game will erupt out with full

 fury at the demise of existing 14th 

DALAI LAMA . INDIA will be highly in

 the GAME and that will be time to hit

 back the CHINKs by flinging  them out

 of Tibet 

                                           - Vasundhra ]


THE ISSUE RESTS


Soon, China would be too distracted to concern

itself with the issue of Tibet.

Japan had invaded Manchuria in 1910, and would advance south and east across large swaths of Chinese territory through 1945.

The new government of the Republic of China would hold nominal power over the majority of Chinese territory for only four years before war broke out between numerous armed factions.

Indeed, the span of Chinese history from 1916 to 1938 came to be called the "Warlord Era," as the different military factions sought to fill the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Qing Dynasty.

China would see near-continuous civil war up to the Communist victory in 1949, and this era of conflict was exacerbated by the Japanese Occupation and World War II.

Under such circumstances, the Chinese showed little interest in Tibet.

The 13th Dalai Lama ruled independent Tibet in peace until his death in 1933.


THE 14TH DALAI LAMA


Following Thubten Gyatso's death, the new reincarnation of the Dalai Lama was born in Amdo in 1935.
Tenzin Gyatso, the current Dalai Lama, was taken to Lhasa in 1937 to begin training for his duties as the leader of Tibet. He would remain there until 1959, when the Chinese forced him into exile in India.
 [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/14th_Dalai_Lama ]


PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

INVADES TIBET


In 1950, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the newly-formed People's Republic of China invaded Tibet. With stability reestablished in Beijing for the first time in decades, Mao Zedong sought to assert China's right to rule over Tibet as well.

The PLA inflicted a swift and total defeat on Tibet's small army, and China drafted the "Seventeen Point Agreement" incorporating Tibet as an autonomous region of the People's Republic of China.

Representatives of the Dalai Lama's government signed the agreement under protest, and the Tibetans repudiated the agreement nine years later.

COLLECTIVIZATION AND REVOLT


The Mao government of the PRC immediately initiated land redistribution in Tibet.

Landholdings of the monasteries and nobility were seized for redistribution to the peasants. The communist forces hoped to destroy the power base of the wealthy and of Buddhism within Tibetan society.

In reaction, a uprising led by the monks broke out in June of 1956, and continued through 1959. The poorly-armed Tibetans used guerrilla war tactics in an attempt to drive out the Chinese.

The PLA responded by razing entire villages and monasteries to the ground. The Chinese even threatened to blow up the Potala Palace and kill the Dalai Lama, but this threat was not carried out.

Three years of bitter fighting left 86,000 Tibetans dead, according to the Dalai Lama's government in exile.


FLIGHT OF THE DALAI LAMA



On March 1, 1959, the Dalai Lama received an odd invitation to attend a theater performance at PLA headquarters near Lhasa.

The Dalai Lama demurred, and the performance date was postponed until March 10. On March 9, PLA officers notified the Dalai Lama's bodyguards that they would not accompany the Tibetan leader to the performance, nor were they to notify the Tibetan people that he was leaving the palace. (Ordinarily, the people of Lhasa would line the streets to greet the Dalai Lama each time he ventured out.)

The guards immediately publicized this rather ham-handed attempted abduction, and the following day an estimated crowd of 300,000 Tibetans surrounded Potala Palace to protect their leader.

The PLA moved artillery into range of major monasteries and the Dalai Lama's summer palace, Norbulingka.

Both sides began to dig in, although the Tibetan army was much smaller than its adversary, and poorly armed.

Tibetan troops were able to secure a route for the Dalai Lama to escape into India on March 17. Actual fighting began on March 19, and lasted only two days before the Tibetan troops were defeated.

AFTERMATH OF THE

 1959 TIBETAN UPRISING


Much of Lhasa lay in ruins on March 

20, 1959.


An estimated 800 artillery shells had pummeled Norbulingka, and Lhasa's three largest monasteries were essentially leveled. The Chinese rounded up thousands of monks, executing many of them. Monasteries and temples all over Lhasa were ransacked.

The remaining members of the Dalai 

Lama's bodyguard were publicly 

executed by firing squad.




By the time of the 1964 census, 300,000 Tibetans

 had gone "missing" in the previous five years,

 either secretly imprisoned, killed, or in exile.


In the days after the 1959 Uprising, the Chinese government revoked most aspects of Tibet's autonomy, and initiated resettlement and land distribution across the country. The Dalai Lama has remained in exile ever since.


China's central government, in a bid to dilute the Tibetan population and provide jobs for Han Chinese, initiated a "Western China Development Program" in 1978.

As many as 300,000 Han now live in Tibet, 2/3 of them in the capital city. The Tibetan population of Lhasa, in contrast, is only 100,000.

Ethnic Chinese hold the vast majority of government posts.


RETURN OF THE PANCHEN LAMA


Beijing allowed the Panchen Lama, Tibetan Buddhism's second-in-command, to return to Tibet in 1989.

He immediately gave a speech before a crowd of 30,000 of the faithful, decrying the harm being done to Tibet under the PRC.

He died five days later at the age of 50, allegedly of a massive heart attack.

DEATHS AT DRAPCHI PRISON, 1998


On May 1, 1998, the Chinese officials at Drapchi Prison in Tibet ordered hundreds of prisoners, both criminals and political detainees, to participate in a Chinese flag-raising ceremony.

Some of the prisoners began to shout anti-Chinese and pro-Dalai Lama slogans, and prison guards fired shots into the air before returning all the prisoners to their cells.

The prisoners were then severely beaten with belt buckles, rifle butts, and plastic batons, and some were put into solitary confinement for months at a time, according to one young nun who was released from the prison a year later.

Three days later, the prison administration decided to hold the flag-raising ceremony again.

Once more, some of the prisoners began to shout slogans.

Prison official reacted with even more brutality, and five nuns, three monks, and one male criminal were killed by the guards. One man was shot; the rest were beaten to death.

2008 UPRISING


On March 10, 2008, Tibetans marked the 49th anniversary of the 1959 uprising by peacefully protesting for the release of imprisoned monks and nuns. Chinese police then broke up the protest with tear gas and gunfire.

The protest resumed for several more days, finally turning into a riot. Tibetan anger was fueled by reports that imprisoned monks and nuns were being mistreated or killed in prison as a reaction to the street demonstrations.

Furious Tibetans ransacked and burned the shops of ethnic Chinese immigrants in Lhasa and other cities. The official Chinese media states that 18 people were killed by the rioters.

China immediately cut off access to Tibet for foreign media and tourists.

The unrest spread to neighboring Qinghai (Inner Tibet), Gansu, and Sichuan Provinces. The Chinese government cracked down hard, mobilizing as many as 5,000 troops. Reports indicate that the military killed between 80 and 140 people, and arrested more than 2,300 Tibetans.

The unrest came at a sensitive time for China, which was gearing up for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.

The situation in Tibet caused increased international scrutiny of Beijing's entire human rights record, leading some foreign leaders to boycott the Olympic Opening Ceremonies. Olympic torch-bearers around the world were met by thousands of human rights protestors.


CONCLUSION


Tibet and China have had a long relationship, fraught with difficulty and change.

At times, the two nations have worked closely together. At other times, they have been at war.

Today, the nation of Tibet does not exist; not one foreign government officially recognizes the Tibetan government-in-exile.

The past teaches us, however, that the geopolitical situation is nothing if not fluid. It is impossible to predict where Tibet and China will stand, relative to one another, one hundred years from now.


 IN TIBET THERE IS NO SIGN OF THE 

END OF GREAT GAME, NEXT PHASE 

OF THE TIBET CHAPTER GREAT 

GAME WILL BE THE END OF CHINK 

GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA

                                              -VASUNDHRA



                                              

























Thursday, June 8, 2017

DJIBOUTI : CHINESE ARE HERE








SOURCE:

https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-djibouti/










      DJIBOUTI : CHINESE ARE HERE









MIGRATION: AN ALTERNATIVE PATH TO PROSPERITY









         DJIBOUTI : CHINESE ARE HERE

GOOGLE/CLICK TO OPEN



  https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/132-chinese-migration-in-africa/file  



To this  day  there are are approximately   ONE million chinese working in African continent from Cape Town to Cairo & they have no intention of going back. As a matter of fact they have displaced Indians who were there in one form or the other for the last two thousand years. 


GOOGLE/CLICK TO OPEN


https://qz.com/217597/how-a-million-chinese-migrants-are-building-a-new-empire-in-africa/ 



   There is  a  unrecognised country known as  MONSOON COUNTRY whose extent runs from East African  coast to Vietnam- Borneo-Philippines. Those who have moved around in this part of the world albeit at a slow pace do have felt the existence of Monsoon Country.  Till 1950 in this complete region it was the domain of Indians & Indians were ruling the roost. With the exit of rule Britannica  &  with the advent of most corrupt Indian regime, Indians have lost the cosy  roost which they were dominating for a thousand years or more & this roost I have named it as  "MONSOON COUNTRY"  Roughly this area comprises  the complete region of   AFROASIA  covered by MONSOON s


                         MONSOON COUNTRY
 IS THE STRAIGHT & DIRECT ANSWER                                      TO  
CHINA's ONE BELT ONE ROAD [OBOR] 
                                 
INDIA DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY BIG                    EFFORT TO RE-DOMINATE 
     THE "MONSOON COUNTRY.  
JUST ANNOUNCE THE PROJECT 
                                   
              START EXECUTING. 

 INDIAN OCEAN & ITS MONSOON 
      IS GOD GIVEN GIFT TO INDIA . 
                               USE IT


                                                                                                 -   VASUNDHRA



























Djibouti Is Hot

How a forgotten sandlot of a country became a hub of international power games.





The bartender measures a shot of Johnnie Walker Red Label in a steel jigger and dumps it over ice. A waitress sets the glass on a tray and steers it through the dining room, where Abouye Wang, the restaurant owner, commands a booth in the back corner, elbows on the table, surveying the dinner crowd.
The buzzcuts perched around the high table in the middle of the room are Americans, he guesses. The two women lost in conversation behind them are French. He recognizes the men in the adjacent booth as German. He spots an Italian port executive and a Palestinian diplomat from the newly opened embassy.
The restaurant, La Chaumière, sits on a corner of the central square in Djibouti, the capital city in the tiny African country of the same name, which until recently was of little consequence to anyone who didn’t live there. La Chaumière’s menu pushes the outer limits of fusion as Wang caters to his evolving clientele. East African seafood dishes, Asian stir fries, French stews, American sandwiches, they’re all here. “If we don’t have what you want,” Wang tells me, “we’ll make it for you.”
It’s my first night in Djibouti, and I’ve come to La Chaumière because I was told it would be full of soldiers, speculators, diplomats, spies, aid workers, contractors—all the outsiders who are turning Djibouti into an unlikely epicenter of 21st century geopolitics. Thomas Kelly, the American ambassador here, likes to say that Djibouti today feels like what Casablanca must have felt like in 1940. “All the different nationalities elbowing into each other,” he says. “All the intrigue.” Wang stands in the center of the mix, walking from table to table, slipping from language to language, witnessing Djibouti’s transformation at close range. Born to an Ethiopian mother and a Chinese father, he roamed East Africa with his family before settling here in 1977, the year Djibouti declared independence from France. He was 7 years old, an exotic import in a place no one ever visited, where nothing ever happened.





The president, many government ministers, and other wealthy Djiboutians live in the ­still-developing neighborhood of Haramous.




Back then, Djibouti, a country about the size of New Jersey, had one paved road and less than a square mile of arable land. The Associated Press deemed it perfectly devoid of resources, “except for sand, salt, and 20,000 camels.” The New York Times guessed the new nation might get swallowed up by one of its neighbors—Ethiopia or Somalia, maybe—because it was “so impoverished that it cannot stand on its own.”
Years passed, and those neighbors were too preoccupied with wars, famine, and civil anarchy to pay much attention to it. Such upheavals, and almost everything else, skirted Djibouti. Then the new century rolled around and, seemingly overnight, the country’s sleepiness became a valuable commodity.
After Sept. 11, the U.S. military rushed to establish its first base dedicated to counterterrorism, and Djibouti was about the only country in the neighborhood that wasn’t on fire. Sitting beside the narrow Bab el-Mandeb strait—a gateway to the Suez Canal at the mouth of the Red Sea, and one of the most trafficked shipping lanes in the world—it provided easy access to hot spots in both Africa and the Middle East. A few years later, when Somali pirates started threatening the global shipping industry, the militaries of Germany, Italy, and Spain joined France, which has maintained a base since colonial times, by moving troops to Djibouti. Japan arrived in 2011, opening its first military base on foreign soil since World War II. Last year, refugees displaced by war in Yemen—just 13 miles across the strait—began arriving by the thousands, attracting aid workers and NGOs looking for a stable regional base.
They eventually come to La Chaumière to gossip, to eavesdrop, to see who’s new in town. Wang is a central branch on the local grapevine. When I ask people here how Djibouti has managed to avoid the turmoil that has plagued the other countries in the region, a stock answer comes back to me from nearly everyone, both local and foreign. “No country is completely safe, but everybody knows everyone here, and they all talk,” Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh, the country’s minister of finance, tells me. “Every time a new camera comes into the country, for example, we know whose it is.” The grapevine, in other words, doubles as a safety net.





The Port of Djibouti sits on one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. And it’s well ­situated for chasing pirates.





Wang knows better than most that the influx of outsiders can stretch the net thin. One evening in 2014, planted in his corner booth, he spotted an unfamiliar figure: a veiled woman walking toward one of the high tables in the middle of the floor. Before he could approach her, she exploded, filling the room with fire, noise, and confusion. A moment later, a second suicide bomber blew himself up just outside the front door. More than a dozen people were wounded, and three died. Al-Shabaab, the Somali-based terrorist group, took credit for the attack, saying it was targeting French commandos for their role in battling Islamic militants in Somalia and the Central African Republic.
Wang, uninjured, decided to rebuild. The Djibouti government, recognizing the symbolic power of the decision, helped him pay for it. The place looks almost exactly the same as it did before, but the clientele keeps evolving. “I’m noticing more Chinese,” Wang tells me.
Three days later, on Feb. 25, China announces it has begun construction on its first-ever military installation abroad, about four miles from the American and Japanese bases. A week after that, Saudi Arabian officials say that they, too, plan to move soldiers to Djibouti and establish the country’s first military station in Africa.
“No country is completely safe, but everybody knows everyone here, and they all talk”
Camp Lemonnier, the American base, presses against the side of Djibouti’s only commercial airport, hidden behind a maze of concrete barriers and razor wire. Inside, it’s a wilderness of containerized living units, or CLUs, stacked atop one another. The laundry building looks like the movie theater, which looks like the credit union. It’s as if someone built a city from Legos and spray-painted the whole works tan.
For years the Americans insisted it was a temporary, or “expeditionary,” camp. But a $1.4 billion upgrade launched in 2013 has turned it into a clangorous construction site. Back in 2002, when the Americans took the camp over from the French, it sprawled across 97 acres. Now it’s pushing 600 and the CLUs are slowly being replaced by multistory, apartment-style barracks.
About 4,000 soldiers and contractors live here, and they include commandos from Joint Special Operations Command, the team that undertakes the military’s most sensitive counterterrorism operations. After the 2012 attack on the diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, a 150-member rapid response team was established at Camp Lemonnier, assigned to handle future threats to diplomatic personnel abroad. Djibouti is also the U.S. military’s regional hub for drones, and it sends thousands of Predators and Reapers across the region each year.


All those secretive aircraft buzzing around an active international airport created serious air traffic problems, which injected some tension between the Americans and their local hosts. In 2011 a Predator drone crashed into a residential area less than three miles from the airport. The following year, a U-28A surveillance plane crashed five miles from the camp, killing its four-man crew. Some of the Djiboutian air traffic controllers at the airport resented the drones, on both practical and moral grounds, and occasionally they would refuse to allow them to take off or land. The Washington Post reported that a $7 million program to retrain the local controllers was a complete failure. Often the controllers failed to show up for class; once, they even locked their American trainers out of the tower. Today most of the drones take off from a more isolated airstrip, about six miles from Camp Lemonnier.
After a couple days in Djibouti, I noticed that of all the foreign militaries stationed here, the American soldiers were the least conspicuous, rarely spotted at La Chaumière or in any of the places locals and outsiders mixed. At Camp Lemonnier, the soldiers said that since the restaurant bombing, they can’t leave the base without special approval. (“They call it ‘liberty,’ and we don’t have it anymore,” one officer explained to me.) Those who do get to go outside the security gates are often members of the Army’s Civil Affairs Battalion, reservists who rotate through for several months at a time. For Djiboutians, they’re the face of the U.S. military.
On a morning in February, a convoy of a half-dozen white Toyota SUVs exits Camp Lemonnier and heads west toward the village of Arta, a little more than an hour outside the city. The Civil Affairs unit is heading for a local clinic, where an Army dentist will offer free care to anyone who wants it.
It’s public relations, an attempt to show the locals that the Americans have more to offer than crashing drones. The Djiboutian interpreter assigned to the excursion, Hersi Aden, tells me he thinks the trip might also show the Americans that the vast majority of locals aren’t the sort that go around blowing themselves up in crowded restaurants. Aden says most Djiboutians, the air traffic controllers notwithstanding, value the presence of all that American military muscle, figuring it might deter radical Islamists from storming in and taking over the country. But Aden says the Americans’ approach to security—the barriers, the lockdowns, the secrecy—is sometimes interpreted as mistrust. “Djiboutians are peaceful people, and they don’t understand this,” he says. “They say, ‘Why are these Americans so scared of us?’ ”










The clinic in Arta is a cinder-block rectangle with a couple rooms full of medical supplies. In the middle of one, the soldiers place a portable, lightweight dental recliner. A table behind it holds a box of latex gloves, gauze, syringes, disposable dental mirrors, and a pair of pliers. The Americans have provided the clinic with $6,000 worth of medical supplies.
While they set up, an Army surgeon who has come to assess the facility tells me this isn’t where residents come when there’s an emergency. “There’s a new hospital down the road,” he says, “and it’s supposedly pretty impressive. Supposedly has lasers and all sorts of state-of-the-art equipment. I’d like to check that one out. The Chinese built it.”
The U.S. soldiers can’t go anywhere without being reminded of the People’s Republic. On the drive to the clinic, I’d noticed lengths of black tubing lying by the side of the road. “That’s a new water pipeline to Ethiopia,” the driver said, “built by the Chinese.” Nobody knows how the new Chinese base will change things, mostly because its scale isn’t yet known, but traces of anticipatory tension are palpable. Several diplomatic officials and members of U.S. Congress have publicly fretted over China’s growing influence in Djibouti, speculating that it might signal an era of increased Chinese military engagement around the world. Kelly, the U.S. ambassador, told me that “snooping,” electronic or otherwise, will be an obvious concern around Camp Lemonnier.
The Americans still have the largest foreign military presence in the country, but China’s intensifying interest in Djibouti is shifting the balance of influence. That brings us back to community relations. At the tiny clinic in Arta, about 50 people wait outside, the men dressed in button-down shirts and macawiis—a loose garment that wraps around the legs like a sarong—and the women draped in colorful headscarves and light shawls. Inside, an Army dentist straps a headlamp to his forehead and stares into the mouth of an unemployed, 29-year-old mother of four. He jabs her gum with a syringe and pries out a tooth.




A Chinese-made railroad is being built parallel to the unused French ­railroad.



Mohamed Khaireh Robleh’s truck rumbles over a set of railroad tracks that run through the center of the city, toward the port. There are no trains in sight, and the crossing lights don’t work. The tracks are broken.
“I grew up with that railroad,” says Khaireh, 67. “It was my life. It was our life.”
In the beginning, Djibouti was a railroad town. Almost a century ago, a narrow-gauge line linked the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa to a small, shallow-water port established by the French on the Red Sea. The trains rattled over a hot and treeless moonscape to carry the food, water, and labor needed to transform the port into a modest colonial outpost.
Khaireh worked those tracks for 40 years, rising into management positions, until the trains stopped running in the early 2000s. The narrow tracks couldn’t handle big payloads, and derailments were common. “We thought the European Union might help us rebuild and modernize it, but they didn’t believe in the project,” he says. “I felt like crying.”
Along came China. For decades it has invested heavily in African infrastructure, bankrolling projects from Angola to Zimbabwe, in exchange for access to natural resources. To move those resources from the heart of the continent to Asia, it needed a terminus, a reliable outlet to the east. Djibouti was perfectly positioned. China is financing a railroad, as well as an expansion of port terminals, fuel and water pipelines, a natural gas liquefaction plant, highway upgrades, two proposed airports, and several government buildings. The new military installation will be a sort of insurance policy, a security station to protect its investments and extend its economic reach.





The road to the new, Chinese-built Doraleh Container Terminal.





When the Chinese began construction on the railroad in 2013, Khaireh was called out of retirement, and now he’s driving me to one of the projects he’s overseeing: a passenger station rising on the outskirts of town. The tracks linking that construction site to Addis Ababa are finished. The first freight train began running last November; it’s powered by a diesel engine because the electrification system isn’t finished. The first passenger trains will run when the station is completed and the electricity works.
Khaireh drives along a dusty frontage road to see how construction is coming. Hundreds of new Chinese freight wagons, tankers, and air-conditioned passenger cars sit beside the tracks, and dozens of locomotives are hidden under blue plastic tarps. The station itself is encased in scaffolding. Workers with whirring circular saws balance high on the beams. Showers of sparks fall to the ground, where a Chinese worker cuts slabs of marble and plasters them to the building’s facade.
“Someday,” Khaireh says, “the railroad will extend to South Sudan, and then all the way to the Atlantic.” He’s pushing the workers, a mix of Chinese and Djiboutians, to finish the station by April. Djibouti’s vacation season begins in May, when lots of people flee the humid, 100F-plus temperatures for the more tolerable hills of Ethiopia. But that’s not the only thing driving construction. He reminds me, with a smile, that Djibouti has a presidential election in April.
“We want to be able to have the president come out here and celebrate by riding on one of the first trains,” he says. “We will get it done.” The certainty of that statement—not that they’ll complete the project, but that the president will win the election—is a near-universal assumption here, and it casts a revealing light on everything that’s unfolding in this country.
“There’s a new hospital down the road, and it’s supposedly pretty impressive. … I’d like to check that one out. The Chinese built it”
The presidential election is just six weeks away, but I don’t see a soul hanging campaign banners or making speeches. The election season, by law, is limited to the two weeks before votes are cast.
Djibouti’s president is Ismail Omar Guelleh, who in 1999 became the second president since independence. When term limits got in the way of a third term for him in 2011, he changed the constitution. That election was boycotted by opposition leaders. This time they say they’ll field a challenger, but it’s not yet clear who it will be.
“The opposition is very unorganized,” says Mohamed Osman Farah, an editor with La Nation, the country’s principal newspaper, which is aligned with Guelleh’s government. “Most of them live abroad. The people don’t trust someone who moves his family to Europe, because he doesn’t believe in the development of our country.”
That’s one way of looking at it, but what if the opposition leaders didn’t choose to move abroad so much as they were forced to flee? The most visible leader of the opposition, Abdourahman Boreh, lives in London. He once was one of Guelleh’s closest confidants and oversaw the country’s free-trade zone and port, which is by far the biggest driver of the economy. In 2008 the government accused Boreh of taking kickbacks when he negotiated on Djibouti’s behalf for the construction of a container terminal, managed by the Dubai-based company DP World. Boreh says the accusation was in retaliation for his opposition to Guelleh’s plan to seek a third term.












Menelik Square, in central Djibouti City.

Threatened with arrest, Boreh fled to London. Djibouti soon seized all of Boreh’s assets inside the country, and in 2010 its courts convicted him in absentia on terrorism charges: He was the mastermind, the government alleged, of a politically motivated grenade attack on a local grocery store. The conviction allowed Guelleh’s government to freeze Boreh’s assets worldwide and to try to extradite him to Djibouti to face a 15-year prison sentence.
The key evidence in the terrorism case was a tapped cell phone call. “Last night the act was completed,” Boreh was recorded saying. “The people heard it, and it had a deep resonance.”
The call, however, wasn’t made after the supermarket blast; it was recorded the day before.
The corruption charges against Boreh were tried in a London court, which had jurisdiction over the case because extradition hadn’t yet been granted. Djibouti’s lawyer, from the American-based firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, hid the timing of the intercepted call from the British courts. After the discrepancy was discovered, a British judge last year reprimanded Djibouti and its lawyer for “reprehensible” conduct. Early this March, the judge dismissed every one of the government’s claims, concluding that Guelleh himself had been aware of the terms of the deals with DP World. The court ordered Djibouti to pay Boreh £9.3 million, or about $13.1 million, for his legal fees.
A couple weeks before my visit, supporters of the Djibouti opposition based in Paris issued a letter urging the international community—“especially those countries with a military base or who are partners in development”—to hold Guelleh to democratic standards. The statement referred to an incident in December when government security forces killed 19 people, including a 6-year-old girl, at a meeting organized in part by opposition members. (The government disputes the death toll, contending that seven people were killed.) I asked the U.S. ambassador if Guelleh’s reputation as a crusher of dissent was something the U.S. would simply have to live with, given the importance of Camp Lemonnier.
“We don’t want to have to ‘live with it,’ ” he said. “For our presence here to be sustainable in the long term, this place has to be governed with transparency.”
But the U.S. has already signed on for the long term. In 2014 it extended its lease on the base for at least 20 more years. In negotiating the terms of that deal, Guelleh nearly doubled America’s rent, to about $64 million per year.
“In the colonial period, everything in Djibouti was viewed negatively. They all said we only had a hot sun, dry winds, and a lot of rocks. … But now the negatives are positives”
Before I arrived in Djibouti, I carried a picture in my mind of what untapped African economic potential, in the traditionally exploitative sense, was supposed to look like: The dirt was red, the leaves were green, and the hills sparkled on the inside. But the ministers in President Guelleh’s cabinet all tried to paint me a much different picture of modern opportunity. Imagine a trackless desert, a relentless sun, and a near-complete absence of fresh water. With that lineup of natural resources—along with a port on one of the most geopolitically significant straits in the world—they believe that in the next 20 years or so, Djibouti will become the next Dubai, a magnet for capital and free trade. To hear them talk, making billions by selling the world’s militaries on the country’s lack of incident was just the first step.
“And why not?” asks Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf. “We have some assets that Dubai never had.”
First, there’s that shipping lane. It’s busier than Dubai’s. Second, there are all those landlocked African countries stacked up behind it; they’re desperate for a portal to the wider world. Third, there’s the infrastructure. Not traditional infrastructure, which, China notwithstanding, is still in short supply, but rather digital infrastructure. Seven submarine fiber-optic cables, the kind that carry the vast majority of the world’s digital information, come ashore in Djibouti, making it the most important hub of connectivity in East Africa. “Forget gigabytes,” says Finance Minister Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh. “We offer terabytes.”
Instead of a bountiful freshwater reservoir, Djibouti has Lac Assal, which is 10 times saltier than the ocean and where the only sign of aquamarine life is an abundance of common bacteria; it’s also beautiful, in an extraplanetary sort of way, and the centerpiece of the government’s tourism plan.
The scouring Khamsin winds, which blow through the country from June to August, are being harnessed to power a 60-megawatt wind farm, and the pitiless sun, which beats down with near-kinetic force, will power solar energy developments and more than quadruple the country’s total domestic energy output. Within a decade, the government hopes to be the first country in Africa to be powered solely by renewable energy.
“It’s interesting,” says Ali Yacoub Mahamoud, the minister of energy and natural resources. “In the colonial period, everything in Djibouti was viewed negatively. They all said we only had a hot sun, dry winds, and a lot of rocks. Nothing valuable. Even the nomads felt that way. But now the negatives are positives.”






Ethiopia sits landlocked behind Djibouti, deeply dependent on the port. The Middle East is just 13 miles across the water.


When the dinner crowd leaves La Chaumière each night, the lobby of the Sheraton fills up. For contractors and foreign militaries, the hotel is a quasi-permanent supplementary barracks. One floor is occupied almost solely by German soldiers. When I try to connect to the hotel Wi-Fi, I’m given two network options: one for guests, one for “Germans.” I can’t find a single tourist here.
At night in the lobby bar, six German soldiers are playing cards, leaning into the game over a low table. Along the far wall, 14 Japanese sailors stare at 13 cell phones (two of them share one, watching a video). Two American contractors, tech workers, are snacking on fruit, eyeing it suspiciously, and slandering their bosses.
One starts punching numbers into the calculator on his phone, tabulating hours worked, unclaimable expenses, total wages. He puts the phone down and leans back in his chair. “A thousand dollars a week,” he says.
“A thousand? Hell, we can make that at home.”
“That’s what I’m saying.” He tastes a wedge of orange and makes a face. “Why are we here?”
They don’t come up with an answer, as if they're unwilling to believe history could have deposited them in this remote, forlorn corner of the world. But the country where nothing happens no longer exists.
(Corrects President Guelleh's relationship to his predecessor in the 33rd paragraph, and updates with statement from government regarding death toll in the 40th paragraph.)











Wednesday, June 7, 2017

PLA CHINA : Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017





NEW 

  [1]Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017

           [ A]  http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/06/pla-china-military-and-security.html



                                       111 - I N D E X - 111

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/111-index.html  ]











SOURCE:
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF?source=GovDelivery





               
                                               [ GWADAR ]

                              JAI HO 

- MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



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The historic blunder of India no one talks about - DailyO


http://www.dailyo.in/politics/chabahar-gwadar-port-india-pakistan-china-ties-cpec-afghanistan/story/1/11256.html





Jun 18, 2016
 - After independence, Gwadar port was reportedly first offered to India by Sultan of Oman but India declined to accept the gift.

                     BESIDES ABOVE

 BRITAIN HAD REQUESTED TO STATION                    ONE INDIAN DIVISON
                               AT 
        BAGHDAD & EAST AFRICA 
- VERABLY THOUGH KNOWN SUBJECT                                     TO 
    AUTHENTICATION BY MEA





China May Set Up Military Base(s) 

                                  in 

                            Pakistan









  Military and Security Developments 
                       Involving
   the People’s Republic of China 2017


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CLICK/GOOGLE TO OPEN THE FULL REPORT

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF?source=GovDelivery


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China could set up a military base in Pakistan and it has capabilities to launch precision strikes at distances of 10,000 km or more with its road-mobile nuclear missiles, warns a report of the US Department of Defence released today by the Pentagon in the US.


Titled “Annual report to the Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017”, it says: “China, most likely, will seek to establish additional military bases in countries with which it has a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan.”



The US report said Pakistan had a precedent for hosting foreign militaries. It did not specify what kind of base could China have in Pakistan — a seaport or a land-based port. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has the provision of making a huge port at Gawadar — some 100 miles west of Karachi. Chinese submarines have used the Pakistan Navy’s facilities at Karachi to dock and refuel.



In another India-related aspect, the report says the focus areas of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) include China’s borders with India and North Korea, East China Sea, the South China Sea. India has un-demarcated 3,488-km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) which is deemed to be the boundary with China.



In February 2016, Beijing started construction of first overseas military base at Djibouti on the north-eastern African Coast. The report hinted at how China was also supplying submarines to India’s neighbours. “Last year, China signed an agreement with Pakistan for the sale of eight submarines. The first four will be built in China, with the remaining four in Pakistan,” the 106-page report said. It listed Bangladesh and Burma — both India’s neighbours — as the other customers of China.



The US report talks about China’s military reforms started in February 2016, saying: “These seek to enhance the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations; improve its ability to fight short-duration and high-intensity regional conflicts at greater distances from the Chinese mainland.”



The PLA, which is biggest standing Army in the world, established five regionally based joint theaters, replacing the decades-old ground force-dominated seven military regions (MR). “PLA reforms appear to have oriented each new theatre command towards a specific set of contingencies,” said the report. India faces the PLA’s Western theatre and also the Tibet Area command.



The PLA Navy places a high priority on the modernisation of its submarine force. It currently possesses five nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and 54 diesel-powered attack submarines (SS). By 2020, this force is likely to grow to anywhere between 69 and 78 submarines.


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https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF?source=GovDelivery