Friday, March 27, 2015

China's Double-Digit Defense Growth

SOURCE
https://snt148.mail.live.com/?tid=cmoPgaNqDU5BG8-AAiZMJIBg2&fid=flinbox






       China's Double-Digit Defense Growth

        What It Means for a Peaceful Rise


Members of People's Liberation Army (PLA) coastal defense force drill at a military base in Qingdao, Shandong province, July 29, 2014. (Reuters)


                
China has done it again. In early March, it released its defense budget for 2015, and as in almost every year for over almost two decades, it increased its military expenditure by double-digit percentages. This year, the Chinese defense budget will rise by 10.1 percent, to roughly $145 billion. And it seems likely that the trend will continue, much to the concern of Washington and regional capitals.



Already, China is the second-biggest military spender in the world, having surpassed the United Kingdom in 2008. China’s new budget for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is more than three times those of other big spenders such as France, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and nearly four times that of its rising Asian rival, India. It is also the only country besides the United States to have a triple-digit defense budget (in billions of U.S. dollars).


This level of spending is all the more remarkable given where China started. In 1997, Chinese military expenditures totaled only about $10 billion, roughly on par with Taiwan and significantly less than that of Japan and South Korea. Beginning that year, however, China’s defense budget began to rise. There were two economic factors that made this growth possible. First, the country’s economy soared; in 1997, defense spending made up less than two percent of GDP, which remains roughly the same share today, at least according to Beijing. Second, low inflation rates over the past two decades have meant that real growth in defense spending has nearly matched nominal growth; even the most conservative estimate of actual growth rates (accounting for inflation) reveal a five-fold real increase in military expenditures since 1997.


What is particularly striking about the growth in defense spending over the last two decades is that it has almost always outpaced GDP growth. Between 1998 and 2007, China’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 12.5 percent, while its defense spending increased at an average of 15.9 percent per annum. Given that the economy is likely to grow by only seven percent in 2015, and its defense spending is growing at double digits, the disconnect between economic performance and defense spending is becoming more pronounced.




 
Comparing China's Military Spending and GDP Growth Rates (Foreign Affairs)




 
 
 
 
 
































 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Drones At Nuclear Power Plants: Enemies or Helpers?

SOURCE
http://thebulletin.org/drones-nuclear-power-plants-enemies-or-helpers8132





             Drones At Nuclear Power Plants

                 : Enemies or Helpers?

                                   By
                        David Lochbaum

David Lochbaum

A nuclear safety engineer, Lochbaum is one of the nation's top independent experts on nuclear power. He joined...
More

 
In the 1939 film “The Wizard of Oz,” Glinda, Witch of the North, asks Dorothy if she is a good witch or a bad witch. “Who, me?” asks Dorothy. “Why, I’m not a witch at all. I’m Dorothy Gale from Kansas.” Not long afterward, of course, viewers are introduced to the Wicked Witch of the West. It’s easy to tell good and bad witches apart because, as the beautiful Glinda explains, “Only bad witches are ugly.” If only it were that easy to tell good drones from wicked ones.


Reports of unmanned aerial vehicles flying over more than a dozen nuclear power plants in France within the past year raised concerns about drones doing bad things. At the same time, experts are examining how drones—in the hands of the right people—might be able to increase nuclear plant safety levels. The key is to distinguish good drones from bad ones.


Good deeds by good drones. Drones can be remotely controlled by a human pilot or programmed to follow pre-specified routes. Drones can travel into airborne radioactive plumes without exposing pilots and crew to radiation. Pre-programmed drones may be able to undertake some missions while humans are busy with other necessary tasks. These capabilities can all be extremely useful after a nuclear accident.


For example, nuclear power plant owners and regulators in the United States are assessing whether drones can perform key functions following accidents. Drones may be able to supplement notification systems (for example, emergency sirens and tone-alert radios) by emitting siren-like sounds that alert people to turn on televisions and radios to hear official declarations about any precautionary measures authorities are recommending. Drones may also be able to augment radiation monitoring by flying routes downwind of the stricken facility and relaying continuous radiation readings back to an emergency response center. This radiation level information would fill in gaps between the existing ground-based detectors.


Drones already demonstrated a post-accident capability by flying around the Fukushima Daiichi site and sending back video and other information to workers seeking to understand the extent of the damage inflicted by hydrogen explosions.


Bad deeds by bad drones. But drones have a potential dark side. Reports of drones buzzing around French nuclear plants prompted considerable discussion about whether drones carrying explosives could wreak damage. The short answer is yes. The longer answer is that the steps mandated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) after the 9/11 tragedy, to reduce nuclear plant vulnerabilities to damage inflicted by a piloted aircraft on a suicide mission, also protect against explosive-laden drones. The NRC’s post-9/11 upgrades did not eliminate the suicide aircraft threat entirely, however, and multiple explosive-laden drones might be able to overwhelm the upgrades. But substantial improvements have already been implemented, such that the drone hazard may only require re-evaluation and modest tweaking to narrow any gaps in existing measures.


Drones may pose a larger threat to nuclear plants by performing other roles. For example, workers and vehicles are searched for weapons and explosives before entering the security fences around a nuclear plant; the fences are equipped with intrusion detection systems that prevent anyone from entering the plant except via the security gates and checks. Drones could fly over the fences, though, to deliver guns and small explosives to individuals inside. If these deliveries went undetected, the security responders at the site could find themselves outgunned or outmaneuvered by armed attackers already inside the perimeter fences.

In addition, drones could distract the plant’s security responders. Similar to how military pilots use countermeasures to confuse incoming missiles, ground-based attackers could employ drones to lure security responders away from an attack route. In the force-on-force exercises conducted periodically to test nuclear plant security capabilities, mock attackers penetrate fences and proceed rapidly through the plant, simulating the destruction of equipment needed to cool the reactor core. Security personnel respond to intrusion-detection alarms and to indications that locked doors have been blown open by rushing to take defensive positions behind bullet-resistant enclosures—located between the intruders and the remaining equipment that could trigger a meltdown if sufficiently damaged. (The NRC and the nuclear industry refer to the list of this equipment as the Target Set, details of which are not publicly available for obvious reasons.)

The exercises have demonstrated that the responders need not be delayed long to tilt the advantage in favor of the attackers. Drones broadcasting loud sounds of explosions and gunfire, for example, could confuse and slow down the responders. Likewise, collisions with the perimeter fence—activating the intrusion-detection system—could send responders on time-consuming wild drone chases.


Needed deeds by the drone police. Clearly, drones are double-edged swords: They can perform critical functions to protect the public in event of a nuclear plant accident, but they can also perform tasks that could cause a nuclear plant disaster. How can authorities permit good drones while prohibiting bad ones?


The NRC should revise its design basis threat (DBT)—which provides “a general description of the attributes of potential adversaries who might attempt to commit radiological sabotage or theft or diversion against which [the power plant] licensee's physical protection systems must defend with high assurance”—and associated adversary characteristics guidance to define the potential hazards posed by bad drones. The DBT and associated guidance establish parameters such as the number of ground-based attackers, the kinds of weapons they might carry, and the tactics they could use—and plant owners must develop security measures to thwart these scenarios. Revised parameters would add drones to the bad guys’ arsenal, and the NRC’s security inspections—including force-on-force tests—would then determine whether the measures taken by plant owners provide sufficient protection.


In Dorothy’s imaginary world, eliminating the Wicked Witch of the West turned out to require nothing more than a bucket of water: “Look what you’ve done! I’m melting! Melting!” screamed the witch as she faded away. Unfortunately, vanquishing bad drones won’t be that easy. Real action is needed to ensure that bad drones do not someday cause a very bad thing to happen at a US nuclear power plant.


(David Lochbaum is director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists. He prepared this article on his own time, and it may not represent the views of the organization.)


















 

Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe, an Appropriate U.S. Response,and the Implications for U.S. Landpower

SOURCE:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1274




Project 1704: A U.S. Army War College

 

 Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern   Europe, an Appropriate U.S. Response,

                                   and

 the Implications for U.S. Landpower




                              Edited by
 COL Douglas Mastriano, LTC Derek O'Malley.





Brief Synopsis

View the Executive Summary

The strategic calculus changed in Europe with the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and its ongoing war against Ukraine. Compounding the dilemma of an aggressive Russia, is the application of ambiguity to create a clock of uncertainty that prevents a decisive response to counter its destabilizing activities. However, this application of ambiguity is easily defeated, if nations are willing to take concerted efforts now to preempt and deter further Russian aggression.


  Project 1704 provides an honest assessment of the tenuous strategic environment that now envelopes Eastern Europe and offers specific recommendations on how to continue the 70 years of unparalleled peace that most of Europe has enjoyed.




 CLICK & READ THE FULL REPORT  pdf   FILE




Download Format:     PDF












http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1274


























 

Thursday, March 26, 2015

One Rank One Pension To Cost Exchequer Rs 7,500 crore-10,000 Crore

SOURCE
http://karnmk.blogspot.in/2015/03/one-rank-one-pension-to-cost-exchequer.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+CGENewsTools+(Central+Government+Employee+News+%26amp;+Tools)







One Rank One Pension To Cost Exchequer Rs 7,500 crore-10,000 Crore

By PTI | 25 Mar, 2015 CHANDIGARH: Implementation of 'One Rank One Pension' scheme, the long-standing demand of Armed Forces veterans, is likely to cost the exchequer Rs 7,500 crore to Rs 10,000 crore, Union Minister Rao Inderjit Singh said today.

The government has already made it clear that One Rank One Pension (OROP) will be implemented with effect from April 1, 2014, the Minister of State for Defence told reporters here.

He said that the Defence Ministry had recently forwarded to the Finance Ministry the cost which the scheme's implementation would entail.

"It is likely to cost us somewhere between Rs 7,500 crore to Rs 10,000 crore," he said, adding that the previous UPA government had made a mere announcement with regard to OROP.

"During the past four to five months, we have gone deep into this. We have calculated the entire cost now," he said.

Read at : Economic Times



 

GEO POLITICS MIDDLE EAST :Pakistan Examining Saudi Request to Join Military operations in Yemen

Source
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/pakistan-examining-saudi-request-join-operation-yemen










    WATCH LIST ITEM ON GEO- POLITICS



GEO POLITICS MIDDLE EAST :Pakistan Examining Saudi Request to Join  Military operations  in Yemen: FO

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ISLAMABAD:
Pakistan claimed that it was examining Saudi Arabia’s request to join the Gulf-led operation against Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen, on Thursday according to sources.


Adviser to Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz confirmed that top Saudi officials had contacted the Pakistani leadership requesting it to join the Yemen operation. A decision has not yet been taken, Aziz said.

He further said that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has summoned a high-level meeting this evening to consult his close aides over the matter.

Aziz added that a decision on whether to comply with the Saudi request will be announced at the conclusion of the meeting.


Earlier during the day, Foreign Office spokesperson Tasneem Aslam told reporters at the weekly media briefing in Islamabad that Saudi Arabia had contacted Pakistan on an emergency basis and extended the invitation to join the operation against Houthi rebels in Yemen.


She did not specify the details of the request made by Saudi Arabia to Pakistan but said that the matter was being examined







All the king’s horses and all the king’s men…

Px26-092
  • As Saudi Arabia, allies launch airstrikes against Shia Houthis in Yemen, Pakistan responds positively to ‘need to ensure Kingdom’s defence’ while analysts warn Pak against joining intra-Arab conflict which can also affect Pak-Iran ties

Pakistan on Thursday decided in principle to join the Saudi-led Gulf countries’ alliance against Shia Houthi rebels to “defend the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Saudi Arabia”.


However, it is yet to be ascertained whether this assistance would be extended to Saudi Arabia in its offensive against the Shia Houthi militia into Yemen or the forces would be offered to ensure territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia had formally sought military support from Pakistan during the recent visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. A high-level delegation would visit Saudi Arabia today (Friday) to assess the situation.


While defence experts have cautioned Pakistan against any role in the Kingdom’s endeavours inside the Yemeni borders, PM Sharif has hinted at provision of troops to safeguard Saudi borders from any external threats.


PM SET IN MOTION:

As the situation in Yemen took a new turn with Saudi planes bombing the Shia Houthi rebels inside Yemen, Sharif Thursday evening chaired an emergency high-level meeting at the Prime Minister’s House to discuss the recent developments in the Middle East and a request forwarded by the Saudi government for military assistance.

The meeting was also attended by Chief of the Army Staff General Raheel Sharif and Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Sohail Aman, Minister for Defence Khwaja Muhammad Asif and Advisor to PM on National Security Sartaj Aziz.


“The meeting concluded that any threat to Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity would evoke a strong response from Pakistan,” said an official statement issued following the meeting.

The meeting also decided that to send a delegation, comprising defence minister and adviser to PM on national security, to Saudi Arabia today to assess the situation and seek the needs of the Saudi government in their fight against Yemeni rebels. Senior representatives from the armed forces would also accompany the delegation.



“The prime minister said Pakistan enjoys close and brotherly relations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries and attaches great importance to their security,” the statement added.


QUANTUM OF SUPPORT:

Although no quick official word was available as to what sort of support Islamabad was going to extend to Saudi forces, the presence of the army chief and the air chief reflected that Saudi Arabia had sought air and ground assistance against Shia Houthis.

A Defence Ministry official said that the decision had been taken in principle to join the coalition against the rebels.
However, the official said no specific help had been sought from Saudi Arabia as yet.

“The civil and military experts would ask from Saudi authorities about their assistance from Pakistan. Later, the government would decided how much support could be extended,” the official added.


PM WARNED:

Speaking on the issue, noted defence analyst Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi warned prime minister against becoming a party in conflict in the Arab World. However, he said it was premature to comment over the nature of Pakistan’s assistance to Saudi Arabia.

“It’s good if this assistance is aimed at safeguarding the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. However, it would be unfortunate for Pakistan if it decides to support any Saudi role inside Yemen. We need to stay away from the intra-Arab conflict,” he added.

Elaborating his views, Dr Rizvi said that in the Arab World, animosity and friendship are short-lived and any role in conflicts may undermine Pakistan’s interest.

“Rather, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif should play a role of an elder and advise the Kingdom for using political means to settle the problem in Yemen. Any adventure inside Yemen would undermine our relations with Iran and would come out as a big loss,” he added.

“Pakistan Army is already fighting a war against terrorists on its western borders while threats are already looming on our eastern borders. We should not push our army into a new war,” he concluded.


SAUDIA STRIKES YEMEN:

Earlier on Thursday, Saudi Arabia said that five Muslim countries, including Egypt and Pakistan, wanted to participate in the Gulf-led military coalition against Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Together with Jordan, Morocco and Sudan, they have “expressed desire to participate in the operation” against the rebels, which the kingdom dubbed “Firmness Storm”, Saudi SPA state news agency said.


Saudi Arabia and four other Gulf states, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, announced earlier a decision to “answer the call of President Hadi to protect Yemen and his people from the aggression of the (Shia) Houthi militia.“


The Kingdom and its allies launched air strikes in Yemen against Houthi fighters, who have tightened their grip in southern city of Aden where the country’s president had taken refuge, the Saudi envoy to Washington said on Wednesday.
The kingdom’s ambassador to the United States announced from Washington that a coalition of 10 countries, including the five Gulf monarchies, had been set up to protect the Yemeni government. However, he declined giving any information on Hadi’s whereabouts, but said the president, who has fled his residence, was still running the government along with members of his Cabinet.


Jubeir said Iranian-backed Houthi Shia militants were now in control of the Yemeni air force and of the country’s ballistic weapons. He told reporters that Saudi Arabia had consulted with the United States but that Washington was not participating in the military operation.


A US official said that the United States was providing support to Saudi Arabia as it carries out its operation, but gave no details.


Jubeir said the operation, which was launched at 2300 GMT on Wednesday in response to a request for assistance by Hadi, was not limited to one particular city or region.


Gulf broadcaster al-Arabiya TV reported that the kingdom was contributing as many as 150,000 troops and 100 warplanes to the operations.


These latest developments follow a southward advance by Houthi militants, who are said to be backed by Iran, who took control of the capital Sanaa in September and seized the central city of Taiz at the weekend as they move closer to the new southern base of US-backed President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi.


 


























INDIA’S APPROACH TO CHINA’S MARITIME SILK ROAD AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW

Source:
http://www.maritimeindia.org/CommentryView.aspx?NMFCID=8390




INDIA’S APPROACH TO CHINA’S MARITIME SILK ROAD 
          AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW


 Author : Gurpreet S Khurana 





         
17 Feb 2015



In his December 2014 pre-election manifesto, Sri Lanka’s President Sirisena had expressed his intent to reconsider the US$1.4 billion Chinese-funded project to develop Colombo port. However, the visit of Chinese ‘special envoy’ (Liu Jianchao) to Sri Lanka in early-February 2015 led to a “careful assessment” of the issue, following which, the Sri Lankan government has indicated that it is likely to go ahead with the project.

The Colombo port project has been essential for the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR) initiative of the Chinese President Xi Jinping. But this success for China may be only the first step in the implementation of MSR, with more to follow. Many other countries in India’s maritime neighbourhood – Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Maldives, Pakistan, Thailand et al – are on the MSR bandwagon. In the context of this trend, this essay examines India’s approach to the MSR concept, and presents an alternative to the prevailing mainstream view in New Delhi.

Invoking the ‘ancient’ Chinese contribution to Asian seaborne trade and cultural linkages, the MSR concept essentially involves China helping its partner countries to develop their port infrastructure to enhance trade connectivity, and to establish manufacturing and free-trade zones in the hinterland, with attendant economic incentives. The MSR initiative is thus proposed as an economic concept. However, even as its specific details are yet unclear, its multi-dimensional strategic intent and wide-ranging ramifications cannot be ignored. India’s response to MSR has been guarded; and understandably so, owing to the adversarial potential of its relations with China.
  
While India has not yet rejected China’s MSR proposal, a preliminary assessment – outlined in the succeeding text – indicates that there may be a case for New Delhi to consider the MSR more objectively.

 The assessment needs to factor both economic and security considerations.

Economics

As the largest manufacturing economy in the world, China’s impressive economic growth in the past few decades has led to rising incomes and better lifestyles, but also slowing down of its exports due to rising production costs. China seeks to address this conundrum by outsourcing manufacturing to its MSR partners. For India – given its advantages in terms of the relatively low cost of labour and raw-material – this presents an opportunity to strengthen its manufacturing base, propagate its ‘Make in India’ campaign, and generate employment opportunities. The prevailing cynicism against shifting China’s ‘sunset industries’ to India purely on environmental considerations may be akin to ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’. Considering that China’s industrial capacity is at least two decades ahead, Indian industries could leapfrog in the same way that the Southeast Asian economies did in the 1980s on the back of ‘outsourcing’ by Japanese multinational companies. Commonly referred to as the ‘Flying Geese Paradigm’, the sound logic for such ‘outsourcing’ was based on comparative advantage and market rationalism.

On the other hand, if New Delhi opts to stay out of the MSR, India’s industrial growth will lag behind its Asian neighbours – most of which are China’s avowed MSR partners – thereby adversely affecting India’s economic growth and developmental plans.

India also needs to overcome infrastructure-related constraints to enhance connectivity for its overseas trade, which contributes substantially to the national economy.  Notably, in 1990–91, India’s external trade accounted for a mere six per cent of the GDP, which rose to 52 per cent by 2010–11. The MSR could be an effective maritime supplement to the land-based Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor under active consideration by New Delhi. It could be dovetailed with India’s own ‘Sagarmala’ project, and thereby contribute to the nation’s efforts to enhance sea-trade connectivity, while also progressively leading to ‘port-led development’ of the hinterland, and the SEZs. The MSR may also help India to develop its ‘blue economy’ through bolstering its marine industries and ship-building capacity.

Security

China’s military-strategic intent behind the MSR cannot be discounted. The unprecedented docking of a PLA Navy submarine at Colombo port in September 2014 is a bellwether for future developments in the Indian Ocean.  China is likely to seek naval access to the maritime infrastructure that it is helping to create, thereby increasing its strategic presence in India’s primary areas of maritime interest. The PLA Navy could seek replenishment facilities in Chittagong, Colombo, Gwadar, Hambantota, and so on.
 
The question arises: what can India do to prevent this?
 
 India could possibly try to use its leverages with the IOR countries; but these are hardly adequate vis-á-vis the economic attractiveness of China’s MSR. Notably, even Bangladesh and Maldives have opted to support the MSR, and with Pakistan, India has no leverage at all. Hence, the progress of the ongoing developments seems inevitable, over which, New Delhi seems to have little control.

On the other hand, permitting a Chinese company to develop an economic zone – comprising a port-hinterland complex with manufacturing hubs – in an appropriate location in India would entail considerable Chinese investment in terms of finances, technology and possibly, skilled human resource. This would lead to China developing major stakes in India, which would contribute to the latter’s national security through ‘dissuasion’.  
 


It is important to note that in the present times of national technical means and stand-off non-kinetic offensive weapons, national security cannot be achieved through physical barriers, including denying Chinese companies / entrepreneurs’ access to Indian production and distribution hubs.

Understandably, India has been cautious with regard to its critical logistic infrastructure including ports and port-connectors, which it calls ‘strategic sectors’. However, the strategic value of a facility depends upon the context.  A ‘generic’ designation of sea-ports as ‘strategic’ may not be appropriate. Hence, a selected site on Indian coast allocated to a Chinese company for port construction need not be designated as strategic.
 
An apt parallel is New Delhi’s ‘active consideration’ to connect the (otherwise ‘strategic’) road infrastructure in India’s north-eastern states to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC).
 
 


Though the MSR is Beijing’s initiative, its historic roots are not exclusively Chinese.
 MSR represents the ancient maritime inter-linkages within Asia, which closely followed the regularly-reversing Monsoon winds, thereby enabling sea-borne commercial and cultural exchanges across Asia.
India’s support to the MSR concept would, therefore, serve to propagate Asia’s ‘rise’ and integrate Asia economically. In the process, it would create mutual dependence, and thereby contribute to regional stability and prosperity.

On the contrary, with the regional countries supporting MSR on the back of growing regional economic integration, India’s exclusivist approach would lead to its marginalisation, thereby helping China to ‘displace’ India’s influence in its own backyard.  
**********************************************

(*Captain Gurpreet S Khurana, PhD, Indian Navy is the Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi.  He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com)


























Saudi Arabia and Iran Compete in Yemen

SOURCE:
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/saudi-arabia-and-iran-compete-yemen?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_term=article&utm_campaign=20150326&mc_cid=7593a77e53&mc_eid=27ea66d20b


Saudi Arabia and Iran Compete in Yemen



Text Size 


 

Summary

While the al-Houthi movement struggles to manage multiple regional challenges to its north, its rise to power in Yemen is a setback for Saudi Arabia on its southern flank. After the fall of the Yemeni government, Riyadh will have to capitalize on the al-Houthis' need for political and financial support to re-establish its influence in the country. But because Iran is trying to fill that support gap, too, Yemen has become another battleground where the two sectarian rivals will struggle against one another.

Analysis

After being driven from the capital of Sanaa in September, Yemen's government is at war with itself. President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi issued a statement March 19 denouncing the airstrikes on his compound in the southern port city of Aden as an attempted military coup by forces loyal to his predecessor and one-time ally, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Earlier that day, soldiers and militiamen loyal to Hadi battled their way into Aden's airport and stormed a nearby military base, both of which were under the control of Gen. Abdel-Hafez al-Saqqaf, a Saleh loyalist.


The infighting in Aden comes after Ansar Allah, the pro-Iranian Zaidi group led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, emerged as the single largest force in the country after taking over large swathes of territory in north and central Yemen. The al-Houthis represent a change in the balance of power in Yemen and even the Arabian Peninsula that has opened the door for Iran to become a major player in what was the exclusive domain of Saudi Arabia not too long ago.

The Rise of the al-Houthis

A number of factors facilitated the al-Houthis' power grab in Yemen. First, Saudi Arabia's attempts to manage the Yemeni government in the wake of Arab Spring protests did not go as planned. Saleh stepped down in favor of his one-time vice president, Hadi, but the move exacerbated intra-government fissures along tribal, ideological, political and military lines. By the time Hadi took over, Riyadh's method of playing the various Yemeni factions against each other had undermined the old system to the point where the al-Houthis could take advantage of and align enough tribes to push beyond its northern stronghold of Saada and make their way down into areas south of the capital.







While Saudi Arabia has long meddled in Yemen and focused on combatting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Riyadh lost sight of developments in Yemen while focusing on other regional fights. Saudi Arabia has been trying to stem chaos in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, especially threats from transnational jihadist groups such as the Islamic State. It has also been occupied with supporting Bahrain's pro-Saudi Sunni monarchy as it faces a democratic uprising from its Shiite minority. It was not that Saudi Arabia was not paying attention to Yemen, but it was not expecting Iran to gain ground on its southern frontier via a movement that is not a traditional Shiite one and in fact is theologically closer to Sunni Islam.


Also, Saudi Arabia did not do enough to prevent Saleh from returning to Sanaa, where he could plot against those he felt were responsible for his fall from power and execute his own return. His plotting weakened the Yemeni government and diminished its ability to combat the al-Houthi insurgency.
Finally, it appears the al-Houthis have learned lessons from when they clashed with Saudi border guards in 2009. Now the al-Houthis are taking caution to steer clear of any direct engagement with the Saudis along the border and have instead focused inward. They are consolidating the nascent power they have accumulated and are weakening groups that might resist them.





The strategy appears to have worked. The Saudis have focused on the conflicts to their north and have not reacted aggressively to the power shift that has taken place in Yemen. Now it is too late to reverse course — at least in the short term. Riyadh lacks the military capabilities to directly intervene in the country and impose order like it did in Bahrain. Also, the different political factions they used to operate through by proxy do not have the same power they once did, making any efforts less effective.
Even if it had the means to intervene, it is not entirely clear the Saudis would want to. The al-Houthis do not pose a major threat to Saudi Arabia; on the contrary, the rebels' control over north and central Yemen insulates Saudi Arabia from the chaos in other parts of the country and especially from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is a more immediate threat. The Saudis would rather have the al-Houthis on their southern border instead of a jihadist quasi-state that is hostile to them. While the Saudis would prefer not to have al-Houthi control of such a large piece of Yemen so close to their border, the situation seems to be the best outcome in a situation where all options are bad — as long as the al-Houthis do not start pushing northward.

Potential Border Incursions

Even if the al-Houthis decided to change course, Saudi Arabia would be able to defend itself. It already has a fence — though it is nothing more than a concrete-filled pipeline — with surveillance equipment in place along long stretches of the border. Nonetheless, Zaidi militiamen were able to penetrate the border in 2009, but they did not make it past the mountains. The Saudi military was able to contain them there and used airstrikes to eliminate them.


The eastern part of the border in Hadramawt is open desert with little cover to conceal an incursion force. Surveillance aircraft can spot ground vehicles from long distances, and reaching a Saudi city or even a road would require traversing hundreds of miles of desert.


The west appears to be the only place where an incursion could have success because there are mountains, roads and people there. The area also happens to be adjacent to the al-Houthi stronghold of Saada. However, the Saudi military has enough capacity to deploy forces that outnumber al-Houthi fighters. Fighting could possibly last for a while, but in the end, the al-Houthis would not be able to withstand or break through the Saudis, who have artillery and air support.

Financial Aid Is Key

The biggest factor keeping the al-Houthis from antagonizing Saudi Arabia is their need for financial support. The country's poor financial and economic situation means the al-Houthis — or any other governing group for that matter — cannot maintain order in country without external assistance. Without long-term financial support, Yemen's water shortages could turn into a humanitarian crisis that draws in Saudi Arabia, creating the need for Sanaa and Riyadh to cooperate. The al-Houthis are aware of this, explaining why they have reached out to Riyadh to participate in indirect talks.


While it would seem logical for the al-Houthis to seek more aid from Iran, they know that Tehran is not capable of matching Saudi aid, even if the West were to lift economic sanctions. Iran can provide military, intelligence, logistical, and political support, but it has little hard cash to offer. Besides, Iran is more than 1,950 kilometers (1,200 miles) from Yemen, while Saudi Arabia is just on its northern border. Saudi Arabia can also help the al-Houthis gain international recognition as the legitimate government of Yemen.


Implementing the Hezbollah Model

The al-Houthis find themselves in a situation fairly similar to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Both groups are the biggest force in their respective countries, but they exist within political and demographic conditions that keep them from running their countries alone. Ansar Allah is trying to emulate Hezbollah in terms of getting other factions to work with it and form a government like the confessional democracy in Lebanon.
Ansar Allah, however, is where Hezbollah was in the 1980s, and it will need time to translate its military prowess into political power. Also, the Saudis will try to prevent the group from going the route of Hezbollah. Unlike Lebanon, Yemen is not under Israeli occupation, and it does not have a neighbor like Syria that the Iranians can use as a conduit to nurture the al-Houthis.


Negotiating Yemen's Future With Iran

Saudi Arabia knows the threat is not pressing and has decided to abstain from any formal diplomatic talks with Yemen. Riyadh also knows Tehran wants to use the al-Houthis to gain a seat at the negotiating table and become a stakeholder in Yemen, so it is being cautious. Ultimately, serious geographic and political limitations prevent Tehran from undermining Riyadh in Yemen.


Though the Saudis see the situation as ultimately favorable, they cannot become too comfortable and allow the al-Houthis to take hold in Sanaa. Riyadh must ensure that the opposition improves its position enough to sufficiently counter the al-Houthi movement. At the same time, Riyadh will need to engage Ansar Allah in talks at some point, especially while the opposition is weak from infighting — and jihadists reap benefits from the struggle.


Many of Ansar Allah's opponents — including tribes, religious Sunni elements and members of the ousted government's security establishment — are open to cooperating with jihadist forces to fight the al-Houthis. The Salafists and jihadists are the most eager to engage in a sectarian battle because they see it as a way to enhance their position. Saudi Arabia cannot allow al Qaeda or the Islamic State to emerge as the most effective forces against Ansar Allah.


In fact, the United States has already indicated that it will work with the al-Houthis to fight jihadists in Yemen, another sign of the shift in the United States' position in the Middle East. Washington sees Iran, Hezbollah and even the Syrian government — except for President Bashar al Assad — as partners in the fight against the Islamic State, a development Saudi Arabia feels threatened by.


If the al-Houthis successfully consolidate their power in Yemen, the southern Saudi provinces of Jizan and Najran will become vulnerable to al-Houthi expansion in the long run because of the significant Shiite Ismaili populations that live there. Certainly the Iranians would welcome this outcome, influencing their support for the Zaidis.


The Saudis see the al-Houthis as a possible threat from Iran. How the Saudis engage with the group and try to put distance between them and Iran will be a key factor to watch. Nonetheless, Yemen's deteriorating security situation has created another Saudi-Iranian geopolitical struggle that will last for the foreseeable future.



"<a href="https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/saudi-arabia-and-iran-compete-yemen">Saudi Arabia and Iran Compete in Yemen</a> is republished with permission of Stratfor."