SOURCE https://www.thequint.com/world/2017/01/16/can-china-army-reach-new-delhi-in-2-days-cold-start-doctrine-chinese-state-tv-war-with-india DELHI PAKRO : IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN DO WHY NOT CHINKS
This is not the first time China has tried to use rhetoric as a deterrence strategy against India, but it comes as probably the first one which is as specific. (Photo: iStock)
DELHI PAKRO DO NOT LAUGH IT OFF. YES IT CAN BE DONE - VASUNDHRA [ THE ANSWER LIES IN THE CONCEPT OF CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF BATTLE FIELD.[COG] FIELD MARSHAL ROMEL HAS DISCUSSED & TOUCHED UPON IT DURING NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN & SO HAVE THE NUMEROUS MILITARY THINKERS. NOW CHINESE ARE ON IT. YES DELHI CAN BE CAPTURED IN 48 Hrs, BUT AFTER CAPTURE HOW WILL THEY WITHDRAW or WILL THEY WITHDRAW ? ] IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN get DELHI CAPTURED WITH A COY GROUP of ARMY, WHY CHINKS CANNOT DO WITH THE THIRD LARGEST ARMY!!!!!!!!
Can China’s Army Really Reach Delhi in 2 Days? Nope, Say Experts
Sameeksha Khare
YEP, SAYS VASUNDHRA
“It would take China's motorised troops 48 hours and its paratroops 10 hours to reach India's capital if war broke out,” a Chinese State television channel boldly proclaimed.
This is not the first time China has tried to use rhetoric as a deterrence strategy but it comes as probably the first one that is so specific.
Interestingly, this also comes on the back of Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat’s pointed comment on honing India’s Cold Start strategy for Pakistan.
Does the Chinese state TV’s statement come as nothing more than a deterrence tool, or are the claims viable?
‘A Ridiculous Remark Made Without Any Practicality’
Experts and retired army officers were quick to rubbish this as illogical rhetoric, and questioned the logistics of the provocative claim. The ill-thought-out remark shows the level of understanding of the people who’ve made it, said retired colonel Rohit Agarwal. Speaking to The Quint, he broke the comment down and analysed its impracticality.
For motorised troops to infiltrate the mountainous terrain of the north-eastern border of India and advance further inside is not possible, he said.
Soldiers of Indian Army and Chinese Army undertaking endurance exercises during Indo-China Joint Military exercise in November 2016. (Photo Courtesy: Twitter/@adgpi)
If you’re talking about motorised troops, you need to first look at the terrain. Where will those troops come from? All of our north-eastern border is mountainous, so, even if they plan on using that route for their troops, how far can they advance?
Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army
As far as the paratroops are concerned, anyone can drop paratroops anywhere, said a former Indian army commander to The Quint. Putting the situation in perspective, he said:
If it takes their paratroops 10 hours to reach Delhi then theoretically it will take even our paratroops the same time to reach Beijing.
Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army
Agarwal explained that depending on the flying time and the time taken to prepare, why just 10 hours? One can drop paratroopers anywhere anytime, but what thereafter? What possibilities will they have after landing in foreign territory? Will it be a clandestine operation? If so, what will it lead to? It would then be a full-scale escalation, he added.
You can drop paratroopers in Delhi as and when you like, but what will they do once they reach the ground? So, I think it’s just rhetoric.
Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army
Agarwal says it’s difficult to discern what might have prompted the state channel to issue the remark. But China is always looking to send messages and threats to India or even United States, said Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret’d).
This claim is beyond ridiculous. It’s saying their motorised troops will reach Delhi in 48 hours – how will they cross the Himalayas?
Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret’d)
Further, a former Army commander explained that notwithstanding all the disputes India has with China and Pakistan, the chances of a war are extremely low.
This is nothing but a figment of imagination of the television channel and a matter of who they’re quoting and how. It’s just imaginations running wild and typical punchline reporting by the state channel.
Former Army Commander
The Chinese state TV’s comment was issued without context and, seeing the experts’ views, is being interpreted as mere rhetoric – thus negating any deterrence effect it may have sought to achieve.
PS CHINKS WOULD OPEN A OPERATION MAINTENANCE AXIS FROM SHILPA PASS TO SIMLA TO CHANDIGARH TO DELHI IN 48 HRS & WILL DO SO ON OTHER MAIN & SUBSIDARY AXIS AS PER THEIR OPERATION PLANS
DELHI PAKRO Do not laugh it off. Yes it can be done The answer lies in the concept of Centre Of Gravity of Battle Field (COG) Field Marshal Rommel has discussed and touched upon it during North African campaign & so have the numerous military thinkers.. Now the chinese are on it(COG). Yes Delhi can be captured in in H plus 48 Hrs but after capture how will they withdraw or will they withdraw at all ? IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN get DELHI CAPTURED WITH A COY GROUP of ARMY, WHY CHINKS CANNOT DO WITH THE THIRD LARGEST ARMY!!!!!!!! Coming to hard facts. After Sumdrung chu incident Chinese have developed the capability to induct one air borne division in 24 hrs, one Airborne corps in 72 hours & they have practically demonstrated by launching a para division within two to four hours in the earth quake zone of 2009( ?year). With the advent of Railway line they can induct 25 to 30 divisons to Lhasa in thirty days with micro induction management. Their road communication in Tibet is almost first class. Chinese have a full fledged Airfield/port with SIX KILOMETER runway Sixty kilometers as the crow flies off CHUSUL south of NGARI in tibet, including at Shigaste & Lhasa. From Ngari flying of heavy weight crafts time to Chandigarh is one hour & to Delhi 2 minus hours (minus). Chinese do have a capability till 2009 to airlift a division & para drop. Which they must have improved probably to a Corps. It is fact that they can capture Arunachal & Aksai chin in 48 hours & Indians response time is estimated to be 7 days. In Ladhak they will link with PAKIS at Siachen for which they do have a large sand model at pass HAJI ALI What ever I say here is all available on the net and much more. Cutting it short Chinese have the capability to capture Chandigarh & Palam in H pls 8 hrs and link up with motorised divisons combo with airlift in D plus 48hrs . It is possible.& be assured Indians will not know what has hit them . THIS IS A FACT. I AM NOT JOKING - Vasundhra
Bumla: The border post in Arunachal Pradesh where Sino-Indian officials meet at least four times a year. The issues they discuss here range from military incursions to civilians who stray across the border.
Classified military documents on China’s strategy for a limited war against India confirm our worst fears: China can take Arunachal in 48 hours. And we are in no hurry to do anything about it.
Repeated violations of the Indo-Chinese border lead to an escalation in the war of words, but India continues to believe that the Chinese are following their usual pattern of aggravation and conciliation. Rapid Reaction Forces, comprising 4 divisions stationed at Chengdu and Lanzhou after an overnight mobilisation cross rapidly into Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh. Indian defences are caught unawares, but the Fifth Mountain Division in Tenga engages the invading forces. They find themselves badly outmatched, not only outnumbered but also out-equipped because the Chinese RRF also include airborne assets. The Indian forces have no immediate airlift capacity to provide back up. Within the next 48 hours Arunachal is overrun. The other Indian divisions in the region need at least a week to reach the zone of conflict. By then, the Chinese have achieved their goal of winning a limited war.
The above scenario is no conjecture, it is a plausible outcome of theChinese doctrine of war against India. The Delhi-based Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), a tri-services institution for planning joint doctrines for the Indian military, in its assessment of Chinese military might, has analysed the Chinese plan for winning limited wars under hi-tech conditions.
The document, a copy of which is available with Open, speaks of a Chinese strategy based on the use of RRFs or ‘fist units’ to fight local wars that ‘can achieve the political objective rendering major wars unnecessary’. These fist units are self contained units to be deployed as ground forces in direct combat, and were raised after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) emphasis on numbers-in-action in a numerically huge army gave way to a capability-driven force.
In other words, the PLA has shifted away from the strategy that gave it victory in the 1962 war against India. But even today, the result is unlikely to be much different. Now, instead of overwhelming numbers, it is the rapidity of movement and mobilisation that is likely to overwhelm India, perhaps leading to a scenario no different from what transpired in 1962.
Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs):
»Total of 23 RRFs in China
»Elite Units trained to carry out ops in all types of terrain
»Meant to provide quick reaction capability to deal with contingencies of local/limited border conflicts
»Maintained at full strength
»Kept in high state of operation readiness
»Exempt from non-operational duties
»Provided modern equipment, high grade communications
»Capability of reaching anywhere within China in 7 days, likely to be reduced further
Speaking to Open, former Army Chief VP Malik confirms, “The Chinese have built infrastructure and have their Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) in place, and are prepared for short wars at the border, as far as movement of troops at short notice and arms are concerned, as they’ve been using an active defence strategy all along which has a certain amount of offensive in that. India earlier was thinking of converting one of its Army divisions into rapid reaction, but did not do it. We need to build our forces in terms of lift capability, landing, light arms and weapons, accordingly—something that was suggested by the IAF and Army earlier, but has not really taken off. Even electronically, the Chinese are far ahead of us.”
The IDS assessment of the Chinese WZC doctrine, done alongwith the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), talks about China’s three-fold War Zone Campaign (WZC) doctrine—elite force sharp arms (that is, suitable hi-tech equipment), fighting a quick battle to force a quick resolution and gaining initiative by striking first. For this purpose, ranged against India are the following:
»In Chengdu adjoining north eastern Arunachal Pradesh: 3 Divisions and one artillery brigade
»In Lanzhou adjoining northwestern Arunachal: 3 divisions and one artillery brigade
These divisions provide a strength of 94,000 men against which India has ranged 9 Mountain Divisions comprising 90,000 men, but most of these would not even enter the conflict. Of the six Chinese divisions, four are airborne RRFs and can be moved within 48 hours on the back of airlift capability granted by Y8, IL-76 and H5 transport planes in the region. With rail and road infrastructure in place, mobilisation time could be further reduced. The Lhasa-Beijing railway line, the highest in the world, would further help in transporting troops and logistics. In contrast, India’s first C-130J transport plane would enter service only in February 2011.[ENTERED IN 2014]As a result, seven of India’s eight mountain divisions in the northeast would be of no use against an offensive as laid out in the Chinese War Doctrine.
The eight Indian mountain divisions in the northeast are as follows:
»2nd mountain Div in Dinjan
»5 mountain Div in Tenga
»17 mountain Div in Gangtok
»20 mountain Div in Rangiya,
»27 mountain Div in Kalimpong
»56 mountain Div in Zakhama
»57 mountain Div in Leimakhong
»71 mountain Div in Assam (still in the process of being raised)
No armoured or airborne units are part of mountain divisions in this region. Moreover, these units require at least a week to be mobilised, which would be time enough for China to bring its entire force of RRFs to bear against India. The numbers in Chengdu and Lanzhou can be backed up by any of the 19 other RRF divisions across China; given their airlift capabilities, many of them can reach the theatre of operations within a week, which is still faster than what it would take Indian troops located far closer to the action.
Former Army Chief JJ Singh sounds sanguine:“The enunciation of a doctrine and the creation of rapid reaction forces (RRFs) is a fundamental imperative for any military. RRF is a high sounding name for ‘reinforcements and reserves which are capable of quick induction’. There is nothing new in that. No professional army can be ‘sans’ doctrine, and no general can ignore having reserve forces in a ‘ready and relevant’ mode, to be employed when and where required.” But the fact is the Indian response to the scenario laid out in documents compiled by its institutions has been slow in coming. India lacks infrastructure in the northeast. The Border Roads Organisation is still in the process of coming up with roads and other structures in the area nearly four decades after the defeat suffered at the hands of the Chinese. An amount of Rs 2,000 crore is now being pumped in for the re-activation of the advanced landing grounds (ALG) in the northeast and Ladakh. In September 2009, in Nyoma, eastern Ladakh, an IAF An-32 transport aircraft landed at the ALG, at an altitude of 13,300 feet, and became the first fixed wing to land at the compact airstrip, which is 23 km from the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Helicopters have been landing at the place, though. Nyoma was re-activated as part of the seven defunct airfields which were to be re-activated, and came after Daulat Beg Oldie and Fukche in Ladakh, which were made operational in 2008. Daulat Beg Oldie is the highest airfield in the world at an altitude of 16,200 feet.
But in Arunachal Pradesh, Machuka,Tuting, Paasighat and Along still await re-activation. And it is here that the Indian vulnerability which was so badly exposed in 1962 persists. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict, and as a result, China registered major gains over India and seized Rezang La in Chushul in the western theatre and Tawang in the eastern theatre. The Chinese strategy was clear: the main assault was launched in the eastern sector, while a simultaneous but smaller assault took place in the western sector. All Indian troops in territories that China claimed belonged to it in the eastern sector were ousted before China declared a ceasefire in November 1962.
The Government’s own assessment of the failures of 1962, recorded in the official history of the war, reads: ‘Strategically, Walong, Tawang and the forward areas in Ladakh were indefensible in 1962 against a major attack. But, regarding eastern Ladakh in particular, it is difficult to think up any viable strategy to save it once the Chinese have stolen a march in logistics by quietly building the road through Akshai Chin.’ That is precisely what the Chinese are busy doing now: stealing the march in logistics.
India, on the other hand, continues to respond slowly. Two Sukhoi-30 squadrons are planned for Tezpur and one for Mohanbari, but only Six Sukhoi-30 aircraft are flying in Tezpur currently. Six C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, which India is buying from the US, are to be based in the northeast, in all likelihood in Jorhat as these aircraft need very little space and can take off and land on short runways.
There is no armoured regiment in the east or northeast. The 66 Armoured Regiment at the Indo-Bangladesh border is to be used for any eventuality in the east and northeast, till light tanks are bought for use at high altitudes.
The Indian Army plans to buy around 300 light tanks, mainly for the China-centric Karu-based 3rd Division, but plans to increase armoured presence in the North Sikkim plateau are also under active consideration.
But even as India gears up to meet the current Chinese threat, China is already planning for the future. As a result, the gap in capabilities is unlikely to shrink, if not grow wider.At the moment, while India has technological superiority in air power, this is also being neutralised by the Chinese. China is inducting 40 Sukhoi 27s and 300 J 10 fighters, 10 IL 78 mid-air refuellers, 4 Awacs and around 4 to 6 airborne early warning aircraft. This will take care of the current imbalance. The addition of 40 IL 76 heavy lift aircraft will bolster their airlift capabilities which will cater to another 48 additional airborne divisions that are being raised this year. In addition, the DIA estimates the Chinese have an additional 500 civilian aircraft for the airlifting of troops.
Former Air Chief FH Major tells Open that while some of the claims may be exaggerated, China does enjoy an advantage in numbers: “300 J-10 aircraft[J-10 is in service in 2017] by the end of 2010 is too high an expectation as each aircraft requires clearance before becoming fully operational. But, inventory-wise China is ahead of us with their force multipliers and counter measures.”
In 1962 as well, the Indian establishment misjudged the intent of the Chinese. The Indian intelligence apparatus told the Government in Delhi that the Chinese ‘were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so’.
The 1962 incursion proved it wrong. The closing remarks of SN Prasad, chief editor of that war’s official history that was commissioned by the Union Ministry of Defence, sound a note of caution worth mentioning here:
‘In the long history of war, defeat has always proved a better teacher than victory. The 1962 war proved it once again. But no nation can afford to have many such teachers.’
