Tuesday, January 17, 2017

China’s War Plan

SOURCE:
http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/india/china-s-war-plan



THREAT

                            China’s War Plan


                                             By 
                          Suman Sharma




10 April 2010  Updated 17 Jan 2017

TAGGED UNDER -






























Bumla: The border post in Arunachal Pradesh where Sino-Indian officials meet at least four times a year. The issues they discuss here range from military incursions to civilians who stray across the border.



Classified military documents on China’s strategy for a limited war against India confirm our worst fears: China can take Arunachal in 48 hours. And we are in no hurry to do anything about it.


Repeated violations of the Indo-Chinese border lead to an escalation in the war of words, but India continues to believe that the Chinese are following their usual pattern of aggravation and conciliation. Rapid Reaction Forces, comprising 4 divisions stationed at Chengdu and Lanzhou after an overnight mobilisation cross rapidly into Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh. Indian defences are caught unawares, but the Fifth Mountain Division in Tenga engages the invading forces. They find themselves badly outmatched, not only outnumbered but also out-equipped because the Chinese RRF also include airborne assets. The Indian forces have no immediate airlift capacity to provide back up. Within the next 48 hours Arunachal is overrun. The other Indian divisions in the region need at least a week to reach the zone of conflict. By then, the Chinese have achieved their goal of winning a limited war.

The above scenario is no conjecture, it is a plausible outcome of the Chinese doctrine of war against India. The Delhi-based Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), a tri-services institution for planning joint doctrines for the Indian military, in its assessment of Chinese military might, has analysed the Chinese plan for winning limited wars under hi-tech conditions.

The document, a copy of which is available with Open, speaks of a Chinese strategy based on the use of RRFs or ‘fist units’ to fight local wars that ‘can achieve the political objective rendering major wars unnecessary’. These fist units are self contained units to be deployed as ground forces in direct combat, and were raised after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) emphasis on numbers-in-action in a numerically huge army gave way to a capability-driven force.

In other words, the PLA has shifted away from the strategy that gave it victory in the 1962 war against India. But even today, the result is unlikely to be much different. Now, instead of overwhelming numbers, it is the rapidity of movement and mobilisation that is likely to overwhelm India, perhaps leading to a scenario no different from what transpired in 1962.

Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs):

»Total of 23 RRFs in China

»Elite Units trained to carry out ops in all types of terrain
»Meant to provide quick reaction capability to deal with contingencies of local/limited border conflicts
»Maintained at full strength
»Kept in high state of operation readiness
»Exempt from non-operational duties
»Provided modern equipment, high grade communications
»Capability of reaching anywhere within China in 7 days, likely to be reduced further

Speaking to Open, former Army Chief VP Malik confirms, “The Chinese have built infrastructure and have their Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) in place, and are prepared for short wars at the border, as far as movement of troops at short notice and arms are concerned, as they’ve been using an active defence strategy all along which has a certain amount of offensive in that. India earlier was thinking of converting one of its Army divisions into rapid reaction, but did not do it. We need to build our forces in terms of lift capability, landing, light arms and weapons, accordingly—something that was suggested by the IAF and Army earlier, but has not really taken off. Even electronically, the Chinese are far ahead of us.”

The IDS assessment of the Chinese WZC doctrine, done alongwith the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), talks about China’s three-fold War Zone Campaign (WZC) doctrine—elite force sharp arms (that is, suitable hi-tech equipment), fighting a quick battle to force a quick resolution and gaining initiative by striking first. For this purpose, ranged against India are the following:

»In Chengdu adjoining north eastern Arunachal Pradesh: 3 Divisions and one artillery brigade
»In Lanzhou adjoining northwestern Arunachal: 3 divisions and one artillery brigade

These divisions provide a strength of 94,000 men against which India has ranged 9 Mountain Divisions comprising 90,000 men, but most of these would not even enter the conflict. Of the six Chinese divisions, four are airborne RRFs and can be moved within 48 hours on the back of airlift capability granted by Y8, IL-76 and H5 transport planes in the region. With rail and road infrastructure in place, mobilisation time could be further reduced. The Lhasa-Beijing railway line, the highest in the world, would further help in transporting troops and logistics. In contrast, India’s first C-130J transport plane would enter service only in February 2011.[ENTERED IN 2014] As a result, seven of India’s eight mountain divisions in the northeast would be of no use against an offensive as laid out in the Chinese War Doctrine.

The eight Indian mountain divisions in the northeast are as follows:
»2nd mountain Div in Dinjan
»5 mountain Div in Tenga
»17 mountain Div in Gangtok
»20 mountain Div in Rangiya,
»27 mountain Div in Kalimpong
»56 mountain Div in Zakhama
»57 mountain Div in Leimakhong
»71 mountain Div in Assam (still in the process of being raised)

No armoured or airborne units are part of mountain divisions in this region. Moreover, these units require at least a week to be mobilised, which would be time enough for China to bring its entire force of RRFs to bear against India. The numbers in Chengdu and Lanzhou can be backed up by any of the 19 other RRF divisions across China; given their airlift capabilities, many of them can reach the theatre of operations within a week, which is still faster than what it would take Indian troops located far closer to the action.

Former Army Chief JJ Singh sounds sanguine: “The enunciation of a doctrine and the creation of rapid reaction forces (RRFs) is a fundamental imperative for any military. RRF is a high sounding name for ‘reinforcements and reserves which are capable of quick induction’. There is nothing new in that. No professional army can be ‘sans’ doctrine, and no general can ignore having reserve forces in a ‘ready and relevant’ mode, to be employed when and where required.”

But the fact is the Indian response to the scenario laid out in documents compiled by its institutions has been slow in coming. India lacks infrastructure in the northeast. The Border Roads Organisation is still in the process of coming up with roads and other structures in the area nearly four decades after the defeat suffered at the hands of the Chinese. An amount of Rs 2,000 crore is now being pumped in for the re-activation of the advanced landing grounds (ALG) in the northeast and Ladakh.

In September 2009, in Nyoma, eastern Ladakh, an IAF An-32 transport aircraft landed at the ALG, at an altitude of 13,300 feet, and became the first fixed wing to land at the compact airstrip, which is 23 km from the Line of Actual Control (LAC). 

Helicopters have been landing at the place, though. Nyoma was re-activated as part of the seven defunct airfields which were to be re-activated, and came after Daulat Beg Oldie and Fukche in Ladakh, which were made operational in 2008. Daulat Beg Oldie is the highest airfield in the world at an altitude of 16,200 feet.



But in Arunachal Pradesh, Machuka, Tuting, Paasighat and Along still await re-activation. And it is here that the Indian vulnerability which was so badly exposed in 1962 persists. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict, and as a result, China registered major gains over India and seized Rezang La in Chushul in the western theatre and Tawang in the eastern theatre. The Chinese strategy was clear: the main assault was launched in the eastern sector, while a simultaneous but smaller assault took place in the western sector. All Indian troops in territories that China claimed belonged to it in the eastern sector were ousted before China declared a ceasefire in November 1962.


The Government’s own assessment of the failures of 1962, recorded in the official history of the war, reads: ‘Strategically, Walong, Tawang and the forward areas in Ladakh were indefensible in 1962 against a major attack. But, regarding eastern Ladakh in particular, it is difficult to think up any viable strategy to save it once the Chinese have stolen a march in logistics by quietly building the road through Akshai Chin.’ That is precisely what the Chinese are busy doing now: stealing the march in logistics.

India, on the other hand, continues to respond slowly. Two Sukhoi-30 squadrons are planned for Tezpur and one for Mohanbari, but only Six Sukhoi-30 aircraft are flying in Tezpur currently. Six C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, which India is buying from the US, are to be based in the northeast, in all likelihood in Jorhat as these aircraft need very little space and can take off and land on short runways.


There is no armoured regiment in the east or northeast. The 66 Armoured Regiment at the Indo-Bangladesh border is to be used for any eventuality in the east and northeast, till light tanks are bought for use at high altitudes.


The Indian Army plans to buy around 300 light tanks, mainly for the China-centric Karu-based 3rd Division, but plans to increase armoured presence in the North Sikkim plateau are also under active consideration.


But even as India gears up to meet the current Chinese threat, China is already planning for the future. As a result, the gap in capabilities is unlikely to shrink, if not grow wider.At the moment, while India has technological superiority in air power, this is also being neutralised by the Chinese. China is inducting 40 Sukhoi 27s and 300 J 10 fighters, 10 IL 78 mid-air refuellers, 4 Awacs and around 4 to 6 airborne early warning aircraft. This will take care of the current imbalance. The addition of 40 IL 76 heavy lift aircraft will bolster their airlift capabilities which will cater to another 48 additional airborne divisions that are being raised this year. In addition, the DIA estimates the Chinese have an additional 500 civilian aircraft for the airlifting of troops.


Former Air Chief FH Major tells Open that while some of the claims may be exaggerated, China does enjoy an advantage in numbers: “300 J-10 aircraft[ J-10 is in service in 2017] by the end of 2010 is too high an expectation as each aircraft requires clearance before becoming fully operational. But, inventory-wise China is ahead of us with their force multipliers and counter measures.”


In 1962 as well, the Indian establishment misjudged the intent of the Chinese. The Indian intelligence apparatus told the Government in Delhi that the Chinese ‘were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so’.


The 1962 incursion proved it wrong. The closing remarks of SN Prasad, chief editor of that war’s official history that was commissioned by the Union Ministry of Defence, sound a note of caution worth mentioning here:

‘In the long history of war, defeat has always proved a better teacher than victory. The 1962 war proved it once again. But no nation can afford to have many such teachers.’








































Monday, January 16, 2017

Modernization : Military to Propose Setting up US-style Unified Commands

SOURCE:http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/military-to-propose-setting-up-us-style-unified-commands/1/858184.html





Military to Propose Setting up US-style Unified CommandsBY


Ajit Kumar Dubey | Posted by Dev Goswami

New Delhi, January 16, 2017




Combat demonstration during 69th Army Day celebrations 

(Picture: Ramesh Sharma)


HIGHLIGHTS

  • 1
    PMO is keen on a proposal that would establish unified commands in different areas of the country.
  • 2
    Each command would have one officer in charge of the resources of all the three services.
  • 3
    Currently, such a command is in place only in Andaman and Nicobar.
  • 4
    US military functions on the basis of such theatre commands; China recently adopted the practice.









Signalling a major restructuring of the armed forces, Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi will be given a detailed presentation 
by the armed forces on the creation of theatre commands in the 
country to bring in better coordination among the three armed 
forces.

The presentation would be made by the chairman of the Chiefs 
of Staffs Committee and Navy's Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba 
during the Combined Commanders' Conference to be held at 
the Indian Military Academy in Dehradoon on January 21, 
sources told Mail Today here.

A detailed report in this regard has already been prepared by 
the services with inputs from all stakeholders, the sources said. 
A 'theatre command' would mean that the resources of all three 
forces will be placed at the command of senior military 
commander. The move would be on the lines of how military 
commands operate in United States and China, which recently 
made the change too.

Explaining how it would work, a source said that the country is 
divided into four to five major areas and the assets and 
personnel of the Army, Navy and Air Force are put under one 
officer who can belong to any of the three services. In the Indian 
context, the country can be divided into geographical theatres 
like southern peninsula, mountainous borders with Pakistan 
and China in the north, the deserts and plains with Pakistan 
and the central and eastern borders with China.

The commands can be given to the respective services based on 
the terrain. For example, a Navy officer can be made in-charge 
of the southern theatre comprising the eastern and western 
seaboard with all naval, Army and Air Force assets under him 
as the fighting would be in the maritime zone, the sources said.

PMO KEEN ON THE PROPOSAL"The Prime Minister's 
Office is very keen on the proposal which was initiated after the 
NDA government under Modi came to power and is considered 
very important for increasing jointness in the forces," the 
sources said.

In his maiden meeting with commanders, Modi had expressed 
anguish at the lack of coordination among them and asked them
 to work towards more joint operations rather than remaining in
 silos

In 2015, after China re-structured its military commands, the 
Army was asked by the government to work on creation of 
theatre commands and work out its command and control 
structures based upon the threat perceptions.

World's most powerful military power America also works on 
the basis of theatre commands but their theatre areas include 
several countries and sometimes continents while the Chinese 
recently divided their military into six theatre commands.

In comparison with China, India has 17 single-service 
commands with seven each of Army and Air Force and three of 
the Navy. The commands operate with lot of inter-service 
rivalry.

The CCC is also likely to review the functioning of nation's only 
tri-service operational command functioning in Andaman and 
Nicobar Command as it functions with a naval head and 
deputies from Air Force and Army.

The CCC will also take up several other issues for reforms, 
including the creation of the post of a new General to be known 
as Permanent, Chairman Chiefs of Staffs Committee.


Also read:


 [a]  India should worry about Xi Jinping's overhaul of the 

Chinese military

































Sunday, January 15, 2017

ARMED FORCES :India: Crises In Command? – Analysis(R)

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/13012017-india-crises-in-command-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29


ARMED FORCES :India: Crises In Command? – Analysis

                                  By 

                  Murli Menon*



India signed a contract in February 2010 for 12 AgustaWestland AW101 VVIP helicopters. Photo by Brehmemohan, Wikipedia Commons.



The controversial nature of the new Indian army chief’s appointment and the corruption scandal involving a former air chief has brought the Indian military leadership in the media spotlight once again.
In India, traditionally, military leadership has got a short shrift. The lack of a strategic culture in India, evident from the lack of understanding of military matters by the civilian hierarchy, is a possible reason for this. The gradual “corporatisation” of the Indian armed forces is another possible contributory factor, where corporate mismanagement [ Read Babugirihas undermined time-proven military leadership skills. India and its defence establishment need to revisit their own military leadership culture and identify weaknesses. A more copious media debate and agitation by the cognoscenti is required before policy changes could possibly be brought about in this regard.
Military leadership offers different sets of challenges than its civilian variant. Over the years, some civilian leaders have to tried to imbibe certain aspects of military leadership but with very little success. 
Attempts by the military to “civilianise” or “corporatise” its leadership ethos may have more dangerous implications as it could have a direct impact on national security.

A military leader needs to lead men into battle. In the absence of war, the armed forces tend to lose their leadership perspective, and consequently, their fighting edge. This seems to be the case with the Indian armed forces, as these days, they are employed essentially only for counter-insurgency or Low Intensity Conflict Operations. The challenges are even more profound when a military establishment must keep itself battle ready even in times of comparative “peace” or “no peace, no war” situations. This is when basic tenets of military leadership cannot be allowed to be glossed over.

The biggest problem for a peace-time military is what has been described as the “ticket-punching” phenomenon. Every military service lays down norms to enable its officer cadre to have a smooth transition from its tactical to operational and strategic levels of leadership. Nevertheless, some officers choose to “ticket-punch” their way through the established hierarchical shaft, either avoiding the more challenging assignments altogether by opting for “low threat” assignments or by opting for other ornamental staff jobs. These “easier” assignments also tend to offer inflated report statuses numerically, allowing the concerned ticket-punchers to steal a march over their other colleagues who may have exposed themselves to operationally much more challenging and riskier assignments. The promotion criteria in all services, therefore, ought to be based on a military leader’s successful transition across the mandatory field and staff assignments across all levels – tactical, operational and strategic – of war, and not any other extraneous considerations.

Another factor that assists “ticket-punchers” in gaining an unfair advantage is the ill-thought out changes in personnel policies, at times provoked by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Staff/Operations criteria attempt proposed by the Army – and undone by the MoD and the wanton reduction some years ago of “discretionary weightage” drastically from 25 per cent to 5 per cent (precluding the scope for objectively compensating a deserving candidate during promotion for higher ranks in the Air Force) are two such cases in point.
If the Establishment sends across the message of appointing only an “operationally sound” officer as the chief of any of the services, most travails regarding inept senior level military leadership would be overcome. Even with such merit-imbued promotional criteria in place, it is possible that a senior military functionary, including a chief, could get compromised in some scam. 
Air Chief Marshall (Retd) Shashi Tyagi’s alleged involvement in the AgustaWestland chopper scam is one such example.
 These types of situations need to be addressed through reforms such as Intelligence Bureau vetting, subordinate reportage in confidential reports, and increased transparency in the equipment procurement processes. What is currently playing out with Air Chief Marshall (Retd) Shashi Tyagi is a different matter altogether. He appears to be the fall guy for big political entities. With a proactive judiciary, it is only a matter of time before the truth prevails.
The requirement, therefore, is to ensure that military leadership does not get compromised in terms of dilution of mandatory qualitative criteria for any promotion, particularly the ones to starred ranks. This would remove any possible controversy if a person with better operational credentials supersedes lesser endowed peers. Military leadership has to be nurtured over time. 
Performance in wars may not always be a practical criterion, given that the entire military leadership is now from a “post-war” era as they were commissioned post-1971, the system should look for other norms. It is still possible that these criteria could be ignored leading to the wrong person being elevated to the top job. India’s Defence Minister Manohar Parikkar is quite right when he says that seniority alone cannot be a criterion for promotion. This is where the Indian military needs doctrinal precepts to support its personnel policies, preventing tinkering of norms without objective analyses. India also needs to put in place institutional quadrennial defence reviews like they have in the US – to undertake reformations in the Indian military’s operational, administrative and support infrastructure and procedures.

Saturday, January 14, 2017

TERRORISM The Profile Of an Urban And Educated Jihadists Of South Asia (r)

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/13012017-the-urban-and-educated-jihadists-of-south-asia-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29



      The Profile Of an Urban

                              & 

Educated JihadistsOf South Asia 

                             By 

                    Abdul Basit*

 Dhakka Bangladesh

BY  






Contrary to popular perception that the jihadists in South Asia come from poor socio- economic backgrounds with madrasah education, a new breed of educated and urban militants with the urge for a sense of belonging has emerged in the region. The desire to create a global Sunni caliphate, among other factors, has contributed to their violent-radicalisation.

Traditionally jihadists in South Asia have been associated with militant organisations like the Afghan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Harkatul Jihadul Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B). These jihadist outfits recruited people from the rural and poor socio-economic backgrounds with madrasah education.
Contrary to these perceptions, in the last two years, a new breed of educated jihadists from urban middle and upper middle class has emerged in South Asia. This breed of South Asian jihadists is manifested in self-radicalised cells and lone-wolf individuals.

Driving Factor: Double Alienation

For instance, the pro-IS cell in Karachi that targeted members of the Ismaili Shia community in Karachi in May 2014 and the five-member cell which carried out the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka in July 2016 were educated scions of rich families. More recently, the terrorists who targeted the Quetta police-training academy in Balochistan were college and university educated students except for the suicide bomber who was a madrasah student.
Similarly, in November last year, Sri Lanka’s Justice Minister Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe briefed the parliament that 32 Sri Lankan Muslims from well-educated and elite families joined Islamic State in Syria. Likewise, the aspiring jihadists who travelled to Syria and Iraq from India had educated and urban backgrounds.
The path to violent-extremism of these jihadists has been paved by an identity crisis, quest for a sense of belonging, a struggle for recognition and resentment towards their respective states due to unemployment, corruption, and bad governance. They suffer a double alienation: from the irresponsive states failing them as citizens and societies where a lack of consensus on what constitutes a ‘good Muslim’ pushes them to extremist discourses for answers. This set of grievances falls within the broader parameters of contemporary

Political Islam and the Salafist narrative.

Traditionally, the Jihadist and sectarian organisations in South Asia have been grassroots movements linked to madrasahs and mosque networks whose target audience remained poor and lower-income class segments of the society. Meanwhile the educated middle- and upper-middle class sections of urban areas have been targeted by evangelical and missionary organisations like Hizbut Tahrir, Al-Huda and Tanzeem-e-Islami whose teachings and lectures revolve around contemporary discourses on political Islam.

Three Reasons

Three reasons account for the emergence of educated and urban militants in South Asia. Firstly, the deeper Internet penetration and the onset of social media that has decreased the distance between local and global developments, accelerated the flow of communication, democratised violence and eroded states’ monopoly on information. The unregulated cyber space in South Asia of 480 million users is the second largest in the world. IS has exploited it to further its ideological narrative. This has had a huge impact on patterns of violent-extremism and terrorism.
The IS’ ability to universalise local grievances in its meta-narrative of global-jihad and offer a putative solution in the revival of the so-called Caliphate has resonated with some of the educated population in urban areas. Other than addressing individual grievances, such rhetoric also provided them with a stronger sense of belonging and empowerment.
Secondly, the lower-threshold of radicalisation and violence because of IS’ violent and cinematic tactics has also played a critical role in mobilising the South Asian-educated and urban youth. They may have harboured radical thoughts but they did not find Al Qaeda and its associates’ jihadist platforms attractive. IS’ radical message provided them an alternative jihadist platform to create a global “Sunni Caliphate” and a spiritual fight for the glory of Islam.
Thirdly, the generational shift undergone by social, political and religious movements creating a rift between the old and the new generations. This rift can lead to the creation of splinter factions by the young and rebellious membership impatient and hungry for change and driven by grand ambitions while the older generation is seen as status quo-oriented and rigid.

Traits and Characteristics of Urban Jihadists

Characteristically, this generation of South Asian urban militants is tech and media savvy, compared to the traditional South Asian jihadists, and has Salafi-Takfiri leanings.
Most of the militants of this generation are between 18-30 years and they have gone through a relatively shorter period of radicalisation. They all seem to be obsessed with ideas of the so-called Caliphate, hijrah and the end-times narratives. 
It is extreme in its methods, unapologetically brutal and morally consequentialist: for them the ends justify the means.
In the rapidly changing global and regional environment, especially the reshaping of the Sunni-Shia conflict in the Middle East arising from civil wars in Yemen, Iraq and Syria, the disaffected and disfranchised Muslim youth in South Asia are facing an ideological dilemma. This unique challenge, in addition to operational and traditional law enforcement responses, requires counter-narrative and counter-ideological responses.
The existing policy frameworks for counter-terrorism and extremism will have to be revised in line with the evolving trends and patterns. However, the counter-ideological components within the broader Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) frameworks do not need to borrow foreign concepts. The answers to the ideological threat are local and enshrined within the pacifist tradition of Sufi Islam in South Asia.
Sufi Islam promotes communal and sectarian tolerance and preaches peaceful-co-existence which needs to be promoted and strengthened. The concept is indigenous to the South Asian socio-cultural milieu and political environment.
*Abdul Basit is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR





RSIS
RSIS
RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the author/s are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, which produces the Commentaries.