SOURCE :
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf
http://southasianvoices.org/a-pakistanis-response-to-a-normal-nuclear-Pakistan/
PART - ONE
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf
According to “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,” a recent report co-authored by Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, Pakistan could have close to 350 nuclear weapons by 2025. The key word here is “could.”
It is no secret that Pakistan faces many internal challenges. For nearly the past decade, our economy has been a mess, our armed forces have been engaged in combating terrorism, and our society has been plagued by a host of problems like unemployment, illiteracy, access to clean water, lack of affordable healthcare, and so on and so forth. But to presume, as I perceive the authors have in their report, that our armed forces are taking money from social programs and diverting it for military purposes is inaccurate.
The fact is that according to government documents our defense budget has hovered around 2.6 percent of the GDP for the last few years; it is also the lowest percentage of our GDP since independence. Even with the current, declared budget at $7.6 billion (compared to India’s $40 billion or America’s $585 billion), our military has a hard time making ends meet. We have invested all of our resources in the war against terror as a frontline state. Strictly financially speaking, it would be impossible for us to develop two-hundred-some nuclear warheads in the next ten years.
The authors have urged Pakistan to consider adopting five initiatives related to the nuclear weapons program:
On the first initiative, I would argue that there is no difference between “full spectrum” and “strategic” deterrence. Pakistan has always maintained a minimum-credible deterrence posture, but as India continues to modernize their weapon systems and expand their nuclear capabilities, Pakistan is forced to respond, so as not to leave a gap.
Western scholars need to understand that the weapons they consider to be tactical play a strategic role in the context of India and Pakistan, because of our geographic proximity. I agree with the authors that we do not need more nuclear weapons than is required to maintain a minimum credible deterrent, which is Pakistan’s stated policy.
Pakistan’s stance on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is easy to understand. The argument Pakistan makes is that the FMCT, as it is being discussed, does not address the existing stockpiles of fissile material that other countries possess. A treaty that doesn’t address existing stockpiles would put Pakistan at a huge disadvantage vis-a-vis India, which is believed to have a far larger stockpile of fissile material. Therefore, lifting our veto on FMCT would not serve our national security interests. Furthermore, it would be advantageous if the international community focused more on complete disarmament rather than the FMCT.
It is also essential to recognize that though Pakistan is the only country to have officially vetoed the treaty, other countries like India are glad about it, because the treaty is not acceptable to them either.
There is no question that Pakistan should separate civilian and military nuclear facilities. This is something that our military and political leadership has also worked towards. For this reason, all of our civil nuclear reactors are under item-specific IAEA safeguards, and I hope that we also sign onto the additional protocols that India has if we are offered a civil nuclear deal similar to the one they enjoy.
On the last initiative that this report recommends, which is signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without waiting for India, I agree. We must appreciate that Pakistan has plans to operate two monitoring stations to detect nuclear tests as per the requirements of the CTBT, which is something that India has not done. Realistically, I can foresee Pakistan signing onto the CTBT, if the United States were to lead the way by ratifying it.
This report was very insightful and offered some wonderful recommendations that will help Pakistan in the near future, but has also created media frenzy.
I would urge the media to refrain from exaggerating the findings of this publication. I have already come across multiple headlines calling Pakistan the third largest nuclear weapons state, which the Carnegie-Stimson report does not argue. The numbers of nuclear weapons that Pakistan could develop in the future, as suggested in the report, are made on the assumption that we will use our entire unsafeguarded fissile material stockpile for weapons development. This is speculative. Pakistan, like India, has an energy crisis, and our current government has made clear that nuclear energy will play a large role in the future of our country. Keeping that in mind, it is my opinion that it is likely a significant amount of our existing stockpiles of fissile material will be used for producing electricity, not weapons.
In conclusion, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have proven their efficacy by deterring Indian aggression. As long as India possesses nuclear weapons and continues expanding its capabilities, Pakistan will be forced to invest in maintaining a minimum credible
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf
http://southasianvoices.org/a-pakistanis-response-to-a-normal-nuclear-Pakistan/
PART - ONE
A Normal Nuclear Pakistan
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pakistan has worked hard and successfully to build diverse nuclear capabilities. It will retain these capabilities for the foreseeable future as a necessary deterrent against perceived existential threats from India. At this juncture, Pakistan’s military leadership in Rawalpindi can choose to accept success in achieving a “strategic” deterrent against India — a nuclear force posture sufficient to prevent limited nuclear exchanges and a major conventional war. Alternatively, it can choose to continue to compete with India in the pursuit of “full spectrum” deterrence, which would entail open-ended nuclear requirements against targets both near and far from Pakistan. These choices would lead Pakistan to two starkly different nuclear futures and places in the global nuclear order.
Pakistan is now competing successfully with — and in some respects is outcompeting — India. Pakistan
operates four plutonium production reactors; India operates one. Pakistan has the capability to produce perhaps 20 nuclear warheads annually; India appears to be producing about five warheads annually.
But given its larger economy and sizable nuclear infrastructure, India is able to outcompete Pakistan in fissile material and warhead production if it chooses to do so. Pakistan has prepared for this eventuality by investing in a large nuclear weapons production complex. Whether New Delhi chooses to compete more intensely or not, it is a losing proposition for Pakistan to sustain, let alone expand, its current infrastructure to produce greater numbers of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Just as the Soviet Union’s large nuclear arsenal was of no help whatsoever for its manifold economic and societal weaknesses, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons do not address its internal challenges.
Pakistan seeks to be viewed as a “normal” state possessing nuclear weapons, as exemplified by membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Its diplomats seek a civil-nuclear cooperation agreement similar to the one accorded to India. A commercial pathway to being mainstreamed into the global nuclear order is highly unlikely for Pakistan, which lacks the commercial leverage and support that resulted in a nuclear deal for India. A different path toward mainstreaming is available to Pakistan, via nuclear-weapon-related initiatives. Having succeeded in achieving the requirements of “strategic”
deterrence, Pakistan is in a position to consider nuclear initiatives that would clarify its commitment to strengthening nuclear norms, regimes, and practices, and would address widely held perceptions that its nuclear deterrence practices are a major source of danger in South Asia.
We propose that Pakistan consider five nuclear weapon-related initiatives:
• Shift declaratory policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence.
• Commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and
tactical nuclear weapons.
• Lift Pakistan’s veto on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations and reduce or stop fissile material
production.
• Separate civilian and military nuclear facilities.
• Sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India.
None of these initiatives would impair Pakistan’s successful accomplishment of strategic deterrence against India. They would, however, require difficult and fundamental adjustments to thinking about nuclear weapons and Pakistan’s deeply ingrained habits of transactional bargaining. Precisely because these initiatives would be so difficult and unusual for Pakistan, they would change perceptions about Pakistan and its place in the global nuclear order. As such, they could facilitate Pakistan’s entrance into the nuclear mainstream, while strengthening nonproliferation norms, bolstering global disarmament hopes, and setting the bar higher for new entrants into the NSG.
The global nuclear order will not be strengthened by trying to accommodate a Pakistan that is greatly increasing its nuclear capabilities while rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Nor will Pakistan become a normal, nuclear state by competing with India or by harboring groups that could spark a war with India. The international community is unlikely to accommodate Pakistan’s desire to enter the nuclear mainstream without corresponding steps by Pakistan to align aspects of its nuclear policy and practices closer with international norms. The steps we propose lend themselves to mainstreaming. More importantly, these steps would advance Pakistan’s national, social, and economic security interests.
CLICK & READ THE FULL TEXT OF THE REPORT IN PDF FILE http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf
PART - TWO
A Pakistani’s Response
to
“A Normal Nuclear Pakistan”
According to “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,” a recent report co-authored by Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, Pakistan could have close to 350 nuclear weapons by 2025. The key word here is “could.”
It is no secret that Pakistan faces many internal challenges. For nearly the past decade, our economy has been a mess, our armed forces have been engaged in combating terrorism, and our society has been plagued by a host of problems like unemployment, illiteracy, access to clean water, lack of affordable healthcare, and so on and so forth. But to presume, as I perceive the authors have in their report, that our armed forces are taking money from social programs and diverting it for military purposes is inaccurate.
The fact is that according to government documents our defense budget has hovered around 2.6 percent of the GDP for the last few years; it is also the lowest percentage of our GDP since independence. Even with the current, declared budget at $7.6 billion (compared to India’s $40 billion or America’s $585 billion), our military has a hard time making ends meet. We have invested all of our resources in the war against terror as a frontline state. Strictly financially speaking, it would be impossible for us to develop two-hundred-some nuclear warheads in the next ten years.
The authors have urged Pakistan to consider adopting five initiatives related to the nuclear weapons program:
- Shift declaratory policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence.
- Commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons.
- Lift Pakistan’s veto on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations and reduce or stop fissile material production.
- Separate civilian and military nuclear facilities.
- Sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India.
On the first initiative, I would argue that there is no difference between “full spectrum” and “strategic” deterrence. Pakistan has always maintained a minimum-credible deterrence posture, but as India continues to modernize their weapon systems and expand their nuclear capabilities, Pakistan is forced to respond, so as not to leave a gap.
Western scholars need to understand that the weapons they consider to be tactical play a strategic role in the context of India and Pakistan, because of our geographic proximity. I agree with the authors that we do not need more nuclear weapons than is required to maintain a minimum credible deterrent, which is Pakistan’s stated policy.
Pakistan’s stance on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is easy to understand. The argument Pakistan makes is that the FMCT, as it is being discussed, does not address the existing stockpiles of fissile material that other countries possess. A treaty that doesn’t address existing stockpiles would put Pakistan at a huge disadvantage vis-a-vis India, which is believed to have a far larger stockpile of fissile material. Therefore, lifting our veto on FMCT would not serve our national security interests. Furthermore, it would be advantageous if the international community focused more on complete disarmament rather than the FMCT.
It is also essential to recognize that though Pakistan is the only country to have officially vetoed the treaty, other countries like India are glad about it, because the treaty is not acceptable to them either.
There is no question that Pakistan should separate civilian and military nuclear facilities. This is something that our military and political leadership has also worked towards. For this reason, all of our civil nuclear reactors are under item-specific IAEA safeguards, and I hope that we also sign onto the additional protocols that India has if we are offered a civil nuclear deal similar to the one they enjoy.
On the last initiative that this report recommends, which is signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without waiting for India, I agree. We must appreciate that Pakistan has plans to operate two monitoring stations to detect nuclear tests as per the requirements of the CTBT, which is something that India has not done. Realistically, I can foresee Pakistan signing onto the CTBT, if the United States were to lead the way by ratifying it.
This report was very insightful and offered some wonderful recommendations that will help Pakistan in the near future, but has also created media frenzy.
I would urge the media to refrain from exaggerating the findings of this publication. I have already come across multiple headlines calling Pakistan the third largest nuclear weapons state, which the Carnegie-Stimson report does not argue. The numbers of nuclear weapons that Pakistan could develop in the future, as suggested in the report, are made on the assumption that we will use our entire unsafeguarded fissile material stockpile for weapons development. This is speculative. Pakistan, like India, has an energy crisis, and our current government has made clear that nuclear energy will play a large role in the future of our country. Keeping that in mind, it is my opinion that it is likely a significant amount of our existing stockpiles of fissile material will be used for producing electricity, not weapons.
In conclusion, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have proven their efficacy by deterring Indian aggression. As long as India possesses nuclear weapons and continues expanding its capabilities, Pakistan will be forced to invest in maintaining a minimum credible
The Indian Additional Protocol is riddled with issues that essentially leave important aspects of inspections and controls vague to the point that it has been deemed perhaps the worst AP currently in existence. It neither restricts the percentage of enrichment to an internationally acceptable level for “peaceful” uses nor does it concede to reporting of information on exports of source-materials to NNWS which fall under 10 tons p/a (uranium) and 20 tons p/a (Thorium). What I’m trying to say then, is that India has managed to “agree to disagree” with the Model AP on most aspects. , a chronological view of the matter would reveal that “the deal” having come years before India agreeing to negotiate an AP, was not a reward for responsible behavior on India’s part but rather the AP was something of a necessity for the deal to gain some semblance of legitimacy. It is therefore, in my humble opinion, counter-productive to aspire to agree on an AP akin to that of India’s. Not to mention, a bit too optimistic (and a tad opportunistic) to expect a nuclear trade agreement to emerge from it. Pakistan is then perhaps being more responsible by avoiding to agree to an AP that would discredit the IAEA in the way that the Indian AP has, while voluntarily agreeing to certain safe-guards to show resolve and commitment to ensuring nuclear safety and security according to international standards.
Hajira I mentioned the Indian Additional Protocol agreement on purpose, because well there is nothing in them as you’ve highlighted. It was just a poke at all those who think that the Indian AP agreement is as comprehensive as the one applied to let’s say the United States. But I do see how it can easily be interpreted in the way you have. I agree with you that the Indian AP has done damage to the IAEA and the nonproliferation regime overall.
But I would argue that deterrence worked without deployed tactical nuclear weapons during crises in 1999, 2001-02 and 2008 because clear red lines were credibly conveyed. I think Robert Jervis’s masterful work “The Meaning of the Nuclear revolution” still helps us understand why this is the case. Even a limited strategic deterrent—with a secure second strike capability—threatens to deliver unacceptable damage on ones adversary.
I also think its worth noting that the China appears to have embraced this notion early and consistently, and with much success. China managed to avoid worrying about “gaps” and trying to compete with the US and Soviet Union despite hostilities with both of them. Because they employed a posture of assured retaliation to deter aggression rather than a posture that embraced nuclear warfighting (as two scholars argue here: http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Fravel.Medeiros.2010.IS.Nucs.pdf), they focused less on numbers or size and more on survivability for a secure second strike. And despite numerous territorial disputes (23 distinct ones I believe and three with nuclear powers), it managed to maintain a successful deterrent. Certainly every country’s deterrent requirements are unique but that seems like a useful model that is both effective and cost efficient, allowing China to deter stronger adversaries with a limited arsenal while investing in economic reforms that made it the great power it is today.
@ M Umar: Do you even realize that Pakistan is not as dependent on indigenous Uranium as India? Pakistan fuels only KANUPP with indigenous Uranium and KANUPP is to be shutdown in 2019.
@Hajira Asaf: Additional Protocol is not meant at putting an upper limit on Uranium enrichment level. If a facility (uranium enrichment in this case) is under the IAEA safeguards then the Uranium (regardless of its level of enrichment) is going to be safeguarded. So, Pakistan (or the non-proliferationists) does not have to worry about what levels India enrich its uranium to in the safeguarded facilities.
A strong rebuttal.
The focus of media reports, as you say, was how high the Pakistani arsenal might climb if production rates are high and if they continue unabated. Toby and I wrote 20,000 words; the press reports were maybe 600-800 words. Authors can’t choose those words. We are grateful that our hard work has been noticed, which perhaps will prompt readers to study the entirety of our report.
Best wishes,
MK