Showing posts with label BORDER DISPUTES. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BORDER DISPUTES. Show all posts

Sunday, May 7, 2017

L O C JAMMU & KASHMIR : BATTALION ACTION TEAM [BAT]

SOURCE:
http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in/2013/10/loc-downside-of-bat-actions.html?m=1







      

     BATTALION ACTION TEAM [BAT]
                                    OF
       PAK INFANTRY BATTALIONS 




LOC: The Downside of BAT Actions        



October 5, 2013 
Updated 05 May,2017.



The recent ongoing Pakistani intrusions on the Line of Control must be understood in the larger perspective of the Pakistan’s philosophy of keeping the LC alive by Border Action Teams(BAT). Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain explains the nuances to clear misconceptions about the LC dynamics.

During the 06 Aug 2013 flare up on the LC (LoC) in the Poonch Sector and the beheading incident in Jan 2013 the common string of information was that the targeted killing of Indian Jawans on the LC was executed by BATs. Even in the Army, not many would boast of knowing what BATs are, how do they function (modus operandi), what effects they have and how the Indian Army handles the threat. In the typical lackadaisical way that the public treats matters military not many sought more information on BATs, preferring to leave them to our professional Army to handle.

In a way that is a positive because the world of the LC is the domain of just a few who have had the honour and the ‘sugar high’ of serving in the razor sharp environment that presents itself daily in the ‘border areas’ of Jammu & Kashmir. It may be appropriate to clarify some of the basic ingredients of this high drama environment.

What is the LC?

The LC is different to the LAC (Line of Actual Control), different to the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) and much different to the Working Boundary (a term used only by Pakistan). The LAC alludes to the land boundary between the areas currently held by China and India along the Northern borders and the AGPL refers to the un-demarcated area north east of NJ 9842. To detail these aspects would be to digress from the main issue the LC, which is quite often called LoC by the media but the Army prefers to shorten it to the more colloquial LC.

The LC is an imaginary line running along the current frontier between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Although the Instrument of Accession of 26 Aug 1947 and Joint Resolution of the two Houses of Parliament of Jul 1994 place the whole of Jammu and Kashmir with India, the actual ground position has emerged over the last 65 years commencing with Pakistan’s invasion in 1947 the conflicts of 1965, 1971 and 1999 (Kargil), as also the proxy war launched by Pakistan since 1989. The LC runs well east of the actual International Boundary (IB) and is the alignment along which the operations of 1947-48 came to a halt thus creating Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK-often referred as Azad Kashmir, or AK, by Pakistan). Unlike the IB there are no boundary pillars (BPs) delineating the LC, however, there are a series of mostly unrecognizable landmarks such as boulders, trees and nullahs which have undergone change over years. The Indian and Pakistan Armies are in eyeball contact in their various pillboxes and picquets all along the alignment but at places terrain constraints may separate the two by two or more km.

It is an environment little known to the outside world, where the notion of ‘Grabbers, Keepers’ exists. Translating this into reality it means that any side grabbing a piece of ground for a tactical advantage gets to keep it unless forcibly evicted (recall Kargil 1999).

Events Leading to Current Status

All was well on the LC till 1989 or so except the sporadic shootouts of lower intensity which took place for the sake of ‘moral ascendancy’. A much misunderstood term, ‘moral ascendancy’ remains even today a task for the wily infantrymen and encompasses a range of sub tasks primary being the sanctity of the LC, (no loss of ground) and prevention of rogue actions by Pakistan.

In 1989 things started to change drastically with the belief among the Kashmiri populace that ‘Azadi’ or merger with Pakistan was becoming a reality. The proxy war within the Valley had to be sustained by Pakistan through induction of terrorists, explosives, military hardware and finances. The LC became the obvious conduit through which all this happened. Much against the common belief that the LC is manned metre to metre the ground reality is that there are large gaps dictated by terrain factors, logistics and climatic constraints. It is these gaps which were exploited and converted to ‘highways’ (a terrorist term) for movement of terrorists, potential terrorists(recruits), hardware, explosives and finances.

The Army was forced to redeploy and selectively reinforce at the cost of its counter terrorist operational grid in the Valley floor. This left many of its LC picquets weaker as a new dimension was added to the task of ‘sanctity of the LC’ this was Counter Infiltration. Sensing a great opportunity the Pakistan Army commenced selectively targeting Indian picquets with a mix of regular troops and well trained terrorists (those who had undergone Daura-e-Khas training). The purpose force back Indian Army counter infiltration ambushes, located between picquets and thus create the gaps needed for infiltration. Unprovoked firing by Pakistani posts further forced the creation of gaps. All this occurred in the Nineties and progressive lessons learnt by the Pakistan Army refined the BAT concept.

Characteristics of BATs

Border Action Teams comprise a mix of Pakistan Army regulars, Pakistan Special Forces elements and high profile terrorists (Jihadis) who are trained to cross the LC to execute raids on Indian picquets, ambushes and patrol parties or logistics elements. Strength has mostly been experienced to be 15 to 20. Beheading has been one of the modus operandi adopted by these teams to cause scare and impose immense caution on their targets. The immediate effect of information about concentration of a BAT opposite a particular segment of the LC is an inevitable strengthening of the defensive stance; stronger patrols, more protection for logistics elements such as mule trains which carry advance winter stocking stores; all this at the cost of the counter infiltration grid. The situation can then be exploited for strong infiltration bids through gaps. Quite obviously BAT actions are in the mold of terrorist acts launched with the intent of imposing caution and creating the tactical conditions for terrorist infiltration.

The Coming of the LC Fence

The inevitable question does the Indian Army sit on its haunches waiting to be attacked; far from it. Indian infantry units are known to have wreaked revenge and delivered telling blows on the Pakistan Army and terrorists. In years before the Cease Fire came into place on 26 Nov 2003 exchange of Arty Fire and direct firing heavy weapons was common place. Many an ingenius Indian gunner and infantry commander innovated and caused much destruction on the Pakistan Army. Among others the name of Brigadier Jasbir Lidder (later Lt Gen), Commander of the high profile 12 Infantry Brigade (Uri) is well known for his famous quip “When Uri rumbles, Chakhoti (PoK town opposite Uri) crumbles”. The ingenius LC fence constructed along the 16 & 15 Corps frontages under the outstanding leadership of then COAS Gen Nirmal Vij greatly altered the odds of infiltration. This needs to be understood in the right perspective as the annual reconstruction of the Fence (an expensive exercise in men and material) is very often questioned within the Army and the less informed bureaucratic circles. 

The LC Fence

The LC Fence changed much more than just the awe inspiring landscape of the Pir Panjal and Shamshabari ranges. It altered what we call the ‘mathematics of terror’ in Jammu & Kashmir. Prior to 01 Jul 2004 (the date the Fence officially came in existence) Pakistan successfully infiltrated 2000-3000 terrorists across the LC each year. On an average 1400-1500 were killed in engagements with the Indian Army on the LC or in the hinterland. The residual figures were always in favour of Pakistan. Then came General Nirmal Vij who led the construction of the Fence from the plains to the obscene heights of the Shamshabari, flaying the ‘nay sayers’. It altered everything. The Indian Army now had an obstacle to concentrate upon and converted it from a mere line of barbed wire to a system comprising steel, lead, electronics, ether and human beings.

By 2006 the Indian Army had acquired the knowledge and experience of exploiting the LC Fence which was leaking just a few hundred terrorists annually while the Army eliminated double the number in its CI/CT operations. The mathematics were now reversed leading to the situation in 2011-12 when less than 300 terrorists roamed the Valley and 19 top terrorists leaders were eliminated with focused CT operations. The transformational ‘Heart Doctrine’ combined with this approach almost brought Kashmir to the doorstep of conflict stabilization awaiting conflict resolution.

The media and the public have often questioned how BATs can enter 400 500 meters into our side and conduct an operation. There is a simple answer to this. In 2003-4 when the LC Fence was constructed there was no ceasefire for most of the period; hence the Fence had to be constructed well away from the LC at most places. Where ever we were/are in domination the construction was well forward, hugging the LC. The Fence gives natural protection against rogue actions but where it is aligned well inside we per force have picquets/posts/detachments ahead but not necessarily on the LC as long as the area ahead can be dominated by fire. Small patrols are used to dominate this space and these are the patrols which are vulnerable to BAT actions. BATs can therefore enter minefields with considerable risk but no other obstacle prevents them from accessing the Indian Army’s patrol bases or routes of patrolling near (400-500 metres) the LC.

To expect Pakistan Army to use BATs more extensively after the Indian Army’s successful handling of the situation in J&K in 2011-12, is to state the obvious. We often hear of the phrase ‘keeping the pot boiling’ in Kashmir while Pakistan handles the Afghan border and its internal security threats. To execute this concept Pakistan requires its terrorist foot soldiers (boots on the ground) in J&K; to allow the fast dwindling strength to reduce even further would be a catastrophe for the ISI’s post 2014 strategy in J&K. Hence the necessity to once again force creation of gaps on the LC to facilitate infiltration.

Many veterans of the Army would recall some of the well known BAT actions which were launched against Indian Army units and the counter actions taken by the same units. The Indian Army has foiled many more BAT actions than the ones which have succeeded. Only a year ago 16 PUNJAB foiled a major action in the Tangdhar Sector. 

Handling BATs at Different Levels

In my long years handling the LC from unit to a Corps Commander I always found the threats from BATs as the most challenging and relished countering these. In 2008 a Pakistan Army unit decided to send a 15 man officer led team across the LC to dislodge a small detachment of my brave Rajputs who had temporarily occupied a patrol base to dominate an area of the LC not usually visited or patrolled. In the ensuing clash between four young Rajput soldiers without a senior leader and the 15 Pakistanis the Rajputs lost one soldier and killed 7 Pakistanis. All hell broke loose on the LC in a frontage of about 3 to 4 Km. My orders to the CO were crystal clear “’the night is yours, I do not want the Pakistani bases, from where the soldiers had emerged, to remain standing”. The Rajputs shocked me next morning when they reported the destruction caused to the Pakistan Army posts. The last hurrah was when a Pakistan Army helicopter emerged late the next afternoon and took away the Pakistani Brigade Commander; it was later learnt that he was removed from command; so much for the moral ascendancy achieved by the Rajputs. As the General Officer of the division I asked no one and no one advised me. It was my calling and the risk was also mine.

The above example displays just how Pakistan Army’s proactive and provocative stance on the LC needs to be handled. The offensive response by Indian Army units has to be reflected in their attitude from the moment they step into their area of responsibility. Most BAT actions take place during handing/taking over between units when command and control is supposedly loose. Infantry units do not realize that each action of theirs even before they arrive in their AOR is under surveillance. Many units having fearsome reputation will never be tested; others with lesser credentials and poor body language of their troops would get tested early. The first engagement if handled with professional aggression will allow a unit a tenure with little turbulence. Destiny has brought many units of both Armies from the Kargil war once again face to face on the LC. 

The reader must not go away with the impression that the Pakistan Army and terrorists rule the roost on the LC, far from it. Yet, it is imperative that our commanders be bold, trust their instinct, train their troops hard and wargame contingencies regularly. This is 24 x 7 soldiering where every movement has to be controlled and reactions kept ready; most important of all — time is the worst enemy of effectiveness on the LC. As a sector cools down so does the vigil and then one fine day it happens; there is only one solution to this constant reminders to all at the oddest time of the day or night. There is no rest on the LC; those who rest seldom live to tell the tales.

About the Author

Besides the optimum combination of ground soldiering, staff work and academics, Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain, the scholar warrior, is best known for his path breaking tenure as Corps Commander of the high profile 15 Corps in the Kashmir Valley, where he employed the most unique methods to stabilise the turbulence that the Valley had experienced giving it the best chance for a return to peace. He remains the only officer of the Army to be decorated six times by the President of India and was recently honoured by the Vice President with the Capital Foundation Society’s award for excellence in the field of military leadership. This article first appeared in South Asia Defence and Strategic Review defstrat.com.





Monday, April 17, 2017

IND- CHINA BORDER DISPUTE: Why China is Miffed

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/why-china-is-miffed/392889.html



                          TIBET THE SPIRITUAL 

                 AUTONOMOUS  REGION OF INDIA

                                     AWAITING TO BE LIBERATED




                GOD FAVOURS  BIG  GUNS 

                                     

                  NOT DEEP POCKETS 

                                   AND

                      INDIA HAS NO GUNS 

                                    BUT 

                     ONLY BIG SCAMS

                                        &

                     BIG COMMISSIONS     

                                                 - VASUNDHRA                                            

 ****************************************


              Why China is Miffed

                                  By

             Gen VP Malik (Retd)

It isn’t just about the Dalai Lama, it is to do with ambition & growth

 

                                                  HARD TIMES: India will require greater political ingenuity to come out of this mess.




INDIA-CHINA 

relations are sinking once again. 

But it would be naive to consider this development only in the light of the Dalai Lama’s visit to the Tawang monastery: it was his fifth visit to Arunachal Pradesh and third to Tawang.

 The reasons for Chinese fulmination are more fundamental and strategic in nature. 

As large and fast growing Asian powerhouses, China and India have become increasing mindful of their territorial integrity and security, strategic and economic ambitions, and manoeuvring space in the global environment. China’s strategic alliance with Pakistan, blocking India’s entry into the NSG and the UNSC, denying  the declaration of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist, its steady outreach to India’s other neighbours in South Asia, and its territorial claims in the area of South China Sea are some of its strategic assertions. 

The fundamental reason, however, remains the dispute over the China-India boundary after China’s PLA occupied Tibet in 1950. The India-China war (1962), skirmishes at Nathu La (1969), at Wangdung (1986), and several attempted intrusions along the disputed boundary have made this the most sensitive issue. 

Let us check on the hotspots — India’s Northeast first. During the 1962 war, after routing India in Kameng (Arunachal Pradesh), the PLA occupied Tawang and came up to Chakoo, south of Bomdila. After the unilateral ceasefire, the PLA withdrew to its present positions on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), 35 km north of Tawang. During that period, China failed to woo the Monpa population of Tawang who kept themselves aloof from the Chinese. 

When talks began, China was prepared to accept the territorial status quo in the Northeast if India would accept the post-war status quo in Ladakh. After 1985, it began to claim Tawang, and later the whole of Arunachal because it is ‘inalienable from China’s Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative jurisdiction’. China opposes even development projects there.
The claims over Arunachal have become shrill and threatening, notwithstanding that the claim repudiates Article VII of the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China Boundary Question of 2005. Its cardinal provision states, ‘In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.’
The situation in India’s northwest is more complex. In the 1950s, China constructed a strategic road connecting Tibet to China’s Xinjiang through the Aksai Chin area of J&K claimed by India. The dispute became one of the triggers for the 1962 war. In 1963, Pakistan and China signed an agreement wherein Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam valley, part of J&K territory of Northern Areas occupied by Pakistan, to China. This area forms a wedge between Afghanistan and Xinjiang and provides land route links between China and Pakistan. The status of Northern Areas was kept nebulous as Pakistan’s constitution did not recognise Northern Areas as Pakistan territory. It was area ‘under the actual control of Pakistan’. 
Article 6 of the pact stated, ‘The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the government of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) on the boundary so as to sign a formal boundary treaty.’ Its next paragraph stated, ‘Provided that in the event of the sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provision of this agreement and the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary to be signed between the PRC and Pakistan.’
But now China tows the Pakistani line on J&K and its troops and engineers are deployed in parts of the PoK. Two years ago, when China and Pakistan decided to build the CPEC with $46 billion investment, China again safeguarded its strategic stake (and overcome the possibility of India’s objections), insisting that ‘disputed territory’ tag be removed from Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan has obliged. After a constitutional amendment, the region will soon be declared as Pakistan’s fifth province. With a change in the political status of Gilgit-Baltistan, China would make significant territorial and strategic gains even though this development would have repercussions for India, Pakistan, and the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.
The Chinese vision for the CPEC goes back to the 1950s, primarily to acquire access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. That motivated them to construct the Karakoram highway and take up construction at Gwadar. The CPEC is a collection of projects intended to modernise Pakistani infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of high-speed motorways and railway networks, energy projects and special economic zones. In the process, Xinjiang will get direct access to Gwadar. The mega project will mark a major advance in China’s plans to boost its influence in the Central, South and West Asia. One has to admire the Chinese leadership’s strategic vision!
While working on the prognosis of these developments, we should also factor in the national power edge that China enjoys over India. There is little doubt that the balance of power will continue to shift in China’s favour.
On the face of it, India and China have a cordial, cooperative, bilateral relationship. There is the civilisation relationship, economic cooperation, the annual strategic, political and economic dialogues; even some military cooperation. But China’s competitive relationship far outweighs the cooperative one. As Aaron Freidburg states, ‘Relations between great powers cannot be sustained by inertia, commerce or mere sentiments’. The deep strategic fissures cannot — should not — be ignored. 
The foremost India-China bilateral problem is of unresolved boundary. China says that Tibet, including south Tibet, is a ‘core issue’ and there will be no compromise over territorial integrity. The problem is that most of China’s neighbours do not know which Chinese era is its territorial benchmark. What exactly is the Chinese territory? China recognises McMahon Line as its boundary with Myanmar but not with India. Till date, it has successfully evaded giving any meaningful idea of their version of the LAC in spite of undertaking to do so in solemn bilateral agreements.
Paul Kennedy in his book The Rise and Fall of Great Powers has stated that ‘Long-term shifts in economic productivity of nations are co-terminus with the increase or decrease of their global influence.’ After successfully developing its economy, China is now revealing its imperious intent more openly.
According to Henry Kissinger, ‘The PRC leadership is capable of extreme elasticity and pliability, surpassing the marvels witnessed in the fantastic physical contortions of the famed Chinese circus gymnasts.’ He also states, ‘The familiar Chinese style of dealing with strategic decisions is: thorough analysis; careful preparation; attention to psychological and political factors; quest for surprise; and rapid conclusion.’
In the coming days, we can expect more of coercive diplomacy and bullying tactics from China. More incidents along the LAC, even border skirmishes cannot be ruled out. China may also encourage Pakistan to create new diplomatic and security pressure points over India. 
India will require greater political ingenuity, determination and more effective military response capability to safeguard its national interests.
 The writer is a former Army Chief




















Thursday, April 6, 2017

GEO STRATEGY : Sino-Indian Strategic Dialogue: Differences In Strategic Thinking (R)

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/04042017-sino-indian-strategic-dialogue-differences-in-strategic-thinking-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29







Sino-Indian Strategic Dialogue: Differences In Strategic Thinking – 

                                By

                         Siwei Liu*



By 



India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi with China's President Xi Jinping. Photo Credit: Narendra Modi, Wikipedia Commons.


 


China and India reopened a new round of strategic dialogue in Beijing February. Admittedly, the dialogue has important implications for maintaining strategic stability in a changing regional security environment. But it has also revealed the differences in the two sides’ strategic mindsets. These differences feed into the trust deficit and will eventually weaken the dialogue process.

The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui and the Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar co-chaired the strategic dialogue held on 22 February 2017 in Beijing. During the seven hour-long talks, the two countries exchanged views on bilateral ties as well as regional and international issues of common concern. There is no denying that this was the right time for the two Asian giants to have such a comprehensive dialogue.
This was the first round of strategic dialogue held since the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014. Before this, the two sides had six rounds of dialogue from 2005 to 2014. Therefore, there is symbolic importance to the reopening of this dialogue for Sino-Indian relations as well. It demonstrates that both sides expect to see a more stable and healthy bilateral relationship.

Similarly, the practical significance of the strategic dialogue is also evident. Tthe new periphery strategies of both countries – China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and India’s Indo-Pacific strategy – to some extent, have caused discomfort to each other. In addition, the new security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region also bring some uncertainties and challenges to China-India strategic relations. It was important, therefore, for both countries to reopen dialogue and discuss how to avoid strategic misunderstanding.

The dialogue attracted considerable attention in various communities in the two countries, including the media. Unfortunately, it seemed that the dialogue was very hard to conduct from a practical point of view. In fact, some Indian analysts have started to complain about the results and expressed disappointment that the dialogue did not address a series of issues that have troubled Sino-Indian relations as they stand today. Similarly, Chinese experts argue that the two countries should use the mechanism to push forward greater strategic convergence rather than get entangled in strategic differences.
The difference in strategic mindsets played an important role in the conduct and results of this round of the Sino-Indian strategic dialogue. Both countries represent ‘oriental’ cultures; however, China and India “think differently.” China’s strategic mindset is more dialectical, synthetic, and also focused on long-term strategic planning. It is quite different from the Indian mindset, which is more abstract, exceptionalism-driven, and in favour of pursuing practical solutions at the tactical level
China and India bring their differing priorities shaped by these different styles of thinking or approaches to the negotiating table.

The Indian side preferred to bring up sensitive issues like India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), getting the UN to impose sanctions on Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar, among others. It appeared that India preferred to solve current problems and differences before pushing the bilateral strategic relations forward.

The Chinese prefer to understand bilateral ties though a big-picture analysis. Fu Ying, a Chinese diplomat, pointed out that, “the two sides should see trees, but also the forest.” Although Beijing was looking to narrow strategic differences through the dialogue, it also was inclined to discuss strategic convergence, including prospects of promoting regional cooperation. Beijing hoped to create a friendly atmosphere for bilateral ties. Contrary to Indian thinking, the Chinese are looking at establishing friendly bilateral relations before addressing specific issues between the two countries.
Admittedly, this is not the first strategic dialogue between China and India and both sides seemed to be highly attuned to each other’s way of thinking. Not just that – the maladjustment, to some extent, also made them uncomfortable. Delhi was obviously disappointed that China disregarded its demands on solving some sensitive issues. Although Beijing tried to address Indian concerns – for instance, a delegate who was an expert on nuclear issues had joined the dialogue on the Chinese side – the Chinese were not comfortable with the Indian over-emphasis on differences between the two sides rather than focusing on the convergences. Beijing does not want to allow these differences to cloud the overall relationship.
Perhaps it is necessary that the Chinese and Indian sides unstudy each other’s strategic mindset more closely. This also includes a better understanding of the other’s strategic culture. The conduct of the latest strategic dialogue has shown that a more open and creative attitude is the only way to have a successful Sino-Indian dialogue.

* Siwei Liu
Associate Researcher, Institution of South Asian Studies, Sichuan University, China






Wednesday, January 18, 2017

DELHI PAKRO : IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN DO WHY NOT CHINKS

SOURCE
https://www.thequint.com/world/2017/01/16/can-china-army-reach-new-delhi-in-2-days-cold-start-doctrine-chinese-state-tv-war-with-india



DELHI PAKRO : IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN DO  WHY NOT CHINKS


















This is not the first time China has tried to use rhetoric as a deterrence strategy against India, but it comes as probably the first one which is as specific. (Photo: iStock)






DELHI PAKRO
DO NOT LAUGH IT OFF. YES IT CAN BE DONE - VASUNDHRA

[ THE ANSWER LIES IN THE CONCEPT OF CENTRE  OF GRAVITY OF BATTLE FIELD.[COG] FIELD MARSHAL ROMEL HAS DISCUSSED & TOUCHED UPON IT DURING NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN & SO HAVE THE NUMEROUS MILITARY THINKERS. NOW CHINESE ARE ON IT. YES DELHI CAN BE CAPTURED IN 48 Hrs, BUT AFTER CAPTURE HOW WILL THEY WITHDRAW or WILL THEY WITHDRAW ? ]

 IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN get  DELHI CAPTURED   WITH A  COY GROUP  of ARMY, WHY CHINKS CANNOT DO WITH  THE THIRD LARGEST ARMY!!!!!!!!


Can China’s Army Really Reach Delhi in 2 Days? Nope, Say Experts






YEP, SAYS VASUNDHRA




“It would take China's motorised troops 48 hours and its paratroops 10 hours to reach India's capital if war broke out,” a Chinese State television channel boldly proclaimed.

This is not the first time China has tried to use rhetoric as a deterrence strategy but it comes as probably the first one that is so specific. 

Interestingly, this also comes on the back of Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat’s pointed comment on honing India’s Cold Start strategy for Pakistan.


Does the Chinese state TV’s statement come as nothing more than a deterrence tool, or are the claims viable?


‘A Ridiculous Remark Made Without Any Practicality’



Experts and retired army officers were quick to rubbish this as illogical rhetoric, and questioned the logistics of the provocative claim. The ill-thought-out remark shows the level of understanding of the people who’ve made it, said retired colonel Rohit Agarwal. Speaking to The Quint, he broke the comment down and analysed its impracticality.
For motorised troops to infiltrate the mountainous terrain of the north-eastern border of India and advance further inside is not possible, he said.








Soldiers of Indian Army and Chinese Army undertaking endurance exercises during Indo-China Joint Military exercise in November 2016. (Photo Courtesy: Twitter/@adgpi)
Soldiers of Indian Army and Chinese Army undertaking endurance exercises during Indo-China Joint Military exercise in November 2016. (Photo Courtesy: Twitter/@adgpi)


If you’re talking about motorised troops, you need to first look at the terrain. Where will those troops come from? All of our north-eastern border is mountainous, so, even if they plan on using that route for their troops, how far can they advance?
 Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army



As far as the paratroops are concerned, anyone can drop paratroops anywhere, said a former Indian army commander to The Quint. Putting the situation in perspective, he said:
If it takes their paratroops 10 hours to reach Delhi then theoretically it will take even our paratroops the same time to reach Beijing.
Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army
Agarwal explained that depending on the flying time and the time taken to prepare, why just 10 hours? One can drop paratroopers anywhere anytime, but what thereafter? What possibilities will they have after landing in foreign territory? Will it be a clandestine operation? If so, what will it lead to? It would then be a full-scale escalation, he added.
You can drop paratroopers in Delhi as and when you like, but what will they do once they reach the ground? So, I think it’s just rhetoric.
 Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army

Agarwal says it’s difficult to discern what might have prompted the state channel to issue the remark. But China is always looking to send messages and threats to India or even United States, said Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret’d).
This claim is beyond ridiculous. It’s saying their motorised troops will reach Delhi in 48 hours – how will they cross the Himalayas?
 Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret’d)



Further, a former Army commander explained that notwithstanding all the disputes India has with China and Pakistan, the chances of a war are extremely low.
This is nothing but a figment of imagination of the television channel and a matter of who they’re quoting and how. It’s just imaginations running wild and typical punchline reporting by the state channel.
Former Army Commander

The Chinese state TV’s comment was issued without context and, seeing the experts’ views, is being interpreted as mere rhetoric – thus negating any deterrence effect it may have sought to achieve.

PS 

  CHINKS  WOULD OPEN A   OPERATION MAINTENANCE  AXIS FROM SHILPA PASS TO  SIMLA TO CHANDIGARH TO DELHI IN 48 HRS  & WILL DO SO ON OTHER MAIN & SUBSIDARY AXIS AS PER THEIR OPERATION PLANS





DELHI PAKRO
Do not laugh it off. Yes it can be done 

The answer lies in the concept of Centre Of Gravity of Battle Field (COG)  Field Marshal Rommel  has discussed and touched upon it during North African campaign & so have   the numerous military thinkers.. Now the chinese are on it(COG). Yes Delhi can be captured in  in H plus 48 Hrs  but after capture how will they withdraw or will they withdraw at all ? 


IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN get  DELHI CAPTURED   WITH A  COY GROUP  of ARMY, WHY CHINKS CANNOT DO WITH  THE THIRD LARGEST ARMY!!!!!!!!


Coming to hard facts

After Sumdrung chu incident Chinese have developed the capability to induct one air borne division in 24 hrs, one Airborne corps in 72 hours & they have practically demonstrated by launching a para division within two to four hours in the earth quake zone of 2009( ?year)

With the advent of Railway line they can induct 25 to 30 divisons to Lhasa in thirty days with micro induction management. Their road communication in Tibet is almost first class. Chinese have a full fledged Airfield/port with SIX KILOMETER runway    Sixty kilometers as the crow flies off CHUSUL south of NGARI in tibet,  including at Shigaste & Lhasa. From Ngari flying of heavy weight crafts  time to Chandigarh is one hour & to Delhi 2   minus hours (minus). Chinese do have a capability till 2009 to airlift a division & para drop. Which they must have improved probably to a Corps.

 It is fact that they can capture Arunachal  & Aksai chin in 48 hours & Indians response time is estimated to be 7 days.  In Ladhak they will link with PAKIS at Siachen for which they do have a large sand model at pass HAJI ALI What ever I say here is all available  on the net and much more. Cutting it short Chinese have the capability to capture Chandigarh & Palam  in H pls 8 hrs and link up with motorised divisons  combo with airlift in D plus   48hrs . It is possible.& be assured Indians will not know what has hit them .

THIS IS A FACT. I AM NOT JOKING -                                                                          Vasundhra